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Abstract 
This is an empirical study of the neglected role of stock market development in the process 
of economic growth in the case of a particular developing economy-Jordan. In particular, 
this study evaluates the impact of stock market development on economic growth, and takes 
Jordan as a country-specific case study using both the macro- and micro-level data sets. 
Thus, the study uses an assortment of different data sets and empirical methodologies to 
assess the relation between the stock market and economic growth within a specific 
country's experience. As a result, this study provides some knowledge that might usefully be 
generalised to other developing counties, particularly to those with a similar economic 
structure. 
The primary contribution of this study lies in the fact that it is the first attempt to study the 
impact of stock market development on the economic growth process of specific-country 
experience, in both the quantitative and qualitative senses. It is also the most comprehensive 
empirical study of finance-growth with respect to the role of the stock market in macro- and 
micro-level aspects. 
The main aims of this study have been to answer the following questions: 
(i) Does stock market development have any influence on economic growth in Jordan? 
(ii) Is the stock market a leading sector in the Jordanian economy? Or is any feedback 
consequence effect of the economic growth generated elsewhere? Or is it a two-way 
causation? 
(iii) Does stock market development facilitate the growth of Jordanian firms in terms of 
value added growth? 
(iv) Does stock market development importantly influence Jordanian firms' financial 
structure choices? 
(v) Does stock market complement or substitute for the banking sector in providing 
financial services to the Jordanian economy? 
Chapters V to VIII of the study attempt empirically to answer these questions. The main 
findings are: First, stock market development has a significant effect on economic growth, 
and this effect remains strong even after controlling for banking sector and other control 
variables. Second, while the evidence largely supports the view that there is a stable, long 
run equilibrium relationship between the evolution of the stock market and the evolution of 
the economy, it provides no support for the view that the stock market is a leading sector in 
the process of Jordan's economic development. The evidence supports the view that the 
relation between stock market development and economic growth in Jordan is bi-directional. 
Third, the micro-level tests suggest that stock market development exerts a statistically 
significantly and economically large impact on the growth of firms'. More particularly, the 
evidence indicates that with more development in the stock market, firms that use equity 
finance heavily grow faster than firms that do not. Fourth, stock market development is a 
significantly and positively related to the debt to equity ratio of firms. Finally, all the 
findings described in this study support the view that the stock market and the banking 
sector in Jordan are complementary rather than substitutes in providing financial services to 
the economy. 
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Chapter I 
Precursors 
1.1 Introduction 
During the last decade the relationship between financial development and economic growth 
has become an issue of extensive analysis and debate. The question bears upon whether 
financial factors are important in influencing economic development. Academics have vastly 
different views on this issue. Some economists believe that the role of finance in economic 
growth is either unimportant or of second-order importance. Others believe that financial 
aspects play a key role in the growth process. For example, Lucas (1988) asserts that 
"Economists badly over-stress the role of financial factors in economic growth" (p. 3), in 
contrast, Summers (1997) asserts that "Financial markets don't just oil the wheels of economic 
growth... They are the wheels of economic growth " (p. 1). 
That two such prominent economists could hold views so diametrically opposed to each other 
is rather startling to the casual observer. But such disagreements regarding the importance of 
financial development in economic growth are not new. Bagehot (1873) and Hicks (1969), for 
example, have argued that financial development played a critical role in England's 
industrialisation by facilitating the mobilisation of capital for "immense works". Bagehot 
(1873) observed "we have entirely lost the idea that any underertaking likely to pay, and seen 
to be likely, can perish for want of money; yet no idea was more familiar to our ancestors, or 
is more common is most countries. A citizen of London in Queen Elizabeth's time... would 
have thought that it was no use inventing railways (if he could have understood what a 
railway meant), for you would have not been able to collect the capital with which to make 
them. At this moment, in colonies and all rude economies, there is no large sum of 
ý, 
_fý 
transferable money; there is no fiend fi-oni which you can borrow, and out of which you make 
immense works" (p. 4-3)1. 
Schumpeter (1912) and Patrick (1966) have argued that services provided by financial 
intermediaries are essential for promoting innovation in technology which has important 
growth effects. Fisher (1933) argued that one important factor contributing to severe economic 
downturn during the Great Depression was poorly performing financial markets. In Fisher's 
view, what made the economy so vulnerable was the high leverage of the borrowing class 
before the Great Depression. The deflation due to the recession redistributed the wealth from 
debtors to creditors and reduced the net wealth of the borrowing class. The downturn of real 
activity forced the borrowing class to cut expenditures or even go bankrupt, which, together 
with decreasing net worth, further enhanced the downturn of the real sector. Gurley and Shaw 
(1955) in their theory made a direct link between financial markets and real activity. Their 
theory stressed that financial markets can extend borrowers' financial capacity and improve 
the efficiency of inter temporal trade and they can pool investors' funds and provide external 
finance to producers. Therefore, financial markets are crucial to development because they 
enhance physical capital accumulation. 
In contrast to the above views, Robinson (1952), for example, does not attribute a "role" to 
finance in development, arguing that economic growth creates a demand for financial services 
"where enterprise leads, finance follows"(p. 86). His view implies that financial development 
is just a "side-show" of economic development and financial institutions play no significant 
role in economic growth. In addition, in the traditional Arrow-Deberu model of resources 
allocation, firms and households interact through markets, and financial intermediaries play no 
role. When markets are perfect and complete, the allocation of resources is Pareto efficient and 
there is no scope for intermediaries to improve welfare (see Friesen, 1979). 
Practitioners, in contrast, have a remarkably consistent view of the importance of finance in 
the growth process. They consider the financial sector as a "real sector". The earlier studies in 
this field had been done by Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973) and others, 
1 This reference is quoted from Sinha and Macri (1999). 
2 
who found considerable evidence that financial intermediation is positively correlated with 
economic growth. But their work, though insightful, lacked analytical foundations. In 
traditional growth theory, financial intermediation could be related to the level of the capital 
stock per worker or to the level of productivity, but not to their respective growth rates; the 
latter were ascribed to exogenous technical progress. 
The recent revival of interest in the link between financial development and growth stems 
from the insights and technique of endogenous growth models, which have mainly shown that 
there can be self-sustaining growth without exogenous technical progress and that the growth 
rates can be related to technology, income distribution and institutional arrangements. This 
provides the theoretical background that early empirical studies lacked: financial 
intermediation not only affects the level of the economy, but also the growth rate. The 
resulting models have provided new impetus to empirical research of the effects of financial 
development on growth and vice-versa. This body of literature, reviewed by Gertler (1988); 
Levine (1997); Bossone (2000); and Tsuru (2000), emphasises how functions exercised by 
financial intermediation, such as mobilising capital, helping to allocate resources, monitoring 
managers, and facilitating risk management, can affect economic growth. 
However, most of the empirical literature on growth that explicitly models finance as an 
explanatory variable in the growth process restricts itself to financial intermediation done by 
the banking sector and ignores the role of the non-banking sector, i. e. stock markets. More 
particularly, these studies have used highly aggregated indicators of financial intermediation, 
such as the ratio of M2 or private sector credit to GDP. Academics and practitioners have 
ignored the role of stock markets on economic development for a long time. The role of stock 
markets in our everyday life has become rather difficult to ignore2. Recently, more attention 
has been given by the theoretical literature on the links between stock markets and economic 
growth, but the empirical evidence is still scarce. A primary reason for the lack of empirical 
literature on stock markets has been the absence of a standard set of indicators to measure the 
extent of market development. 
2A recent market crisis in East Asia has further whetted researchers' appetites to study the impact of financial 
development in growth. 
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The few empirical studies in this topic, however, perform cross-country growth regressions. 
Therefore, they do not explicitly confront the issue of causality. Stock market development 
may predict economic growth simply because it anticipate future growth; thus stock market 
development may simply be a leading indicator rather than a causal factor. In particular, this 
approach involves averaging out variables over long time periods, and using them in cross- 
section regressions aimed at explaining cross-country variables of growth rates. Therefore, this 
technique cannot allow different countries to exhibit different patterns of causality, yet it is 
likely that in some countries the stock market is a leading sector whilst in others it lags behind 
the banking sector. This means that the causality result is only valid on average. Thus, these 
researches have not completely resolved the issue of causality but suggest strongly that stock 
market development is an important determinant of future economic growth. The questions 
about causality remain unsolved: does stock market development affect growth, does 
economic growth lead to more stock market development, or both? 
Furthermore, cross-country growth regressions suffer from a variety of errors: measurement 
errors, statistical errors and conceptual errors. There is no defensible view for including 
different countries in the same regression. Also, since various factors change during the time 
period of study (governments, policies, preferences and business cycles), hoping to capture all 
these changes by certain explanatory variables averaged over time is rather optimistic. 
Consequently, interpreting the coefficient derived from such studies is rather difficult. As with 
other cross-sectional studies, the coefficients are only suggestive of partial correlations. This 
approach also by averaging of value over long period of time is not able to distinguish whether 
or not the development of stock markets affect the long-term growth rate of the economy, or it 
just influence the short-term level of development. A country experiencing short period of 
rapid growth and no growth after is treated the same empirically as the one experiencing 
moderate growth over long period. In summary, we believe that in these studies there is no 
consensus judgement that stock markets cause growth and what evidence there is very much 
country-specific. Consistent with our view, the World Bank (1993) expressed that the 
economic policies are country-specific and their effectiveness depends on the effectiveness of 
the institutions which implement them. 
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By contrast, this study addresses some gaps in the existing empirical literature and examines 
the role of stock market development on economic growth in the small, developing economy 
of Jordan. More particularly, this study evaluates the impact of the stock market development 
on economic growth, and takes Jordan as a country-specific case study using both the macro- 
and micro-level data sets. Thus, we use an assortment of different datasets and econometrics 
methodologies to assess the relation between the stock market development and economic 
development within a specific country's experience. 
The study of this important issue is timely because Jordan, as is the case in many other 
developing countries, is starting an ambitious program to improve the operation of the 
domestic stock market to be more effective in the economic growth process. However, there is 
no empirical evidence that provides policy makers with information concerning the particular 
causal patterns between the stock market development and the real sector in the economy. In 
addition, there are points of view that doubt the existence of a positive impact of the stock 
market on economic growth in small, developing countries like Jordan. The main reasons are 
to be found in market inefficiencies in developing countries. This makes it likely that stock 
markets will be more like burgeoned casinos than institutions designate to ameliorating and 
mobilising saving rates and enhancing investment decisions, technical innovation, and long- 
run growth. Thus, by choosing an individual country-Jordan, this study results will be more 
appropriate for policy decisions to developing economies in general and Jordan in particular. 
In addition, providing empirical evidence of this important issue within specific-country 
experience will add to the literature on the role of stock market development on economic 
growth and opens an exciting topic for research. 
1.2 Motivation Issues and Objectives of the Study 
The question arises here why we are choosing Jordan as our country case study. As with most 
developing countries, Jordan has a stock market. The Jordanian stock market (Amman 
Financial Market) was established in 1976 and started its first day of business on January 1, 
1978. The establishment of this market was a major step on the path of developing the 
financial sector in Jordan so as to enable a better utilisation of a valuable resource through the 
5 
development of the sound capital market. It was established to contribute towards the capital 
raising and capital-allocating process which is so important in to strength Jordan's economy. 
Since its establishment, the Amman Financial Market (AFM) has experienced an impressive 
development and become an important force in the financing investment in Jordan. Together 
with the Istanbul Stock Exchange, the AFM has become one of the leading capital markets of 
the Middle East. El-Erian and Kumar (1995) point out that, "Jordan has a relatively highly 
developed equity market tit'llicli plays an important part in the economic life of the country" 
(p. 146). Moreover, IMF (1995) asserts that, "the AFM is one of the most active capital 
markets in the %t'orld" (p. 47). These views provide us the main motivation to study this market. 
As with most stock markets, two main objectives lay at the root of the establishment of a stock 
market in Jordan. One goal is to devise a new mechanism for corporate finance in order to 
improve the process of fund allocation; the second goal is to improve information flows, both 
in the economy and in financial markets as a whole, so as to lower the costs associated with 
the flow of funds. Thus, the study will focus to analyse Jordan's stock market performance 
regarding the first objective. 
Recently, in an important study Levine and Zervos (1998a) pose a question as to whether 
stock markets are merely burgeoning casinos where more and more players are coming to 
place bets, or whether stock markets are importantly linked to economic growth. A growing 
theoretical literature suggests that stock markets by promoting efficiency, reducing transaction 
costs, increasing liquidity, lowering risks, and transferring irreducible risks to those more 
willing to bear them, can influence the growth rate of countries. Hence, given an appropriate 
regulatory and institutional environment, stock markets can complement banks in not only 
generating funds, but also allocating capital optimally. The importance of stock markets stems 
from their ability to reduce liquidity and productivity shocks, and expand the information set 
at the disposal of the financial sector, both of which affect the marginal efficiency of capital 
which, in turn, influences output and its growth. 
One of the significant roles of stock markets is that they provide a way of checking that firms 
are well run with optimal management techniques for operation. Under these circumstances, 
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investors have a vast interest in keeping tabs on management. If the management pursues a 
policy that is not compatible with the investor beliefs, this is reflected in the stock price and 
the stock price is thus representative of the turn value of the firm. Moreover, continuous 
adjustments of share prices impose control on the investment behaviour of these firms. In 
addition, stock markets can and do attract foreign portfolio capital. Much of this capital can be 
used to provide additional funds in the form of equity to the corporate sector. 
However, another important strand of the literature stressed the negative impact of stock 
markets on the rate of investment, the time horizon of firms, international competitiveness, 
and economic development. They argued that even with well organised stock markets such as 
those found in the United States and United kingdom, the market does not in practice perform 
at all well its supposed monitoring, screening and disciplinary functions. The perceived 
failures of the pricing and takeover mechanism are thought to lead to the phenomenon of 
"short-termism" (Froot et al., 1990). 
In light of the somewhat divergent set of views among practitioners (including academics who 
subscribe an important role to finance in growth) and a large number of academic economists, 
this study reviews existing theories on the important of stock market in growth, organises an 
analytical framework for the study of the stock market and growth, and evaluates the 
quantitative evidence of the importance of the stock market development in economic growth 
within an individual country's experience. The focus on the empirical work derives from the 
preponderance of theoretical reasoning that exists in the literature as compared to the scarcity 
of empirical work on the subject as well as our believe that this issue is very much country- 
specific and the conclusions drive from one country or group of countries experience may not 
be bound to apply to other countries. 
As mentioned before, the main objective of our empirical work is to investigate whether stock 
market development leads to economic growth in the small, developing economy of Jordan. 
We provide tests at both the macro- and micro-levels. More specifically, at the macro-level we 
mainly try to answer the following two questions: 
" Does stock market development have any influence on economic growth in Jordan? 
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" Is the stock market development a leading sector in the Jordanian economy? Or is any 
feedback consequence effect of the economic growth generated elsewhere? Or is it a 
two-way causation? 
At the micro-level we attempt primarily to examine the following two questions: 
" Does stock market development facilitate the growth of Jordanian firms in terms of 
value added growth? 
" Does stock market development importantly influence Jordanian firms' financial 
structure choices? 
Recently, many of the debates in financial literature focus on the relative merits of stock 
markets versus banks. Many researchers stress the advantages that banks have over markets in 
financing country's growth. Others, however, emphasise the comparative merits of stock 
markets. Another argument argues that the stock market versus banks debate is of secondly 
importance. According to this view, both banks and stock markets arise to ameliorate 
information and transaction costs and thereby provide financial services that enhance 
economic growth. Furthermore, banks and stock markets might act as complements in 
providing financial services and promoting growth. 
In light of the divergence of the above views, at macro-and micro-levels, in this study we also 
try to answer the following important question: 
" Does the stock market complement or substitute for the banking sector in providing 
financial services to the Jordanian economy? 
1.3 Contributions of the Study 
This study makes the following contribution to the literature of stock market and economic 
growth. 
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" The primary contribution of this study is that it is the first attempt to study the impact of 
stock market development on the growth process of specific-country experience, in both the 
quantitative and qualitative senses3. Thus, the experience of Jordan in the development of 
its economy as well as its stock market presents an excellent opportunity to add the results 
of a country-specific study to the debate in the literature on the role of stock market 
development on economic growth. 
" This study is the first to explicitly investigate the direction of causality (both at the short- 
and long-terms) between stock market development and economic growth. 
" This study is the most comprehensive empirical study on finance and growth with respect 
to the role of the stock market in macro- and micro-level aspects. 
Unlike most previous studies this study extends and constructs simple empirical models to 
incorporate the effect of stock markets on growth taking into account other factors that may 
affect growth. 
Stock market development and growth are modelled and tested as endogenous. Earlier 
studies only treated and tested stock markets as an exogenous variable. Stock markets may 
develop in anticipate of financial needs of industries or firms. Furthermore, factors such as 
quality of the legal system, clearance and settlement issues, transparency and the inside 
information problems, taxation issues, accounting standards, liberalisation of restrictions on 
international flows, macroeconomic environments, saving and investment, the development 
of banking sector as well as non-banking financial institutions (pension funds, insurance 
companies, mutual funds and investment banks) are important eliminates for stock market 
development. 
Earlier studies base on cross-country regressions imply that countries as well as firms all 
countries have identical production functions. It is generally felt that the production 
function may actually differ across countries. This study addresses this shortcoming by 
3 Known by author. 
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focusing only on one country's experience; it also uses a panel data framework which 
allows for the differences in the production function across firms. 
" Finally, unlike earlier studies in this field this study empirically emphasises the dynamic 
capital structure decisions of firms. 
1.4 Structure of the Study 
In order to study the issues mentioned above, the remaining chapters of this study are 
organised as follows. Chapter II gives a comprehensive analysis of the macroeconomic 
environment of Jordan. The chronic imbalances that the economy has suffered are analysed 
and assessed. In particular, this chapter highlights the performance of the Jordanian economy 
covering the recent economic history, economic growth, investment, inflation, fiscal policy, 
and external account. In addition, in this chapter special attention is paid to analysis the 
evolution of the financial system in Jordan. 
Chapter III provides a historical account of the development of the Jordanian stock market, 
with analysis of the successes and failures encountered along the way. This chapter also 
provides a detailed analysis of the current development of the Jordanian stock market with 
respect to other emerging and advanced stock markets by using a wide number of stock 
market development indicators. 
Chapter IV surveys the literature on the "stock markets-growth nexus" to put the research topic 
into perspective. The survey begins by looking at how the traditional theories of growth failed 
to recognise the importance of the financial factor in the growth process and demonstrates how 
the emergence of the endogenous growth literature changed the profession's views on factors 
affecting growth by allowing technical change to be modelled endogenously. The survey 
includes a main section on the functions of stock markets. In this survey we focus on ties 
between economic growth and the quality of the functions provided by stock markets which 
play critical roles in an economy. These functions include facilitating of liquidity, risk 
diversification, information production, corporate control and monitoring, capital mobilising, 
and transmission path for monetary policy. Then, we review the most important theoretical 
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literature that directly modelled the role of financial markets in economic development. 
Considering the debate in financial literature which hinges on the assumption that debt market 
and equity finance are substitutes for each other, this chapter finally includes a section 
discussing in detail the important of stock market vis-ä-vis banks for the economic 
development in developing countries. 
In Chapter V empirical tests at macroeconomic level are conducted to gauge the relationship 
between the stock market development and economic growth. More particularly, in this 
chapter we present a simple plausible framework for studying some elements of endogenous 
growth that relate to the main aspects of the functions of financial markets. Based on this 
framework, we extend a simple endogenous growth model in order to incorporate the effect of 
financial markets. Then, the model is estimated and tested by running Two-Stage-Least- 
Square (TSLS) regressions. 
Since one of the basic purpose of this study is establishing the direction of causality between 
the stock market development and economic growth in the Jordan case, this study would not 
be complete without in-depth analysis of this issue, i. e., whether the stock market is a leading 
sector in the process of economic development, or is any feedback consequence effect of the 
growth generated elsewhere, or it is a two-way causation. Using some of the latest time-series 
techniques, Chapter VI examines the causality issue. The causality tests are performed within 
a framework based on unit-root testing and cointegration. 
Chapter VII investigates the interaction between stock market development and economic 
growth in Jordan using micro data. Specifically, in this chapter we provided a firm-level test 
of the hypothesis that the development of the stock market is an important determinant of 
economic growth in Jordan. Focusing on mobilising of capital, information production and 
monitoring roles of the stock market, in this chapter we conducted a simple dynamic empirical 
model in which stock market development affect firm growth through enhancing productivity 
growth within the firm. We used firm level panel data for a sample of Jordanian quoted 
companies covering the period 1988-98. With this panel data set we used the latest technique 
in estimating the dynamic panel model. Specially, we used both the difference and the system 
GMM dynamic panel estimators. 
The different attributes of debt and equity make the development of markets that facilitate the 
issuance and trading of these instruments very important. As stock markets become more 
developed and as imperfections in the capital markets are removed, corporations will have 
greater access to a broader range of financial instruments. This increased access would be 
expected to affect the financial policies of firms, thus affecting firms' investment, profitability 
and productivity growth. Therefore, establishing evidence about the effect of the stock market 
on financial structure will add the second side to the relation between the stock market 
development and firms' growth. The financial literature has not addressed this issue of stock 
market development and firms' financial structure in great detail. However, as stock markets 
develop and as barriers to investment are removed, a priori expectation suggests that 
corporations will use more equity to debt in order to finance new growth. Using both the 
difference and system GMM estimators to estimate a dynamic adjustment model, Chapter VIII 
investigates the effect of stock market development on the financial choices made by the 
Jordanian firms during the period 1988-98. Specifically, in this chapter we attempted to 
answer the questions of how stock market development affects the ability of Jordanian firms to 
raise capital for new growth and how this development affects the capital structure choices 
these firms make. 
Finally, Chapter IX summarises the results of the study and discusses some policy 
implications. 
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Chapter II 
The Jordanian Economy 
2.1 Introduction 
Jordan is the creation of recent political events. Great Britain was established the country 
(originally called Transjordan) in 1921 as a semi-autonomous emirate within the framework 
of its mandate over Palestine. On May 25,1946, Transjordan became an independent 
Kingdom allied to Britain. From April 1950, it became known as "the Hashimite Kingdom 
of Jordan" and consisted of two parts: that original part, originally known as Transjordan, 
and the eastern part of Palestine known as the West Bank (of the River Jordan). After the 
1967 war, the West Bank was occupied by Israel, and Jordan retrieved its original state. It 
has a total area of 89,342 square km, consisting mainly of desert plateau in the east, 
highlands in the northwest, and the fertile rift valley along the west. 
The World Bank classifies Jordan as a developing country. The Jordanian economy is by 
and large a market-based economy despite the fact that economic growth is of great 
concern to the Government. The relatively small size of the economy and its limited 
natural resources has forced Jordan to develop strong external economic and financial 
relations to cover its economic development needs. The level of economic activity in 
Jordan tends to be greatly affected by these relations. Important indications of this 
relationship are foreign trade with neighbouring Arab markets, foreign financial assistance 
(aid and grants), and remittances from Jordanian expatriates, particularly from the Gulf 
countries. The result of this dependence on external relations has been a vulnerability of 
the economy to exogenous factors beyond the control of the economy itself. 
In addition to this peculiar set-up, the economy itself is characterised by the following: (i) 
structure problems, indicated by the low degree of complementarity among the various 
sectors, and extensive dependence on foreign markets for imports and exports; (ii) a 
chronic imbalance between budget revenues and expenditures, and the existence of a long- 
standing budget deficit, although recently domestic revenues have managed to cover 
current expenditures; (iii) serious discrepancies between investment and national savings, 
leading to a significant dependence on external sources, mainly aid, grants and debt for 
financing investment; (iv) an imbalance between population density and growth and 
employment, resulting in structural distortion in the employment market. 
This chapter traces the evolution of the Jordanian economy. More particularly, this chapter 
highlights the performance of the Jordanian economy covering, recent economic history, 
economic growth, investment, inflation, unemployment, fiscal policy, external account, 
and finally the development and structure of the financial system is analysed with special 
emphasis on banking sector operations. Thus, this chapter and next chapter provide the 
background for the empirical chapters which investigate the interaction between stock 
market development and economic growth in Jordan. 
2.2 Recent Economic History 
Jordan does not have a well-developed economy. It is a middle-income country of about 
4.77 million inhabitants and an annual per capita income estimated at US$ 1552.5 in 1998. 
Jordanian economic structure is dominated by trade- and services-related activities; these 
account for more than two-thirds of GDP, and industry and agriculture account for the rest. 
Historically the country has relied on aid and remittances from Jordanians working 
overseas to support the economy. Because of its narrow production base, the economy is 
highly dependent upon imports, which represent over 50 percent of GDP. Some of the 
imbalances in the economy have stemmed from the huge waves of refugees which spilled 
into Jordan in 1948,1967 and 1990/91. These population changes had a major structural 
effect on the economy, contributing to the increased urbanisation of the Jordanian 
population, and creating problems for the Government due to the high cost of providing 
adequate services. 
The size of the public sector in Jordan is large in relation to the level of domestic economic 
activity. However, the public sector is not engaged in manufacturing activities; it is 
primarily limited to providing basic services (health and education), public utilities (water 
and electricity), and infrastructure support (mainly in the areas of transportation, 
communications, and irrigation). 
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From the early 1970s, Jordan's strategy was to develop itself as a provider of skilled 
manpower and trade-related services for the Arab countries. Accordingly, the authorities 
chose a strategy aimed at educating Jordan's youth to prepare them for employment in and 
around the region. At the same time, with the sizable amounts of worker's remittances and 
aid received from abroad, Jordan was able to maintain income and consumption at levels 
that exceeded those that could be expected from the available production capacity in the 
domestic economy (Owen and Pamulk, 1998). 
Jordan's economic growth during the 1970s and through the mid-1980s was robust. 
Domestic prices were generally stable, with high inflation rates averaging 8 percent during 
the decade through the mid-1980s. As a result of high current expenditure, however, 
Jordan incurred large fiscal deficits that, excluding foreign grants, averaged more than 20 
percent through the mid-1980s. These were largely financed by readily available foreign 
grants. Fiscal revenues remained highly dependent on international trade-based taxes, even 
though the revenue-to-GDP ratio increased to 25 percent of GDP by the mid-1980s. The 
domestic savings rate was relatively modest, with private sector savings offsetting large 
dissavings of the public sector. Investment remained at comfortable levels, at more than 30 
percent of GDP, but much of the domestic private sector investment was directed towards 
housing construction. Despite an unusual import boom, the external current account 
remained in virtual balance during this period. 
By the mid-1980s, the flow of foreign grants from Arab oil-export countries and inflows of 
workers' remittances started to decline in the aftermath of the oil price collapse. As a 
result, there was a rapid acceleration of external debt-services payments, which led to the 
emergence of serious financial imbalances. Moreover, the sharp increase in public sector 
debt-service payments further accentuated Jordan's medium-term fiscal imbalance. In 
response to an easing of credit stance and a large devaluation, the inflation rate started to 
accelerate to double-digit levels by 1988. In addition, Jordan's reserves had fallen to the 
equivalent of two weeks of imports (World Bank, 1994). At the same time, banks started to 
accumulate non-performing assets, leading to bank failures. 
To address these difficulties, the authorities initiated corrective macroeconomic policies, 
including a large devaluation of the Jordanian dinar. The exchange rate, which had 
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remained fixed to the special drawing rights (SDRs) for more than twenty years up to the 
end of 1987, was depreciated by 21 percent in real effective terms in 1988. By that time, 
however, Jordan had become one of the most heavily indebted countries in the world 
(World Bank, 1989a), with its ratio of external debt to GDP increased to 164.3 percent of 
GDP by 1989. 
In order to address the rapidly growing imbalances, in late 1988 and early 1989 the 
Government adopted a medium-term growth-oriented adjustment programme supported by 
the IMF and the World Bank. This was a necessary prerequisite to any rescheduling of 
debt. Jordan's economic and financial performance during the first two years of the 
adjustment programme 1989-90 was encouraging. The expansions in the net domestic 
assets of the banking system, the trade deficit, and the external current account deficit were 
kept below their respective programme targets, allowing the Central Bank of Jordan's 
foreign exchange reserves to exceed the programme target significantly in 1989. The 
budgetary situation also improved, although, owing to higher than expected interests on 
foreign debt, the overall budget deficit exceeded the programme target. 
Following the exchange depreciation in 1988, the Government introduced a number of 
reforms in the exchange and trade systems and in interest rate policy. These included, in 
particular, abandoning the dual exchange rate system, which they had introduced as a 
temporary emergency; adopting flexible exchange rate management, with the Jordanian 
dinar pegged to a basket of currencies; abandoning the policy of supporting the inter-bank 
rate through intervention; freeing up interest rates, with both deposit and lending interest 
rates allowed to be freely determined by market forces; and phasing out non-tariff barriers 
in stages and replacing them with tariffs initially, to lower effective protection and foster a 
broadly neutral system of incentives. The Government also adopted a strategy aimed at 
obtaining debt relief through the rescheduling and lengthening of the maturity structure of 
debt and reducing the debt burden in relation to GDP. 
In 1990 the Government continuous implemented various structural measures, including 
tariff reform and further interest rate liberalisation, and pursued flexible interest and 
exchange rate policies. However, the impact of the second Gulf War hit the Government's 
efforts and damaged the success of the programme, resulting in further imbalances in the 
economy as Jordan lost its major trading partner, Iraq, as well as other major local markets 
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in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Added to this, as a result of Jordan's stance in the conflict, 
around 350,000 Jordanian workers in the Gulf States were expelled. The economic 
difficulties reached a peak in 1990 when Jordan stopped servicing its debt. When the 
regional crisis ended in early 1991, the Government re-evaluated and resumed their 
adjustment and structural reform efforts. This led to the adoption of a second medium-term 
adjustment and structural reform programme beginning in 1992, supported by the IMF. 
Since the new structural adjustment programme was implemented, Jordan has recovered 
from the severe economic disruptions that were caused by the 1990-91 Gulf War. Exports, 
imports and inflation are all doing better than expected. The government budget deficit 
(excluding grants), reduced to below 10.7 percent of GDP in 1998 from 17.3 percent in 
1989, contained credit expansion and lowered tariffs from an average of 35 percent in 
1992-94 to its current level of around 21 percent. Jordan's trade balance, even through 
improving, is still poor, with a trade deficit of JD 1442.3 million in 1998 or 27.5 percent of 
GDP. 
In 1995, the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) announced that it had pegged the Jordanian 
dinar to the US dollar at the rate of JD1.41 to the US$, in order to encourage local 
investors to switch from foreign currency deposits to dinar deposits, which would lead to 
increased accumulation of reserves. It is further worthy of note here, that many important 
reform measures during the period 1992-98 were adopted in order to liberalise markets in 
Jordan, and to remedy structural distortions in various economic sectors. Efforts to bolster 
confidence in the investment climate in the Jordan also continued through the ratification 
of the Companies Law, the Security Law, and the promulgation of a new regulation for 
promotion of non-Jordanian investment aimed at eliminating all restrictions on foreign 
investment. Undoubtedly, these structural reforms are an essential condition for keeping 
pace with the requirements of economic globalisation and integrating with the world 
markets. This is particularly important since Jordan signed the European partnership- 
agreement in November 1997. In addition, steps have been taken to join the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), through the lifting of all restrictions and controls on international 
trade'. 
I In April 11,2000 Jordan became a number of the WTO. 
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Furthermore, as part of its public sector enterprise reform, Jordan's Government has been 
implementing a privatisation programme. In fact, Jordan initiated such a programme in 
early the 1990s, but the government have been slow in implementing it. There are several 
reasons for this: a lack of political consensus about the desirability of privatisation, 
fragmented management of privatisation without a strong central direction, and social 
concerns especially about potential labour redundancies in the overstaffed public enterprise 
sector. The initial focus of the programme will be to secure new financing for 
infrastructure development, but the programme is also intended to raise enterprise 
efficiency. To achieve this, the Government is moving state enterprises into a commercial 
environment not only by reducing subsidies, but also by breaking old public monopolies. 
2.3 Economic Growth, Inflation and Unemployment 
2.3.1 Economic Growth 
As we have mentioned before. Jordan is not an oil-exporting countries: the oil booms in the 
mid-1970s and early 1980s were profitable for Jordan because oil-exporting neighbours 
were generous in the provision of grants and soft loans and in generating employment for 
Jordanians. During the 1970s and early 1980s Jordan's economy grew in excess of 10 
percent per year, and investment averaged 35 percent of GDP. During this period, private 
investment was directed partly towards the construction of housing and partly towards the 
transportation and mineral-based processing sectors. 
The steep decline in oil prices that had hit the world by the early of the 1980s caused a 
significant slowdown in the economies of the oil-exporting states, causing a decline in 
grants assistance and remittance income in Jordan. The growth of the boom years was not 
self-sustainable due to the excessive reliance on foreign assistance and foreign labour 
markets, and after a few years of accumulating costly foreign commercial debt, Jordan 
began to experience successive years of weak growth. In 1980, the real GDP increased by 
17.6 percent, but this growth declined to 9.8 percent in 1981, and fell further to 5.6 percent 
in 1982 and to 2.5 percent in 1983. The growth rate slowed further to a low of 0.8 percent 
in 1984, recovering only somewhat in later years: 2.7 percent in 1985,2.4 percent in 1986 
and 1.9 percent in 1987 (see Figure 2.1). 
18 
Due to the Government's expansionary policy, in 1988 the Jordanian economy experienced 
an actual economic crisis with a rapidly growing debt and debt-services burden. With 
dwindling foreign reserves and an inability to service external debt, the Jordanian dinar 
was devalued in 1988 and again in 1989. Reflecting this deteriorating macroeconomic 
environment, aggregate investment declined to less than 22 percent of GDP. This 
economic crisis was manifested in the sharp decline in real GDP growth, when a negative 
growth rate of -2.1 percent was registered in 1988, which fell further to -3.9 percent in 
1989, and to -8.0 percent in 1990. 
In order to overcome this severe economic crisis and revitalise economic activity, Jordan 
had to shift its economic policy and started implementing a medium-term economic 
adjustment programme for 1989-1993. It aimed at correcting structural imbalances in the 
economy in both the balance of payments and the Government's budget while maintaining 
a reasonable growth rate. However, in 1990 the programme was severely interrupted by the 
Gulf crisis. 
The restoration of economic stability in Jordan and political stability in the region in the 
last quarter of 1991 enabled the economy to achieve a moderate growth of 1.8 percent in 
real GDP, which was attributed to improved performance in the construction, trade and 
financial services sectors. However, Jordan had to overcome a problem of severe 
indebtedness. In 1992, Jordan adopted an amended economic adjustment programme for 
the period 1992-97. The macroeconomic policies which Jordan adopted in accordance with 
this adjustment programme, led to positive developments in the main economic indicators. 
The shift in economic policy became quite obvious after the lapse of the interruption 
caused by the Gulf crisis. 
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Accordingly, Jordan has rebounded in remarkable fashion, and economic performance has 
been impressive, aggregate investment recovered to reach about 35 percent of GDP in 
1992. Real GDP rebounded by 16.1 percent in 1992- the highest in the Middle East and 
North Africa region. By 1993, GDP had grown by 5.7 percent against a regional average of 
4.8 percent. The steady growth in GDP continued in 1994, as Jordan experienced an 
economic growth of 7.6 percent against a regional average of 2.0 percent2. In 1995, growth 
in GDP continued, this time at a rate of 3.9 percent. These successive years of strong 
growth were fuelled by a construction boom, a sharp increase in exports, strong rebounds 
in several other sectors from the recession of 1988-1991, and a major expansion of 
remittances from Jordanians returning home as a consequence of the Gulf War. 
The sharp decline in construction sector activity and the decline in external trade activity 
because the negative effect on business disappointments in the Middle East peace process 
had clearly negative effect on the dynamics of growth in Jordan's economy in 1996,1997 
as well as in 1998. The above factors contributed towards the slowing of economic growth 
to 1.0 percent in 1996, to 1.3 percent in 1997 and to 2.2 percent in 1998. 
It is worth noting here that the situation in Iraq continues to impact negatively on the 
Jordanian economy. The shrinkage of the Iraqi market due to economic sanctions has 
limited the capabilities of the private sector to export to what has been among Jordan's 
largest export areas. Further, inspections at the Port of Aqaba have hampered the flow of 
goods to Jordan and imposed delays on the receipt of inputs, thus causing production 
delays and making several Jordanian industries less competitive. 
Overall, as shown above, Jordanian economic performance in the last three years- 
1996,1997 and 1998- has been disappointing. The economy needed a persistent increase in 
investment to accelerate its growth. But the country has always been characterised by the 
failure of domestic savings to meet its investment, making investment and capital 
formulation even more difficult. Despite the significantly narrowed deficit gap between 
domestic savings and investment to 24 percent of GDP in 1998, compared with 28.4 
percent in 1992 (see Figure 2.2), the gap is still considered wide, and is the principal 
manifestation of the structural imbalance confronting the Jordanian economy. This gap is 
2 See United Nations (1995). 
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being financed through various sources, notably through remittances of Jordanians 
working abroad, external borrowing and official grants. 
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In light of its per capita income, as we have mentioned above, the World Bank classifies 
Jordan as a middle-income country. A drastic fall of over 33 percent in per capita GDP was 
witnessed following the near collapse of the Jordanian economy and the financial crises in 
the late 1980s. However, fiscal discipline, structural reforms, and the investor-friendly 
laws of the 1990s all contributed towards a satisfactory recovery in per capita GDP (see 
Figure 2.3). This growth, however, was short-lived as Jordan fell back into recession at the 
close of the decade. 
2.3.2 Labour Force and Unemployment 
According to available statistics, the total labour force in Jordan reached 1,031,797 in 
1997, of which around 17 percent were civil servants. Employment is widely diversified 
across the various economic sectors. However, a significant number of employees in the 
education and health sectors are actually government employees on the payrolls of the 
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Ministry of Education and Ministry of Health, respectively. Around 21 percent of the 
labour force is employed in mining and manufacturing, whereas only 4 percent is 
employed in financial intermediation, despite Jordan's relatively large banking sector (see 
Figure 2.4). 
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Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, 1998. 
A high rate of unemployment has been one of the banes of the Jordanian economy. With a 
large number of refugees entering the labour market at various times, Jordan has had to get 
used to a high level of unemployment. The unemployment rate increased from 9 percent in 
1979 to 14.8 percent in 1987 to 17.1 percent in 1991 (Marashdeh, 1996). Throughout much 
of the 1990s, unemployment has remained relatively high. Following the Gulf crisis, 
unemployment reached 19 percent according to official estimates. This has not decreased 
significantly despite the Government's efforts to ease unemployment throughout the past 
few years. The Centre for Economic Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan estimated 
the unemployment rate in 1996 at around 27.5 percent. Officially the unemployment rate 
was estimated by the Department of Statistics for the period from October through 
November 1997, at 14.1 percent, although the Planning Ministry has estimated that it was 
actually around 15 percent (CBJ, 1997). Unofficial estimates suggest that unemployment 
could be at nearly 30 percent. However, while the estimates of unemployment may vary, 
the real rate of unemployment is difficult to determine given the parallel economy, 
employment in family businesses which falls outside tax reports, and underemployment. 
The higher rate of unemployment in Jordan is attributable to several factors: the high rate 
of population growth, the increase in migrant workers, and the mismatch between 
education and the needs of the economy. Indeed, all these are valid reasons, however, the 
absence of employment opportunities because of the lack of industries is actually the main 
reason for the high unemployment rate. 
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2.3.3 Intlation 
Jordan experienced a relatively high inflation rate during the 1970s: it was estimated by the 
percentage change in consumer price index (CPI) at an annual rate of 8.3 percent. The 
influx of income from Jordanians working in Arab oil states, foreign aid from Arab 
countries, and high import prices were the major causes of higher domestic prices and the 
declining purchasing power of the Jordanian dinar during this period. However, the rate of 
inflation slowed as the economy moved into recession in the second half of the 1980s, and 
it was estimated at an average of less than 4 percent. This recession stemmed from at least 
three factors: the decline in foreign aid from the Arab oil producers, decline in remittances 
from Jordanians working in the oil states, and a decline in Jordanian commodity exports. 
In 1989 and 1990, inflation increased dramatically to 25.6 percent and 16.2 percent 
respectively, as a result of the devaluation of the Jordanian dinar and the consequent 
inflationary effects associated with devaluation3. Since then, the control of inflation has 
been the main success story of the last few years (see Figure 2.5). The inflation rate 
dropped to 3.3 percent in 1993 and to 3.1 percent in 1998 with average rates over the past 
eight years of less than 4 percent. The increase in CPI in 1996 to 6.5 percent was due 
mainly to the reduction in Government subsidies and the increase in world food prices. 
The decrease in consumer prices is attributed mainly to the fact that the 1989 peak was a 
one-off event caused by the devaluation of the dinar, although the government continued to 
adopt economic stability policies aimed at controlling the growth rate of aggregate demand 
in order to contain inflationary pressures on the Jordanian economy. 
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3 Kandil (2000) examines the asymmetric eifccts of exchange rate fluctuations on real output and price in 
twenty-two developing countries including Jordan. She finds positive and statistically significant relation 
between currency depreciation and price inflation in Jordan (price inflation increases in the face of exchange 
rate depreciation). 
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2.4 Public Finance 
2.4.1 Fiscal policy 
The public sector in Jordan has traditionally been very large. Government expenditure 
averaged about 42 percent of GDP during the period 1978-98. The Government provides 
modern services in various types of infrastructure, as well as in education, health care and 
other public services. Capital expenditure and the military, which together accounted for 
about 62 percent of total central outlays and 32 percent of GDP during the 1970s and early 
1980s, were in large part financed from foreign grants. 
Domestic revenue, which accounted for 22.2 percent of GDP on average between 1978 and 
1988, was too low to finance the Government expenditure; moreover, its structure was 
unbalanced, with taxes on foreign trade providing nearly two-thirds of total tax revenue. 
Notwithstanding the sizable receipts of foreign grants, Jordan was unable to sustain the 
public expenditure programme; the overall fiscal deficit (including grants) averaged 10 
percent of GDP during 1978-88, and made external borrowing necessary. Excluding 
grants, the overall deficit accounted for 21.9 percent of GDP at the same period. 
Following the near-collapse of the economy in 1988-89, Jordan turned to the IMF for 
supporting a structural adjustment programme to stabilise and restructure the economy. A 
component of the programme called for a tightening of the Government's fiscal policies 
which included restraining public expenditure, freezing public sector payrolls, and 
dramatically reducing subsidies. In addition, the programme called for a shifting of the 
sources of government revenue from income-based taxes to expenditure-based taxes in 
order to stimulate investments and savings. The results to date have been relatively 
positive, and the Government's budget deficit was reduced from 9.1 percent of GDP in 
1992 to 6.8 percent of GDP in 1997 (see Figure 2.6). 
24 
Figure 2.6: Government Budget Deficit 
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However, controlling the budget deficit remains an ongoing and difficult challenge. The 
budget deficit for 1998 is estimated to amount to around JD 20 million, or around 8 percent 
of the GDP. This rise in deficit is largely as a result of an 11.7 percent decrease in tax 
revenue due to the recession plaguing many sectors, particularly construction. In addition, 
current spending increased by 9.5 percent primarily due to large military and security 
expenditures. 
Efficient tax collection methods, expenditure restraints, and debt service relief have all 
contributed towards a reduction of the fiscal deficit, although not to an appreciable extent. 
In a move to boost revenues, the Government implemented a strategy aimed at broadening 
the domestic tax base and making the tax system more simple and efficient. Prior to 1995, 
there were ten personal income tax brackets (with a top marginal tax rate of 5 percent), and 
five corporate tax rates based on a maximum for both personal and corporate income taxes. 
Corporate income taxes have been, by and large, standardised, with a marginal tax rate of 
15 percent for industrial companies and 25 percent for service companies, although tax 
rates for banks remain as high as 35 percent. Export earnings are exempt from tax, but 
customs duties remain high. In addition, a general sales tax of 10 percent was introduced to 
replace the complicated consumption tax. As a result, tax revenues increased from 11.5 
percent of GDP in 1989 to around 16 percent of GDP in 1998 (see Figure 2.7). 
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As mentioned before, Jordan has historically relied on foreign grants to finance much of its 
current expenditure. However, in recent years, Jordan's reliance on international aid has 
significantly decreased. Foreign grants as a percentage of GDP have been reduced from a 
level of around 16 percent in 1989 to around 5.1 percent in 1998. As a percentage of 
central government expenditure, foreign grants have also been reduced from a level of 
around 34.4 percent in 1989 to around 13 percent in 1998. 
2.4.2 External Debt 
As mentioned above, Jordan's economy lacks abroad spread of earnings and has had to 
depend principally upon the remittances of workers overseas and foreign aid to supplement 
government reserves. In the late 1980s, foreign aid, remittances and tourist revenues 
accounted for over 60 percent of current receipts (World Bank, 1994). This is a huge 
imbalance for any economy. 
The steep decline in oil prices that hit the region in the first half of the 1980s caused a 
significant economic slowdown in the oil-exporting states, which meant that grant 
assistance and remittance income declined sharply in Jordan. Despite the ensuing 
substantial reductions in remittances and foreign aid, the Government attempted to 
maintain their domestic economic policies unchanged during the period 1984-88. Instead 
of adjusting to the lower financing available, the Government resorted to external 
borrowing in order to finance the deficit in the Government budget and the balance of 
payments. After a few years of accumulating costly foreign commercial debt, the Jordanian 
economy had begun to experience an actual economic crisis with high debt and debt- 
services burden. With an external debt amounting to JD 4,317.9 million or the equivalent 
of US$ 6,088 million (109.8 percent of GDP) by the end of 1988 compared with US$ 
1,900 million in 1980 (less than 53 percent of GDP), Jordan had become one of the most 
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heavily indebted countries in the world. Also the debt service as a ratio of GDP increased 
from 5.9 percent in 1980 to 22.1 percent in 1988 and to 34 percent in 1990; as a percentage 
of exports the debt service increased from 1.8 percent in 1980 to 49.7 percent in 1988 and 
to 50.5 percent in 1990. 
As payments difficulties emerged, and as part of an overall strategy to achieve external 
current account adjustment, the Govcrnrnent initiated an external debt-management policy 
in 1989 aimed at obtaining debt relicf through rescheduling, lengthening the maturity 
structure of debt, and reducing the dcbt burden in relation to GDP over the medium term. 
However, the 1990/91 Gulf crisis severely aggravated Jordan's external situation because 
of the loss of export markets for goods and services in neighbouring countries and the loss 
of foreign aid. Moreover, there was a sharp reduction in remittance flows, largely resulting 
from the massive return of Jordanians who had been working abroad. In the event, Jordan 
was unable to discharge its external debt-service obligations and made payments only to 
official creditors. The Government were aware that Jordan was unable to normalise 
payments relations with its creditors through regular debt servicing in cash and that 
exceptional financing through restructuring of the debt and debt service payments was 
necessary. Its also become clear that capitalisation of the unpaid debt-service obligations 
would lead to a build-up of external debt and that growth in debt service would exceed the 
growth potential for external current account receipts, making the overall situation 
unsustainable in the medium- to long-term (Alonso-Gamo and Mansur, 1996). 
The situation called for the Government's immediate revision of its debt management 
strategies and accordingly, Jordan negotiated with both the Paris Club and the London 
Club to reschedule the debt. The Government was successful in reducing its debt with the 
London Club through judicious buy-back agreements which took advantage of heavily 
discounted rates. In 1993, Jordan and the Paris Club replaced a year-by-year agreement 
with a three-year rescheduling accord. In 1997, the accord was extended, and Jordan 
received its final debt rescheduling from the Paris Club. 
Debt rescheduling has provided some cash-flow relief, but has not decreased the stock of 
debt to an appreciable extent. However, as a result of decreased new borrowing, debt buy- 
back, and debt swaps, external debt as a proportion of GDP had fallen steadily to around 
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96 percent by the end of 1998. Also the debt service ratio had fallen to manageable levels 
of less than 21.4 percent of export earnings in 1998 (see Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1: External Debt and Debt Burden (1988-1998) 
Item 1988 1989 1 990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Disbursed External Debt (JD 
million) 
4318 4462 3801 4958 4577 4230 4338 4465 4722 4580 5009 
Debt Burden (JD million) 871 924 890 859 966 857 606 642 672 611 550 
As a percentage of GDP (%) 
Disbursed External Debt 109.2 164.3 143.9 179.8 143 1111.3 102.9 96.7 99.2 91.6 96.7 
Debt Burden 22.1 34 34 31.4 30.2 22.5 14.4 13.9 14.1 12.2 14.8 
As a percentage of exports (%) 
Debt Burden 49.7 11 55.5 50.5 48.1 50.5 43.9 29.1 26.4 25.9 24.1 21.9 
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, different issues. 
2.4.3 Privatisation 
Since its inception in the mid-eighties, privatisation has acquired an increasing degree of 
importance, and has been considered by many in Jordan as an indicator of a new economic 
direction. However, although there has been a growing recognition of its need and 
desirability, privatisation in Jordan is less advanced than originally expected. Despite a 
heightened awareness of the excessive size of the public sector in Jordan and its increasing 
inefficiency over the years, rhetoric on privatisation has far exceeded action. 
The extent of public involvement in economic activities in Jordan can be summarised in 
two different areas of intervention. The first is the direct involvement of the public sector 
through the actual production of goods and services. Public enterprises in Jordan are 
concentrated in five major sectors: water, electricity, transport, telecommunications, and 
mining. In most cases, such enterprises enjoy monopoly status. This is particularly true of 
electricity generation and distribution, mining (phosphate and potash), and 
telecommunications. 
The second area of public involvement and participation in economic activity in Jordan is 
through direct equity shareholding by the central government. This is carried out through 
the Jordan Investment Corporation (JIC), the investment arm of the Government. In 1998, 
the JIC held shares in around 20 companies listed in the Amman Financial Market (AFM), 
with an approximate market value of around JD 464 million, accounting for around 
11 
percent of total market capitalisation. 
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In order to facilitate the process of privatisation in an efficient and transparent manner, the 
Executive Privatisation Unit was cstablished at the Prime Ministry to coordinate the 
preparation of privatisation transactions based on comprehensive guidelines and 
regulations. The Unit also manages the marketing efforts of enterprises being privatised, 
executes transactions, and negotiates with the concerned parties. 
The Government has recognised that the fiscal burden caused by subsidising public sector 
enterprises and specific Government services would be a drain on the financial resources 
needed to sustain the impressive economic performance experienced during the last few 
years. This is particularly true since part of these resources was planned to be in the form 
of external borrowings, leading to a rise in the external debt of the already heavily indebted 
country. In addition, the Government has concluded that, in light of the limited government 
funding sources for investment in infrastructure, it is necessary to mobilise private 
financial resources. Privatisation, therefore, is considered to be important as a vehicle to 
accelerate the mobilisation of resources for investment in infrastructure. The Government 
has used the following two methods: first, sale of privatisation candidates in the utilities 
sector to strategic, or anchor, investors to bring in immediate revenues for investment in 
infrastructure; and second, linkage of the sale to mandatory investment requirements, 
where strategic investors must commit themselves to provide new investments during a 
specific period of time in order to expand and improve services (Gupta, 2000). 
In addition, there are other equally important factors behind the Government's drive for 
privatisation: First, privatisation is expected to reduce the financial burden on the 
Government budget caused by regular subsidies to public sector enterprises. By releasing 
scarce financial resources, the Government will be able to increase investment allocations 
to sectors that directly benefit the poor, such as education, nutrition and health. Secondly, 
privatisation will improve the efficiency of public sector enterprises, which have not only 
been performing poorly, but have also been highly resistant to change despite almost 
continuous reform efforts. Finally, privatisation will bring in the investment resources 
needed for the modernisation of the public sector. 
The Government, however, has indicated that privatisation in Jordan will not necessarily 
be limited to the sale of the assets of public sector enterprises to the private sector, i. e., 
changing ownership of public sector enterprises, but that other methods are also under 
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consideration. For example, the privatisation of the Alai Gateway Hotel and the Duty Free 
Shops at Queen Alia International Airport was carried out by means of the 
commercialisation of the former and the corporatisation of the latter. 
1998 was an important year for privatisation in Jordan, both in terms of successes and 
failures. In November 1998, the Government closed the sale of 33.09 percent of the Jordan 
Cement Factories Company to Lafarge of France. The sale was worth JD 72 million, priced 
at JD 3.6 per share. Also, in the same year, the Government delayed the sale of the Jordan 
Telecommunication Corporation, following a decision by Southern Bell Corporation of the 
US to withdraw from the final bidding. This left Cable and Wireless of the UK as the only 
remaining bidder from the four which had originally shown genuine interest. Another 
important privatisation was initiated for the proposed restructuring and sale of the national 
airline, Royal Jordanian (RJ). The financial advisory mandate had originally been awarded 
to Citibank, but negotiations collapsed following disagreements between the Government 
and Citibank on matters relating to indemnification. Banque Paribas of France has since 
signed a contract to advise on the restructuring and privatisation of RJ. 
Despite all the positive points that have just been discussed, up to now the privatisation 
process has not been smooth. There are, as a World Bank report argues, some key issues 
that still need to be addressed4. These issues, and the policy action expected, are as 
follows: First, a lack of broad public participation in privatisation. To establish such 
participation, the Government intends to combine the sale of shares to a strategic investor 
with a public share offering. Secondly, the involvement of foreign investors. There is a 
concern that privatised public sector enterprises may fall into the hands of foreign 
investors. This, it is argued, will give control over public sector enterprises to foreigners, 
reduce the economic sovereignty of the country and make its economic activities even 
more vulnerable. To avoid such a development, the Government is expected to require 
foreign buyers to have local partners. The Government itself also intends to introduce the 
so-called "golden shares rule" in order to acquire a voice in the decision-making process 
of the privatised public sector enterprises. Finally, the limited absorptive capacity of the 
AFM. This, however, is not considered to be a real concern. Subscription to shares of 
privatisation candidates usually takes place at the financial institutions which issue the 
4 World Bank (1995). Jordan privatisation note. The World Bank; Washington, D. C. 
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privatisation equities on behalf of the privatisation candidates. Commercial banks, by 
virtue of their dominance in the AFM, can buy ailing public sector enterprises and resell 
them after readjusting their financial and administrative structures. This is expected to 
accelerate the privatisation process, especially for public sector enterprises which cannot 
be offered for sale through public subscription. The banks can also raise funds for public 
sector enterprises, through implementing reform programmes for their affiliated 
companies, as a first step towards privatisation. Moreover, the banks, as a means of 
supporting the privatisation proccss, can expand the margin of their finance mechanisms 
by developing investment trustee serviccs regarding buying and trading shares. 
Table 2.2: Maior Privatisation Deale in Tnrdnn 
Company Date Size & Type of Privatization 
Jordan Hotels and Tourism Jan. 1995 JIC sold its 87% shareholding to Zara Investment 
Arab Potash Company April. 1995 J1C Two thirds of the Company's authorised capital came 
from 6,000 private investors 
Jordan Tobacco and Cigarettes Sept. 1996 JIC floated 40,000 shares on the AFM 
Jordan Paper and Cardboard Sept. 1996 JIC floated 587,00 shares on the AFM 
Jordan Co. for TV, Radio and Cinema Production Feb. 1996 JIC announced its intention to sell 75.7% of its stake 
Jordan Tourist and Spa Complex Feb. 1996 JIC announced plans to sell 78% of the company 
Jordan Food Processing Feb. 1996 JIC announced its intention to sell 77% of its stake 
Jordan Glass Industrial Company June 1996 Shareholders voted to liquidate the firm. JIC, which 
owns, 60% had been attempting to sell its stake since 
1994 
Jordan Electricity Authority Aug. 1996 Converted into a company owned fully by the 
Government and capitalised at JD500 million in 
anticipation of privatisation 
Jordan Holiday Company Aug. 1996 JIC sold 33.7% of the company's share to a private 
Jordanian investor 
Arab International Hotels Company Dec. 1997 JIC shareholding diluted due to capital increase 
Jordan Cement Factories Nov. 1998 JIC sold 33.09% of its holdings to Lafarge of France 
Jordan Tourism and Spa Complex Dec. 1998 JIC leased the complex to Accor and Arm companies 
Source: Jordan Investment Corporation 
2.5 External Account 
Jordan's external economy has been perpetually under pressure from a large structural 
trade deficit. Income from expatriate remittances helped with the price of oil in the mid- 
1980s but with the subsequent slowdown in the regional economies, the current account 
moved heavily into deficit. This was particularly evident in the early 1990s when the 
current account deficit increased to around 16.3 percent of GDP. The deficit has been 
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gradually diminishing, and in 1997, the country registered a surplus of around JD 20.8 
million. It is estimated that Jordan's current account balance slipped back into a deficit of 
around 1.0 percent of GDP in 1998 largely as a result of a fall in workers' remittances (see 
Figure 2.8). 
2.5.1 Trade Balance 
The deficit in the trade balance is considered to be one the basic characteristics of the 
Jordanian economy. It has been suffering from a chronic trade deficit of an increased 
magnitude as commodity imports have substantially surpassed visible exports. This has 
been a result of Jordan's relatively narrow export base and its heavy reliance on imported 
consumer goods and energy products. Despite the devaluation of the Jordanian dinar, 
which made Jordanian goods more attractive internationally, and trade liberalisation 
policies which sought better to integrate the Jordanian economy with the world, the 
practice of curtailing imports and stimulating exports has met with little success. Although 
exports and imports have grown by 72 percent and 52 percent respectively since 1990, this 
has not had much effect on the trade deficit. This is due to an import bill which has 
historically been around twice as high as export earnings. Historically, merchandised trade 
deficits have been financed by remittances from Jordanians working abroad, foreign aid, 
external borrowing and a considerable draw down of foreign exchange reserves. 
Jordan's external commodity trade has been expanding rapidly. Commodity exports 
increased significantly from JD 90.9 million in 1978 to JD 1275.6 million in 1998, at an 
average annual rate of 13.5 percents. On the other hand, commodity imports increased 
5 World Bank (1996) classified Jordan within "Rist growing exporters" developing countries. 
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from JD 458.9 million in 1978 to JD 2,717.9 million in 1998, at an average annual rate of 
8.8 percent. The share of commodity exports in financing commodity imports increased 
from 19.7 percent in 1978 to 46.9 percent in 1998. However, exports have not been able to 
cover imports and this has led to a trade deficit of an increasing magnitude, rising from JD 
368.0 million in 1978 to JD 1442.3 million in 1998. As a percentage of GDP, the trade 
deficit declined from 47.2 percent in 1978 to 27.5 percent in 1998 (See Figure 2.9). 
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Export diversification has increased in recent years as Jordan has moved away from 
traditional crude material exports and focused on value-added manufactured products. 
Although phosphates and potash continue to be the country's major exports- representing 
around 25 percent of total exports in 1998- manufactured products such as pharmaceuticals 
account for an increasing share of Jordanian exports. This trend toward a more diversified 
export base is encouraging, especially as Jordan prepares to integrate formally into the 
global economy through WTO membership. 
Manufactured goods, mainly consumer products, continue to be one of Jordan's major 
imports. However, machinery takes up the lion's share of imports as a result of Jordan's 
drive toward building up a capital intensive manufacturing base and the Government's 
large expenditures infrastructure. 
2.5.2 Expatriate Remittances 
While Jordan has experienced a continuous merchandise trade deficit over the years, it has 
enjoyed a growing trade surplus in services. The country has become a major exporter of 
skilled labour whose remittances are the primary reason behind the improved current 
account balance. Expatriate remittances currently account for over 77 percent of the total 
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services balance surplus. It is estimated that some 800,000 Jordanians currently work 
abroad, and remittance continues to he channelled to Jordan because many of the 
expatriates have dependants at home who rely on them to supplement their income. 
As a percentage of GDP, expatriate remittances increased from 20.4 percent in 1978 to 
24.0 percent in 1984. As a result of collapse in oil prices, in the mid-1980s, the flow of 
expatriate remittances started to decline to reach 14.8 percent in 1988. Despite the 
expulsion of over 350,000 Jordanians many remained in the lower Gulf region and Saudi 
Arabia, and many more have retired or are returning. Consequently, remittances have 
grown steadily from their low of JD 306.3 million, or at 10.7 percent of GDP in 1991 to 
around JD 1173.5 million or to 23.7 percent of GDP in 1997. In 1998, remittances declined 
to around JD 1093.8 million or to 20.9 percent of GDP (see Figure 2.10). 
2.6 Financial System 
Many studies mentioned that Jordan has a very well developed financial sector. Among 
these studies, Beck, et al., (1999a) and Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999) examined the 
financial development and financial structure for up to 150 countries. They have used a 
wide variety of indicators that measure the size, activity and efficiency of financial 
intermediaries and stock markets. Their papers provide international comparisons 
regarding economic development and bank, nonbank, and stock market development. 
According to their analysis, Jordan is classified among countries that have a well- 
developed financial system or among countries that have financially developed 
6 
economies 
6 See further Wilson (1995); Abu-Jabarah (1993); ESCWA (1997); Cobham (1995); Kinght (1998) and 
others. 
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Over the last two decades, Jordan's financial system has expanded considerably as 
evidenced by the increase in the ratio of financial assets to GDP from about 80 percent in 
1970 to over 200 percent in the late 1990s. Jordan's financial system is very deep 
compared with other emerging market economies as well as with developed economies7. 
The monetisation of the economy led to a complementary rise in credit. Credit to the 
private sector stood at 82 percent of GDP at the end of 1998, up from 36 percent in 1978. 
The Jordanian system is also bank-oriented, with more than 90 percent of financial assets 
in banks, and with limited financial intermediation through mutual funds and other types of 
institutional investor. The establishment of the AFM in 1978 for trading in securities 
further enhanced the official performance of the financial system. Since its creation, the 
AFM has expanded its operations rapidly, making it one of the most active and organised 
emerging markets in the Middle East'. 
2.6.1 Structure and Size of The Financial System 
The Jordanian Banking System comprises licensed banks, special credit institutions, and 
long-term institutions, such as pension funds and insurance companies. Licensed banks are 
the central players in the system accounting for about 90 percent of total financial system 
assets. Specialised credit institutions have captured 4 percent of total financial system 
assets. 
2.6.1.1 Licensed Banks 
Commercial banking in Jordan goes back to 1925 when the Ottoman Bank9 started its 
operation in the country. The Arab Bank, which was established in Jerusalem in 1929 and 
which moved headquarters to Amman after the 1948 war, was the first local bank. The 
Jordan National Bank followed the Arab Bank in 1956. In 1960, two new local banks were 
established: the Bank of Jordan and the Cairo-Amman Bank. It is useful to note here that in 
the early stages of its development and until the 1950s, the banking system in Jordan was 
dominated by foreign banks, mainly British (Hayek and Zreikat, 1976). Thereafter, more 
local and foreign banks were established, bringing the total number of licensed banks to 
twenty one by the end of 1998, of which nine were national commercial banks and five 
7 For comparison see Beck, et al., (1999a) and Demirgue-Kunt and Levine (1999). 
8 In the next chapter we will provide a detailed analysis of the development of the AFM. 
9 The name was changed to the Grindlays Bank in the late sixties. 
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were branches of foreign banks, in addition to two Islamic banks and five investment 
banks. These banks have a total o{' 457 operating branches. The demographic indicator of 
the total number of branches of operating, banks is about ten thousand citizens per branch. 
This statistic indicates congestion in the Jordanian banking sector. In the US, by 
comparison, although there is only one bank branch for every thirteen thousand people, 
however, the enormous disparity in annual per capita income, which is thirteen times 
greater in the US than it is in Jordan, should be noted here. The numbers of Jordanian bank 
branches operating abroad, including representative offices, are 107. 
Banks have to be licensed by the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) before they can operate in 
Jordan, they must also comply with CBJ regulations with respect to their activities and 
practices as well as the ratios fixed by the bank's credit, liquidity, cash reserves, and 
capital. Banks may not open new branches or merge with other established banks except 
with the approval of the CBJ. 
The licensed banks in Jordan are completely privately owned, and compete with each other 
for custom. The development of automation within the banking sector has been spasmodic 
since it began in the early 1980s. The allocation of commercial bank finance is a matter for 
the banks, not for the government. The Government provides investment finance in other 
ways, particularly through its own expenditure. Nevertheless, the major source of finance 
in the economy is the banks, together with specialized financial institutions and the AFM. 
Jordan's banking industry is highly concentrated and characterised by an oligopolistic 
market structure. The largest three banks in the market, Arab Bank, Housing Bank and 
Jordan Bank, had a market share of 91 percent at the end of 1996 (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine, 1999). 
The recession in the mid-1980s caused deep problems in the Jordanian banking system. By 
the end of the decade, the share of uncollectable loans of the banks' portfolios was 
estimated at 30 percent. In these circumstances, several banks were technically bankrupt 
(World Bank 1994). In 1989, one of the major financial institutions, Petra Bank, failed, 
triggering what threatened to be a major banking crisis. The system stood vulnerable to 
further failures. 
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This situation has changed dramatically since 1991. As the Government's macroeconomic 
and adjustment programme succeeded in stabilising the economy, and as the monetary 
inflows of the workers returning from the Gulf states resulted in a higher demand for 
nontradable goods, the volume of ccononmic activity recovered and the price of land and 
property went up sharply, bailing out the Nanking system's debtors and increasing the 
value of the collateral already foreclosed. Also, the spread of the banks widened 
substantially, increasing their prof itability. These events increased the value of the banks' 
capital and allowed them to build reserves against losses. 
Total banks assets have shown an impressive increase as is demonstrated in Figure 2.11. 
They increased to JD 10,460.2 million in 1998, compared with JD 637.1 million in 1978, 
or at an average annual growth rate of 14.2 percent. The growth in the total assets of 
licensed banks is attributed to the intensifying degree of financial intermediation. Total 
banking system assets as a percentage of GDP, which is normally used as a measurement 
of the importance of the banking sector in the economic development process, was 81.7 
percent in 1978, and exhibited a continuous increase to reach 199.8 percent by the end of 
1998. Although the ratio fluctuated during some periods, the general trend was in an 
upward direction. This ratio being more than 1.0 indicates that the banking sector is 
growing at a faster rate than GDP. 
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Total deposits held by licensed banks rose from JD 448.5 million at the end of 1978 to JD 
6,811.4 million at the end of 1998, that is at an average annual rate of 13.8 percent. As a 
percentage of GDP, total deposits increased from 57.5 percent in 1978 to 130.1 percent in 
1998 (see Figure 2.12). Licensed banks financed their activities mostly via time deposits, 
which at the end of 1998 commanded an average share of about 72.6 percent of total 
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Figure 2.11: Licensed Banks Total Assets 
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banking system deposits, followed by demand deposits that accounted for about 15.7 
percent of total banking system deposits. 
Figure 2.12: Deposits with Licensed Banks by Type 
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Credit facilities by licensed banks increased from JD 332.8 million in 1978 to JD 4,285.3 
million in 1998, registering an average annual growth rate of 13.0 percent. As a percentage 
of GDP, credit facilities increased from 42.6 percent in 1978 to 81.8 percent in 1998 (see 
Figure 2.13). Licensed banks' credit to the Government declined from 20.5 percent of 
total credit facilities in 1978 to less than 10 percent in 1998. It is important to note here 
that credit growth rose in line with the strengthening economy. 
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Data on sectoral distribution of credit facilities in 1998 (Figure 2.14) shows that the bulk of 
licensed banks' credit facilities go to financial services, mainly trade. Consequently, the 
commodity producing sectors received proportionately less finance, with agriculture 
receiving about 3 percent and industry and mining a little over 16 percent. In the case of 
agriculture, this might be explained by the fact that a substantial part of agricultural 
activities is linked either to subsistence agriculture or to very small-scale farms, which 
generally do not have any access to credit facilities. Another possible explanation is that 
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Jordan has a special financial institution, the Agricultural Credit Corporation, which 
provides subsidised loans to this sector. 
Figure 2.14: Credit Facilities Extended by the Licensed Banks According to 
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Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, June 2000. 
2.6.1.2 Specialized Credit Institutions 
Specialised credit institutions (SCI) were established to provide medium- and long-term 
credit facilities on concessional terns suitable for the financing of development projects in 
Jordan's different economic sectors, particularly agriculture, industry, and housing. These 
institutions complement the bank's role rather than provide a substitute for their finance. 
They were created in order to allocate resources and activities that the market supposedly 
left unattended. At present, there are five specialised credit institutions in Jordan, three of 
which are government-owned, while the public and private sectors jointly own the other 
two. 
Specialised banking activities began with the establishment of the Economic Development 
Fund in 1951. The SCIs in Jordan are the following: the Agricultural Credit Corporation, 
the Industrial Development Bank, the Jordanian Credit Corporation, the Housing 
Corporation, and the Rural & Urban Development Bank. 
The consolidated balance sheet of specialized credit institutions shows that total assets 
increased from JD 412.3 million in 1993 to JD 505.2 million in 1998, or at an average 
annual rate of 3.5 percent. According to the lending activity of SCIs, the outstanding 
balance of their loans increased from JD 287.9 million in 1993 to JD 343.1 million in 
1998, or at an average annual rate of 3.0 percent (see CBJ, 1998). 
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2.6.1.3 Insurance Company and Pension Funds 
The insurance industry in Jordan has developed rapidly during the last decades. New 
companies have been established, premiums have increased to a great extent, and 
awareness of the need for insurance has become explicit. At present, there are 26 insurance 
companies operating in Jordan, of which one is a foreign company. 
However, in Jordan, as in many developing countries, the main line of insurance business 
is compulsory motor insurance, which is often subject to regulated and low premiums. 
Motor insurance produces large technical losses, which force insurance companies to 
scrutinise claims and delay their scttlements. In many cases, large court awards complicate 
matters, as claimants prefer to go to court rather than accept reasonable settlements by 
insurance companies. A climate of mistrust has evolved over time between insurance 
companies and their clients. This has had adverse effects not only on motor insurance but 
also on the development of other personal lines, including household and life insurance. 
The insurance sector in Jordan is a small but growing one. Total premiums were JD 57.7 
million in 1998, representing 1.1 percent of GDP. By international standards, this is a small 
proportion, especially when compared with the insurance sectors in the United States (8.57 
percent), and in Great Britain (11.43 percent). In large part this may be attributed to the 
underdevelopment of life insurance. In 1998, the life insurance represented around 22.2 
percent of gross insurance premiums, while motor insurance represented around 58.5 
percent in the same year. The existence of a credible social security system, together with 
cultural and religious factors may explain the underdevelopment of life insurance in 
Jordan. 
With regard to pension funds, there are two major pension funds in Jordan for state 
employees (one for full-time, and the other for part-time employees). In addition, there are 
many other pension funds, established by professional associations and by large 
enterprises. These institutions should be concerned with maintaining funds and be 
primarily concerned with maintaining and increasing the value of savings of their 
contributors. However, many of them are used to granting subsidised housing loans to their 
participants, to organised societies, and to their employees. These subsidised loans detract 
from the funds' ability to fulfil the purpose for which they were established. Many of them 
are also forced to invest a substantial portion of their assets in short-term loans. 
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The largest of these institutions is the Social Security Corporation. This institution, unlike 
those in many developing countrics, has enjoyed greater freedom from government 
interference, but investment has been constrained by the highly conservative policies of the 
corporation and by the shortage of' attractive investment opportunities. Increasingly, the 
corporation has been forced to place a growing percentage of its new flows into bank 
deposits, which accounted for around 50 percent in 1998, while investment in corporate 
equities was less than 15 percent and in mortgage and government bonds accounted for 3.4 
percent in the same year (see CBJ, 1998). 
2.6.2 Monetary Policy, Interest Rates and Foreign Exchange Rate 
Prior to the establishment of the CBJ in 1964, the Jordan Currency Board and the Ministry 
of Finance managed the currency and monetary affairs of Jordan. The former was 
responsible for issuing and redeeming local currency in exchange for sterling and investing 
the currency cover in British government bonds and treasury bills, while the latter was in 
charge of exchange control operations and the licensing of commercial banks. 
With the changing economic and financial environment, a need was felt for creating an 
effective authority capable of managing monetary and credit policies most conducive to 
domestic economic development. The CBJ was established in accordance with Law No. 4 
of 1959. By the end of 1963, the members of the first Board of Directors of the CBJ were 
appointed by the Council of Ministers, and the Bank began its operations on October 1, 
1964. 
Since its establishment, the CBJ has confined its efforts to the realisation of its basic goals, 
notably to maintain monetary stability, to ensure investors' confidence in the Jordanian 
dinar, and to create a price environment that reinforces the stability of Jordanian economy. 
The objectives and functions of the CBJ are outlined in article 4 of the CBJ Law No. 23 of 
1971. This article states that " The objectives of the Central Bank shall be maintain 
monetary stability in the Kingdom, to ensure the convertibility of Jordan Dinar, and to 
promote the sustained economic growth in the Kingdom in accordance with the general 
economic policy of the Government". 
41 
As shown above, the present Law of 1971 has not confined the CBJ to practising 
traditional Central Bank activities, but it has also been empowered to play a development 
role consistent with the changing needs of the Jordanian economy. The CBJ's objectives of 
promoting sustained growth in Jordan keeps the door wide open for it to undertake 
measures and to pursue active monetary policies that are development-oriented 
2.6.2.1 Monetary Policy 
In developed economies monetary policy is used as a means of steering the economy. The 
aim of monetary policy is to strike a balance between the need to avoid recession with the 
resultant unemployment problems while at the same time preventing overheating of the 
economy with its consequences for inflation. Monetary policy can also be used to 
compensate for fiscal policy laxness, as if there is excessive government spending which 
could be inflationary, a tight monetary stance would prevent this occurring. 
In Jordan, monetary policy has been used as a tool of economic management since the CBJ 
was established. As mentioned above, the period during the 1970s and the early 1980s 
brought to the fore the capabilities of the Jordanian economy and its ability to react to 
economic advancements, which were enabling the economy to achieve high growth rates. 
This was partly due to the substantial increase in expatriate remittances, an increase in 
Arab oil exporting countries grants' and the rise in national exports. This contributed in 
increase of the Jordan's foreign currency reserves. During this period the goals of 
monetary policy were to reduce inflation, promote economic growth, mobilise domestic 
savings into productive investments and stabilise the Jordanian dinar. In order to promote 
economic growth and to combat inflation, the CBJ started a policy of limiting credit to 
consumer goods and increasing credit to productive projects. 
As a result of these favourable developments and the monetary policy adopted, domestic 
liquidity (money supply M2) significantly increased from JD 606.7 million in 1978 to JD 
1615.2 million at the end of 1984, or at an average annual rate of 16.4 percent. 
Development of domestic liquidity during this period indicates that the increase realised 
during this period involved two essential components: the first is a narrow money supply 
(M1), which includes currency in circulation with the public and demand deposits in 
Jordanian dinar, which registered an increase from JD 375.4 million in 1978 to JD 878.4 
million at the end of 1984, or at an average rate of 15 percent per year. 
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The second component of domestic liquidity is the quasi-money, which consists of demand 
deposits in foreign currencies pertaining to the private sector, public entities, and financial 
institutions. This component registered a significant rise from JD 331.3 million in 1978 to 
JD 879.3 million in 1984, or at an average rate of 21.5 percent per annum 
During the period 1985-89, the Jordanian economy was hit by recession. The consequences 
of these effects were the contraction of the export market, the drop in expatriate 
remittances and Arab grant receipts. Under such circumstances, the Jordanian economy 
suffered serious setback from unfavourable developments that had a direct adverse impact 
on the major monetary indicators. M1 recorded average annual growth rates of 6.1 percent, 
while M2 registered average growth rates of 8 percent per year 
To counter the adverse effects and the sharp decline of late 1980s, the policies of the CBJ 
during 1990-98 were restrictive and designed to control inflation, reinforce the foreign 
reserve position to maintain the stability of the dinar's exchange rate in order to improve 
the performance of the economy, and to meet the objectives of the economic reform 
programme. More particularly, until September 1993, the CBJ pursued a direct monetary 
policy to influence the banks' liquidity and credit facilities granted by commercial banks. 
To improve the performance of the monetary policy and its impact on liquidity and bank 
credit, the CBJ started moving towards an indirect monetary policy. To implement its 
policy of indirect monetary control, the CBJ began to use certification of deposits as a tool 
of intervention in the money market to influence banks' liquidity and credit. The volume of 
intervention by the CBJ depends on the liquidity level maintained by the banking system, 
and expansion of credit is designed in accordance with the specified goals of the 
adjustment programme. 
The CBJ began, on September 1,1993, by issuing three and six months certificates of 
deposit in JD. To make it attractive for commercial banks to buy certificates of deposits, 
the CBJ frequently raised the rate of interest on these instruments. The rate was initially 
around 3 percent and recently reached about 8.5 percent. In January 1994, the rule limiting 
credit facilities to ten times a bank's net worth was abolished. In June that year, the reserve 
ratio on local currency deposits was reduced by 1 percent to 14 percent. As of 1 October 
1994, interbank, headquarters and foreign branch deposits in Jordanian dinars were 
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excluded from the calculation of reserve requirements. The central bank described this as 
an attempt to promote the interbank market. 
This monetary policy, succeeded in controlling the growth rate of domestic liquidity 
despite the accelerated growth of domestic credit during the earlier part of the 1990s. The 
new policy proved to be effective. The growth rate of domestic liquidity (M2) was 
maintained, reflecting positively on the monetary stability indicators of Jordan. M2 
increased from JD 3122.6 million in 1990 to JD 6003.2 million at the end of 1998, or at an 
average annual rate of 7.5 percent. Money supply (M 1), registered a slight increase from 
JD 1432.8 million in 1990 to JD 1625.2 million at the end of 1998, or at an annual average 
rate of 1.4 percent. Quasi-money registered a significant increase from JD 1,689.8 million 
in 1990 to JD 4,229.2 million in 1998, or at an average annual rate of 10.7 percent (see 
Figure 2.15). This increase is attributable largely to JD-denominated savings and time 
deposits, which reflect a higher degree of confidence in and the attractiveness of the 
Jordanian dinar to depositors. 
(JD million) 
Figure 2.15: Domestic Liquidity 
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Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, different issues. 
2.6.2.2 Foreign Currency Reserves 
The CBJ keeps and manages Jordan's gold and foreign exchange reserves. Thus the Bank 
is responsible for the selection of suitable investments and the amounts to be invested in 
each currency, taking into consideration developments in foreign exchange and money and 
capital markets to ensure safety and profitability. The CBJ allows licensed banks to keep 
foreign assets in accordance with regulations it issues from time to time in conformity with 
the general economic interests of Jordan. From the beginning of 1992, the CBJ gradually 
dismantled foreign exchange controls in order to make international dealings easier for 
citizens, exporters, and importers as well as to encourage foreign investors. 
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One of the most prominent features of Jordanian economic performance in the last few 
years has been the significant achievements in the foreign currency reserves. The CBJ built 
up an unprecedented level of foreign currency reserves which amounted in 1997 to US$ 
2,200 million, compared with US$ 459.7 million in 1989 (see Table 2.3). Foreign reserves 
thus became sufficient to cover Jordan's imports for a period of up to 7 months, compared 
with 2.3 months in 1989. With this cover, and with a growing comfort in the fundamentals 
of the economy, the CBJ began undertaking a substantial liberalisation policy. Reflecting 
the growing confidence in the economy and in the state of its own foreign currency 
reserves, the CBJ lifted restrictions on the Jordanian dinar and allowed it to be fully 
convertible. 
Table 2.3: International Liquidity 
(US$ Million) 
Item 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Foreign Exchange 459.7 847.8 824.7 750.2 1631.9 1691.9 1971.7 1758.5 2200.1 1749.6 
SDRs 11.0 1.0 1.1 0.6 5.5 0.7 1.2 0.8 0.2 0.8 
IMF Reserve 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 
Total Excl. Gold 470.7 848.8 825.8 767.2 1637.4 1692.6 1972.9 1759.0 2200.3 1750.4 
Gold Reserve 103.2 101.3 104.6 102.2 100.6 198.6 195.9 179.7 200.7 204.3 
Total including Gold 573.9 950.1 930.4 871.4 1738.0 1891.2 2168.4 1956.7 2401.0 1954.7 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, December 1991 and January 1999. 
In June 1997, the CBJ removed the ceiling on forward buying and selling transactions and 
allowed free movements of capital by residents, with no restrictions on the amount of 
foreign currencies held by individuals. This was the first time in Jordan's history that the 
movement of currency had been completely free. The CBJ has also lifted all restrictions on 
the movement of investment capital. In 1998 Jordan witnessed a drop in foreign currency 
reserves to about US$ 1,750.4 million, largely due to King Hussein's illness. 
2.6.2.3 Dinar's Exchange Rate Policy 
Until the breakdown of the Sterling area on June 23,1972, the Jordanian dinar (JD) was 
primarily linked to the pound Sterling. On February 22,1975, the dinar was linked to the 
SDRs, a policy which lasted until 198610. The dinar exhibited relative stability during 
1975-85; it was supported by large capital inflows, mostly in foreign aid and the 
10 In response to the weakening of the US dollar in 1985 and to the resulting appreciation of the dinar, the 
link to SDRs was replaced by a basket of currency with the weight of the US$ higher than its weight in the 
SDRs. 
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remittances of the Jordanians working abroad. This exchange rate policy resulted in a real 
exchange rate appreciation of about 31 percent. 
This value of the JD affected the competitiveness of Jordan by making Jordanian products 
more expensive than foreign products. This led to a reduction in exports and an increase in 
imports. As foreign goods were cheaper in JD, consumers could satisfy their wants by 
importing products rather than by producing domestic goods. In addition, these weakened 
the economic base and hindered the establishment of new productive investment, as the 
bulk of investments were concentrated in the real estate and mineral sectors. Furthermore, 
this led to an influx of foreign workers to work in Jordan, taking advantage of the foreign 
exchange differentials. Those workers accepted lower wages than did the Jordanian 
workers who priced themselves out of the market. This led to an increase in the 
unemployment rates in Jordan. 
The ensuing recession during the second half of the 1980s and the balance of payment 
pressures forced the partial flotation of the dinar. In October 1988, the dinar was put on a 
managed float and devalued by about 12 percent. In February 1989, the authorities also 
devalued the dinar by about 13 percent (the exchange rate was fixed at US$1.76 per one 
dinar) and this devaluation was accompanied by the closure of the exchange houses. 
The crisis, however, continued to deepen, with the spread between the official market and 
parallel market exchange rates rising rapidly. In an attempt to stabilise the market, the JD 
was delinked from the US$, on May 1989, and linked instead to a trade-weighted basket of 
currencies. In July 1989, a two-tie exchange rate was applied to the public sector's imports 
of essential goods and transferred to Jordanians studying abroad. The dual exchange 
system was terminated, and the exchange rates were unified at US$1.49 per dinar. 
On October 1995, the CBJ amended a new policy for determining the Jordanian dinar 
exchange rate. Under this amendment priority was given to keeping the dinar's exchange 
rate stable against the US dollar and allowing it to fluctuate against other foreign 
currencies. The CBJ took this measure in order to impart greater transparency to the stable 
of the Jordanian dinar exchange rate, and to bolster the interest rate policy in its efforts to 
enhance the attractiveness of keeping assets denominated in Jordanian dinar against those 
denominated in US dollars. It is important to note here that, during the period (1992-98) 
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the main characteristic of the dinar was the stabilisation: it stood at an average of US$ 1.4 
to JD I (see Figure 2.16). 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, different issues. 
2.6.2.4 Interest Rate Policy 
During the 1980s, Jordan's financial system operated under a fixed interest rate structure 
set by the CBJ, and passive in nature. Interest rates did not substantially change over time. 
The discount rate in Jordan moved from 5 percent in 1978 to 6.25 percent in 1993, and 
then finally to 9 percent in 1998. The CBJ did not appear to have used its discretionary 
power at that time to influence the banks' asset/deposit mix. Given the large amount of 
excess liquidity coupled with a low credit demand, changes in the discount rate did not 
have much influence on the behaviour of banks in Jordan. 
However, the policy of fixing interest rates suffered from a major problem. Those interest 
rates were set regardless of the rate of inflation prevailing in Jordan, and the most cases, 
interest rates were less than the prevailing inflation rates. This led investors to look for a 
quick profit by investing in unproductive projects. As a result, the policy limiting credit to 
combat inflation and stimulate economic growth led to a divergence of investment from 
long-term to short-term projects, i. e. trade, real estate and the housing sector. In September 
1989, the CBJ took the first step towards liberalising the interest rate, by floating interest 
rates on deposits. 
In February 1990, the CBJ floated the interest rate system on credit facilities, thus making 
the interest rates system fully liberalised. However, credit institutions specialising in 
promoting and financing priority productive activities were excluded from interest rate 
liberalisation. The aim was to ensure sufficient and relatively low cost financing for these 
priority sectors, such as agriculture, industry, rural development and housing. The rates of 
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interest charged on credit to these sectors remained at lower favourable rates, as specified 
by the CBJ. 
In 1993, in line with Jordan's economic structural reform programme, the CBJ moved 
toward indirect measures of control. It undertook a restrictive monetary policy aimed at 
maintaining high interest rates in order to stabilise the currency and build up foreign 
reserves. To that end, the CBJ amended its interest rate policy in favour of long-term time 
deposits, and introduced one-month, three-month, and one-year certificates of deposit 
through bi-monthly tenders with commercial banks. The objective was to free up interest 
rates and allow them to be largely determined by market forces. 
ýofoý 
Figure 2.17: Interest Rate Structure 
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2.7 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has given a comprehensive analysis of the macro environment of Jordan and 
analysis the reforms and the evolution of the financial sector development in Jordan. The 
Jordanian economy has experienced rapid expansion during the 1970s and the early part of 
the 1980s, as real GDP grew by more than 10 percent on average. However, this 
expansion was largely financed by foreign grants and remittances from Jordanians 
working abroad. In the second half of the 1980s, the pace of economic growth slowed and 
Jordan started to experience reversionary trends. These recessionary trends were 
transmitted from neighbouring oil producing countries to Jordan. Since these countries 
served as a market for Jordanian products and services, the slowdown in these countries 
affected the Jordanian economy. 
As a result of this slowdown, Arab grants started to decline and the number of Jordanian 
workers working in these countries decreased as the Gulf countries terminated some of 
3-Months CDS -- --6-Months CDS Discount Rate 
Deposit Rate --*-- Lending Rate 
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their contracts. Moreover, the Gulf crisis in 1990/91 increased the imbalance in Jordan's 
economy. This crisis has impact on the economy through Jordan's economic regional 
linkages; trade, foreign assistance, and workers' remittances. The crisis touched the lives 
of all Jordanians and severely hit the fledgling Jordanian economy. 
Following the near-collapse of its economy, Jordan was forced to re-examine its policies 
and to redirect its development strategies. The country was struggling with economic and 
financial crisis and traditional remedies were proving ineffective. Jordan stood at a critical 
crossroad. In response, the country chose to accelerate the liberalisation of its economy, 
and actively worked at enhancing its competitiveness within the regional and global 
contexts. In pursuit of this goal, Jordan removed, to a large extent, the structural 
imbalances of the economy. Remarkable progress was achieved toward opening the 
economy through regional and global free trade, harmonising legislation to facilitate the 
free flow of capital, stabilising the monetary indicators to reassure investors, and creating 
attractive conditions for investment and business opportunities. Policy makers in Jordan 
realised that wide-ranging economic structural reform policies implied the application of 
fundamental policies for an efficient reallocation of financial resources and redirection of 
new savings and investment flows to productive projects. The authorities also recognised 
that the reform of financial sector, including increasing access to foreign financial 
resources, would help to ensure sound and economically viable enterprises that would 
have access to the credit flows that were necessary for restructuring. 
The Government has enacted a new Investment Law, amended the Income Tax Law and 
the General Sales Tax Law to make them more receptive to the private sector initiatives. 
Furthermore, it has removed cumbersome import licensing requirements, lowered and 
restructured the tariff regime, reduce income taxes and streamlined tax procedures. 
In order to improve the functioning and standards of Jordan's financial sector, the 
Government has initiated a restructuring effort to promote Jordan as a regional financial 
hub providing modern financial services to the business community. Substantial progress 
has been made in adopting international norms relating to capital adequacy and prudential 
lending. The CBJ has made significant improvements in the supervision system by 
instituting full financial disclosure by the banks. It has already adopted a number of 
measures to replace direct control with indirect monetary instruments in order to 
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encourage competition among banks, and, as a confidence-building measure, removed the 
credit-to-deposit ratio, thus encouraging the evolution of an efficient interbank money 
market. 
The structural and legislative adjustments were, for the most part, successful. The 
economy grew in real terms by an average of 4.7 percent during the period 1990-98. 
Inflation was checked to around 3.0 percent and the exchange rate of the Jordanian dinar 
remained stable. However, the Jordanian economy took a sharp downward turn toward the 
end of the 1990s. Domestic factors were in part responsible, but political and economic 
disruption in the neighbouring Palestinian and Iraqi markets contributed significantly. 
Nevertheless the World Bank described Jordan's economic reform and development 
agenda to be sound and well. In addition, in September 1996, Standard & Poor's upgraded 
Jordan from B+ to BB- in recognition of continued progress with fiscal prudence and 
structural reform. Jordan's upgrading was based on its progress in strengthening public 
finance, underpinned by a strong commitment to fiscal restraint. In addition, the outlook 
was revised to "stable" as a result of reduced vulnerabilities to adverse external economic 
and political developments. 
However, more than any other country in the region, Jordan's future performance depends 
on political stability in the Middle East. Its three major sources of revenue- tourism, 
remittances and regional trade- are vulnerable to political setbacks. Progress in the peace 
process and the relaxation of the UN embargo on Iraq will inspire confidence in the 
Jordanian market. The Government also needs to continue with its policies of economic 
restructuring, privatisation and liberalisation, and put in place key legislation governing 
investment and taxation in order to stimulate the local and foreign investment needed to 
replace aid as the main support of the economy. 
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Chapter III 
An Overview of the Development of the Amman Financial 
Market 
3.1 Introduction 
The increased attention given to emerging markets shown by the World Bank in promoting the 
establishment of stock markets in developing countries is part of a wider process focusing on 
the importance of the financial sector in leading development. In this context, the AFM was 
established in 1976. Since its establishment, the AFM has developed and expanded greatly. It 
has lately been the focus of attention of several international as well as national institutions 
because of its potential and its performance. This, coupled with political developments in the 
region, namely the peace process, has created more interest in investment opportunities in 
Jordan. 
This chapter sheds some light on the establishment and objectives, the structure and 
characteristics of the AFM, its development and performance as well as its operational 
procedures. This chapter also highlights the development of the AFM in comparison with 
other emerging markets as well as with developed markets. Thus, with chapter II, this chapter 
provide the background for the empirical chapters which investigate the interaction between 
the stock market development and economic growth in Jordan. 
3.2 Establishment and Objectives 
The establishment of the AFM as the country's stock exchange was a major contribution 
towards improving the financial sector in Jordan, in order to enable it to realise a better 
utilisation of financial resources by mobilising local and foreign savings, and channelling such 
resources towards productive projects. Credit for establishing the AFM goes to the efforts 
made by the CBJ and to the support and encouragement of the Jordanian Government in 
addition to the technical assistance offered by the International Financial Corporation (IFC) of 
the World Bank. Before the establishment of the AFM, the sale and purchase of stocks used to 
take place through a few real estate agents and brokers alongside their other activities. 
Moreover, there were no announced prices for stocks which resulted in high transaction costs 
as well as large price fluctuations. 
The AFM is a public financial institution with legal, administrative, and financial 
independence. It was established in 1976 as the country's stock exchange, and started its first 
day of business on January 1,1978 with the 57 list companies. Following significant local and 
regional interest, the AFM became one of the most sophisticated stock markets in the Middle 
East and one of the most active stock markets among the emerging markets' (World Bank, 
1994; Toukan, 1994; Cobham, 1995; El-Erian and Kumar, 1995; IMF, 1995; Vittas, 1997; 
ESCWA, 1997; Azzam, 1997; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2000; and others). 
The establishment of the AFM was a major step on the path of developing financial resources 
through the development of a sound capital market. According to AFM law, the objectives of 
the market are threefold: First, to mobilise savings by encouraging investments in securities 
thereby, channelling savings to serve the interests of the national economy. Second, to regulate 
and control the issuance of securities and dealings. This is to ensure soundness, ease, and 
speed of transactions in accordance with the financial interests of the country. Finally, to 
collect and publish information that will help investors evaluates all the quoted companies. 
The AFM was also established to the process of raising and allocating capital that is so 
important in strengthening the Jordanian Economy. It can encourage savings and investment 
and offers investors the opportunity to participate in developing the private sector in Jordan 
and to share in the growth of its finest companies. By encouraging capital raising among 
corporations and investment abroad by participants, the AFM can contribute to accelerating 
2 Jordan's economic growth. 
1 Emerging stock markets are defined by the International Financial Corporation to consist of stock markets in 
developing countries (low and middle-income economies). 
2 The main purpose of this study is to examine this issue. 
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Prior to the reform of the financial sector, the AFM operated under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Finance. Revenue and expenditures were treated as entries in the accounts of the 
general government budget, and were therefore collected and allocated by the Budget 
Department. In June 1997, a new Securities Law was enacted. Under this law, the AFM is 
regulated and supervised by the Securities Commission (JSC). The commission is responsible 
for establishing an enabling environment to achieve sound dealing in the securities and capital 
market of Jordan, and to protect securities holders, investors and the public from fraud and 
deceit. The commission regulates and monitors the business operations of the entities that fall 
under its supervision which are the securities exchange, the securities deposit centre, the 
financial services companies, the shareholding companies, the investment companies and 
mutual funds and the certified financial professionals (see Figure 3.1). 
L___ u=ities Institute 
Established by Securities Law 
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3.3 The Market Structure 
The AFM combines features normally found in both a stock exchange and a government 
securities and exchange commission. It is a government-mandated vehicle for both the 
regulation and institutionalisation of the securities market in Jordan. The AFM has been given 
an appropriate mandate to promote the development of the securities market, and to regulate 
the activities of the number of firms dealing in securities, such as underwriters, brokers, and 
investment advisors, and to regulate the trading market as such. To this extent, the AFM 
functions not only as a typical stock exchange, but also as an organising and controlling body. 
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Figure 3.1: Market Institutions Created by the Securities Law 
Like any other market, the AFM is composed of two main markets, which complement each 
other: the Primary Market and the Secondary Market. The main characteristics of each market, 
its components and its development are described below. 
3.3.1 The Primary Market 
The Primary Market deals with new issues. New issues consist of "share issues" and "bond 
issues". Share issues include issues by newly established companies, as well as by the 
established ones through capital increases or by public and private offering. Currently, the 
issuing price per share for newly established companies is set by law at JD 1. Before 1997, an 
issuing Committee at the Ministry of Industry and Trade in co-operation with the AFM 
determined a price for new share offerings by established companies. There was, however, no 
specific formula for calculating the price of new issues. The calculation was usually done 
based on a purely subjective weighting between the book value of the share and its market 
value. This method of pricing has the potential to create several distortions in the market. 
In the case of a private subscription it was in the interest of the directors of a company, who 
usually own the larger block of shares, to ask for the price of the new shares to be as low as 
possible. This would save them large amounts of money and gain them the differential 
between the subscription price and the market price of their shares. This practice was not in 
the best interests of the company and could hurt small shareholders. 
Currently, under the new Security Law, the General Assembly and the Board of Directors 
determine the prices of new issues using a market-based method. A market-based method of 
pricing more accurately reflects the value of the securities being floated. Pricing of new issues 
in more developed stock markets typically takes place through negotiation between an 
investment bank, an underwriter, and the company selling the shares based on its potential 
earnings. In a successful underwriting, shares would initially trade at a price close to the 
offering price, giving the seller evidence that he has the purchase price. The primary benefits 
of a market-based pricing of new issues would be to encourage companies to list shares on the 
exchange and to enable them to raise more money through the public issue of the same 
54 
number of shares. In addition, the success of the Government's privatisation efforts would be 
greatly enhanced under a transparent, market-based system of pricing. 
This poses the puzzle of why companies can raise more equity now than before. An appealing 
explanation is that with equity issues so underpriced in the past, firms were reluctant to sell 
shares. Underpricing caused a huge excess demand for shares, with the chances of actually 
getting shares in a company very small. Further, there was typically a big jump in price on the 
first day of trading, conferring a capital gain on those lucky enough to acquire shares in the 
initial location. Subsequent share purchases did not benefit from this initial jump in share 
price, and counted more on long-term capital gains. This situation may have improved with 
liberalisation and with better opportunities for dynamic companies. Also, under the new 
pricing system the extent of over-subscription has gone down, improving chances of securing 
shares in the initial allocation and raising the expected return. In short, as the equity market 
moves into supply-demand equilibrium, the amount of equity can be expected to go up3. 
Since the establishment of the AFM, the number of primary issues in the market has increased 
tremendously with regard to equities. This indicates the growing potential and importance of 
the capital market in Jordan4. The AFM has witnessed six distinct phases in the growth of 
primary issues of shares. The first phase lasted from 1978 to 1982, when the value of primary 
issues increased from JD 11.9 million to JD 91.3 million, or on average by around 69.6 percent 
per year. The second phase lasted for the following 10 years during which the value of 
primary market issues declined at an annual rate of 5.1 percent to reach JD 54.6 million in 
1992. This mainly due to the slowdown of the economy during this periods. The third phase 
witnessed a phenomenal increase, with the value of primary issues increasing by 318.3 percent 
in 1993 to JD 228.394 million, and by a further 102.9 percent in 1994 to reach JD 463.3 
million. This indicates that companies were increasingly turning to the stock market as a 
means of raising funds. This was due partly to a significant increase in market prices, and the 
3 But of course, for the investor, whose opportunity cost is the interest rate, capital gains do matter and the sum of 
dividend yield (measured relative to market price) and capital gains must exceed the interest rate sufficiently to 
compensate for the higher risk. 
4 Aylward and Glen (1999) rank Jordan one of the top three countries among the emerging economies according 
to the importance of equity issues in financing investments. 
5 See Chapter II. 
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credit tightening imposed by the CBJ has also encouraged this move by making the more 
traditional bank loan less available. 
The fourth phase saw declines of 28.8 percent in 1995 and 43.1 percent in 1996, with primary 
issues reaching to JD 187.7 million. The fifth phase witnessed another dramatic increase, with 
the value of new primary issuing reaching JD 337.7 million in 1997, or an increase of 77.8 
percent above their 1996 level. Finally, as a result of a significant decline in market prices in 
1998, the primary issues declined sharply to JD 47.5 million (see Figure 3.2). 
It is worth mentioning that the value of new issues during the period 1993-98 is double the 
combined sum of the value of new issues during the period 1978-92. This tremendous increase 
in the activity of the primary market can be attributed to many factors, among which are the 
potential of the Jordanian economy in the light of the peace treaty, the increase in trading 
volume in the secondary market, and the increase in stock prices that encouraged many 
established companies to raise their capital through issuing new shares to the public. 
The AFM plays a central role in facilitating business expansion in Jordan and efficiently 
channelling resources to serve the interests of the overall economy. In most recent years, since 
the AFM come into existence, business and the general public have become increasingly 
aware of the benefits such a market offers. Businesses have turned to the stock market as a 
means of financing expansion and of raising funds. Capital formulation in Jordan has 
increased from around JD 229.1 million in 1978 to over one billion in 1998. At the same time, 
new issues have increased over tenfold during the same period. The ratio of total value of new 
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shares to gross fixed capital formulation has increased fron around 5.2 percent in 1978, to 
over 25.3 percent in 1997 (see Figure 3.2). This reflects not only the market's maturity, but 
also public confidence in it. 
The Jordan bond market is much less developed and still in the early stages of development. It 
has always been weak and dependent mainly on government development bond issues. New 
issues of corporate bonds registered a small value, almost zero during most years in the period 
1991-98 (see Figure 3.3). Currently, most bonds are issued by the CBJ for monetary purposes 
in small quantities and denominated in the local currency. In 1998, it issued JD19 million of 
these bonds (called Development Bonds) which were purchased by official and private 
pension funds, commercial banks, and individuals. 
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3.3.2 The Secondary Market 
The Secondary Market is the market that trades in securities which have already been issued 
and subscribed. It is divided into four markets: The Parallel Market, Regular Market, Bond 
Market, and Legal Transfers (transactions off the trading floor). Trading in the Secondary 
Market is conducted five days a week, Saturday to Wednesday. The first step a company takes 
upon fulfilling the legal requirement for registration is to apply to the AFM for listing. If 
approved, it adopts the status of " waiting to be listed". 
Companies waiting to be listed are prospective entrants to the Parallel Market, and are not 
traded on the trading floor. These companies are traded through the Legal Department at the 
AFM. This group includes those companies whose listing requirements have not yet been met, 
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and in addition, listed companies which have violated certain listing requirements and have 
been degraded by the AFM. The Parallel Market, in turn, includes those companies waiting to 
be listed in the Regular Market. 
However, before becoming eligible for listing in the mainstream transactions of the Regular 
Market, the company must have been in operation for two years and must have published two 
annual financial reports. The company's stocks are traded in the Parallel Market for at least 
one year, and it has at least ten percent of its shares traded before the AFM Securities 
Commission considers it for regular listing. 
Since the AFM was established, the number of listed companies has almost doubled. And also, 
as shown in Figure (3.4), most companies are traded in the Regular Market. In 1978, only 57 
companies were listed in the AFM, all of them being traded in the Regular Market. In 1998, 
there were 100 listed in the Regular Market and 50 in the Parallel Market, with 62 companies 
waiting to be listed. 
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3.3.2.1 The Parallel Market 
The Parallel Market offers newly emerging companies, which need liquidity, an opportunity to 
have their shares traded in an orderly and fair manner while preparing to meet the more rigid 
requirements of formal listing in the Regular Market. Since new companies must meet special 
requirements set by the AFM Securities Commission before being transferred to the Regular 
Market, the establishment of this market was necessary for trading shares prior to formal 
listing. To this extent, the Parallel Market is a preparatory market for listing in the Regular 
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Market. The trading rules of the Parallel Market are similar to those of the Regular Market. 
Listing requirements are less stringent, but offer the same essential protection to the investor. 
In addition, the Parallel Market was established due to the tremendous increase in the demand 
for shares in the early 1980s. This was represented by an accelerated increase in the volume of 
trading and in the number of shares traded in the Regular Market causing, an imbalance 
between the demand and supply of shares which prevailed at the time. 
The Parallel Market was established in 1982 and began its first day of trading on February 20th 
of that year. Since its inception, the Parallel Market at the AFM has experienced distinct 
phases of growth in terms of share trade and volume and it has developed into a fully-fledged 
market, meeting the demands of companies and investors alike. The total number of shares 
traded increased from JD 11.2 million in 1982 to JD 24.8 million in 1983 before declining to 
JD 12.6 million in 1984 and to JD 6 million in 1985. It then increased in the following two 
years to reach JD 13.4 million in 1987, before declining sharply to a trough value of JD 1.7 
million in 1990. After declining during the Gulf crisis year 1990/91, the number of shares 
traded increased rapidly thereafter reaching a peak of JD 93.2 million in 1998 (see Figure 3.5). 
As can be expected, the increase in total number of shares traded has been accompanied by 
increases in volume. In 1982 the value of traded shares was approximately JD16.4 million, it 
increased to JD 21.8 million in 1983 or by 32.9 percent, before declining to JD 6.2 million in 
1984 and JD 2.4 million in 1985. Over the two years, the value of trade in this market 
recovered to reach JD 4.7 million in 1986 and JD5.6 million in 1987. However, as a result of 
the 1988 economic crisis, the volume of share trade sharply declined to reach JD 2.5 million in 
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1990 at an average annual rate of 24.4 percent. Over the following seven years, the volume of 
share trade in Parallel Market increased at an average annual rate of 25.3 percent to reach JD 
50.8 million in 1998 (see Figure 3.5) 
3.3.2.2 The Bonds Market 
Bonds traded at the AFM include corporate bonds, development bonds, treasury bonds, and 
treasury bills. The maturity of these debt instruments ranges between 3 months to 10 years. 
Trading in bonds and bills at the AFM has been generally slow. Since the AFM came into 
existence, the volume of bonds traded has fluctuated between JD 2 million and JD 22.2 
million. During the period 1978-98, the volume of equity traded incorporated an average of 
97.9 percent of overall volume in the Secondary Market. Bonds, on the other hand, registered 
the rest (see Table 3.1). 
There are several factors underlying the underdevelopment of bonds market in Jordan, among 
them the sudden burst of inflation of the late 1980s, which caused large losses to the holders of 
fixed-rate bonds. Also, there are few bonds issued, with most being held until they mature. In 
most cases, bonds are sold to banks at subsidised rates and this in effect discourages banks 
from selling bonds in the Secondary Market because of the loss involved. 
Further, a major factor inhibiting the development of the bonds market in Jordan is the lack of. 
an institutional and legal infrastructure. There are no financial institutions with sufficient 
expertise to price, underwrite, and sell a corporate bond issue. The bond market needs to be 
supported by an institutional infrastructure that includes, among other things, efficient clearing 
and settlement arrangements. Clearing, settlement, custody and payment systems are either 
absent or not fully developed, and, as a result, trades run many risks, such as those that may be 
created by the unreliability of counterparts, fraud, and multiple trades of the same securities. 
Jordan needs creative financial institutions that can meet the changing financial requirements 
of the country, be it projects finance, flouting rates or any other form of fixed rate financing. 
Investment bank services are also needed, these include strong financial analysis, underwriting 
of bond issues, floating of these bonds to the public at large and making market of these 
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issues. Other factors, such as the lack of information and market makers with access to 
liquidity support, also hamper bonds market development in Jordan. 
Table 3.1: Trading VoInmP in 
Year Organized Market Parallel Market Transaction off the 
Tradin Floor 
Bonds Market Total Vol. 
in Secondary 
Trading 
Volume 
(JD M) 
% To Total 
Vol. In 
Seco. 
Market 
Trading 
Volume 
(JD M) 
% To Total 
Vol. In Seco. 
Market 
Trading 
Volume 
(JD M) 
% To Total 
Vol. In 
Seco. 
Market 
Trading 
Volume 
(JD M) 
% To Total 
Vol. In 
Seco. 
Market 
Market 
(JD M) 
1978 5.6 57.7 0.0 0.0 4.1 42.3 0.0 0.0 9.7 
1979 15.8 77.5 0.0 0.0 3.8 16.6 0.8 3.9 20.4 
1980 41.3 83.1 0.0 0.0 6.7 13.5 1.7 3.4 49.7 
1981 75.4 89.4 0.0 0.0 6.6 7.8 2.3 2.8 84.3 
1982 112.2 80.5 16.0 11.5 9.6 6.9 1.9 1.1 139.7 
1983 119.5 76.3 22.8 14.6 13.4 8.6 0.6 0.5 156.3 
1984 53.0 76.8 6.2 9.0 8.3 12.0 1.7 2.2 69.1 
1985 64.4 72.3 2.4 2.8 14.4 16.9 3.6 4.2 84.8 
1986 65.8 65.6 4.8 4.8 26.1 26.4 2.5 3.2 99.2 
1987 142.6 85.5 5.6 3.4 18.0 10.8 1.0 0.6 166.0 
1988 127.0 74.3 5.7 3.3 22.2 13.0 16.7 9.8 171.6 
1989 365.2 66.0 2.3 0.4 164.9 29.8 22.2 3.8 553.3 
1990 226.4 90.7 2.5 0.0 17.8 7.1 3.1 2.2 249.4 
1991 292.4 91.2 10.4 3.2 16.0 5.0 1.5 0.6 319.9 
1992 878.7 97.0 8.2 0.9 15.3 1.7 4.3 0.4 905.8 
1993 933.4 92.4 35.2 3.5 37.4 3.7 4.6 0.4 1010.0 
1994 430.3 78.8 64.7 11.8 47.4 8.6 4.3 0.8 546.7 
1995 362.1 70.4 56.8 11.1 83.0 16.1 12.2 2.4 514.1 
1996 210.7 74.5 37.9 13.4 28.9 9.9 5.1 2.2 282.6 
1997 304.1 71.7 51.2 12.0 67.7 16.0 2.0 0.3 424.9 
1998 413.6 76.8 50.8 9.4 69.7 12.9 4.1 0.9 538.2 
Source: Amman Financial Market, The Twenty First Annual Report, 1998. 
3.3.2.3 Transactions off the Trading Floor 
The Secondary Market also serves the purpose of legal transfers. The Legal Department at the 
AFM provides a setting for special transactions such as sales of unlisted companies, 
transactions from abroad or those which involve transfers within families and are related to 
inheritance. In 1998, transactions off the trading floor registered JD 70.2 million, representing 
almost 13 percent of the overall volume of trade in the Secondary Market (see Table 3.1). 
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3.3.2.4 The Regular (Organised) Market 
The Regular or Organised Market is that part of the Secondary Market that regulates and 
supervises at the trading floor of the AFM controlled by certain listing requirements. Most 
companies listed at the AFM are traded on the regular market. Companies listed in this market 
are divided into four sectors; the banking and financial institutions sector; the insurance sector; 
the services sector; and the industrial sector. In 1998, there were 100 companies listed in the 
market, compared to 57 companies in 1978. The industrial sector accounted for 48, services 
19, insurance 17, and banks and financial institutions 16. The majority of transactions in 
equity dealing at the AFM take place at the Regular Market, during 1978-98, since the AFM 
was set up, the volume of equity traded in this market represented an average 78.5 percent of 
overall volume traded in the Secondary Market. 
The industrial sector is generally the most active in terms of traded shares, it accounted for 
46.7 percent of overall volume traded in this market in 1998, followed by the banking sector at 
46.2 percent, the services sector which accounted for 15.8 percent, and finally the insurance 
sector at 1.3 percent. During the period 1978-92 witnessed a dramatic growth in the number of 
shares traded at the Regular Market. The total number of shares traded in this market increased 
from 2.4 million in 1978 to a peak value of 344.8 million in 1992, before declining to JD 
244.3 million in 1993 and to JD 154.6 million in 1998 (see Figure 3.6). It is worth noting here 
that the ratio of the total number of traded shares to the total number of subscribed shares 
increased gradually from 2.8 percent in 1978 to reach 87.1 percent in 1992 before declining to 
57.3 percent in 1998. 
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As can be expected, the increase in the total number of shares traded has been accompanied by 
an increase in trading volume and market capitalisation. In 1978, the value of traded shares 
was approximately JD 5.6 million; it increased on average by 45.0 percent per year during the 
nine-year period up to 1987 to reach JD 142.6 million. However, due to the economic crisis 
and the instability of the JD exchange rate in 1988, the volume of shares traded dropped by 
1 1.6 percent to JD 127 million. After the crisis was absorbed, an increase in volume occurred 
until the onset of the Gulf crisis when the volume decreased to JD 268.9 million in 1990 
compared to JD 367.6 in 1989; the value of shares traded increased rapidly thereafter, reaching 
a peak in the market's life of JD 933.4 million in 1993. The main reason for the huge volume 
increase during 1992 and 1993 could be explained by the extraordinary situation which 
followed the Gulf crisis in terms of extra liquidity in the economy, lack of investment 
opportunities, and a limited supply of shares. These factors also subsequently affected the 
prices of shares, driving them up. 
Sharp declines in the volume of shares traded were recorded in 1994,1995, and 1996 to JD 
430.3 million, JD 362.1 million and JD 210.0 million, respectively. Political uncertainty about 
the Middle East peace process, poor economic performance, and the policy of maintaining 
high interest rates to support the Jordanian dinar, were the major factors behind these declines. 
In 1997 and 1998, the volume of shares traded increased to JD 404.1 million and JD 413.6 
million respectively, or an increase rate of 44.3 percent and 36.0 percent, respectively (see 
Figure 3.7). 
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Market capitalisation at the AFM has grown in three phases. It has enjoyed rapid growth 
during the period 1978-83, from JD 286.1 million in 1978 to JD 1008.2 million in 1983, or at 
average annual rate of 28.6 percent. The following four years witnessed a decline in 
capitalisation at an average annual rate of 2.4 percent to reach JD 915.8 million in 1987. Real 
interest in the capital market in Jordan started to be shown after the economic crisis of 1988, 
when market capitalisation began increasing at a faster rate, reaching about JD 3,310.7 million 
in 1995 at an average annual rate of 15.5 percent. But it dropped by 2.4 percent in 1996 to JD 
3,230.5 million, and then increased to JD 3,602.5 million and JD 3,835 million in 1997 and 
1998, respectively, or at an annual rate of 11.5 percent and 6.5 percent, respectively (see 
Figure 3.8). 
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As a percentage of GDP, market capitalisation increased from around 38.3 percent in 1978 to 
around 73.2 percent in 1998 (see Figure 3.9). This is considered one of the higher ratios 
among the emerging markets, as indicated by IFC reports. This also highlights the important 
role of the capital market in the country's economy. The industrial sector leads the market 
with around 63 percent of total market capitalisation. Within this market capitalisation, AFM 
statistics indicate that non-Jordanians own about 44.3 percent of the market value. This 
percentage reached around 56.6 percent in the banking sector alone. In addition, the 
Government, through the JIC, by the end of 1998, held shares in around 20 companies listed in 
the AFM, with an approximate market value of around 11 percent of total market 
capitalisation. Their ownership is mainly concentrated in the mining and tourism industries, 
such as potash, phosphate, cement and some hotels. 
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With respect to the turnover ratio, which is used as an indicator of market liquidity, this 
increased from 2.8 percent in 1978 to 20.4 percent in 1981, before declining gradually in the 
following three years to reach 7.9 percent in 1984, thereafter rising to its highest historical 
level of 87.1 percent in 1992. The main reason for this large increase in turnover ratio in 1992 
could be the high level of liquidity in the financial sector as 350,000 expatriates returned to 
Jordan, bringing with them their life savings. Apart from bank deposits, the stock exchange 
was the only other major investment vehicle and as a result volumes grew by over 300 
percent. Sharp declines in turnover ratio were recorded in the following six years and it 
reached 15.9 percent in 1998 (see Figure 3.10). This was due to political and economic 
uncertainties. 
With regard to the visibility of the AFM, it is superior to many other markets in the region, 
and Jordan is one of the few countries in the Middle East to be represented on the Board of the 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). Jordan has an institute of accountants 
which decides upon the auditing standards to be followed by Jordanian companies and which 
is attempting gradually to close the gap between local and international standards. All listed 
companies must publish audited financial statements within four months of the year-end. Six- 
month unedited interims are also required (a limited review by auditors is required for banks). 
Historically, the price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio at the AFM has ranged between 7.5 and 24.7. 
The P/E ratio increased from 10.8 in 1978 to its historical high of 24.7 in 1987, before 
declining to 7.5 in 1989 and thereafter continuously increasing to reach 23.2 in 1993. The P/E 
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ratio dropped to 18.1,17.4 and 13.5 in 1994,1995, and 1996, respectively. Thereafter, this 
ratio increased to 14.7 and 16.4 in 1997 and 1998, respectively. The price-to-book value 
increased from 1.2 in 1978 to 1.8 in 1981, before declining to 1.2 in 1990. Subsequently this 
ratio rose to 2.5 in 1993. By the end of 1998, the price-to-book value ratio had declined to 
reach 1.6. Dividend yield increased from 2.3 percent in 1978 to 3.5 percent in 1980, before 
declining to 2.2 percent in 1981 and then rising to its historical peak value of 3.72 percent in 
1984. The next six years witnessed a decline in this ratio which reached 1.85 percent in 1990, 
before rising to 2.3 percent in 1998 (see Figure 3.10). 
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4.4 Characteristics of the Market 
The AFM consists of a broad spectrum of participants they includes companies, individual 
investors, institutional investors, financial institutions, and dealers with assigned 
responsibilities. Trading in the market is based on a continuous trading system. Each company 
has an assigned board on the trading floor and all trades have to be executed through a 
licensed broker on the floor. 
In 1998, there were 33 brokerage firms licensed by the AFM to trade in the market. Fifteen of 
the brokerage firms were public shareholding companies dealing in new shares as well as 
buying and selling securities for their own account and for their clients against a commission 
in the Secondary Market. There were also 16 private shareholding brokerage companies. 
These also buy and sell securities on behalf of their clients against commission and sometimes 
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for their own account. Their legal set-up and nature takes the form of a limited liability 
company. The remaining two take the form of partnerships functioning only as a broker. 
Investors in the AFM, especially in the Secondary Market, are of different groups. The 
breakdown of different types of investor is not documented. There is no available information 
on the percentage of individual investors as opposed to institutional investors, although this 
type of information is crucial. Currently, the main institutional investors in Jordan consist of 
the Social Security Corporation, the Jordan Investment Corporation (government agency), 
insurance companies, saving funds, and different employee provident and investment funds. 
The first two institutions have been mostly net buyers in the market and they do not participate 
frequently on the selling side. 
3.4.1 The Market Trading System 
In principle, the securities traded on the AFM are divided into two groups: equities and debt 
instruments. The buying and selling of orders is handled by licensed brokers and executed on a 
continuous action basis during trading hours. The passing of a client's orders via telephone or 
verbally, however, is acceptable as long as such orders are subsequently confirmed either by 
order forms duly filled and signed by the client, or by an equivalent statement transmitted in 
written form. Trading on the floor takes place in units, each worth JD 50 of the nominal value 
of the shares. Most shares have a nominal value of JD 1, with the exception of a few shares 
such as the Arab Bank with a nominal value of JD 10, the Jordan Petroleum Refinery (JD 5), 
and the Jordan Tobacco and Cigarette Corporation (JD 5). Therefore, a round lot (unit) is 50 
shares for those whose nominal value is JD 1, and 10 shares for those whose nominal value is 
JD 5. 
Settlements among brokers take place a spot basis at (T+1). Prices of shares are quoted in 
Jordanian dinar, and they change increments of JD 0.01 with a maximum change of 5 percent 
on the previous day's close imposed on the day movement of a share6. This ceiling is applied 
6 Such regulation has also been applied in numerous emerging stock markets (e. g., in China, Lithuania, Poland, 
Turkey, South Korea) and also in some mature ones (France). Theoretically, it is widely argued that if the price is 
not allowed to settle at its equilibrium level because of the presence of institutional constraints, demand may not 
match supply (or vice versa) and disequilibrium occurs (see Cou, 1997; and Shen and Wang, 1998). Charemza et 
al., (1997), however, have shown that the appearance of such constraints does not necessarily imply inefficiency. 
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to prevent large price fluctuations, to eliminate unnecessary speculation, and to protect the 
interests of small investors7. The only exception to this rule occurs when there is a stock 
dividend and a price adjustment is required, or when a company is initially listed, in which 
case its price is floated for 15 minutes and the base price is then set for that day. 
Currently, the AFM keeps an up-to-date record of all transactions and all traded shares are 
registered. Registration takes place the day following the trade day, when the brokers record 
the transaction with the AFM. The AFM is given two business days afterwards to update its 
records and to deliver all transactions (contracts) to the issuing companies who should update 
their records accordingly within three business days. The usual full settlement time-frame for 
equity should be a maximum of six business days (T+6). 
In 1997, as mentioned earlier, a new securities law was enacted to reflect the development of 
systems and the sophistication of new products and participants. According to this law, trade 
conformation available electronically and manually at least by the end of the trading day, 
which would increase the speed of transactions and registry and reduce the costs of 
intermediation 8. At T+1, the trade confirmation will be transmitted to the Securities 
Depository Centre (SDC) for clearance and settlement. Integrated with the settlement bank, 
the SDC should be able to both confirm title of the security by seller, and necessary funds for 
the buyer (who will necessarily have at least one account at the settlement bank), and will 
achieve true Delivery Versus Payment (DVP) settlement at T+3 upon confirmation and 
processing of the information (see Figure 3.11). 
Many studies also argue that the absence of price limits cause anomalies causing in turn a lack of efficiency (see 
Claessns et al., 1995; Richards, 1996). 
7 However, some empirical evidence from emerging markets suggests that trade barriers increase, rather than 
decrease portfolio risk. Charemza and Majerowska (2000), for example, seriously criticise the effectiveness of 
price limits, since price limits are expensive, increase market inefficiency and increase portfolio risk. 
8 At the beginning of April 2000, the automated trading system was introduced. This is an important innovation 
in the market microstructure, and perhaps the most important development in the history of the Jordanian stock 
market, allowing every transaction taking place at the AFM to be conducted through a central computer network. 
The process allows quick documentation of all dealings, and, more importantly, it will offer easy access for 
investors into details of the market situation and thus facilitate the entry of foreign capital into the market. See for 
example Economides and Schwartz (1995) and Economides (1995) for a more detailed discussion of the benefits 
of introduction of electronic trading systems in stock markets. 
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3.4.2 Available Market Information 
In any particular area of investment, as is well known, it is imperative to bear all available 
information in mind. Indeed to try and invest rationally, the investor will have to consider 
factors such as economic growth, company reports, government economic policies and many 
others. 
In Jordan, the sources of information available about investment in company shares can be 
divided into three groups: company reports, stock market publications, and brokers' research. 
1. Company Reports. 
Perhaps the most factual and direct source of information is company reports. All the listed 
companies are required by law to publish their annual reports during the first four months 
immediately following the end of the financial year. These include a profit and loss account 
and a balance sheet. 
From a browse through annual reports, we can see that the main sections include notice of the 
annual general meeting, List of Directors, Secretary and Auditors, Chairman's Review, 
Directors' Report, Report of the Auditors and the Accounts. On the balance sheet are included 
measures such as loans, overdrafts and details of share capital, current and other assets 
including listed and unlisted investments, loans to directors, details of valuation of certain 
assets, additions to and disposal of fixed assets, arias of fixed cumulative investment and any 
change in the company's assets. 
In the profit and loss account are listed charges for depreciation, interest on loans and 
overdrafts, charges in corporate tax, investment income, proposed and paid dividends, pension 
and compensation, auditors' remuneration and turnover. One of the conditions of entry into 
the listed stock market is that the company must be prepared to provide shareholders with 
sufficient information for its appraisal. To achieve this, companies are required to enter into a 
general agreement with the Stock Exchange for the provision of information. One of the 
provisions is to prepare a half-yearly report to be sent to the shareholders. In this report a half- 
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year statement of profit and loss and comparative figures for the corresponding period are 
provided. Supplementary information may also be provided by the Chairman's Report. 
II. The Stock Market Publications 
In its various publications, the AFM has been active in providing information about the listed 
companies. These include: 
1. Monthly Statistical Bulletin 
A monthly statistical bulletin is published by the AFM. It contains valuable data and the 
financial ratios of the listed companies. The bulletin includes cumulative market data, and 
sectoral data, as well as individual company data. 
2. Annual Report 
The AFM publishes an annual report on the market's activities during the year. For example, 
the number of shares traded, their market value, number of transactions made, companies 
which have offered new issues, companies' authorised capital and other similar information 
are included. The report also lists all the licensed brokers, the achievements of the Market and 
the Chairman's view regarding future plans. 
3. Companies Guide 
The AFM also publishes the Jordanian shareholding companies guide on an annual basis, to 
provide interested parties with a reference that contains important information. The guide 
includes valuable data and the financial ratios of listed companies, in addition to information 
about numbers of shareholders, ownership ratios, the number of employees in each company 
and their balance sheets and profit and loss cost account for the past five years. In addition, the 
rules and regulations of the Market, Companies Law, Banks Law, and Insurance Law are also 
published. 
4. Daily Official List 
Prices of traded shares are quoted on a daily and weekly basis through the local Arabic and 
English newspapers, reporting the total number of traded shares, their market value, the 
number of transactions made, the closing price and the nominal value of the quoted shares. In 
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addition, a short daily price quotation is broadcast on Jordan Television. The closing prices of 
Jordanian shares listed and traded are quoted and transmitted also via Reuters Monitor 
Network worldwide. In addition to Reuters, private companies have begun participating in the 
disclosure process by facilitating access to information on the market via computer modem 
and telephone services. 
III. Brokers Research 
Although brokers in Jordan have not been active in conducting research on the market or on 
listed companies in the past for of several reasons, mainly the small size of the market, many 
have recently started doing so. There are several brokerage houses that have started 
conducting activities in the market, as well as keeping a database on prices and company 
results. This information is usually supplied to major investors when it is required. There are 
several international institutions that also provide information about the market and companies 
in the market. The IFC, for example, covers Jordan in their emerging markets reports; and the 
HSBC, Worldscope and Meedmoney magazine cover Jordan in their publications. 
3.4.3 Foreign Investment 
The remarkable role that the AFM is playing in mobilising funds and providing investment 
channels on national and international levels was the driving force behind the continuous 
efforts to modernise and improve the efficiency of the Market, through new legislative 
reforms, efforts to automate trading and the depository and the settlement systems, in 
accordance with international standards. As part of these efforts, as mentioned before, a new 
securities law was passed in 1997. The new securities law came as a part of the new regulatory 
and legislative reforms, aimed at liberalising and increasing the openness of the economy in 
order to create a better local climate and attract foreign investments. 
The most important development in the new law was the abolition of the non-Jordanian 
ownership ceiling of 50% and allowing non-Jordanian investors to own up to 100% of any 
companies in any sector of the economy, except for the sectors of construction contracting, 
trading and trade services, and mining. The underlying argument for this reform is that the 
Government has realised that more opening the stock market to foreign investors has many 
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benefits. It represents an opportunity to attract foreign capital to finance economic growth. By 
raising the demand for shares on the stock market, foreign investment liberalisation also 
lowers the cost of capital for local firms9 and adds to their incentives for going public, which 
in turn makes the market more liquid and efficient1° and increases the market size. This, in 
turn, increases local investors' opportunities for portfolio diversification, which raises their 
incentive to invest in shares". i 
The Jordanian Government imposes no restrictions on repatriation of capital if the original 
amount is transferred to the country through a bank. The initial investment and any capital 
gains or dividends can be transferred freely with no restriction. When dividends, which are 
distributed annually, are declared, they are tax-exempt for Jordanians as well as for foreigners 
investing in Jordan. Shares are traded ex-dividend on the day following the general assembly 
meeting, which is usually held during the first four months of each year. In addition, capital 
gains from trading or investing in Jordanian stocks are also exempt for both Jordanians and 
foreigners. Such tax exemptions have contributed significantly to giving the AFM a 
competitive edge on an international level. 
It is worth mentioning that abolishing the ownership ceiling besides other legislative reforms 
had a direct effect on foreign investment at the AFM. As shown in Table (3.2) the value of buy 
orders in 1998 amounted to JD 205.0 million, compared with JD 26.5 million in 1996, an 
increase of JD 178.5 million or 673.6%. The sell orders amounted to JD 80.7 million, 
compared with JD 17.9 million in 1996, an increase of JD 62.8 million or 350.8%. As a 
consequence, the net investment for non-Jordanians in 1998 amounted to JD 124.9 million, 
compared with JD 8.5 million in 1996, an increase of JD 119.4 million or 1404.7%. 
9 Stulz (1997,1999), Bekaert et al., (2000a, b), Kim and Singal (2000) and Henry (2000a, b) provide three reasons 
why stock market liberalisation might cause a fall in the liberalising country's cost of equity capital. First, stock 
market liberalisation might increase net capital inflows and an increased net capital inflow could reduce the risk 
free rate. Second, allowing foreigners to purchase domestic shares facilitates risk sharing between domestic and 
foreign investors and should reduce the equity premium. Finally, increased capital flows should increase stock 
market liquidity, and thereby reduce the equity premium. 
10 Buckberg (1995) and Kim and Singal (2000) provided some evidence that opening up stock markets improves 
markets' efficiency. 
11 For more a detailed discussion of the benefits of open stock markets to foreign investors see, for example, 
Hargis (2000), Bekaert et al., (2000a, b) Kim and Singal (2000) and Bekaert and Harvey (2000). 
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Table 3.2: Trading Volumes of Non-Jordanian Investors in Shares 
(JD Million) 
Year Buy Sell Net 
Companies Individuals Total Companies Individuals Total Investment 
1996 16.5 10 26.5 7.5 10.4 17.9 8.6 
1997 82 18.5 100.2 28.8 14.6 43.4 56.8 
1998 187.8 17.2 205 69.5 11.2 80.7 124.3 
JuUiee: til'1V1, lvluinºiiy Oiausucau tsuiieun, uecember 199 . 
Also in light of the developments in investment of non-Jordanian investors, the percentage of 
their ownership of market capitalisation increased gradually from 31.1 percent in 1994 to 
reach 45.9 percent in 1998. According to the sectional contribution of non-Jordanian investors 
in the capital of shareholding companies, banks and finance companies occupied the first rank 
at an average of 50.2 percent of the total market capitalisation during the period 1994-98, 
followed by the industrial sector at an average of 23.9 percent, the insurance sector at an 
average of 15.8 percent, and finally, the services sector at an average of 6.9 percent (see Table 
3.3). 
Table 3.3: Non-Jordanian Ownership in the Share Holding Companies 
(%) 
Year Banking and 
Finance 
Insurance Services Industry All 
Sector 
1994 46.7 16.0 2.9 23.6 31.1 
1995 46.3 15.7 3.3 19.9 31.0 
1996 47.7 16.5 7.3 21.8 32.8 
1997 53.8 16.0 79.3 26.0 39.1 
1998 56.6 15.1 10.8 27.6 44.3 
Source: Amman Financial Market, The Twenty First Annual Report, 1998. 
2.4.4 The Price Index 
Since 1980, the AFM has had a price index. This indicator was developed to represent the 
general trend of the Market. In 1992, the price index was revised and updated in co-operation 
with the IFC of the World Bank. The methodology chosen to construct the new price index 
was based on market capitalisation, which is similar to the methodology used by the IFC in 
constructing their indices and in calculating many other indices such as the Standard & Poor 
indices. More particularly, in the new price index, besides including companies most 
representative of their sector, factors such as market capitalisation and liquidity are taken into 
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consideration. In general, the index can be considered as an indicator of value, taking prices 
into consideration. 
In 1993, the AFM started publishing this Price Index with its daily stock price list. The base 
year used for the index was 1991 and a modification of the previous years was done to 
correspond with the new chosen sample. The sample initially included 50 companies to 
represent the broad market based on sectoral representation, market capitalisation and 
liquidity. The sample was revised in 1994 to include 60 companies. Figure (3.12) shows the 
developments in the prices based on the above measure of the price index from 1978 to 1998. 
The share price index of the AFM clearly establishes the strong correlation of the stock market 
with economic activity and the political situation. 
3.5 The Development of the Market in Comparison with Worldwide Stock 
Markets 
Global Emerging Markets Research of Baring Securities in 1994 argued that the AMF has 
experienced an impressive development since its establishment in 1978; it has become one of 
the most active and organised markets among the emerging markets. It is also playing an 
important role in the financing of development in Jordan. However, stock market development 
is a multidimensional concept. The term stock market development is associated with size, 
liquidity, stability, regulatory and institutional environment, and integration with the world's 
capital markets. 
In order to investigate the development of the AFM in comparison with other emerging as 
well as developed markets, we used indicators to suit the purpose of the concept of market 
development. This is done by constructing proxies that measure stock market development. 
While none of them measure stock market development exactly, taken together, they provide a 
reasonable representation of the extent of stock market development and are indicators the 
1 most commonly used by academics and practitioners 2. 
12 See for example Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996a) and Beck et al., (1999a). 
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We used sixteen related stock market development13: three measures of stock market size, two 
measures of stock market liquidity, one measure of stock market stability, two measures of 
stock market concentration, two measures of stock market integration with world capital 
market, five measures of stock market regulatory and institutional environment and one for 
market transaction costs. Furthermore, to produce an assessment of the overall of the AFM 
development in comparison with other markets, we calculate indices of stock market 
development that average together the information contain in the individual indicators. 
3.5.1 Stock Market Size 
There are three indicators used to measure stock market size: market capitalisation adjusted 
for size of economy, number of listed companies and average size of companies. Market 
capitalisation refers to the total value of listed shares on the stock exchange. Capitalisation of a 
company is calculated by multiplying the number of that company's shares which are 
outstanding by its share price. To calculate market capitalisation, this information is 
aggregated for all companies listed on the stock market. Since large economies are bound to 
have a large market capitalisation, this variable is adjusted for size of economy by dividing by 
GDP. The assumption underlying the use of this variable as an indicator of stock market 
development is that the size of the stock market is positively correlated with the ability to 
mobilise capital and diversify risk. Bekaert and Harvey (1997) also suggest that the size of the 
stock market may reflect the degree of market integration. Larger market capitalisation relative 
to economic activity suggests that the country is more likely to be integrated into world capital 
markets. 
As shown before, the AFM has developed rapidly since its establishment as illustrated by the 
rise in capitalisation as a percentage of GDP, which was about 68 percent on average during 
the period 1986-1997. As is evident from Table (3.5), this is one of the highest ratios among 
emerging markets, such as Brazil (18%), India (21%), Greece (14%), Korea (37%), Turkey 
(13%), and Mexico (28%), as well as some developed markets, such as Austria (13%), France 
(31 %), Germany (26%) and Canada (64%). 
13 We will use some these indicators i. e., quantitative ones, in the following empirical chapters. 
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The second indicator used to measure stock market size is the number of listed companies. In 
general, more developed markets have a larger number of companies listed on their stock 
exchanges. One reason why a larger list of companies implies a more developed stock market 
is that in mature markets, it is relatively easy to list the companies on the exchange. 
Cumbersome listing rules (as are prevalent in undeveloped markets) deter many companies 
from listing. 
With an average of 103 listed companies during the period 1986 to 1997, Jordan is one of the 
largest Middle East markets in the region: Morocco (28), Kuwait (56), Saudi Arabia (65), 
Tunisia (20), but it is still small compared to other emerging markets as well as developed 
markets such as India (4826), Brazil (562), Korea (682), Greece (174), Turkey (168), France 
(597) and Germany (564). This may indicate that it is relatively difficult for companies to list 
on the Jordanian stock exchange. Actually, the limited number of companies listed on the 
AFM is related to the fact that many Jordanian companies remain family-owned businesses 
with no interest in going public. Their refusal to issue-publicly held equity is based on a fear 
that they will lose control and be forced to disclose what is believed to be personal 
information. 
The average size of the companies listed in stock markets provides an idea about the number 
of shares available for trading. Small size companies listed on the stock exchange implies that 
a smaller number of shares is available for trading, which initially deters investors from 
entering the market and, at a later stage, when trading is active, results in violent price 
movements. Average company size is calculated by dividing the total market capitalisation by 
the number of listed companies. With an average size of US$ 93.2 million from 1986 to 1997, 
Jordan has very small size companies compared with other emerging markets and compared 
with developed markets, for example: Brazil (US$ 476.6 million), Greece (US$ 148.5 
million), Indonesia (US$ 103.2 million), Turkey (US$ 237.7 million) and Mexico (US$ 970.9 
million) (see Table 3.4). 
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3.5.2 Liquidity 
Liquidity refers to the ease and relatively low cost of buying and selling securities. A more 
liquid stock market can encourage investors to acquire more information about firms, and 
allows them to alter their portfolios quickly and cheaply. Thus, a more liquid stock market 
makes investment less risky and facilitates long-term, more profitable investment. A 
comprehensive measure of liquidity would quantify all the costs associated with trading, 
including time costs and the uncertainty of finding a counterpart and of settling the trade. To 
analyse the liquidity of the Jordanian market compared with other emerging and developed 
countries, we use two related measures: turnover ratio and value traded adjusted for the size of 
the economy (GDP). 
Value traded (adjusted for the size of the economy) refers to the value of all trades in the stock 
exchange. This measure is divided by GDP to adjust for the size of the economy. The ratio of 
organised equity trading as a share of gross domestic product positively reflects liquidity on an 
economy-wide base. As is evident from Table (3.4), with about 18.5% of total value/GDP 
ratios, Jordan has a liquid market compared with Middle Eastern markets and most emerging 
markets i. e. Egypt (3.9%), Lebanon (0.7%), and Morocco (2.8%), Greece (4.7%), Turkey 
(10.1%), India (9.7%), and Mexico (12.4%). Compared with developed markets such as 
Canada (31.6%), Australia (35.7%), Germany (35.9%) and Japan (46.5%), Jordan has a 
relatively illiquid market. 
Turnover ratio equals the value traded divided by market capitalisation. It measures the size of 
equity transaction relative to the size of the equity market. High turnover ratio is often used as 
an indicator of low transaction costs. With about 26.5% of turnover ratio during the period 
1987-97, Jordan has a higher turnover ratio when compared with some emerging markets such 
as those in Chile (9.2%), Morocco (10%), South Africa (14%), Pakistan (9.9%), and Tunisia 
(8.7%). When compared with other emerging as well as with developed markets such as those 
in Argentina (41%), Brazil (69.8%), Turkey (78.8%), France (49.6%), Germany (142.8%) and 
others, Jordan exhibits a relatively low turnover ratio. 
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The relatively low liquidity of the AFM compared with some emerging markets as well as 
developed markets is primarily due to the following factors: (i) the current method of trading 
on the exchange: there are no market makers which tends to limit the size of trades that can be 
executed; (ii) a substantial government's share portfolio, a significant portion of which is not 
traded; and (iv) the relative lack and undevelopment of institutional investors, e. g. pension 
funds, insurance companies and mutual funds. 
It is important to note that there is an argument to show that liquidity may not be an 
appropriate indicator of stock market development. Most researchers agree that investors do 
not want investable funds tied up for long periods of time, which would be necessary for the 
financing of long-term projects by firms. Equity markets allow firms to receive the funds 
needed for long-term finance but also provide the liquidity required by investors. Singh 
(1997a) however, argues that this turns equity markets into casinos which suffer from "short- 
termism" where investors have short-term horizons and misguided expectations. Thus, 
according to this argument, excessive liquidity could be an indicator of market inefficiency 
and volatility. 
3.5.3 Market Concentration 
Stock market concentration refers to that select little scrip that dominates market activity. In 
certain emerging markets, while there may be both high capitalisation and volume, a few 
companies dominate the market. Such high concentration may not be desirable, since it affects 
liquidity. Moreover, the large volume of trading activity may be mistakenly interpreted as a 
sign of a developed stock market. Therefore, any measure of stock market development should 
include a proxy of market concentration. 
There are two indicators used to measure stock market concentration: the share of market 
capitalisation accounted for by the ten largest stocks and the share of market trading value 
accounted for by the ten most active stocks. Like most emerging markets, as is evident from 
Table (3.4), Jordan exhibits a high market concentration. The largest ten companies account 
for 59.7 percent of the market capitalisation. Also the ten most active traded stocks with 
respect to trading volume accounted for 51.2 percent of total volume traded in the market. It is 
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important to note here that capitalisation concentration has declined over the last few years in 
this market. There has been an even more significant decline in the share of value traded by 
the most active stocks, which attests to the increased breadth and depth of the market. 
3.5.4 Stability 
No set of measures of stock market development would be complete without a measure of the 
stability of the market because volatility of stock returns is another attribute that has received 
great attention in the theoretical literature and is of great interest to practitioners. One of the 
simplest methods of measuring stability is to observe the movements in stock prices and hence 
market returns. In simple terms, less volatility implies greater stability and as a result greater 
stock market development. This conclusion may not be entirely correct. Indeed, many 
observers would argue that high volatility could be an indicator of development, in that 
revelation of information would lead to its being incorporated in stock prices (Bekaert and 
Harvey, 1995a). 
The IFC provides a calculation of standard deviation of stock market returns for both emerging 
and developed markets based on 60 months of statistical data for stock market returns. Based 
on this statistical reference, the Jordanian stock market is shown to have a standard deviation 
of (0.0388) during the period from 1986 to1997. Compared with both emerging and developed 
markets, the Jordanian stock market exhibits very low level of volatility14, which may indicate 
that Jordan has a relatively stable stock market. This may indicate also that the AFM is 
efficient15. It is well known that in an efficient market, new information will be correctly and 
quickly incorporated into prices and even though that may entail price jumps, prices 
overshooting and deviations from the equilibrium are reduced in efficient markets. Thus, 
holding all else constant, efficient markets will be less volatile than inefficient markets. 
14 This view is consistent with the findings in Bekaert and Harvey (1995a, 1997); Erb, et al., (1995,1998); El- 
Erian and Kumar (1995), Rouwenhorst (1999) and Kim and Singal (2000). The low level of volatility returns 
may imply that the equity capital cost in Jordan is relatively low. 
15 In a recent empirical work, Wright (1999) investigates the long memory in stock returns for 17 emerging 
markets including Jordan. Among very few emerging markets, he finds no evidence of long memory in Jordan 
stock market returns, which implies market efficiency. 
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Table 3.4: Indicators of Stock Market Development, 1986-1997 
(Annual Average) 
Market No. of Average Total Value Turnover Concentration 
Country Capitalisation 
(%) 
Listed 
Companies 
Co. Size 
(US$ M) 
Traded/GDP 
(%) 
Ratio 
(%) 
Capital 
Indicator 
Activity 
Indicator 
Volatility 
(%) 
Argentina 11 166 435.7 4.6 41.5 51.9 85.4 8.80 
Australia 89 1155 571.5 35.7 40.2 N N N 
Austria 13 112 353.7 9.1 69.8 N N N 
Bangladesh 20 152 7.5 2.5 12.6 N N N 
Brazil 18 562 476.6 12.6 67 42.4 63.7 11.09 
Canada 6.4 1177 416.8 31.6 49.2 N N N 
Chile 62 226 244.2 5.7 9.2 42.2 58.3 6.96 
China 6 216 170.1 12.3 201.6 13.9 13.8 18.24 
Colombia 11 118 103.3 0.9 8.5 49.8 67.8 6.93 
France 31 597 987.4 15.2 49.6 N N N 
Germany 26 564 1178.9 36.9 142.8 N N N 
Egypt 18 626 32.0 3.9 22.3 29.8 36.4 8.34 
Greece 14 174 148.5 4.7 34.7 61.1 50.1 6.43 
India 21 4826 22.0 9.7 46.5 24.8 81.1 8.42 
Indonesia 23 184 103.2 10.6 46.4 47.6 32.1 10.97 
Israel 29 449 70.7 13.9 48.4 38.8 32 6.39 
Japan 93 2163 928.7 46.5 50.3 N N 6.91 
Jordan 67 105 39.2 18.5 28.5 59.7 51.1 3.88 
Korea 37 628 54.0 51.8 140.4 38.8 12.5 9.03 
Kuwait N 56 349.8 N N N N N 
Lebanon N 6 322.7 0.7 N N N N 
Malaysia 117 420 132.2 56.6 48.5 36.4 15.5 8.80 
Mexico 26 198 790.9 12.4 48 35.5 45.6 10.26 
Morocco 28 68 248.5 2.8 10 65.2 73.4 4.96 
Nigeria 6 135 20.0 0.1 2.3 45.8 57.2 18.90 
Oman N 64 62.4 N N N N N 
Pakistan 14 620 14.0 1.3 9.9 66.8 90.5 8.80 
Philippines 54 178 141.9 15.6 29 48.1 35.2 9.42 
Portugal 18 176 263.2 7.8 42.9 83.3 67.5 5.11 
Saudi Arabia 10 65 848.4 N N N N N 
South Africa 161 680 361.5 22.5 14 26.1 27.6 6.47 
Spain 29 390 756.2 29.6 102 N N N 
Thailand 45 319 54.6 23.4 52.2 N N N 
Tunisia 20 24 68.0 1.7 8.7 N N N 
Turkey 13 168 237.7 10.1 78.8 54.2 33.7 17.59 
UK 118 1959 928.7 51.9 44.4 N N 3.59 
US 81 7338 1277.7 89.1 110.3 N N 3.03 
Venezuela 14 100 160.2 3.2 23.1 61.5 65.8 13.16 
Zimbabwe 
L- 
31 
I 
60 30.8 2.6 8.4 67.4 42.9 10.95 
Source: Author's calculations based on IFC, Emerging Stock Markets Factbook, different issues. 
3.5.5 Market Integration 
One of the most important indicators of the development of a stock market is its degree of 
integration with other stock markets around the world. To measure the degree of market 
integration, the standard practice is to use an International Arbitrage Pricing Model (IAPM) 
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and an International Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM). Korajczyk (1996) uses a 
multifactor IAPM and ICAPM to measure stock market integration. These models imply that 
the expected return on each asset is linearly related to a benchmark portfolio, or a linear 
combination benchmark portfolio. In domestic versions of these models, the benchmark 
portfolios include only securities traded on the domestic exchange, while the international 
version includes all securities. 
If the models are correct, then the benchmark portfolio should explain all the systematic 
expected returns on assets above the risk free interest rate. Under the hypothesis that the 
models are correct, any systematic deviation of expected return from a risk free asset is termed 
as excess returns on a risk free asset, or zero beta assets (an asset with zero correlation with a 
benchmarket portfolio. Korajczyk (1996), by using IAPM and ICAPM models, computes the 
systematic deviation between actual returns and those implied by the model. 
In particular, for a benchmark portfolio, P, and given in assets and T period, consider the 
following regression: 
Rk 
t= ak + 
bk P+ 6k. r 
k =1,2,..., 
where Rk, t is excess return on asset k, in period t, i. e., the return above the return on a risk free 
or zero- beta asset, ak is mis-pricing k relative to the benchmark portfolio. 
If stock markets are perfectly integrated, then the intercept in a regression of any assets excess 
return on p should be zero, which implies that in a such market there is no excess return, or in 
other words, 
a, =a2 ="""=a1 =0 (3.2) 
Accept of equation (3.2) implies efficiency and, therefore, market integration. The absolute 
value of the intercept term in equation (3.1) is taken as a proxy for market integration and the 
ability of an agent to diversify risk internationally. Thus a greater value of IAPM and ICAPM 
measures imply asset pricing inefficiency, and thus less stock market integration. According to 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996a), greater pricing errors reflect poor information about 
firms, high transaction costs, and official barriers to international asset trading. To compute 
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estimates of stock market integration for each stock market, Korajczyk (1996) computes the 
average of the absolute value of ak equation (3.1) across all stock in each country, and he 
shows also that the greater excess return may reflect a variety of constraints to integration, 
higher official barriers to international trading, higher transaction costs, and poor information 
about firms. 
Table (3.5) lists the Korajczyk measure of the average of the absolute value of ak, under both 
IAPM and ICAPM across 24 countries' stock markets including Jordan, during the period 
1986-1996. Both the IAPM and ICAPM measures give a similar result for Jordan: 2.53 under 
IAPM and 2.55 under ICAPM. Compared with both developed and emerging markets, 
Jordan's stock market appeared to have a low value of error pricing, which indicated a high 
degree of integration with other stock markets around the world and as well as market price 
16 efficiency 
3.5.6 Transaction Costs 
Market microstructure is a key determinant of transaction costs (trading costs), directly 
through the institutional and competitive structure of the market, and more directly through 
any taxes or regulatory charges on market participants. Transaction costs, in turn, affect 
market performance through their effect on trading volumes. Therefore, the level of 
transaction costs may provide an indicator as to the development of market microstructure 
e. g., regulatory regime, trading mechanisms, the type of information available to market 
participation and the manner in which incoming orders to buy and sell are matched. 
Transactions cost may have several effects on a market's performance: for example, one might 
expect that increased transaction costs would increase the average holding period of securities 
(Harvey, 1994)17. However, the main effect of increased transactions costs is usually thought 
16 This result is consistent with Bekaert and Harvey's (1995b) findings, who used the regime switching model to 
examine the time varying world market integration in twelve emerging markets including Jordan. They find that 
Jordan has a high degree of market integration with the world market estimated at 85% over all the sample period 
from 1978 to 1993 compared with (59%) for Chile, (14%) for Colombia, (54%) for India, (79%) for Malaysia, 
(21%) for Mexico (27%) for Nigeria, (89%) for Greece, (97%) for Korea, (89%) for Taiwan, (77%) for Thailand, 
and (47%) for Zimbabwe. 
17 Bulkley and Harris (1997), however, show that the reverse may be true, because increased transaction costs 
cause a bias in investment decisions towards assets with shorter pay-offs, thus reducing average holding periods. 
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to be that they reduce the incentive to trade, and therefore produce a thinner market. Thin 
trading tends to induce or increase autocorrelation in share returns and it also affects volatility. 
Another important effect of transaction costs relates to market efficiency. In general, 
regulatory policy has a direct impact on stock market efficiency in that trading arrangements, 
costs and taxes may produce too little or too much trading, and thus causes inefficiency 
(Stiglitz, 1989b; and Roll, 1989)8. 1 
Transaction costs include both the fixed costs associated with a trade, such as taxes and 
commissions, as well as the major costs that the market imposes: the bid/ask spread, which is 
the difference between the offer and bid price. The spread that investors pay for accessing the 
market reflects a combination of factors, including the differences of opinion held by buyers 
and sellers, but also including microstructure features. In some markets, for example, a market 
maker is responsible for quoting prices. He has responsibility for ensuring market liquidity, 
but the risk associated with that activity is reflected in the bid/ask spread, which is the source 
of returns on the market maker's inventory and for bearing risk. Alternatively, multiple market 
makers are possible and the competition this provides should reduce spreads. In markets like 
Jordan's, no designated market maker exists, perhaps reducing spreads even further, but, with 
no individual responsible for making the market, investors are exposed to the possibility of 
reduced levels of liquidity. Adopting a microstructure that allows for competition among 
traders may have a direct effect on trading costs. 
Barings Securities provides information on transactions costs for many emerging markets. 
Barings Securities calculates the percentage spread as the difference between the offer and bid 
price divided by the average of the offer and bid price. Barings uses the mid-point in the 
divisor in order to avoid the problems caused by large fluctuations in the current price. The 
last column of Table (2.6) presents estimates of the percentage spreads from Barings 
Securities, based on snapshots of individual stocks during the weeks of July 17 and July 24, 
1995. The country spreads are calculated by capitalisation-weighteding the percentage spreads 
of the individual firms within each country. As we can see from the numbers in the last 
column of Table (3.5), the percentage spread in Jordan is very low (58 bp) compared with the 
18 For empirical evidence see for example Green, et al., (2000). 
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other countries included. For example, the spread in Chile is close to 400bp. In both Argentina 
and Turkey, the percentage spread is more than 150 bp. 
Table 3.5: Indicators of Stock Market Development- 
Market inteuratinn and gnri nd Ana1ve: c 
Market Inte rations 
Country IAPM 
Pricing Error 
ICAPM 
Pricing Error Market Spread 
(Basis Points) 
1 Argentina 4.98 11.58 155 
2 Australia 4.94 4.14 
3 Brazil 7.26 6.92 85 
4 Chile 5.56 4.25 393 
5 Colombia 5.62 4.82 100 
6 Greece 5.29 5.23 48 
7 India 3.33 2.89 150 
8 Indonesia 3.68 3.03 112 
9 Japan 2.39 2.26 
10 Jordan 2.55 2.05 58 
11 Korea 3.73 3.18 41 
12 Malaysia 3.90 2.45 69 
13 Mexico 5.94 5.77 93 
14 Nigeria 3.66 3.72 
15 Pakistan 2.59 2.15 38 
16 Philippines 5.26 4.90 94 
17 Portugal 4.02 5.28 93 
18 Taiwan 5.68 3.18 47 
19 Thailand 3.12 6.66 70 
20 Turkey 6.38 2.56 160 
21 United Kingdom 2.94 2.24 
22 United States 2.71 2.24 
23 Venezuela 6.67 5.15 
24 Zimbabwe 5.57 5.18 
Source: (a) Korajczyk, A. (1996). (b) From Barings Securities (July 1995). 
2.5.7 Regulation and Institution Indicators 
Qualifying the extent of stock market development also requires a look into the institutional 
aspects of the country's market environment, it's underlying legal and tax framework, its 
accounting standards and also its provision of a regulatory mechanism. In general developed 
stock markets have prudential supervisory bodies, information disclosure, low transaction 
costs, and short settlement times in case of disputes over financial and other contracts. 
The regulatory and institutional environment helps define the development stage of the stock 
market. Dividend repatriation rules, ceilings in equity returns, and tax laws influence the 
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extent and level of foreign equity participation. Standardised accounting rules instil investor 
confidence in the quality of information and data for companies. Accurate and timely 
publishing of key financial information such as pricing-earnings (P/E) ratios allow market 
watchers to process such information. All this promotes stock market development, by 
lowering the transaction costs for the use of equity capital. 
In order to measure regulatory and institutional development as a proxy of stock market 
development, we use the indicators developed by IFC for its Emerging Markets database: 
regular publication of P/E ratio, accounting standards, investor protection, Securities 
Commission, and restrictions on investors. Unlike the financial indicators of stock market 
development which can be quantified, these indicators are relatively subjective. 
A. Regular publication of PIE ratios: a regular publication of price-earnings ratios is one 
yardstick for judging how a company is doing and what kind of income potential it has in 
future, since companies with high P/E ratios are regarded as better investments. The IFC 
classifies the stock market regarding the published price-earning information into two groups: 
markets which publish this information are international and comprehensive, and the others 
are not. 
B. Accounting standards: financial information may not be accurate or comparable from 
company to company without the adoption and enforcement of accounting standards, which 
are generally accepted. If foreign investment is to be encouraged, accounting practices need to 
be in line with internationally accepted accounting standards. To the question, " Does the 
country have internationally accepted accounting standards? " The IFC classified the 
countries in three groups: countries that have good accounting standards, countries that have 
adequate accounting standards, and others that have poor (internationally accepted) accounting 
standards. 
C. Investment protection: an important characteristic for the development of a stock market 
is the presence of protection mechanisms including provisions regarding the duties of insiders 
(directors and corporate officers), the rights and remedies of shareholders, disclosure and use 
of information by insiders, and takeovers and new issues. Also, creditors' protection 
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mechanisms are required. The most basic of these are rights to repossess collateral and to 
participate in key decisions such as filing for creditor protection and management during 
reorganisation. Strong disclosure and accounting standards and practices are essential for both 
equity and debt investors to monitor corporate performance. Legal and regulatory enforcement 
is also essential, of course, for these rules to have real content. The IFC classifies the countries 
according to the quality of their investment protection laws: countries that have good 
protection laws, countries that have adequate protection laws, and others that have poor 
protection laws. 
D. Security Commission: it is widely agreed that an appropriate regulatory framework for 
securities is needed to increase investor confidence. Regulation is unlikely to be satisfactory if 
left entirely to the market. And also, in order for a market to operate, intermediaries 
(underwriters, dealers, brokers, research firms, and investment banks) between buyer and 
seller should exist. To make these institutions work as well, in facilitating an environment 
conducive to investment, brokerage rates, underwriting fees etc., must be high enough for 
these institutions to attract and still leave shareholders with an adequate return on capital. 
Having a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) does all this. 
E. Restrictions on foreign investors: one issue of prime importance developing a stock 
market is the question of whether there are restrictions on repatriation of dividend income, 
capital and entry/exit of the firms. The integration globalisation of financial markets implies 
that there is free trade in financial services as well as in financial assets. While the scale of 
capital flowing to and from developing countries is substantial, the financial markets of some 
developing countries are closed, while others continue to restrict outward capital flows in an 
attempt to direct more domestic funds towards domestic investments. 
The restrictions on foreign portfolio investors take many forms: formal or informal limits on 
the degree of foreign participation permitted in the market, formal or informal limits on 
foreign ownership of corporations, and rules governing hard currency repatriation of profits 
and capital by foreigners. These, restrictions could also take another form, if the country has a 
tax bias against equity finance, where a large percentage of capital gains and dividend income 
is withheld as taxes. This tax will discourage the investors from investing in these countries, 
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since they could seek a more profitable net return elsewhere. In this context, it is useful to note 
here that high capital gains taxes, or taxes on equity market transactions, can directly affect 
growth rates. These taxes alter resources allocation by reducing the expected after-tax resale 
value of companies' stock. This reduces the fraction of resources invested, and may thus have 
adverse consequences for growth. 
The IFC classifies stock markets on the basis of their treatment of foreign portfolio investment 
into the following categories: free entry markets, being markets that have no significant 
restriction on purchasing or buying stocks; relatively free entry markets, being markets that 
have some restriction procedures required to ensure repatriation rights; special class markets, 
being markets that have restrictions to a certain class of stock designated for foreign investors; 
authorised investor markets, being markets where foreign investors might be approved in 
buying stocks; and closed markets. Being markets that are closed, or where access is severely 
restricted (e. g., for non-resident nationals only). 
With regard to the repatriation of profits or income (dividends, interest, and realised capital 
gain) and capital (initial capital investment), the IFC classifies stock markets into two 
categories: free stock markets, and stock markets that have some restrictions. In the free 
markets, repatriation is done routinely, while in other markets, repatriation requires some 
registration with or permission from a central bank, ministry of finance, or an official of 
exchange control that may restrict the timing of exchange release. 
As it is evident from institutional development indicators, Jordan appears to have a more 
developed stock market compared to most emerging markets: the price-earning information is 
published internationally and comprehensively, accounting standards are good and 
internationally accepted, investor protection laws are adequate, listed stocks are freely 
available to foreign investors, income and capital are freely repatriated, and there is no tax on 
capital gains and dividends yield (see Table 3.6). 
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Table 3.6: Indicators of Stock Market llPVPlnnýPnt_Tnctitntinnýl Tnýl.,. ýt,... ý 
Country Publish Accounting Investor Restriction 
Re aration of 
Withholding Taxes (%) 
PIE Standard Protection on Entry Capital Income Interest Dividends Capital 
Gains 
Argentina C A A F F F 0 0 0 
Brazil C G G F F F 15 0 0 
Chile C G G RF SR SR 15 30 35 
China C P P SC F 0 20 0 
Colombia C A A Al F F 7 0 0 
Egypt F F F 0 0 0 
Greece C A A F F F 15 0 0 
India C G G Al F F 20 20 10 
Indonesia C P A RF SR SR 20 20 0 
Israel 35 25 0 
Jordan C G G F F F 0 0 0 
Korea C G G RF F F 13.2 16.5 0 
Malaysia C G G F F F 15 0 0 
Mexico C G G F F F 0 0 0 
Morocco 0 10 0 
Nigeria P A A 10 10 10 
Oman F 0 0 0 
Pakistan C A A F F F 10 10 0 
Philippines C G A SC F F 20 15 0.5 
Portugal C A A F F F 40 20 0 
South Africa F F F 0 0 0 
Thailand RF F F 15 10 0 
Tunisia 20 0 0 
Turkey C A A F F F 0 0 0 
Venezuela C A A RF SR SR 0 0 1 
Zimbabwe C A A RF F F 30 15 10 
Source: IFC, International Stock Market Factbooks, 1994-1998. 
Key: 
Regular Publications of PIE: P =Published, C =Comprehensive and published internationally 
Accounting Standards: G =Good, of internationally acceptable quality; A =Adequate; P= Poor, requires reform 
Investor Protection: G =Good, of internationally acceptable quality; A= Adequate; P =Poor, requires reform 
Restriction on entry: F=Free entry; RF=Relatively free entry; SC=Special Classes; AI=Authorised 
investors only. 
Repatriation of income and capital: F=Free, SR=Some Restrictions 
3.5.7 Stock Market Development Indices 
While each of the indicators discussed above gives certain aspects of stock market 
development, it would be particularly difficult to assess the level of development of the AFM 
compared with other markets based on individual sets of indicators. Consequently, in order to 
provide a clearer picture of the development of the AFM compared with emerging as well as 
developed markets, we have used the IFC methodology developed by the Emerging Markets 
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database group and Den rguc-Kunt and Levine's (1996a) contract conglomerate indices of 
stock market development that aggregate information contained in individual indicators. Here 
we contract four conglomerate indices. As a first step for each country k, the mean removed 
value (X) is calculated for the following stock market development indicators: market 
capitalisation, traded/GDP and turnover ratios. 
X (k)' - 
[X (k) - mean (x)] 
ABS l mean (X )I 
(3.3) 
where X(k) is the mean removed value of stock market development indicator X, for country 
k. Mean(X) is the average value of X across all countries from 1986 to 1997. ABS I mean 
(X) is the absolute value of mean (X). 
As a second step, we take a simple average of the mean removed market capitalisation, value 
traded/GDP and turnover ratios to obtain an over index of stock market development, INDEX 
A. INDEX B is contracted in the same way. It aggregates information on the three indicators 
used in INDEX A and IPAM pricing errors to option a more comprehensive index that 
incorporates international integration. Since IAPM provides data for only 23 countries, this 
index is only valid for 23 countries. INDEX C is similar to INDEX B, however it combines 
INDEX A with ICAPM pricing errors. Given data restrictions, it is computed also for 23 
countries. Finally, INDEX C averages the mean removed values of market capitalisation, 
value traded/GDP, turnover ratio, IAPM pricing errors, market concentration, and market 
volatility. This indicator is computed for the 18 countries with data on all six underlying 
indicators. It is important to note here that for pricing error, concentration ratio and volatility, 
where a larger number refers to less stock market development, we multiply the indicator 
number by minus one before computing the means-removed values. 
Table (3.7) gives the country-by-country values and rankings for the four aggregate indices. 
As is evident from this table, we can say that Jordan has a developed stock market compared 
with the emerging as well as with the developed markets. Particularly, INDEX A, which 
aggregates the information on market size and liquidity, ranks the AFM development 
thirteenth out of the thirty-five markets included in this index. INDEX B and INDEX C, which 
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combine INDEX A with price error measures (IAPM and ICAM), give similar results. They 
rank AFM development eighth among the twenty-three markets included in these indices. 
Finally, INDEX D, which aggregates information on market size, liquidity, international 
integration (IAPM pricing errors), market concentration and volatility, ranks AFM 
development third (after Malaysia and Korea) among the eighteen markets included in this 
index' 9 
Table 3.7: A re ate Index o f Stock Market Develo ment, 198 6-1997 
Country INDEX A INDEX B INDEX C IND EX D 
Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank 
Argentina -0.5 26 -0.9 17 -1.31 23 -1.27 14 
Australia 0.73 9 0.02 6 0.05 6 
Austria -0.19 21 
Bangladesh -0.68 32 
Brazil -0.11 18 -0.98 21 -0.99 19 -1.08 10 
Canada 0.51 11 
Chile -0.28 22 -0.77 16 -0.74 14 -1.20 13 
China 0.87 7 
Colombia -0.82 35 -0.76 15 -1.15 22 -0.97 8 
France 0.07 14 
Germany 0.98 6 
Egypt -0.53 26 
Greece -0.48 25 -0.92 19 -0.92 16 -1.50 17 
India -0.34 23 -0.69 13 -0.68 12 -0.93 
4 
Indonesia -0.17 20 -0.58 11 -0.58 10 -0.95 
6 
Israel -0.12 19 
Japan 1.04 5 0.39 5 0.40 5 
Jordan 0.14 13 -0.28 8 -0.26 8 -0.75 3 
Korea 1.35 4 0.57 4 0.57 4 -0.35 2 
Malaysia 1.4 3 0.58 3 0.66 2 -0.32 1 
Mexico -0.08 16 -0.61 12 -0.65 
11 -0.94 5 
Morocco -0.63 30 
Nigeria -0.62 27 -0.92 18 -0.93 
17 -1.10 12 
Pakistan -0.77 34 -0.97 20 -0.96 
18 -1.22 14 
Philippines -0.02 15 -0.55 9 -0.56 
9 -0.96 7 
Portugal -0.37 24 -0.751 14 -0.84 
15 -1.08 10 
South Africa 0.92 8 
Spain 0.62 10 
Thailand 0.3 12 -0.26 7 -0.21 7 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
-0.72 
-0.10 
33 
17 -0.53 10 -0.70 13 -1.03 
9 
UK 1.39 2 0.63 2 0.64 3 
US 2.17 1 1.23 1 1.24 1 
Venezuela -0.67 31 -1.07 23 1.05 
21 -1.50 17 
Zimbabwe -0.62 27 -1.03 22 -1.02 
20 -1.42 16 
No. of Countries 35 23 23 
18 
Source: Author's calculations. 
19 These results are consistent with Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996a, Table 
4), and Levine and Zervos, (1996, 
Table 1). 
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3.6 Sammary and Conclusion 
The AFM has developed greatly since its establishment and has succeeded in accomplishing 
several of its goals by mobilising capital into the productive sectors of the economy. This is 
evidenced by the level of high activity in the Primary Market over the last decade. It also 
highlights the importance of the Capital Market to the national economy when comparing the 
size of the market to GDP. When comparing the AFM with other emerging markets, this 
market appears to be well organised, attractive, and well managed with much potential for 
growth. In fact, the AFM today ranks among the leaders of the emerging markets. 
Unfortunately, AFM development in the last few years has been constrained by lingering high 
interest rates which have driven whatever financial market liquidity that exists into short-term 
time deposits. 
The AFM is considered to be one of the most liquid and active bourses in the Middle East. 
However, as shown by the relative weakness of the AFM over the last few years, the market 
remains sensitive to economic and political developments (especially the Middle East peace 
process). This in turn is a reflection of the thinness of the market and the dependence of the 
small Jordanian economy on the other countries in the region and on their prospects. However, 
it is clear that the AFM's past record of performance places it in a strong position to provide 
increasing amounts of equity capital to Jordanian companies. When viewed in the context of 
Jordan's pivotal role in the Middle East process, the AFM has the potential to develop into a 
regional securities market, attracting global funds for companies in the region. 
The AFM can also play a significant role in the planned privatisation of public sector 
enterprises in Jordan. This role can be in the form of evaluating stocks of public sector 
enterprises offered for sale, providing funds necessary for investors in stocks, providing hire- 
purchase funding for the small investor, and transforming part of the debt of public sector 
enterprises into equity shareholding. This will rectify their financial structures and enable the 
promotion of their shares when they are offered for sale, as well as assisting in the 
establishment of investment funds to place investors' funds in stock and widening ownership 
of shares. 
94 
Despite the accomplishments so far, the AFM has much room for improvement to become a 
regional financial market in the future. And there are several comparative advantages in this 
market, which should be further developed in order to improve its efficiency and to attract 
international investments, which would increase the depth of the market and enable it better to 
compete at emerging markets level. 
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Chapter IV 
Literature Review 
4.1 Introduction 
Much of the criticism of the development of stock markets, especially in developing countries, 
arises from the speculative nature of these markets. Critics claim that to a large extent, the 
observed prices and their movements are not captured by so called "market fundamentals" 
(Shiller, 1981), and this has adverse implications for capital formulation and economic growth 
(De Long et al., 1990). Some critics argue that stock market discipline cannot be enforced in 
developing countries due to information problems, lack of prudent regulatory bodies, high 
transaction costs, inadequate competition, and a lack of investors due to imperfect information 
flows. 
Furthermore, some researchers have concluded that banks are more suitable than stock 
markets for developing countries in particular (Stiglitz, 1989a; Collier and Mayer, 1989; 
Cobham, 1995; and Dow and Gorton, 1997), and that stock markets do more harm than good 
(Singh, 1992a, 1996,1997a, 1999). Singh, for example, argues that some characteristics of 
mature stock markets, such as volatility, deterrence of risk-averse savers and the demands of 
speculative investors for short-term profits at the expense of long-term growth, were likely to 
be a far larger problem in developing markets and to have a negative impact on the country's 
overall development. 
In terms of theory, researchers hold different opinions regarding the importance of stock 
markets for economic development. A growing theoretical literature argues that stock markets 
are importantly linked to economic growth. They provide services that boost economic 
growth. For example, Greenwood and Smith (1997) show that large capitalised stock markets 
can facilitate investments in the most productive technologies projects, by lowering the cost of 
mobilising savings. Levine (1991), Bencivenga and Smith (1991), Bencivenga et al., 
(1995,1996), Diamond (1996), Greenwood and Smith (1997), and Fulghieri and Rovelli 
(1998) and others argue that stock market liquidity is important for economic growth. 
Moreover, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Merton (1987), Bhide (1993), and Holmstrom and 
Tirol (1993) and others argue that liquid stock markets can increase incentives to acquire 
information about firms and improve corporate governance. Obstfeld (1995) and others show 
that international risk sharing through the integration of stock markets improves resource 
allocation and thereby accelerates the rate of economic growth. Finally, Chain et al., (1999) 
argue that beside the traditional channels, stock markets are an important path through which 
monetary policy affects economic growth. 
However, Mayer (1988) shows that even large stock markets are unimportant sources of 
corporate finance. Stiglitz (1985,1993) argues that stock market liquidity will not enhance 
incentives for acquiring information about companies or exerting corporate governance. 
Further, Tullio and Pagano (1994) show that greater liquidity of stock markets reduces 
uncertainty and this in turn may reduce savings rates to the extent that economic growth 
decelerates. Moreover, Devereux and Smith (1994) argue that greater risk sharing through 
internationally integrated stock markets can reduce savings rates and thereby slow economic 
growth. Finally, Morck et al., (1990) and others emphasise that stock markets can damage 
economic growth by easing the corporate takeover mechanism. 
With regard to empirical work on the role of stock markets in the economic development 
process, there seems to be a lack of research in this direction. Part of the problem lies in the 
absence of indicators that can accurately measure the extent of stock market development. For 
a long time academics had neither a common concept nor a common measure of stock market 
development (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1996a). With the exception of work such as that of 
Atji and Jovanovic (1993) and Levine and Zervos (1996,1998a) at macroeconomic level and 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998,2000), Rajan and Zingales (1998), and Beck and 
Levine (2000) at firm and industrial levels, this topic has been virtually ignored. 
1 These works will be discussed in detail in the following chapters. 
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In this chapter we survey the literature on the stock markets-economic growth nexus in order 
to put the research on this topic into perspective. The survey begins by reviewing the 
theoretical growth literature. Then the theoretical literature on stock market functions is 
reviewed. In this review we focus on the ties between economic growth and the quality of the 
functions provided by stock markets which play critical roles in an economy. These functions 
include facilitating liquidity, risk diversification, information production, corporate control 
and monitoring, capital mobilising, and providing a transmission path for monetary policy. 
Then we present the most important theoretical literature that directly models the role of 
financial markets in economic development. Considering the debate in financial literature 
which hinges on the assumption that debt and equity finance are substitutes for each other, this 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the importance of stock markets vis-ä-vis banks for 
developing countries. 
4.1 Economic Growth Theory: An Overview 
Economic growth theory addressees an issue which is of fundamental importance to human 
welfare: the determination of living standards. Economic growth, defined throughout this 
study as growth in real per capita gross domestic product (GDP), is obviously not the sole 
determinant of economic development. Other elements such as the distribution of income, the 
availability of health care and access to education, are also important factors. Economic 
growth, however, is a critical condition. Indeed, a continued increase in the average standard 
of living of the population of any country can only occur as the result of sustained economic 
growth. 
The formal study of economic growth and the public policies necessary to encourage a 
2 sustained increase in output began over three hundred years ago by Sir William Petty. 
However, it was not until John Stuart Mill, the most prominent of the early growth 
economists, that any analytical framework was applied to the growth process. The organising 
2 Sir William Petty (1676), measured, compared, and discussed changes in the standards of living in France and 
England 
. Cited 
in Eltis (2000). 
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theme of his " Principles of Political Economy" (1848) was a production function based on 
land, labour, capital, and the productivity of these inputs3. 
By the early 1960s, neo-classical growth theory was the generally accepted approach to 
modelling growth. Based on the work of Solow (1956), Swan (1956), and Cass (1965), this 
kind of framework assumes a neo-classical production function with a constant return to scale, 
diminishing returns to each input (labour and capital) as well as a smooth elasticity of 
substitution between the inputs. 
The neo-classical growth model is thus a fairly simple general equilibrium model that 
emphasises the process that leads an economy to its steady-state crucial role in ensuring 
convergence to such a steady-state but also implies that, in the steady state, the productivity of 
capital is zero, the capital labour ratio is fixed, and that hence growth-generated endogenous 
factors (i. e., capital accumulation) are zero. In this model, the steady-state rate can be positive 
if some exogenous force (usually technological progress) is acting on the system- hence the 
expression "exogenous growth model". Since this model assumes that the rate of technological 
change is given exogenously, it does not provide a useful framework for understanding 
economic forces and policies, such as the financial factors effect. In this model financial 
factors, at most, can influence only the equilibrium level of capital stock per worker, but not 
the rate of economic growth. 
In the mid-1980s, a new wave of research on economic growth appeared. This wave led to the 
development of what has been called "endogenous growth theory", which sought to generate 
alternative ways of modelling the determination of long-term growth rates by focusing on 
economic growth as an endogenous outcome of an economic system. New endogenous growth 
theory began with the works of Romer (1986), Lucas (1988) and Rebelo (1991) who 
developed models characterised by non-decreasing returns to a broad class of capital goods 
(including human capital). This type of framework built on earlier work by Arrow (1962), who 
constructed a growth model without the tendency for capital accumulation to generate 
diminishing returns by introducing knowledge spillover across producers. Romer's (1986) 
main contribution was to integrate these types of spillover into a competitive framework. 
3 For more information about the history of economic growth theories see for example Eltis (2000). 
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What Follows is an attempt to illustrate the chief contribution of the endogenous growth 
theory vis-a-vis neo-classical growth theory. 
Consider the following production function, which for simplicity, depends only on the capital 
stock 
Yý _f (K, ) (4.1) 
where Yt and Kt denote the output and stock of capital at time t, respectively. By totally 
differentiating equation (4.1), we have: 
G, = 
dk` 
.f 
(Kt) = sr (Pt (4.2) 
yt 
where Gy is the growth rate of output, s is the savings rate, and cp is the marginal productivity 
of capital. 
In the traditional literature on growth, emphasis has been placed on the dynamic process that 
would lead the economy to a steady-state equilibrium in which per capita real output growth 
would eventually stop. The assumption of the decreasing marginal productivity of capital 
plays a crucial role in ensuring convergence to such a steady-state equilibrium. In the context 
of equation (4.2), decreasing marginal productivity of capital, cp, and hence output growth, 
goes to zero as capital stock, K, grows over time. 
The new endogenous growth theory, however, considers a different mechanism in which the 
marginal productivity of capital does not converge to zero as capital grows unboundedly. 
Thus, it is possible for real per capita output to grow endogenously, even in the absence of 
exogenous productivity growth. By altering the rate of technological advancement or human 
capital accumulation, and thereby investment in physical and human capital, respectively, the 
endogenous growth theory showed that they could influence long-term steady growth. Since 
there are externalities to human and physical capital in this theory, appropriate policies and 
choices help private agents internalise these externalities which could accelerate long-term 
growth. Thus, the overall policy regime of a country, including taxes, financial structures, 
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market and regulatory regimes, and macroeconomic distortions, could alter savings and 
investment allocation decisions in ways that alter long-term growth. 
The birth of the endogenous growth theory has enabled the development of tractable growth 
models where the long-term rate can be affected by elements such as technology, government 
policies and institutional arrangements. This has rekindled interest in the role of financial 
development in economic growth. There was obviously no way to induce a role for finance in 
the determination of long-term rate in the neo-classical model; financial factors in the steady 
state could be related to the level of capital stock per worker or to the level of productivity but 
not their respective growth rates. Outside of the steady state, financial elements could affect 
the transitional growth rate but not the long-term growth rate. 
Drawing on the developments in endogenous growth theory, a literature has recently emerged 
that examines the effects of financial development on long-term growth rates. This body of 
work, reviewed by Levine (1997), Bossone (2000), and Tsuru (2000), emphasises how 
functions exercised by financial intermediaries, such as mobilising capital, helping to allocate 
resources, monitoring managers, and facilitating risk management, can affect economic 
growth. 
4.3 The Functions of Stock Markets 
The role and impact of stock markets on the economic development process have not received 
as much attention as other elements of the financial sector. Historically, the economists have 
focused on banks. Schumpeter (1912)4 and more recently Patrick (1966) argue that the 
services provided by the banking system are essential for technological innovation and 
economic growth. Goldsmith (1969) and McKinnon (1973) and others provide conceptual 
descriptions of how the financial system affects economic growth. Recent theoretical models 
have documented the links between banks and economic activity. By economising on the costs 
of acquiring and processing information about firms and managers, banks can influence 
resources allocation. Better banks are lower cost producers of information with consequent 
4 This reference is from Levine et al., (2000). 
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ramifications for capital allocation and productivity growth (Diamond, 1984; Greenwood and 
Jovanovic, 1990; King and Levine, 1993a, b; and Arnold and Walz, 2000). 
In the last decade the availability of more appropriate data has increased the number of 
empirical researches in this field. Ghani (1992), King and Levine (1993a, b), Degregorio and 
Giudotti (1995), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), Rousseau and Wachtel (1998), 
Beck et al., (1999b), Levine et al., (2000), Levine (2000), and others show that measures of 
banking development are strongly correlated with economic growth in a broad cross-section of 
countries. According to this view of researchers, a well-functioning financial system is critical 
for sustained economic growth. 
Besides the historical focus on banks, during the last decade a growing theoretical literature 
suggests that well-functioning stock markets can play an important role in the economic 
development process by performing the following financial functions: facilitating liquidity, 
diversification risk, aggregating and disseminating information about firms, promoting 
corporate control and monitoring and transmitting a path for monetary policy. By altering the 
quality of these functions, a well-functioning stock market can affect a steady state of growth 
by altering the rate of savings rate, technological innovation, and economic efficiency. 
Debate exists, however, over the signs of the effects of stock markets on economic growth: 
many theoretical studies suggest that stock market development slows economic growth. With 
regard to this debate on the relationships between stock market development and economic 
growth the follows a detailed discussion of the stock market functions mentioned above, and 
how these functions affect economic growth. It is worth noting here that this does not mean 
that any stock market provides these functions in isolation. As a matter of fact, a well- 
functioning stock market provides the aggregate of these individual functions. Any theory of 
stock markets, therefore, will need to synthesise these functions into a single coherent whole 
while understanding the link between stock market development and economic growth. The 
following pages will show that none of these studies provided a comprehensive framework for 
the different functions provided by stock markets. 
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4.3.1 Liquidity 
One way stock markets may affect economic activity is through their liquidity. Liquidity refers 
to the ease and speed with which agents can convert assets into purchasing power without 
large price changes between trades (Economides and Siow, 1988). In other words, it is the 
ability to perform a transaction without cost. Thus, real estate is typically less liquid than 
equities, and equities in advanced stock markets, such as the UK, Japan, and the US are 
typically more liquid than equities traded on most of the emerging stock markets. Liquid stock 
markets are those where it is relatively inexpensive to trade equities and where there is little 
uncertainty about the timing and settlement of these trades (Levine, 1997). 
The link between liquidity and economic growth arises because many high-return projects 
require a long-term commitment of capital. Savers, however, do not like to relinquish control 
of their savings for long periods. Thus without a liquid stock market, or other financial 
institutions that promote liquidity for long-term investment, less investment is likely to occur 
in high-return projects. Enhanced liquidity, therefore, facilitates investment in long-term, more 
highly productive projects that boost economic growth. 
The role of stock markets as a supplier of liquidity in the economy has been recognised in 
much theoretical literature. Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Bencivenga and Smith (1991), 
Levine (1991), Bencivenga et al., (1995,1996), Diamond (1996), and Fulghieri and Rovelli 
(1998) and others show that a stock market may arise to provide liquidity to an economy 
directly; savers have liquid assets i. e. equities, while firms have permanent use of the capital 
raised by issuing equities. In particular, savers receiving shocks can sell their equity claims on 
the profits of the illiquid production technology to others. Market participants do not verify 
whether agents received the shock or not, participants simply trade in an impersonal stock 
exchange. Thus, with liquid stock markets equity holders can readily sell their shares, while 
firms have permanent access to the capital invested by the initial investors. By facilitating 
trade, stock markets reduce liquidity risk. As stock market transaction costs fall, more 
investment occurs in the illiquid, high-return projects. If illiquid projects enjoy sufficiently 
large externalities, the greater stock market liquidity induces faster growth. In other words, 
with a liquid stock market, the initial investors do not lose access to their savings for the 
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duration of the investment project because they can quickly, cheaply and confidently sell their 
shares in the firm. Thus, more liquid stock markets ease investment in long-term, potentially 
more productive projects, thereby improving capital productivity and enhancing prospects for 
long-term growth. 
Furthermore, greater liquidity of stock markets has an indirect impact on the monitoring of 
management. With more liquidity, the market becomes more efficient in that it better reflects 
information about a firm (Holmstrom and Tirol, 1993). This makes the firm's stock price more 
informative and hence more useful in monitoring management. More liquidity also makes it 
easier for an investor to accumulate positions in a stock and to sell these positions as well. 
There is an argument that in a liquid market, shareholders who do not agree with management 
policies can sell their shares rather than try to force management to adopt different policies 
(Bhide, 1993). Another argument states that liquidity is essential for large shareholders to 
build positions (Maung, 1998). Hence, with liquid markets, investors who want the firm to 
change its policies or who want to acquire the firm will succed. 
A liquid stock market can also influence economic growth through the rate of technological 
innovation. For example, different production technologies may have a wide array of gestation 
periods for converting current output into future capital, where long-term technologies enjoy a 
greater return. Investors, however, may be reluctant to give up control of their savings for very 
long periods. As the presence of a liquid stock market reduces the cost of exchange ownership 
claims, then long-term production technologies will be more attractive. Thus greater liquidity 
will induce a shift to long-term, higher-return technologies (Fulghieri and Rovelli, 1998). 
Bencivenga et al., (1996) argue that without liquid markets, savers would have been less 
willing to invest in the large, long-term projects that characterised the industrial revolution 
"the industrial revolution therefore had to wait for the financial revolution before it occurred" 
(p. 2). Boyd and Smith (1998) point out that, "the absence of equity markets would prevent 
society from employing its most productive capital technologies. If this were to occur, it 
is to 
be imagined that there would be large associated welfare losses" (p557). 
Theory, however, is unclear about the effect of enhanced liquidity on savings rates. Tullio and 
Pagano (1994) show that greater liquidity reduces uncertainty, and this in turn may reduce 
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savings rates to the extent that economic growth decelerates. Further, Bencivenga et al., 
(1995) argue that greater liquidity may induce a reallocation of investment out of initiating 
new capital investments and into purchasing claims on ongoing projects. This, in turn, may 
lower the rate of real investment enough to decelerate growth. Demirgue-Kunt and Levine 
(1996b) point out that increased liquidity can hinder growth through three channels. First, by 
increasing the return on investment, greater stock market liquidity may reduce savings rates 
through the income and substitution effect. If savings rates fall enough and if there is an 
externality attached to capital accumulation, greater stock market liquidity may slow economic 
growth. Second, by reducing the uncertainty associated with investment, greater stock market 
liquidity may reduce savings rates because of the ambiguous effects of uncertainty on savings. 
Third, stock market liquidity may adversely affect corporate governance, very liquid markets 
may encourage investor "myopia" 5. According to this view stock market liquidity may 
actually prevent economic growth. However, Bencivenga and Smith (1991) emphasise in their 
model that growth increases even when aggregate savings are reduced as a result of the greater 
liquidity of stock markets, the reasons being the dominant effect that the stock market has on 
the efficiency of investment. 
4.3.2 Risk Diversification 
While savers generally do not prefer risk, high return projects tend to be riskier than low 
return projects. Stock markets may mitigate the risks associated with investment. They provide 
vehicles for trading, pooling, and diversifying risk. Diamond (1967) argues that stock markets 
allow efficient risk sharing. By providing risk diversification, stock markets can affect long- 
term economic growth by altering resources allocation and savings rates. Levine (1991) 
demonstrated that stock markets could accelerate economic growth by reducing two types of 
risk, liquidity risk and productivity risk6. Productivity risk lowers welfare and discourages 
risk-adverse investors from investing in firms. Stock markets allow investors to invest in a 
5 More liquid markets make it easy for dissatisfied investors to sell quickly. Liquid markets may weaken the 
investor's commitment and reduce the investor's incentives to exert corporate control by overseeing managers 
and monitoring firm performance and potential. 
6 Productivity risk arises because firms are subject to productivity supply shocks during a certain period of 
production e. g, the oil shocks of the 1970s. On the other hand, liquidity risk is the risk of being unable to sell 
financial assets except at a discount from their face value. 
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large number of firms and diversify away from idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Well- 
developed stock markets could, thus, allow investors in multiple firms, both local and foreign 
and reduce exposure to any one sector. This raises the fraction of resources allocated to firms 
and accelerates economic growth. Mauro (1995), however, shows that stock markets, by 
allowing portfolio diversification, may be reducing precautionary savings, thereby tending to 
lower economic growth. 
Stock markets also, by providing risk diversification services, can affect technological 
innovations and accelerate economic growth. Engaging in innovation is risky, however, the 
ability to hold a diversified portfolio of innovative projects reduces risk and promotes 
investment in innovative activities. King and Levine (1993b) argue that risk diversification 
made possible by stock markets positively aids innovation and thereby accelerates economic 
growth. They argue that holding a diversified portfolio of new technological products reduces 
risk and leads to greater investment in new technology than would otherwise be the case. 
Saint-Paul (1992) relates growth to portfolio diversification via the stock market. He shows 
that firms can increase their productivity by specialising, but this increases the risk from sector 
demand shocks. When no stock markets exist, these shocks can be diversified through 
"technological flexibility" which means choosing less specialised, and, therefore, less 
productive technologies. The development of a stock market enables agents to reduce such 
risk through diversification of their investments, while at the same time choosing more 
productive and specialised technology, and, in turn, this productivity gains accelerated growth. 
Moreover, Saint-Paul (1992), Devereux and Smith (1994), Obstfeld (1995), Stulz (1997,1999), 
and Bracker et al., (1999) and others show that stock markets provide a vehicle for the 
diversification of risk through internationally integrated stock markets and greater risk 
diversification can influence growth by shifting investment into higher productive projects. 
Consequently, since high-expected return projects also tend to be comparatively risky, greater 
risk will foster investment in higher return projects and allow countries to specialise. Bekaert 
(1995), Bekaert and Harvey (1995a, b; 1998; 2000), Kim and Singal (2000), and Bekaert et al., 
(2000a, b) argue that higher degrees of market segmentation will increase the level of risk. This 
situation will strongly affect the local cost of equity, which may have implications for growth. 
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Integration can decrease risk for the world stock markets as a whole, and hence reduce the 
country's cost of capital by making diversifiable risks that would not otherwise be 
diversifiable. 7 
Furthermore, Stulz (1997,1999) details some of the distortions that occur in the segmented 
market. In the segmented market, local investors are unable to diversify their equity portfolios 
because they can only invest in local equities, which consist only a small number of equities 
(as in most of the emerging markets). Since investors will pay a premium for diversification, 
new local firms will arise that inefficiently operate in industries that provide diversification. 
Current firms may also diversify away from their core activities by accepting negative "Net 
Present Value" projects that make them more attractive to investors. In this situation we can 
see that segmentation leads directly to an inefficient allocation of capital, which in turn 
negatively affects economic growth. s 
In the integrated stock market, these inefficiencies should be reversed. With integration, 
investors will no longer be interested in investing in inefficient domestic firms when they have 
opportunities to invest in foreign stock that is efficient. If economic liberalisation occurs at the 
same time9, inefficient firms will be driven out of business because their products will no 
longer be able to compete with foreign products in terms of quality and price. Similarly, local 
producers may reallocate capital from the inefficient conglomerate divisions in the divisions 
that have a comparative advantage (Bekaert and Harvey, 1998). While the better-functioning, 
more integrated stock markets imply greater risk sharing, a reduction in uncertainty, in turn, 
can reduce the need for precautionary saving, reduce the savings rate, and thereby retard 
economic growth (Devereux and Smith, 1994). As a result, the theory is ambiguous about the 
ultimate effect on savings rates of greater risk sharing through international integrated stock 
markets. 
7 International assets pricing models show how a shift from market segmentation towards integration reduces the 
systematic risk of a stock, lowering the required rate of return and increasing the price of the stock, and therefore 
reducing the cost of equity capital. In completely segmented markets, the expected return of the local market is 
determined by the variance of the return in that market times the price of that variance. In integrated markets, the 
expected return of the local market is determined by the covariance of the return in that market with the world 
market portfolio times the time of that covariance risk (see for example, Errunza and Losq, 1985). 
8 For more a detailed see for example Shing and Stulz, 1998; Faver et al., 1998; and Bekaert, et al., (2000a, b). 
9 Tamirisa (1999) and Svaleryd and Vlachos (2000) argue that economic liberalisation occurs simultaneously 
with international financial liberalisation. 
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Furthermore, recent theoretical research suggests that stock markets, by reducing risk, can 
facilitate a liberal trade policy and thereby economic growth. For example, Freeny and 
Hillman (1998) provide a theory of trade policy as income insurance. Specifically, they model 
a two-sector economy with perfectly negatively correlated productivity shocks, which 
determine which sector will be competitive in terms of exports and import. In the standard 
case with no financial markets i. e. where no portfolio diversification is possible, they argue 
that the competitive import sector can choose to lobby for protection and policy makers will 
respond by implementing a tariff. This tariff increases the price for competitive imported 
goods but also induces a consumption distortion in the economy, thereby lowering economic 
growth. In the case when the financial markets work, they argue that the special interest 
groups have no incentive to lobby for protection and free trade will prevail because they will 
optimally hold a fully diversified portfolio in the domestic and international financial markets. 
Thus, Freeny and Hillman argue that financial development should precede trade 
0 liberalisation' 
Finally, Hargis (2000) provides a theoretical model that shows how international cross-listings 
can transform a segmented local equity market from equilibrium of low liquidity and market 
capitalisation to an integrated market with high liquidity and market capitalisation by altering 
the incentives of companies and individuals to participate in the market. He argues that 
integrating stock markets through international cross-listing can increase the revenue received 
by entrepreneurs going public by increasing the number of investors who are able to diversify 
away a larger portion of the company's risk, and increase the number of market participants 
who buy and trade equity, improving liquidity. These factors can stimulate market 
development and encourage entry to more companies and investors, reduce firms' costs of 
raising capital and thereby facilitate economic growth' 1 
10 Svaleryd and Vlachos (2000) provide empirical support for this view using data from 80 countries during 
1960-94. They found that there is a strong positive relationship between openness to trade and domestic stock 
market development. In addition, they found that the degree of integration in international financial markets has a 
positive effect on openness to trade. 
11 Many recent empirical studies show that listing shares abroad reduces firm's cost of raising capital by 
diversifying its exposure to different market risks, by reducing illiquidity of trading in its shares and by 
eliminating investment barriers due to international differences in accounting practices, disclosure requirements 
and taxation laws. For a full survey of these studies see Karolyi (1998). 
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4.3.3 Information production 
There are various reasons why resources may not be allocated to their highest value of optimal 
use. The primary reasons are that it is difficult and costly to evaluate firms. Individual savers 
have neither capacity time, nor the means to acquire information about projects with the 
highest returns, but at the same time they are reluctant to invest in projects when there is little 
reliable information. Consequently, higher information costs may cause savers to forego 
higher return opportunities. 
The presence of stock markets may influence the acquisition and dissemination of information 
about firms (Grossman, 1976,1980; Kyle, 1984; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993; and 
Subrahmanyam and Titman, 1999). Stock markets provide incentives to gather information, 
which is reflected in stock prices. These prices in stock markets direct capital to its best use 
(the "prospective" role of stock prices), and provide managers with feedback about how 
investors evaluate their performance (the "retrospective" role) (Dow and Gorton, 1997). 
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) argue that stock markets promote the acquisition and 
dissemination of information, thus allowing for better resource and risk allocation. Kyle 
(1984) shows that larger, more liquid stock markets can encourage investors to acquire more 
information about firms which would improve resource allocation. Further, Demirguc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic (1998) argue that well-developed stock markets serve as direct sources of 
capital and as mechanisms for ensuring that investors have access to information about firms' 
activities. They show that the existence of developed and active stock markets should make it 
easier for firms to raise long-term capital. 
Stock markets aggregate and disseminate information through a pricing process. Even 
investors that do not undertake the costly process of evaluating firms, managers and market 
conditions can observe stock prices that reflect all the relevant and available information 
(efficient prices) obtained by others. Stiglitz (1985) argues that stock markets quickly reveal 
information through publicly posted prices, but that this quick public revelation creates a free- 
rider problem; it reduces the incentive for investors to expend lots of resources in obtaining 
information about firms because investors can get this information by observing prices. Capiro 
and Demirguc-Kunt (1997) show that prices quoted on the stock market at least partially 
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reveal information that more informed investors possess 12. These prices provide key price 
signals to managers regarding corporate investment decisions (Grossman, 1978; Grossman 
and Stiglitz, 1980; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1982; Morcket et al., 2000; and Pagano and 
Zingales, 2000). Tobin (1982) argues that the most important consequence of stock prices that 
reflect new firm-specific information is that they allow for improved microeconomic capital 
allocation. He refers to this linkage as the ` fiu fictional" form of an efficient market. Thus, if 
this were the case then any pricing inefficiencies would send misleading signals to managers 
and would distort investment decisions13. Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) and Subrahmanyam 
and Titman (1999) present models in which information produced by the stock market 
improves allocational efficiency through guiding managerial decisions 14. Based on the above 
arguments, stock market efficiency appears to play an important role in the contribution of 
stock markets to country's economic growth. 
Stock prices affect resources allocation and economic efficiency within the firm in a number 
of ways. A firm which desires capital first, can raise it through an initial public offering. There 
is direct allocation efficiency here in that: If investors believe that the capital can be more 
efficiently deployed elsewhere, or if the expected returns on the project are insufficient to 
induce enough saving, then the price will be low and the project may not be undertaken, and 
also the offering will fail because the market ascribes a value to the firm that is below its start- 
up cost (Coonely and Kalay, 1993). 
After firms go public, their equities trade on the stock exchange. As long as the stock is 
publicly quoted, investors have an incentive to value it and gather information on it since there 
is a profit potential in this activity. The stock price, therefore, provides an average valuation of 
the firm by investors. Should the firm be unable to finance all its investment needs through 
12 Dow and Gorton (1997) show that the same information could be produced in a bank economy in which, 
instead of information traders, bank officers carry out investment appraisal and monitoring. 
13 Some empirical evidence of the linkage between share prices and investment confirms this argument (see for 
example, Fishcher and Merton, 1984; and Anderson and Subbaraman, 1996). In recent studies, Durnev et al., 
(20001) provide empirical evidence to show that firm-specific stock price variation reflects the capitalisation of 
the firm-specific information into stock prices, and increased firm-specific information capitalisation intensity is 
linked to real investment decisions through at least one channel. More firm-specific information in stock prices 
can alleviate underinvestment problems associated with accessing external funds, and thereby lower the cost of 
external capital. 
14 See also Fishman and Hagerty (1989) and Bernhardt, et al., (1995). 
110 
retained earnings it will need external finance. The stock market valuation of the firm will be 
important here since only those firms whose value is greater than their expenses will be 
allocated funds. Again the market demonstrates allocation efficiency. Firms that are highly 
leveraged and pay out high dividends will need to keep going back to the market to raise funds 
and again the stock price will be an important determinant of the amount of capital allocated to 
the firm (Allen, 1993). 
Furthermore, Ehrlich, et al., (1994) provide a framework which suggests that stock markets 
provide useful business information which is essential in generating entrepreneurs' human 
capital or firms' specific knowledge that contributes to the productivity growth. They show 
that, to get the best returns in the markets, individual or institution investors make the effort to 
acquire information about listed firms on a daily basis. They trade on the information, and the 
aggregate information is revealed in the markets. Once the market information is created, it 
then becomes publicly available. This market information is very important for entrepreneurs 
in augmenting their understanding of the market's environment. It provides knowledge about 
how investors evaluate both their and their competitors' current decisions, future plans and 
managerial performance. It enhances entrepreneurs' knowledge about the operation of 
efficient firms and their ability to develop more efficient production methods. The information 
reveals the general belief in the current and future prospects of the economy as a whole. 
Entrepreneurs learn from the information created in the stock markets and implement it at the 
firm level which becomes entrepreneurs' human capital or firms' specific knowledge. The 
accumulation of firms' specific knowledge contributes to productivity growth. 
4.3.4 Monitoring Managers and Exerting Corporate Control 
It is widely believed that stock markets are more efficient at monitoring managers and exerting 
corporate control than individual investors are. Stock markets can exert control over managers 
through two mechanisms: the voting and takeover mechanisms. The ability of individual 
shareholders to influence managers by their vote, however, depends on the ownership 
structure. If share ownership is widely dispersed, the influence that each owner can exert on 
management will be small (Stulz, 2000). Moreover, if a shareholder knows that his own voting 
behaviour will not significantly affect the voting outcome, he will have little incentive to bear 
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the cost of detecting poor management (Pound, 1988). However, it is argued that even small 
shareholders, by acting together, can influence managers. One way would be through proxy 
voting; minority dissident stockholders could obtain from other voting shareholders the 
authority to act as designated voting representatives at the shareholders' meeting. 
The threat of takeovers provides a second mechanism whereby stock markets can exert control 
over managers, since sales by dissatisfied shareholders can drive down the share price, thereby 
allowing others to purchase the firm, fire the management, change the policies and reap the 
resulting capital gain. If the takeover is effective, the market value of a firm should not 
considerably diverge from its fundamental value, since, if it did, the management would 
immediately change its strategy or another company would take it over. 
Many studies have mentioned the role of the stock markets in exerting control over managers. 
Knight (1998) argues that a well-functioning stock market can discipline weak management 
by depressing the value of the equity of their firms, thereby rendering them more likely targets 
for acquisitions and mergers. If market discipline can be made to work this way, weak 
management is forced either to improve performance or exit the market before their firm 
becomes insolvent. Diamond and Verracchia (1982), Stein (1988) and Jensen and Murphy 
(1990) show that trading shares in a stock market that efficiently reflects information about 
firms (efficient stock market) helps mitigate the principle-agent problem. The principle-agent 
problem often arises because managers gain from decisions affecting their firm's value only to 
the extent of the shares they hold. Suppose a manager holds very little of the firm's equity and 
his compensation (either flat or tied to the firm's earnings) produces most of his income. This 
manager has an incentive to take actions that maximise his compensation in ways that might 
have little or nothing to do with maximising the firm's value (and equity value). For example, 
many methods of manipulating earnings can lead to higher compensation. Since the manager's 
equity ownership is small, he may have an incentive to take "imprudent actions". 
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One possibility for mitigating the principle-agent problem is compensating managers with 
binding contracts that are contingent on long-term performance (Yanagawa, 2000)15. Such 
contracts require a good measure of the long-term value of the firm. For example, current 
profit is not a good measure for this purpose because it can be manipulated and it reflects 
short-term considerations. Clearly such a measure should be unbiased, free from manipulation 
by the management or outsiders. The latter argument suggests an important use of efficient 
stock markets. Thus, the stock market price in an efficient market gives a good measure of the 
firm's performance and its long-term value (Durnev et al., 2001). Tying the manager's 
compensation to the stock prices reduces the incentive for imprudent actions and therefore 
increases the firm's value 16. Dow and Gorton (1997) write that, "because of the agency 
problem, the managers will not necessarily extract information from stock prices; they must be 
given appropriate incentives to make good investment decisions. These incentives are linked to 
the stock market because stock prices can be used to evaluate previous management decisions. 
Stock prices can then improve investment decisions by allowing more accurate monitoring of 
the quality of past managerial investment policy" (p. 1089). Thus, an efficient stock market 
can enhance economic growth by mitigating the principle-agent problem and consequently 
increasing a firm's economic efficiency. 
Bolton and Thadden (1998) show that an active stock market facilitates takeovers as a means 
to acquire control by reducing free riding. Similarly, if takeovers are easier in well-developed 
stock markets and if managers of under-performing firms are fired following a takeover, then 
the stock market can promote better corporate control by easing takeovers of poorly managed 
firms. Thus, well-functioning stock markets that ease corporate takeovers can promote 
economic efficiency and thereby accelerate growth (Stulz, 2000). 
However, there are disagreements in the theoretical literature about the importance of stock 
markets in corporate control. Kahn and Winton (1998) argue that well-functioning stock 
markets can undermine effective control by a large shareholder by giving him excessive 
15 Another possibility is debt. Debt holding decreases incentives for imprudent actions in two ways: it increases 
the fraction of equity ownership held by managers, and it increases the probability of bankruptcy after imprudent 
actions. 
16 For more detailed discussion of this argument see for example Stulz (2000). 
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incentives to speculate rather than monitor. With regard to this argument, Stulz (2000) points 
out that, "making the stock market less liquid could make large shareholders more active, 
because in a more liquid market, if they feel that the firm is poorly managed, they might just 
sell their shares" (p. 25). Bhide (1993) and Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) argue that 
well-developed equity markets encourage more dispersed ownership and this dispersion 
impedes effective corporate control 17. 
Furthermore, Stiglitz (1985) shows that "asymmetric information" 18 may reduce the efficiency 
of corporate takeovers as a mechanism for exerting corporate control, and stock market 
development, therefore, will not significantly improve corporate control. Moreover, Stiglitz 
gives three additional reasons why takeovers are not an effective control mechanism. First, if a 
realising firm disburses lots of resources to obtain information, other firms will observe the 
results of this research when the realising firm bids for shares. This will cause others to bid for 
shares, so that the share price rises. The discovery firm that expended resources obtaining 
information, therefore, pays a higher price than it would have to pay if `free-riding" firms 
could observe its bid. Thus, the rapid public dissemination of costly information will provide 
incentives for obtaining information and making effective takeover bids. Second, there is "a 
public good" nature to takeovers that makes takeover mechanisms ineffective. If the takeover 
is successful, and if as a result the market value of a share is increased, then those shareholders 
who have not sold out get a free ride, this creates an incentive for existing shareholders not to 
sell if they think the value of the firm will increase following the takeover. Thus, value- 
increasing takeovers may fail because the realising firm will have to pay a high price, which 
will reduce the incentives for the discovering firm hoping to take them over. Third, current 
17 Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that takeovers that might not be possible in the absence of large shareholders 
might be possible in their presence. 
18 Asymmetric information may arise from the fact that in corporations quoted on the stock markets the managers 
and the shareholders do not have access to the same or symmetric information. Managers clearly know a great 
deal more about the operations and the future prospects of their corporations than do the shareholders; if the 
corporation is not doing well, the managers have an incentive to conceal this information from the shareholders. 
In principle, the managers are supposed to be the agents of the firm's shareholders. However, since the objectives 
of the two groups may differ, in corporations where there is separation of ownership from control there exists a 
"moral hazard" that the managers may pursue policies which promote their own ends at the expense of those of 
the shareholders. This also leads to the "principal-agent" problem (Singh, 1992a). 
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managers are often in a position to take strategic actions that deter takeovers and maintain 
their positions. 
Moreover, Shleifer and Vishry (1986) argue that well-developed stock markets that facilitate 
takeovers may abuse resources allocation. Existing implicit contracts between former 
managers and stakeholders in the firms do not restrict new owners and managers to the same 
extent that they bound the original managers. Thus, a takeover allows new owners and 
managers to break implicit agreements and transfers wealth from firm stakeholders to 
themselves. While new owners may profit, there may be deterioration in the efficiency of 
resources allocation. Further, another important cost arising from takeover activities in stock 
markets is that a takeover induces management to concentrate on providing short-term profits 
and financial returns to the shareholders (Stulz, 2000). This policy jeopardises corporations' 
attempts to make the investment needed for their long-term success, and, as a result, adversely 
affects their efficiency and competitiveness. 
4.3.5 Mobilising Capital Resources 
Stock markets and other financial institutions play a key role in mobilising capital resources to 
their efficient use (Stulz, 2000; and Wargler, 2000). Stock markets aggregate the small savings 
of numerous investors for use by agents with entrepreneurial and managerial talents who need 
funds for large-scale capital investment. Stock markets can ease capital mobilisation and 
allocation to more efficient uses by providing investors as well as entrepreneurs with liquidity 
and risk pooling facilities. Levine (1997) points out that, "Mobilising-pooling involves the 
agglomeration of savings from disparate sources for investment. Without access to multiple 
investors, many production processes would be constrained to economically inefficient of 
scales. Furthermore, mobilisation results in the creation of small denomination instruments. 
These instruments provide opportunities for households to hold diversified portfolios, invest in 
efficient firms, and to increase asset liquidity" (p. 698-99). Sirri and Tufano (1995) argue that 
by enhancing risk diversification, liquidity, and the size of feasible firms, mobilising improves 
resources allocation. In addition, we argue here that the main impact of capital mobilisation is 
one of promoting technological innovations. Through easing the burden of risk to capital 
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contributors as well as to the entrepreneurs, markets and institutions enable the undertaking of 
risky technological innovations. 
The intimate relationship between the mobilising function of financial markets and 
technological choices was first emphasised by Hicks (1969) in his quest to explain the genesis 
of the industrial revolution. He argues that an essential feature of industrial development is the 
adoption of technologies that require large-scale illiquid capital investments. Financial 
markets and institutions that provide risk-sharing possibilities make it economically feasible to 
implement such technologies. For Hicks, the industrial revolution was not associated with the 
discovery of any particular new technology. He argues that most of the technological 
innovations had been made before the onset of the industrial revolution. However, their 
adoption and full implementation on an economical scale required the commitment of large- 
scale investments for a long period in an illiquid capital form. Financial markets and 
institutions that provided investors with liquidity made such technologies feasible. He points 
out that, "In order that people should be willing to sink large amounts of capital, it is the 
availability of liquid funds which is crucial". Thus the choice of production technologies is 
intimately linked to the capital mobilisation role of financial markets. 
In more recent studies Bencivenga et al., (1995) and Hermes and Lensink (1999) argue that by 
economising the transaction and information costs that are associated with multiple bilateral, 
financial markets can ease capital mobilisation and thereby enhance capital accumulation and 
resources allocation, which in turn has a positive effect on economic growth. Bencivenga and 
Smith (1991) and Greenwood and Smith (1996) show that large, liquid, and efficient stock 
markets can ease capital mobilising. By agglomerating savings, stock markets enlarge the set 
of feasible investment projects. Since some worthy projects require large capital injections and 
some enjoy economies of scale, a stock market that eases capital mobilising can profoundly 
affect economic growth. 
4.3.6 Transmission Path for Monetary Policy 
Understanding how monetary policy affects economic activities remains one of the greatest 
challenges of academics. There are two possible paths, or channels, through which monetary 
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policy flows to affect the economy: the "money" channel, and the "credit" channel 19. These 
paths, however, have one similarity- they must be paths through some financial market. An 
important financial market that has been overlooked as a channel for monetary transmission 
mechanisms is the stock market. 
Recently, Boyle and Peterson (1995), Malliaropulos (1996) and Chami et al., (1999) have 
argued that, besides the traditional channels, the stock market is an important path through 
which monetary policy affects economic activity. They show that stock markets can provide 
this mechanism through the effect of inflation on household equity holding. Monetary policy 
is a key determinant of the rate of inflation. Stockholders respond to actual inflation, expected 
inflation, and monetary policy actions by changing the rate of return they expect from their 
stockholdings 20. The managers of firms, in turn, are charged with creating value for the 
shareholders of the firm. They react to changes in the stock price of their stockholders by 
changing the conditions of production. Thus, by affecting the rate of inflation, a change in 
monetary policy will alter stockholders' required rate of return. As required rates of return 
change, the stock price fluctuates. Managers respond to changing stock prices by changing 
their investment and production plans, in turn affecting capital productivity in the economy 
and thereby affecting economic growth. Therefore, this channel suggests that price level is the 
appropriate target of monetary policy. 
Another example of how economic growth can respond to monetary policy through the stock 
market mechanism is when monetary policy lowers the return to holding money by lowering 
short-term interest rates, and demand for other assets increases (Cheung and Ng, 1998). 
Among these assets, the shares issues by firms to finance their investment projects. As the 
demand for their shares increases (raising the price), firms realise that more of their 
investment projects have a positive net present value, and they issue more shares in order to 
19 For more details on these monetary transmission mechanisms see Romer (1993). 
20 In his well-known general equilibrium model for the financial sector, Tobin (1969) emphasised stock returns as 
an important link between the real and financial sides of the economy. In that model, Tobin demonstrated how 
stock returns might respond to changes in the monetary variables of the model. Empirically, Mandelker and 
Tando (1985) find that money growth has a positive impact on real stock returns in six major industrialised 
countries. Aspern (1989) also, finds that money supply is positively related to stock prices in ten European 
countries. Sharpu (1999) finds that a one percentage point increase in expected inflation in the US increases 
required long run real stock returns by about one percent point, and it reduces the current price of stocks by about 
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finance them. In this way, investment increases and output rises. In this example, the "special 
feature" of the stock markets is that money is an asset that substitutes for shares. 
4.3 Some Theoretical Models 
As we have shown above, a rich theoretical literature emphasises the role of financial markets, 
especially stock markets, in spurring economic growth. Among these studies, however, there 
are eight important studies that have directly modelled the role of financial markets in 
economic development: Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Bencivenga and Smith (1991), 
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1989), Saint-Paul (1992), Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999), Boyd 
and Smith (1998), Levine (1991), and King and Levine (1993a). These models link the 
financial system with the steady-state growth rate of per capita output. Specifically, most of 
these models extend and link two literatures: the endogenous growth literature, associated with 
the work of Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988), who construct models in which agents make 
decisions that fully determine the economy's steady-state growth rate, and the financial 
structure, associated with the work of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Diamond (1984), 
which construct models in which financial contracts emerge as optimal responses to an 
economy's informational and risk characteristics. The following paragraphs provide a brief 
summary of each of these studies. 
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) emphasise in their model both the informational and risk 
sharing roles of financial markets in improving capital mobilising to the optimal use and hence 
in increasing growth. They develop a model with two assets: safe, low-yield technology, and a 
risky high-yield one, where the return on the latter is affected by an aggregate and a project- 
specific shock. Financial markets are able to offer agents a higher return than they invested 
individually because they collect information that enables them to decipher the aggregate 
productivity shock and they can better diversify project-specific risk due to the large portfolios 
they hold. Therefore, financial markets allocate capital more efficiently and the resulting 
higher productivity of capital increases growth. It is worth noting that in this model higher 
growth stimulates increased participation in financial markets, which leads to the expansion of 
20 percent. 
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financial institutions. Thus, a two-way causality between financial development and growth 
emerges in their model. 
Bencivenga and Smith (1991) construct a bank that by pooling the economy's resources 
eliminates liquidity risk and invests more efficiently. In their model, a bank enables 
individuals to pool liquidity risks and can promote higher growth by shifting the composition 
of savings towards more capital accumulation and by reducing unnecessary capital liquidation. 
Banks channel funds from risk-averse savers to entrepreneurs who invest in productive capital 
and hence provide liquidity to the former group by enabling them to hold bank deposits 
instead of other liquid and unproductive assets. These funds are then available for investment 
in capital accumulation and thus reduce the need for the self-financing of investment. 
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1989) propose a theoretical model to examine the impact of financial 
market imperfections on the long-term productivity growth of firms. Their model focuses on 
failures of firms in selling equity securities, which help firms by diversifying the risk of real 
investment. Particularly, they argue that failures in stock markets limit the abilities of firms to 
diversify the risks of their operations and hence lead to a reduction in the level of such 
operations as an alternative means of risk management. They show that since the curtailment 
of firms' operations will limit the extent of "on-the-job training" and other learning effects, as 
well as direct investment in productivity improvements, the stock market imperfection will 
adversely affect the rate of productivity growth. 
Saint-Paul (1992) presents a model in which financial markets interact with the technological 
choice of the firm in that financial markets allow riskier but more productive technologies, and 
technological choice, in turn, affects the viability of financial markets. Productivity growth is 
achieved through a greater division of labour that leaves specialised factors of production at 
greater risk. By enabling agents to hedge against risk through holding diversified portfolios, 
financial markets permit a division of labour. Thus, the Saint-Paul model emphasises that 
financial markets contribute to growth by facilitating a greater division of labour which 
implies specialised (and therefore risky) and productive technology. Without financial 
markets, technology becomes less specialised, leading, in effect, to diversification through 
technology. 
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Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) emphasise in their model how going-public decisions 
provide important insights into the development of financial markets and how government 
actions that can have the effect of "Jump-starting" an economy's stock market can improve 
economic efficiency. They show that because both liquidity and the information generated in a 
stock market are determined by the number of stock market participants, whether a firm is 
better off being privately as opposed to publicly financed is also determined by the size of the 
stock market. When the stock market consists of a relatively small number of firms, the 
information conveyed in the stock market is less accurate, which decreases the advantage of 
being publicly financed. As the stock market grows, the information conveyed by stock prices 
improves, which, in turn, increases the incentive for firms to go public. 
Subrahmanyam and Titman show that by going public, firms can generate positive 
externalities by increasing the size and informational efficiency of the stock market. As a 
result of these externalities, there can be a path dependency in the development of financial 
markets, particularly they assume that an economy can have two equilibriums: first, a "bad" 
equilibrium in which most firms remain private; second, a "good" equilibrium in which there 
are superior resources allocation and greater firm values and in which most firms are publicly 
traded in the stock market. Firms choose not to go public in the bad equilibrium because they 
ignore the positive externality associated with having additional firms trading on the stock 
market. They argue that with more publicly traded stocks, it is more attractive for individuals 
to open brokerage accounts to become stock market investors. When the influence of 
serendipitous information on production choices is strong, these additional active investors 
improve the capital allocation process, providing a greater incentive for individuals to become 
active investors, thus creating a snowballing effect that can move the economy from the bad 
equilibrium to the good equilibrium. 
Boyd and Smith (1998) have developed an endogenous growth model which presents a 
framework in which capital formulation is financed by issuing debt and equity. They examine 
an economy in which investments are undertaken by a set of agents who require external 
financing, and in which their financial decision depends on the amount of information needed 
by the investor to monitor the management. Boyd and Smith suggest two kinds of technology 
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available to the investors: one which yields a return which is freely observable only by the 
initiating investor (debt); the other which yields a return which is publicly observable (equity). 
They conclude that as an economy moves along a growth path and accumulates capital, the 
relative price of capital falls, as a result monitoring costs will rise as the economy grows. As a 
consequence, investors will tend to employ observable capital production technology more 
intensively as an economy grows. Hence, as the economy grows, there will be an increased 
volume of equity market activities, and a fall in the debt/equity ratio. Accordingly, Boyd and 
Smith's analysis suggests that there is a bi-directional relationship between stock market 
development and economic growth, and the banking sector and stock market, in the long-term, 
become complementary source of finance. 
The most important contribution to the theoretical literature of stock market development and 
economic growth has been that of Levine (1991). In order to explain the role of financial 
market development in economic growth, his work constructs an endogenous growth model in 
which the stock market emerges to allocate risk, and explores how the markets alter 
investment incentives in ways that change steady-state growth rates. He demonstrates that 
stock markets accelerate growth by facilitating the ability to trade ownership of firms without 
disrupting the productive process occurring within firms and by allowing agents to diversify 
portfolios. In the absence of the stock markets, lenders facing liquidity constraints which 
would force firms to pay back loans, thus forcing firms to liquidate (fully or partially) those 
assets which they own. Since such assets include capital assets, which embody a firm's 
technology, this will lower the firm's productivity. He further explains the effect of tax 
policies on growth both directly by altering investment incentives and indirectly by changing 
the incentives underlying financial contracts. 
Like Bencivenga and Smith (1991), Levine's model uses the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) 
structure of preference to create liquidity risk and also to include productivity shocks that 
create production risk. Liquidity risk and productivity risk create incentives for the formation 
of stock markets. Productivity risk lowers welfare and discourages agents from investing in 
firms. The stock market allows investors to invest in a large number of firms and to diversify 
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away from idiosyncratic productivity shocks. This raises welfare, the fraction of resources 
invested in firms, and the economy's steady-state growth rate. 
In the Levine model the economy consists of an infinite sequence of three period-living agents 
and a countable infinity of agents are born each period. Population growth is zero. Young 
agents are identical with the following utility functions: 
it (Cr, C-,, C3) = 
[c2 +0c3]-r 
I 
(4.3) 
where O. is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and c is age i consumption. Since young 
agents do not value age one consumption, all young period income is saved, hence the 
financial system and policy cannot affect agents' decisions about how much of their income to 
save. Furthermore, the agent-specific, privately observed random variable cp becomes known 
at the beginning of the second period of life, and has a probability distribution as following: 
0 with probability 1- it 
1 with probability lt 
(4.4) 
The preference structure implies a "desire for liquidity" because agents want to consume their 
wealth at age two if (p=O. In the second stage of a firm's production, age three firm members 
with physical capital hire age one workers and produce goods 
Yý-, t+2 t+B2 
0(B1, 
t+2 = 1l r+2 
K (4.5) 
where Lt+2 is age one labour units hired per entrepreneur in t+2 and rat is a firm specific 
productivity shock with an expected value of one. 
From a maximisation of the agent's problem, Levine derives the following steady-state growth 
rate: 
G, = Kir `5 pq = Kir `5 p 
Ez (4.6) 
1-Jr+E, r 
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where Gy is the growth rate, K is the physical capital investment, and q is the stock market 
development. 
In Levine's model, the stock market raises the growth rate by increasing the productivity of 
firms or by improving the allocation of resources. Stock markets increase firm efficiency, 
through K, because they eliminate the premature liquidation of firm capital. Instead of the 
liquidation of capital, agents that receive liquidity shocks sell their shares to agents that value 
period three consumption. Consequently, more capital is maintained in firms for two periods, 
which accelerates the rate or physical capital accumulation. Stock markets influence growth 
also by increasing the fraction of resources allocated to firms. If agents are sufficiently risk 
averse, the proportion of resources devoted to firms is higher with stock markets. By allowing 
firms to diversify productivity risk, stock markets encourage risk-averse agents to invest more 
in firms. In addition, stock markets reduce the liquidity risk associated with firm investment; 
agents that receive liquidity shocks can sell their shares for more than the liquidation value of 
the firm price. Finally, by increasing firm efficiency, stock markets raise the return on firm 
investment. Thus, the emergence of stock markets to manage productivity and liquidity risk 
accelerates growth by attracting resources to socially productive firms. 
King and Levine (1993a) proposed a model in which innovation activities serve as an engine 
of growth. A higher rate of successful innovations results in a high growth rate of productivity. 
Financial markets appear in two different forms in the model. The first is where the 
intermediaries act like venture capital firms. They evaluate, finance and monitor the risky and 
costly innovations. The second form is like the stock market. The present value of the 
innovation is revealed in the stock market and selling the equity shares on the market can 
diversify the risk associated with innovation. Therefore, according to King and Levine, better 
development of the financial market can improve the possibility of successful innovations: 
"Better financial systems improve the probability of successful innovation and thereby 
accelerate economic growth" (p. 513). They point out that, `financial institutions play an 
active role in evaluating, managing, and funding the entrepreneurial activity that leads to 
productivity growth. Indeed, we believe that our mechanism is the channel by which finance 
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must have its dominant effect, due to the central role of productivity growth in development" 
(p. 5! 5). 
In conclusion, in the above theoretical studies which link financial markets development with 
economic growth, three channels are emphasised: the promotion of physical capital 
accumulation, improved capital mobilising and increased the productivity growth through the 
facilitation of (risky) technological advances and the inducing of real economic efficiency 
with which resources are utilised 21. Despite their efforts, however, they are still not very 
successful in providing a comprehensive framework of the different functions of stock markets 
with empirically testable relationships. As we have shown above, all these studies concentrate 
on specific aspects of financial markets and their impact on real activity and ignore other 
functions. Another area of neglect is that so far very few attempt have been made to 
distinguish the roles played by different financial markets, such as banks, stock markets, bond 
markets and insurance companies, in the relationship between financial markets and economic 
growth. 
4.4 Debt versus Equity Markets and Economic Development 
Recently, much of the existing debate in the financial literature hinges on two central 
questions. Are debt and equity finance substitutes? And, what stock markets do that banks 
cannot? While stock markets and banks have existed in most developing countries, their 
relative importance has varied. The World Bank (1989b, 1994b) has argued strongly the for 
establishment and promotion of stock markets in developing countries along western 
developed lines, while economists such as Stiglitz (1989a), Collier and Mayer (1989), 
Cobham (1995), Singh (1992a, 1996,1997a, 1999), Fry (1997) and Singh and Weisse (1998) 
have put the emphasis on banks rather than on stock markets. 
It is widely argued that banks are better at providing inter-temporal and intergenerational risk 
sharing through averaging gains and losses over time and long-term commitment, while stock 
21 Economic efficiency (X-efficiency or technical efficiency) reflects the 
degree to which a producer achieves the 
maximum attainable quantity of output for a given bundle of 
inputs or alternatively, the degree to which a given 
level of output is achieved with the minimum attainable 
level of inputs. And measured as the observed total cost 
compared to the optimal given the level of output and 
input prices. 
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markets provide cross-sectional risk sharing by providing a more diverse set of financial 
instruments (Allen and Gale, 1995,1997; and Fulghieri and Rovelli, 1998). As we have shown 
above, the major function of financial markets is to provide opportunities for risk sharing 
among different individuals. Stock markets allow them to diversify their portfolio, reduce 
idiosyncratic risks and adjust the riskness of portfolios according to their ability to bear risk. 
Thus, under the stock market, different individuals are exchanging risks at a given point in 
time. This type of risk sharing is termed as "cross-sectional risk-sharing". In the real world in 
which participation and markets are incomplete it is impossible to obtain insurance against all 
risks. One form of risk sharing that is not provided by stock markets is called 
"intergenerational risk sharing". If one generation wants to sell its holdings of assets, another 
generation must be willing to buy. However, in stock markets, different generations participate 
in the market at different points in time and thus participation is incomplete. This difficulty in 
matching means the price at this exchange becomes very volatile, and this price variation may 
cause large consumption risks. In this case banks can provide insurance against these 
variations in asset prices by averaging gains and losses over time (Fulghieri and Rovelli, 
1998). Another type of risk-sharing that is not provided by stock markets is "inter-temporal 
risk sharing". An example of this type of risk is external shocks, which can affect the whole 
economy e. g., oil shocks, financial crises. This type of risk cannot be diversified away by 
holding a large portfolio with many stocks. According to Allen and Gale (1997), banks can 
diversify this type of risk by using the accumulation of large reserves of safe assets as a way of 
building up in good times and drawing down in bad times. 
Another advantage of banks over the stock market is that it is better to mitigate agency costs 
and informational asymmetries, which could lower the cost of capital especially for younger 
and small firms whose fund-raising is constrained by capital market imperfections (Stulz, 
2000). Banks reduce the informational asymmetries and agency costs by building long-term 
relationships with firms supported by implicit self-enforcement contracts or reputation 
concerns (Diamond, 1991; Scholtens, 2000). Fama (1985) argues that banks are better at 
reducing informational asymmetries by collecting information, because bank borrowers are 
also depositors, and the history of deposit provides inside information on the quality of the 
borrower. A deposit regularly supplied would indicate that its holder has a stable financial 
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situation and would be able to reimburse his loan, whereas a volatile deposit would reflect the 
opposite (Singh, 1992b, 1997b). For competitive reasons also, enterprises may be unwilling to 
reveal to the general public the information which would be necessary in order to obtain funds 
from the stock market, but would agree to provide it to their bank 
Banks also facilitate re-negotiation of contracts; this can be beneficial for firms, especially 
those experiencing problems. But, ex post control on firms is weaker than in the stock market, 
since banks incurring sunk monitoring costs have an incentive to extend their loans to 
unprofitable projects, leading to "soft-budget constraints" (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995). 
Stock markets with no process of long-term monitoring can halt unprofitable projects but 
make re-negotiation more difficult due to co-ordination failures among many different 
investors (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996). 
The greatest advantage of banks, however, lies mainly in their monitoring and controlling 
mechanisms. The importance of the governance role implicitly assumes that financiers know 
very well how firms should be run. In such cases, a majority view of the firm's opportunities 
among financiers can be reached easily. According to Diamond (1984) and Arnold and Walz 
(2000), an intermediary, namely a bank, can play the role of a delegated monitor. However, 
when firms belong to entirely new industries or their technologies are rapidly changing, there 
might be a lack of common knowledge about the optimal strategy of these firms. In such 
cases, the governance functions by banks would be less important and inefficient. The stock 
market, however, could play this role more efficiently, since stock prices continuously 
aggregate diverse information obtained by investors. This allows stock prices to reflect the 
true value of a firm given current management policies and thus provide, as we have 
mentioned elsewhere, signals for the allocation of resources. 
Proponents of the stock markets also emphasise that by acquiring inside information about 
firms, banks can extract information rents from firms (Hellwing, 1991). The bank's market 
power reduces the incentives of firms to undertake profitable projects since banks extract a 
large share of the profits (Rajan, 1992; and Arnold and Wa1z; 2000)22. By encouraging 
22 Cetorelli and Gamberra (2000), however, find that financially more dependent 
industries grow faster in 
economies with more concentrated banking sectors. 
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competition, stock markets create greater incentives for entrepreneurship than banks. 
Furthermore, banks tend to be ineffective corporate controllers due to their insider status. If 
bankers hold equity and vote on the shares of other shareholders, they might collude with 
managers against other outside investors and thereby thwart competition and hinder effective 
corporate control (Hellwig, 1998). 
We have shown from the above discussion that there is an intensive debate focused on the 
relative merits of banks as opposed to stock markets23. Historically, empirical research on the 
relative merits of banks versus stock markets in fostering economic performance has centred 
on advanced countries. For developing countries, much less empirical research has been done. 
For example, in more recent studies, Mayer (1988) has presented empirical evidence on the 
overall contributions of internal finance and various forms of external finance to the non- 
financial corporate sectors of a number of developed countries. He found that the most 
important source of funds in the UK, Japan, Germany, and France was retained earnings. With 
stock markets showing up as relatively unimportant, the banks were the most important source 
of external finance in these countries. However, in the US, much external finance was raised 
through the bond market. Interestingly, support for this result can be found in the work of 
Corbett and Jenkinson (1994), when they found that over the period 1970-89, the stock 
markets made a net negative contribution to the financing of corporate investment in the UK 
and a small positive one overall in the US. 
In the first large scale empirical study of corporate finance for developing countries, Singh and 
Hamid (1992) have analysed corporation financial structures in nine developing countries over 
the period 1980-8824. Their sample frame is the 50 largest manufacturing firms quoted on the 
stock markets in each of these countries. Singh and Hamid find that firms in the developing 
countries use external finance to a far larger extent, and that this is extremely high relative to 
the experience of developed countries. They also find that the majority of the countries in their 
sample, the top corporations used much more equity than debt to finance the growth of their 
23 See Allen and Gale (1999) Boot and Thakor (1997), Rajan and Zingales (1999), Stulz (2000) and Beck and 
Levine (2000) for discussion and additional references. 
24 The countries studied include the Republic of Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Pakistan, India, Turkey, Mexico, 
Jordan, and Zimbabwe. 
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net assets. Therefore, they conclude that equity finance has been much more important for 
these firms than for firms in the industrialised countries and much important than previous 
work on developing countries had suggested25. Other economists such as Atkin and Glen 
(1992) have used this work to press the case for the establishment and promotion of equity 
markets in developing countries. 
More detailed work was undertaken by Singh (1995). In his study, Singh set new data covered 
the top 100 listed corporations, over a slightly longer time period, 1980-90, and including an 
extra country (Brazil). Singh's new results confirmed the earlier findings by Singh and Hamid 
(1992): the mean proportion of internal finance (retained profits after tax as a percentage of 
the growth of net assets) was 38.8 percent, while issues of equity finance provided 39.3 
percent and long-term debt provided 20.8 percent. Singh (1995) has gone to some lengths to 
reject the suggestion that developing countries are simply repeating the historical experience 
of the US. He suggests that the essential reasons why developing countries corporations 
resorted so much to equity financing in the 1980s and in the earlier 1990s were: First, the 
relative cost of equity capital over the 1980s and the early 1990s fell significantly, which 
resulted from the large rise in share prices and a rise in real interest rates. The rise in share 
prices was brought about by both internal and external financial liberalisation and government 
support for stock markets in these countries. The rise in interest rates was a consequence of 
both internal financial liberalisation (financial de-repression) and a steep rise in international 
interest rates. Second, the governments in many developing countries have played a major 
active and productive role in the expansion of these markets. These activities include financial 
liberalisation and privatisation, which have significant effect both on the supply of and the 
demand for securities. 
Nigaraj (1996) shows that capital market growth in India led simply to portfolio substitution 
from bank deposit to tradable securities rather than to a greater national of financial savings. 
He notes that despite the stock market boom during the 1970s and the substantial resources 
rose there by Indian corporations, investment in fixed assets declined. Furthermore, Samuel 
(1996) estimates the role of the stock market as a source of finance for sample data which 
25 See for example, Fry (1988): " The 35 security markets that exist in developing countries have generally played 
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covered both Indian and US firms. He finds that internal finance plays less of a role for Indian 
than for US firms -and external debt a bigger role26. To the extent that these findings for India 
are generalisable to other developing countries, Samuel concludes that the development of 
stock markets is unlikely to spur corporate growth in developing countries. 
Furthermore, Singh (1992a, 1996,1997a, 1999) and Singh and Weisse (1998) argue that the 
stock market development in developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s is unlikely to help 
in achieving quicker industrialisation and faster long-term growth in most developing 
countries. They show that the development of the stock markets in most developing countries 
has not led to an increase in aggregate savings as a result of greater new-issue activities on the 
stock markets in these countries, and that in some countries e. g. Mexico and Turkey, aggregate 
savings fell during the 1980s. And these new issues simply represent substitution of one form 
of saving (government saving or banks saving) for another (purchase of corporate shares in the 
stock markets). Further, they argue that share prices in emerging markets exhibit much greater 
volatility than those of advanced countries, this being due to various imperfections and the 
segmentation of stock markets in these countries27. A high degree of volatility has a negative 
effect on the role of the stock market: it makes share prices much less useful as a guide to the 
allocation of investment resources, it also discourages risk-averse investors and savers, it 
raises the cost of capital to corporations and it may also stop risk-averse firms from raising 
funds or from seeking a listing on the stock market. Moreover, these researchers show that 
stock markets invariably encourage short-term profits rather than permit corporate managers 
to take a long-term view of investment, which is in turn most important for developing 
countries. 
Based on the above arguments Singh (1992a, 1996,1997a, 1999) and Singh and Weisse 
(1998) argue that stock markets in developing countries do more harm than good and that 
only very minor roles in domestic resource mobilisation" (p. 288). 
26 Samual's (1996) result is consistent with theoretical predictions, given that information and agency problems 
are less severe for Indian than for U. S. firms. (The Indian financial system is predominantly bank-oriented, more 
like the German and Japanese Financial systems than like U. S and U. K systems. ) 
27 Some researchers also document a similar conclusion (see for example Rouwenhorst, 1999; and Gen et al., 
2000). High price volatility in emerging markets may stem from small-market and informational imperfections. 
With few trades occurring, information about stocks- and therefore stock prices- tends to be noisy. Moreover, 
limited-reporting requirements in many markets means that investors typically have less information about firms 
and receive less-frequent updates than do investors in advanced markets. 
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bank-based financial system is more suitable for the developing countries. Singh (1997a) 
points out that, "Stockinarkets are potent symbols of capitalism but paradoxically capitalism 
often flourishes better without their hegemony. ... 
Developing countries simply cannot afford 
the luxury of stockmarkets. As Keynes noted ..., when the capital development of a country 
becomes the by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done "(p. 780). 
Cameron (1997) argues that savers are at a disadvantage in acting directly with entrepreneurs 
because of the cost of information. He concludes that a bank-based system of finance, 
although carrying its own risk, is a far better system for developing countries. Further, 
Cobham (1995) shows that because stock markets in developing countries suffer from 
problems such as an imperfect flow of information, high transaction costs because they are too 
small to benefit from the economies of scale that characterise the major stock markets of the 
world, in the developing countries there must be a strong preference for a bank-based rather 
than a market-based system. Furthermore, Fry (1997) points out that, "At best stock markets 
play a minor role; more often they resemble gambling casinos and many actually impede 
growth in developing countries" (p. 754). 
Other observers, however, regard stock market development as highly favourable to economic 
development, on the grounds that stock markets may be better at providing capital for new 
ventures and financing risky technical innovations, and on the grounds that stock markets may 
mobilise additional financial resources for investment. Kenny and Moss (1998) have gone to 
some lengths to reject Singh's suggestion that stock markets will cause such problems as to 
make them do more harm than good for developing economies, and to develop a justification 
for their opinion that the focus should be on stock markets rather than on banks in developing 
countries. They argue that: First, short-termism becomes less necessary with the creation of 
investment instruments that no longer have to match the preferred liquidation dates of equity 
holders. As stock can be sold at any time, much of the liquidity risk will be reduced. Second, 
stock markets can make equity finance increasingly cheaper for firms. Stock markets can do 
that by encouraging new supplies of capital. This in turn reduces the average cost of capital 
and new investors entering the market will raise P/E ratios. Finally, companies, by financing 
their activities through issuing equities, will have the opportunity to take risks much greater 
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than they could with finance from a bank loan, they will also be more willing to take risks than 
company owners because that risk has been diversified among many investors. They also 
argue that because of the need for reserve requirements, moving capital from the informal 
market to the banking sector crowds credit, and stock markets are free from this problem 
The World Institute for the Development of Economic Research (WIDER) in their report in 
1990 pointed out that, "the need to attract foreign capital in non-debt creating forms is only 
one reason, and not the most important reason, why developing countries should wish to foster 
their emerging equity markets. Equity markets are a vital part of economic development-they 
encourage savings, help channel savings into productive investment and encourage 
entrepreneurs to improve the efficiency of investment" (p. 6). Allen (1993) uses the "multiple 
checking" provided by stock markets to argue that stock markets might be preferable in 
situations where optimal managerial decision rules are hard to formulate (for example in 
industries where technology is constantly changing), whereas banks work well in situations 
where there is consensus about technology (such as in competitive industries). 
Atje and Jovanovic (1993) provide a model in which stock markets have a greater stimulating 
effect on economic growth than banks. This is because it is assumed that stock markets are 
more conducive to the development of venture capital and hence technical progress than the 
banks. Their cross-country empirical analysis suggests that countries that finance their 
investments more with equities and less with debt tend to grow faster. This leads them to 
enquire why " more countries are not developing their stock markets as quickly as they can as 
a means of speeding up their economic development" (p. 636). 
Furthermore, Cho (1986) argues that credit markets need to be supplemented by a well- 
functioning equity market. He suggests that this is because "equity finance is free from 
adverse selection and moral hazard effects while debt finance is subject to them in the 
presence of asymmetric information" (p. 197). He then shows that in order for the lenders 
(debt finance) to allocate credit to a firm as efficiently as equity investors, they must know one 
more permanently, and know the riskiness of each individual borrower. Therefore, in a world 
of imperfect information, the existence of equity markets will enhance the allocative 
efficiency of capital. He therefore concluded that a substantial development of equity markets 
131 
is essential for successful financial liberalisation in developing countries. Fledman and Kumar 
(1994) argue that the limited availability of debt finance in many developing countries, 
including bank loans which may be limited to a select group of companies, makes equity 
finance in these countries more attractive 
Other empirical research, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996,1999), focuses on the 
impact of stock market development on firms' financing decisions and the impact of the 
availability of long-term debt on firms' performance. Analysing firm level debt-equity ratio in 
30 developed and developing countries, they find that the existence of active stock markets 
increased the ability of firms to borrow, especially in countries with developing financial 
markets. They also show that an active stock market and an improved ability of creditors and 
debtors to enter into long-term contracts are reflected in the ability of firms to grow at rates 
greater than they could attain by relying on their internal sources or short-term bank credit. 
These findings are consistent with the view that improvement in stock market functioning 
trends to improve liquidity information quality, monitoring, and corporate control, such that 
these improvements induce creditors to lend more. For these firms, debt and equity finance are 
complementary. 28 
Furthermore, using data from 44 developed and developing countries from 1976 to 1993, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996a) investigate the relationships between stock market 
development and financial intermediary development. They find that countries with better- 
developed stock markets also have better-developed financial intermediaries. Thus, they 
conclude that stock market development goes hand-in-hand with financial intermediary 
development and stock markets provide important but different financial services from banks. 
Using pooled data from 15 industrial and developing countries from 1980 to 1995, Gracia and 
Liu (1999) examine the macroeconomic determinants of stock market development, 
particularly market capitalisation. In their regressions they includes one measure of financial 
intermediaries development i. e., domestic credit to the private sector divided by GDP. They 
find that financial intermediary development measure has a positive and significant effect on 
stock market capitalisation. They conclude that the stock market is a complement rather than 
28 A fact also noted by Rajan (1992), Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Pagano and Zingales (2000). 
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substitute for the banking sector and developing financial intermediaries can promote stock 
market development. Using bank-level data from 80 developed and developing countries over 
the period from 1990-97, Demirguc-Kunt and Haizinga (2000) investigate if there is any 
relationship between banks' performance and the level of stock market development. They 
find that a larger market capitalisation to GDP increases banks profits and interest margins, 
which reflecting possible complementarities between bank and stock market finance29. 
Therefore they conclude that stock market development may improve bank performance, for 
instance, as stock markets generate information about firms that is also useful to banks. The 
legal and regulatory environment that makes stock market development possible may also 
improve the functioning of banks. 
Moreover, in a recent empirical paper, Levine and Zervos (1998a) find that stock market 
development is robust with economic growth and that a stock market provides different 
financial services from those provided by banks30. Gerad and Demirguc-Kunt (1997) point out 
that, "banking system and stock markets development are complementary, most likely because 
each produces and demands better information" (p26). In an important empirical study, 
Levine (2000) argues that financial services provided by banks and markets are both important 
to the economic development process of a country. Finally, Beck and Levine (2000) provide 
evidence that industries that are heavy uses of external finance grow faster in countries with a 
higher overall rate of financial development. They then conclude that banks and markets might 
act as complements in providing financial services and promoting economic development. 
From the above review, it seems that some economists tend to argue that since stock markets 
do not raise much capital, they are relatively insignificant in the development process. From a 
casual reading of corporate finance literature, this view is not so surprising (Harris and Raviv, 
1991). For example, since managers typically have more information than outsiders, equity 
may be mispriced in the market from their point of view. Given that they have the choice of 
borrowing, the managers may only issue new overpriced equity. They may make investors 
29 The interest margins of banks reflect the efficiency with which commercial banks perform their main function. 
Crucially, banks affect the net return for savings and the gross returns for investment. The speed between two 
returns mirrors the bank interest margins, in addition to transaction costs and borne is directly by savers and 
investors. This suggests that bank interest spreads can be interpreted as the efficiency of a bank's functions. 
30 More details about Levine and Zerovs (1998a) work will be provided later in Chapter V. 
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reluctant to invest in new equity issues and it is consequently not surprising that many 
companies do not rely heavily on new equity to finance new investment. However, this 
method of evaluating the functioning of stock markets (i. e. by the amount of capital raised 
through it) overlooks some of the important roles the stock market can play in the 
development process. 
The fundamental role played by the stock markets is to facilitate the reallocation of funds from 
agents (individuals) with an excess of capital given their investment opportunities towards 
agents (firms) with a shortage of funds vis-ä-vis investment opportunities. This implies that 
stock market development, by reducing the transaction costs of savings and investment, it 
lowers the overall cost of capital in the economy. 
Furthermore, stock markets perform a variety of functions that include helping investors to 
price and hedge risk more effectively. An equity market allows a firm to diversify some of the 
risks it faces, by allowing it to sell to other investors who are more willing bear these risks. 
This allows firms to borrow more and thus encourages growth. Also, from the lender's 
viewpoint the information set on which much decision-making is dependent is expanded with 
the existence of a stock market. This allows banks to make better credit assessment and 
possibly provide additional sources of financing for existing firms. Further, stock markets 
become important tools for attracting increased foreign capital because of their strength in 
pricing risk. 
An active and well-functioning stock market can also contribute to the overall stability of a 
country's financial system in two ways. It provides an alternative to bank credit as a source of 
funding for capital investment by domestic enterprises, and by providing a market for 
corporate ownership; it can serve as an instrument for exercising market discipline over bank 
management- if bank equities are publicly traded. Then weak management can, in principle, 
be discipline by the market for corporate ownership and control (Knight, 1998). Furthermore, 
a well-functioning pricing mechanism and the related potential for efficient mergers and 
acquisitions can strengthen market discipline and contribute to a more efficient allocation of 
capital (Schleifer and Vishny, 1986; and Fledman and Kumar, 1994). 
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Moreover, the notion of banks and stock markets as substitutes for each other and as 
competing for finance seems misleading since to a large extent they compete for different 
kinds of finance. Banks and markets might act as complements in providing financial services 
and promoting economic development (World Bank, 1995b; Boyd and Smith, 1998; and 
Huybens and Smith, 1999). Banks are suitable for financing traditional industries such as 
agriculture where technology is known and where there is a consensus on how firms should be 
run. Stock markets on the other hand are better suited to financing large industries in which 
there is a rapid and continuous technological change (Singh et al., 2000)31 and industries with 
high concentration ratios in which there is no dominant strategy for the firm (i. e. there is 
disagreement among parties as to what is the optimal strategy for the firm). Carlin and Mayer 
(1999), using data from 27 industries in 20 OECD countries over the period 1970-1995, find 
that equity-financed industries carry out more R&D and employ higher skilled workers, while 
bank-financed industries tend to undertake less R&D. Black and Glison (1998) a find 
significant correlation between stock market activity and venture capital market 
development32. They argue that a dynamic venture capital sector exists only in stock-market 
based economies, as opposed to economies dominated by banks, and claim that this is because 
venture capital requires the exit option that arises through access to stock markets 33 
Furthermore, the amount of equity an investor puts down is limited by the amount of debt he 
can raise. In other words, in order for banks to lend to investors, investors must fulfil at least 
two kinds of covenant: meet minimum debt-service coverage ratios and meet prudent bank- 
stipulated "debt-equity" ratios. General experience suggests that firms prefer to finance their 
investments using debt since the cost of debt (due to its tax deductibility) is lower than the cost 
of equity. However, debt cannot exist as a replacement for equity beyond a certain level of 
31 For a theoretical explanation see for example Allen (1993), Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) and Biais and 
Casamatta (1999). 
32 Venture capital is defined as investment by specialised venture capital organisations (venture capital funds) in 
high-growth, high-risk, often high technology firms that need capital to finance product development or growth 
and must, by the nature of their business, obtain this capital largely in the form of equity rather than debt. 
33 In a more recent empirical study, Singh et al., (2000) investigate the relation between stock market 
development and both the development and usage of information technology and the development of venture 
capital using data from 63 developed and developing countries. Their results, however, show that there are weak 
relationships between stock market development and both information technology development and usage and 
development of venture capital. 
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leverage since lenders want the collateral of equity as a cushion. More equity, therefore, 
allows for more debt. Fully leveraged firms do not exist in any prudent system. As Chirinko 
and Singha (2000) point out that, "the capacity of issue debt will be curtailed at sufficiently 
high leverage ratio by the cost of financial distress and at this point, firms must resort to 
equity issues" (p. 419)34. In summary, the absence of a well-functioning stock market may limit 
the ability of firms to achieve an efficient mix of debt and equity, in spite of a well-functioning 
debt market. In this sense, stock market and banks may function as complements, rather than 
substitutes, and a stock market that functions well may have positive externalities for the rest 
of the banking system35 
Furthermore, stock markets offer an exit option for entrepreneurs and therefore decrease 
banks' market power (Stutz, 2000)36. Stock markets also enable an entrepreneur who has 
obtained bank financing to realise profits from a successful project by selling it. An 
entrepreneur considers not only the profits generated in a new venture but also the possibility 
of a lump-sum gain through selling the venture to the public. The existence of well- 
functioning stock markets (efficient stock markets) increases the return for entrepreneurs and 
thus the incentives to undertake risky venture projects (Davidson and Henrekson, 2000; and 
Stulz, 2000)37. Thus, together, banks and stock markets work to promote growth. 
The limited availability of debt finance in many developing countries, including bank loans 
which may be limited to a select group of companies, can also make stock markets necessary 
to finance other groups in developing countries. This limitation can reflect endogenous 
constraints in credit markets, resulting from adverse selection and incentive problems. 
Adverse selection in credit markets refers to a situation where a rise in interest rates may lead 
to a less favourable composition of the group of loan applicants. This may happen because 
borrowers prepared to pay higher interest rates are usually risk lovers, so they take on projects 
34 In addition, high gearing made the corporate sector financially fragile and vulnerable to interest rate and 
exchange rate shocks (Glen, et al., 2000). 
35 This argument will be discussed in detail in Chapter VIII. 
36 Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) argue that bank dependence can lead to a higher cost of funds for firms because 
banks extract rents from their corporate customers. 
37 If the stock markets are not efficient, then the public offering will be less feasible as a result of high transaction 
costs or the uncertainty of getting a fair price in the stock market. Thus, inefficient stock markets may reduce the 
incentive to enter new ventures, reducing overall long-term productivity of the economy. 
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that are characterised by higher profits if they succeed, combined with a high probability of 
failure. On the other hand, borrowers with the highest probability of success may decide not to 
undertake their project after an increase in the lending rate. Hence, more risk-averse borrowers 
may drop out of the pool of loan applicants when a lender increases the interest rate. This 
problem may give rise to another problem- the so- called "moral hazard". Moral hazard refers 
to a situation when two parties agree on a contract, but where one party afterwards takes an 
action that is not observed by the other agents. The hidden actions are meant to increase the 
welfare of the informed agent at the expense of the uninformed agents. 38 
Stock market can also play an important role in influencing the success of the public enterprise 
reform strategy (privatisation), which is an important component of policy strategies to 
accelerate economic growth, especially in many developing countries (Pohl et al., 1995; 
Hermes and Lensink, 2000; and Scholtens, 2000). In particular, the existence of a well- 
developed stock market helps determine variable options for privatisation. A well-functioning 
stock market promotes privatisation by enabling public offerings. Using a public offering to 
obtain widespread ownership of enterprises requires a liquid stock market to be able to absorb 
the new issues without negatively affecting the market as a whole. The existence of a well- 
developed stock market, furthermore, makes it easier for governments to privatise their 
projects since privatisation leads to widespread public ownership is often politically more 
acceptable to the public than sales to a small group of investors (Lieberman and Kirkness, 
2000). Stock markets can also play an important role in financing privatisation by 
complementing the banks' ability to mobilise savings (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1999). 
Privatisation through public share offerings can also spur the development of stock markets, 
directly through the capitalisation of the stock market and through higher equity valuations 
and trading liquidity, and indirectly through increasing opportunities for portfolio 
diversification, accelerating the development of an institutional framework, and increasing 
investor confidence (Perotti and Oijen, 1995,1997,2001). 
38 Equity markets also face the same adverse selection problem as debt markets. Nor are they free from "moral 
hazard" problems. But shareholders are in a better position to deal with "moral hazard', since their vote allows 
them to exert some control over the managerial board. Moreover, if they strongly disapprove of their managers, 
they can sell their stocks. If a sufficient number of shareholders do this, the price of the stock will fall, increasing 
the firm's cost of capital in the future and exposing it to a hostile takeover. 
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4.6 Summary and Conclusion 
Economists have long stressed the importance of financial markets in fostering economic 
growth. Early contributions by Goldsmith (1969), Shaw (1973) and McKinnon (1973) 
mentioned the empirical correlation between financial markets and economic development. 
They argued that financial markets promote growth through greater accumulation of capital, 
improved mobilisation of capital and by enhancing efficiency in resource allocation. 
Theoretically, however, links between financial development and growth are difficult to 
formalise. In traditional growth theory, financial development could only have an influence on 
the level of economic activity, but not on its long-term growth rate. 
The development of endogenous growth models, which show that growth rates can be related 
to institutional arrangements, has made it possible to formalise the presentation of the 
interactions between financial markets and economic growth. However, the role and the 
impact of stock markets on the economic growth process have not received as much attention 
as other elements of the financial sector in theoretical studies. Historically, these studies have 
focused on banks. Recently, more attention has been given to the role of stock markets on the 
economic growth process. However, all these studies concentrate on specific aspects of stock 
markets and their impact on real activity. None of them has provided a comprehensive 
framework of the different effects of stock markets and at empirically testable relationships. 
The existing theoretical literature has identified various mechanisms to explain the positive 
influence of stock markets on the long-term economic growth rate. The mechanisms 
emphasised by these studies rely on the premise that stock markets help to promote physical 
capital accumulation, improving capital mobilisation and increasing productivity growth 
through the facilitation of (risky) technological advances and inducing the real economic 
efficiency with which resources are utilised. Stock markets can do this by providing different 
functions: specialising in collecting information, evaluating projects, sharing risks, providing 
liquidity, exerting corporate control, and mobilising capital. 
Yet, the role that stock markets play in stimulating economic growth is not undisputed. It may 
be that more liquid stock markets, with a substantial amount of small shareholders and hence 
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diffuse ownership, decrease incentives to monitor the investors carefully. Moreover, liquid 
equity markets may facilitate hostile takeovers, which decrease the efficiency of resources 
allocation. There are also some researchers who argue that stock markets even in developed 
countries do not perform monitoring, screening and disciplinary roles very well. Stock markets 
do not have an important role since only a small part of corporate investments is financed by 
means of equity. Stock markets may even have a negative effect since they are merely 
"Casinos". Moreover, because most stock markets in developing economies are very thin, 
Singh (1997a), for example, argues that this may lead to excessively volatile share prices. 
Stock price volatility may seriously hamper economic development. Some researchers also 
argue that because the stock markets have many more problems with asymmetric information, 
banks are more suitable for developing countries. The reason is that stock markets very often 
provide investors with short-term finance, whereas banks, especially group-banks, have long- 
term relationships with firms. In other words, stock markets may suffer from "short-termism". 
Taking in to account the literature which has been reviewed in this chapter, the following 
chapters investigate empirically the stock market development-growth link and examine 
whether the stock market and banking sector are complementary or substitutes for each other 
in providing financial services and thereby enhancing economic growth in the case of the 
small developing country of Jordan. In these chapters we shall introduce different empirical 
methodologies to analyse the link between stock market development and economic 
performance. 
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Chapter V 
Macroeconomic Evidence: Stock Market Development 
and Economic Growth 
5.1 Introduction 
As we have shown in Chapter IV, much of the criticism concerning the development of stock 
markets, especially in developing economies, arises from the speculative nature of these 
markets, and the fact that these markets cannot be enforced in developing countries due to 
information problems, lack of prudent regulatory bodies, high transaction costs, inadequate 
competition, and lack of investors due to imperfect information flows. Based on these 
arguments, critics' content that stock markets in developing economies do more harm than 
good by distorting capital formulation and resources allocation. The conclusion is therefore 
that a bank-based financial system is more suitable for developing countries. 
Levine and Zervos (1998a) pose a question as to whether stock markets are merely burgeoning 
casinos where more and more players are coming to place bets, or whether they are 
importantly linked to economic growth. As mentioned in Chapter III, the main objective 
behind the establishment of a stock market in Jordan (AFM) has to contribute to raising capital 
and assisting its allocation process in order to strengthen the Jordanian economy. 
Consequently, in order to investigate whether the AFM achieves its objective in enhancing the 
macroeconomic growth of the country, this chapter proposes a simple plausible framework for 
studying some elements of endogenous growth that relate to the main aspects of the functions 
of financial markets. In particular, in this chapter we make the following two main 
contributions. First, we extend a simple model of a Romer (1986), Lucas (1988), Rebelo 
(1991), and Pagano (1993a) type of endogenous growth economy in order to incorporate the 
effect of financial markets. Utilising the theoretical literature that we have reviewed in Chapter 
IV, we argue that the degree to which financial markets, particularly stock markets, influence 
real economic growth depends on how effectively they improve capital accumulation, 
facilitate capital mobilisation and increase the productivity of capital investment. Second, the 
model is estimated and tested on an individual country- Jordan. This study therefore represents 
the first attempt to examine the link between stock market development and economic growth 
in the experience of a specific country, and thus its results will be appropriate for policy 
recommendations to other developing countries with a similar economic structure. 
The particular questions we are trying to answer in this chapter are the following: does the 
development of the stock market have any influence on Jordan's real economic growth? If it 
does, have the level of stock market development and the level of banking sector development 
both influenced Jordan's economic growth? If they have, this suggests that both the banking 
sector and the stock market in Jordan may have an independent empirical connection with 
Jordan's economic growth. In order to examine these issues, we include in our analysis 
variables for the banking sector development, specifically, in the regressions we 
simultaneously include the banking sector and the stock market development indicators. 
Furthermore, we control for economic factors that may influence the economic growth, in 
order to gauge the sensitivity of results to changes in these variables. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 provides a review and 
discussion of the shortcomings in the existing empirical literature in this field. In section 5.3 
the theoretical framework is presented. We describe the empirical methodology and the 
variables and their measurements in section 5.4. Section 5.5 describes data sources and 
statistical descriptions. The main results of the chapter are contained in section 5.6. Finally, 
section 5.7 contains the summary and the conclusion to the chapter. 
5.2 Previous Empirical literature 
There are many studies that emphasise the links between the state of development of a 
country's financial sector and the level and rate of economic growth. The argument essentially 
is that the functions the financial sector provides are an essential catalyst of economic growth. 
This type of empirical study started with Goldsmith (1969), and McKinnon (1973), and more 
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recently, Ghani (1992), King and Levine (1993a, b), Degregorio and Giudotti (1995), Rousseau 
and Wachtel (1998), Beck et al., (1999b), Levine et al., (2000), Levine (2000) and others. 
While all these studies utilise bank measures of financial development, with the exception of a 
very few recent empirical works: Atji and Jovanovic (1993), Harris (1997), and Levine and 
Zervos (1996,1998a), the role of stock markets in the macroeconomic development process 
has been completely ignoredl. A part of the problem may stem from the absence of indicators 
that can accurately measure the extent of stock market development. 
Atji and Jovanovic (1993) used a reduced form of an equation derived from an argument of 
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) to determine empirically whether stock market development 
has a transitory level effect or permanent growth effects. They find a significant correlation 
between growth over the period 1980-88 and the value of stock market trading divided by 
gross domestic product (GDP) for 72 countries. Therefore, they conclude that stock markets 
on their own can raise a typical developing countries economic growth by a rounding 2.5 
percent per annum. As can be seen, Atje and Jovanovic succeeded in obtaining favourable 
results for the hypothesis that the development of the stock market has positive effects on 
growth, but over quite a short period (1980-1988), which does not really seem representative 
of long-term trends. 
Following the methodology of Atji and Jovanovic (1993), Hams (1997) re-examined the 
empirical relationship between stock market development and economic growth utilising 
sample data covering 49 countries during the period 1980-91. His findings on the effects of 
stock market development on economic growth were the same as those of Atji-Jovanovic 
found. When he divided his sample into developed and developing countries, he found that for 
less developed countries, the stock market development effect is similar to that found for the 
full sample. For developed countries, however, stock market development has less effect. 
In order to evaluate the relationship between stock market development and national growth 
rates, capital accumulations, rates of technological change, and savings rates, in the two 
important recent papers, Levine and Zervos (1996,1998a) build on Atji and Jovanovic's study 
using various measures of stock market development. They argue that well-developed stock 
1 To the best of our knowledge. 
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markets may be able to offer different kinds of impetus to investment and growth from the 
development of the banking system. In particular, they show that increased stock market 
capitalisation measured by the ratio of the stock market value to GDP, may improve an 
economy's ability to mobilise capital and diversify risk. Liquidity is another important 
indicator of stock market development in that it may be inversely related to transaction costs, 
which impede the efficient functioning of stock markets. Liquidity is measured by total value 
of shares traded relative to either GDP or total market capitalisation. The latter is known as the 
turnover ratio and may be an indicator of the level of transaction costs. Other stock market 
developments indicators in which Levine and Zervos used are the volatility of market returns 
and the ability of markets to diversify risk internationally- the degree of stock market 
integration with world markets. 
Using data from 47 countries over the period 1976-93 Levine and Zervos run cross-country 
regressions and find that stock market liquidity is positively and significantly correlated with 
current and future rates of economic growth, capital accumulation, and productivity growth. 
They also find after including both stock market and bank indicators in the same regressions, 
that both banking development and stock market liquidity are good predictors of economic 
growth, capital accumulation and productivity growth. They conclude that stock markets 
provide different services from those provided by banks. What kind of different services, 
however, is not explained. They also find that volatility is insignificantly correlated with 
growth, similarly, market size and the degree of market integration are not robustly linked 
with economic growth, capital accumulation, and productivity growth2. Also, none-of the 
stock market indicators is robustly related to private savings rates. 3 
Since all the previous empirical studies are based on cross-country growth regressions they are 
subject to criticism. They do not explicitly confront the issue of causality- stock market 
development may predict economic growth simply because stock markets anticipate future 
growth (Levine, 1997)- thus stock market development may simply be a leading indicator 
2 In more recent study, however, Leahy et al., (2000) and Bassanini et at., (2001) find evidence from OECD 
countries (using panel data analysis) that the degree of stock market capitalisation is strongly related to both 
economic growth and to the investment rate. 
3 Bonser-Near and Dewenter (1999) also provide evidence from 16 emerging markets over the period 1982-93 
that the growth of the stock market is not necessarily associated with higher savings rates. 
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rather than a causal factor. In particular, this approach involves averaging out variables over a 
long time period, and using them in a cross-section regression aimed at explaining cross- 
country variables of growth rates. Therefore, this technique cannot allow different countries to 
exhibit different patterns of causality, yet it is likely that in some countries the stock market is 
a leading sector whilst in others it lags behind the bank sector. This means that the causality 
result is only valid on average. As pointed out by Quah (1993), Lee et al., (1996) and Arestis 
and Demetriades (1997), it is difficult to draw any causal inferences from the cross-section 
regression methodology used in such work. 
Consequently, one should refrain from interpreting the coefficients of explanatory variables as 
indicative of the elasticity that predicts the magnitude of change in growth following a 
particular policy reform. All the coefficient estimates and corresponding t-statistics from 
cross-section regressions does not help evaluate the strength of partial correlation between 
explanatory variables and explained variables. As pointed out by Harberger (1987) 
"... regressions cross country do not resolve causal issues, nor do the regressions describe a 
single piece of machinery over time. They should be viewed as evaluating the strength of the 
partial correlation and not behavioural relationships that suggest how much growth will 
change when the right-hand-side variable changes. The results unearth suggestive empirical 
regularities and should not be interpreted as stylised facts, or as behavioural relationships" 
(p. 265). 
Moreover, Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue that both stock market development and growth 
could be driven by a common omitted variable such as the propensity of individuals in the 
economy to save. Since endogenous savings (in certain macroeconomic models) affect long- 
term growth, it may not be surprising that growth and stock market development are 
correlated. This argument is hard to refute with simple cross-country regressions. In the 
absence of a well accepted theory of growth, the list of potential omitted variables for which 
the stock market might be a proxy is large, and the explanatory variables to include a matter of 
conjecture (Paxson, 1996). 
Further, the cross-country regressions suffer from three kinds of error: measurement errors, 
statistical errors, and conceptual errors. Measurement errors occur when the variables are 
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defined collected, and measured incorrectly across different countries. Moreover, published 
data sometimes fail to capture the reality on the ground. A statistical error occurs when the 
regression analysis assumes that the observations are drawn from the same population; yet 
vastly different countries appear in cross-country regressions. 
Conceptually speaking, the coefficients of such studies should be interpreted with extreme 
caution. This is because when studying long periods of time, many changes occur 
simultaneously: countries change policies, economies experience business cycles, perceptions 
and performances of people change, and governments change. Hoping to capture all such 
changes by means of certain explanatory variables averaged over time is being rather 
optimistic. Thus, aggregation trends to blur importance and events across countries. 
In consideration of the above-cited limitations of the cross-sectional method of studying 
growth, which is a truly dynamic concept, we believe that the results of Atji and Jovanovic 
(1993), Harris (1997) and Levine and Zervos (1996,1998a) are subject to criticism, and we 
also do not believe that the equation of causality is addressed satisfactory in these studies. In 
summary, however, in these studies, there is no consensus that the existence of a stock market 
causes economic growth. Demetriades and Hussein (1996) and Stulz (2000) have shown 
evidence that the issue is very much country-specific, which agrees with the views recently 
expressed by the World Bank (1993), that economic policies are country-specific and their 
effectiveness depends on the effectiveness of the institutions which implement them. 
Finally, another shortcoming in these studies is that most of them do not provide a theoretical 
framework to support the empirical specifications. Also most of the previous studies employ 
only the stock market development variable as the determinant of economic growth in the 
regression equations that are empirically estimated. By neglecting other growth-determining 
variables, such as the share of investment in the GDP, human capital stock, macroeconomic 
stability and the degree of openness of an economy, their estimates of the impact of stock 
market development variables could hardly be free of the bias caused by the omitted variables. 
In addition, most of the earlier studies did not take in to consideration the possibility of the 
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endogeneity of stock market development. It may be argued that stock market development is 
not exogenous in that it may be simply a leading indicator rather than a causal factor4. 
Consequently, in this chapter we attempt to address the gap in this field by providing an 
empirical analysis of the effect of stock market development on economic growth in an 
individual country- Jordan- by proposing a simple plausible framework that suggests that the 
stock market may influence economic growth through improved capital accumulation, the 
facilitation of capital mobilisation and the increased productivity of capital investment. 
Empirically, we use a Two-Stage-Least-Squares (TSLS) approach to correct for the 
endogeneity of independent variables, specifically the level of financial development. The 
TSLS approach allows us to address the issue of endogeneity of independent variables by 
using instrumental variables. However, the main difficulty in using this method is to find 
suitable instruments for endogenous variables. Such instruments must, in each case, be 
sufficiently highly correlated with the explanatory variables and uncorrelated with the error 
term. However, econometrics textbooks commonly recommend using either the preceding or 
subsequent period value of an explanatory variable as its instruments5. Consequently, we used 
a one-lagged value of endogenous variables as instruments' in our estimation of the TSLS 
regressions. 
`' Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995) point out that, "it is unclear whether the relation between growth and financial 
sophistication isolates the effect of an exogenous improvement in financial system on the growth rate, or, in 
inverse, reflects the impact of good growth prospects on the incentive to develop the financial sector" (p. 443). 
Pagano (1993a) shows that regulatory and institutional factors may influence the development of stock markets. 
In important studies, La Porta et al., (1997,1998,1999,2000) show that the quality legal and accounting 
standards are important determinants of stock market development. They find that countries that protect 
shareholders have more valuable stock markets, a larger number of listed securities per capital, and a higher rate 
of IPO (Initial Public Offering) activity that do the unproductive countries. In addition, using pooled data from 
fifteen industrial and developing countries from 1980 to 1995, Garcia and Liu (1999) find that real income, 
savings rate, and financial intermediary development are important determinants of stock market development 
measured by market capitalisation. Using data from 16 emerging markets, Levine and Zervos (1998b) investigate 
the effect of liberalisation of restrictions on international flows on stock market development. They find that 
stock markets become larger, more liquid, more internationally integrated, and more volatile following the 
liberalisation of restrictions on capital and dividend flows. Moreover, Boyd et al., (1996) examine the effect of 
macroeconomic stability measures by inflation and stock market development. They find that inflation and the 
development of the stock market are very negatively correlated. Thus, there is clear evidence that stock market 
development is not a completely exogenous determinant. In our case also, it was clear from Chapter III that 
macroeconomic evolution, particularly macroeconomic stability, is an important factor for stock market 
development in Jordan. Therefore, it is important to correct for the endogeneity of stock market development in 
the empirical analysis. 
5 See for example, Thomas (1985, Chapter 3, p. 42-77) and Kennedy (1998, Chapter 9, p. 137-50). 
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5.3 Theoretical Framework 
As shown in Chapter IV, the modelling of financial markets and the investigation of their 
welfare economics and growth implications are still in their infancy. The claims that the 
effectiveness of financial markets and the level of real activity are closely related are, 
however, not new. Against the background of neoclassical growth theory these studies could 
argue only temporary efficiency effects resulting from financial market development. More 
recent developments in growth theory allow for level as well as growth- path effects, but these 
models, as we have shown in Chapter IV, concentrate on specific aspects of stock markets and 
their impact on real activity. For example Bencivenga et al., (1995) and Levine (1991) in their 
model emphasised that stock markets provide liquidity, allowing a shift from current liquid but 
unproductive assets towards less liquid but more productive assets, thereby increasing the 
funds available for productive capital. Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) argue that stock 
markets promote the acquisition and dissemination of information, thus allowing more 
economic efficiency. Saint-Paul (1992) argues that stock markets permit agents to increase 
specialisation, shifting away from less specialised and inefficient technologies, and thereby 
affecting the availability of financial markets. All of these researches cover important aspects 
of stock markets and their impact on real activity, providing important analytical insights into 
issues raised in the literature. However, they all fall short of providing a comprehensive 
framework of the different effects of stock markets and of empirically testable relationships. 
Utilising the theoretical literature mentioned above, we can identify three fundamental 
channels through which the functions of financial markets influence economic growth: 
" Financial markets development mobilises and allocates resources to their efficient use. 
" Financial markets development may change the savings rate and hence affect physical 
capital accumulation. 
" Financial markets development increases the productivity of capital utilised in an 
economy. 
To shed more light on how financial development, especially stock market development, can 
influence economic growth, we present a simple framework based on an endogenous growth 
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model (AK) as exemplified by Romer (1986), Lucas (1988), Rebelo (1991), and Pagano 
(1993a). 
Suppose the aggregate of output, y, is produced according to the following constant-returns-to- 
scale production function: 
t= 
AK 
t (5.1) 
y, i = AK t+l (5.1a) 
or A= '+' 
I 
(5. lb) 
K, 
Yt-I = AK t-j (5.1c) 
where K and t are the capital stock and time respectively; and A is a variable which measures 
the social marginal productivity of capital or the level of total factor productivity which has 
two components: economic efficiency and the level of technological progress. 
For the sake of simplicity we shall assume that population is stationary, and that the economy 
produces a single good, which can be invested or consumed: if the good is invested, it 
depreciates at the rate, 6, per period, then the gross investment is equal to: 
It = Kr+j -(1- (5) Kt 
K, j = Ir +(I -(5) Kr 
(5.2) 
(5.2a) 
where I is the level of investment. In a closed economy with no government, capital market 
equilibrium requires that gross saving S, equals gross investment I: 
Sc Ic (5.3) 
In the process of transforming savings into investment, the stock market and other 
intermediates absorb resources so that a dollar saved by households generates less than one 
dollar's worth of investment. Since households invest only a fraction of their savings then 
capital market equilibrium: 
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ß St = It (5.4) 
I 
S or ` (5.4a) 
The remaining fraction (1-13) goes to the stock market as commission, fees, etc and to other 
financial intermediaries i. e. banks, as the spread between lending and borrowing rates (and is 
lost in the process of the stock market and other financial intermediates). The leakages of 
financial resources may also reflect economic efficiency or the so-called X-efficiency of 
financial markets. 
Growth rate at time t+1 can be defined as: 
Gr+1 _ 
Avt (5.5) 
Yt 
A't+l 
ivr 
Gr+1 = 
Y`+l (5.5a) 
yt 
since y, = Axt+, . substituting this 
into (5. Sa) yields: 
G_ AK t+j _1 (5.5b) 
yt 
substituting the value of AK,,, from (5.2a) into (5.5b) yields: 
- 
AIIt+(1-S) KýJ 
r+1 
yt 
dropping all subscripts for a steady state of growth: 
G= 
AI 
+A 
(1-6)K 
YY 
G 
AI+A K- SK 
-1 (5.6c) 
YYY 
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substituting the value of K/y from (5. lb) into (5.6c) yields steady state growth: 
G= Al +A 
1 
-Ab 
1 
yAA 
Al 
-b (5.7) 
substituting the value of "I" from (5.4) into (5.7) yields: 
G= Aß 
S 
(5.8) 
y 
we can rewrite the equation (5.8) as follows: 
G= A(ßs)-b (5.9) 
where s=Slv. 
Equation (5.9) suggests that at steady states, the real economic growth rate is some composite 
of the social marginal productivity of capital, the proportion of total savings that are mobilised 
to investment, and the savings ratio. In identity form, a re-interpretation of equation (5.9) can 
be written as follows: 
G=In A+1nß+Ins (5.10) 
The idea is that the above identity, equation (5.10), represents a composite of the three main 
mechanisms by which financial development may induce endogenous economic growth: 
1) It can raise 0 the proportion of savings channels to investment (mobilisation and 
allocation of capital to its efficient use). 
2) It can contribute to raising s, the savings rate and, thus, physical capital 
accumulation, and 
3) It can increase A, the level of total factor productivity, by influencing economic 
efficiency or the level of technological progress. 
Financial markets and institutions play a key role in mobilising and allocating resources to 
their efficient use. Stulz (2000) points out that, "even though a country has savings, its growth 
can be stunted because its financial system fails to direct these savings where they can be 
invested most efficiently" (p. 11). Wargler (2000) stresses, "a fundamental job of the economy 
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is to allocate capital efficiently. To achieve this, capital is supposed to be invested in the 
sector that are expected to have high returns and be withdrawn from sectors with poor 
prospect... financial markets and institutions do more than just provide a sideshow to the real 
economy; they perform a fundamental allocative function" (p. 187-188). Financial systems 
aggregate the small savings of numerous investors for use by agents with entrepreneurial and 
managerial talents who need funds for large-scale capital investment. Financial markets can 
ease capital mobilisation and allocate it to more efficient uses by providing investors as well 
as entrepreneurs with liquidity and risk pooling facilities. Also one of the main impacts of 
liquidity and risk pooling and sharing is promoting technological innovations. By easing the 
burden of risk and liquidity to capital contributors as well as to the entrepreneurs, markets and 
institutions enable the undertaking of risky technological inventions and innovations. 
Financial markets and institutions that are not sufficiently developed may either fall short of 
receiving all potential savings from households or divert many of the savings away from 
investment. With underdeveloped financial markets, individuals may allocate some of their 
savings to passive instruments, such as gold, which cannot be used directly for physical 
investment. With the development of efficient financial markets and institutions, more savings 
would be channelled to the financial sector and this would increase the amount of funding 
channelled to the most productive investments and therefore lead to economic growth. 
The degree of development of stock markets and other financial institutions may also affect 
the savings rate of households. However, evidence is ambiguous as to whether a more 
developed and efficient stock market would increase the proportion of income that individuals 
save. Improved efficiency, additional liquidity, and the ability to realise capital gains from 
stock markets might increase the returns on savings. As is well known, savers are offered 
higher returns. 
A higher return on savings, however, does not necessarily translate into higher savings. The 
decision on savings is dependent on two countervailing effects. The decision of the household 
on how much to save depends on its performance with regard to present versus future 
consumption. With a higher return on savings, consuming in the future becomes relatively 
cheaper. This induces the household to give up current consumption for higher consumption in 
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the future and therefore save more. This is called the "substitution" effect. However, the 
higher rate of return on savings implies that households need to save less in order to obtain the 
same level of future consumption as before. This is called the "income" effect, which leads to 
a lower savings rate. Thus, the total effect of increased returns on the savings rates is a little 
more ambiguous. 
The insurance function of financial markets and institutions also has ambiguous effects on the 
savings rate. As we mentioned before, financial markets are suppose to provide individuals 
with insurance against liquidity shocks. In the absence of banks or stock markets, individuals 
need to put aside cash for unforeseen emergencies. They cannot invest all their savings in 
physical assets, because assets cannot be easily liquidated. For instance, with the existing 
financial intermediation that pool individuals' savings, individuals who face a liquidity shock 
can get their savings back by withdrawing deposits from the bank or selling stock. Clearly, 
more savings will be channelled to physical assets, but whether individuals will increase 
aggregate savings is not clear 6. 
Increasing the productivity of investment represents the third channel through which financial 
markets and institutions impact economic growth. This channel is undoubtedly the primary 
role of financial market and is generally believed to be far more relevant to growth than other 
channels (Stiglitz, 1989; and Bossone, 2000). As we have shown before, the existing 
theoretical literature has identified two main functions to explain the positive effect of 
financial markets, especially stock markets, on productivity of investment and thereby growth. 
In particular, stock markets can do this through their monitoring and information production 
functions7. By aggregating and disseminating information about firms, stock markets provide 
incentives to gather information, which becomes reflected in stock prices. This information 
production role has consequences that have efficiency implications. It is very important for 
entrepreneurs in augmenting their understanding of the market environment. It provides 
6 Jappelli and Pagano (1994,1999) argue that the increased availability of credit and insurance to households, 
which is associated with financial development, reduce the propensity to save. Thus, they suggest that financial 
development can harm rather than strengthen the process of capital accumulation. 
In addition, according to Saint-Paul (1992) markets can increase investment productivity through a greater 
division of labour. By enabling agents to hedge against risk through holding diversified portfolios, financial 
markets permit a division of labour which implies specialised and therefore more productive technology. 
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knowledge about how investors evaluate both their own and their competitors' current 
decisions, future plans and managerial performance. It enhances entrepreneurs' knowledge 
about efficient firms' operation and their ability to develop more efficient production methods. 
The information reveals the general belief in the current and future prospects of the economy 
as a whole. 
Financial institutions also provide an information production function. Instead of informed 
traders producing information through trading and conveying it via prices, banks hire loan 
officers who produce information while evaluating projects for loan financing. The 
information created by loan officers, however, is not as widely disseminated and the firms are 
not accessed as continuously and efficiently as when they are traded on the stock markets. 
Most of the information collected by banks remains as private assets. In the sense of 
influencing the whole economy, from this point of view, stock markets are certainly more 
significant than banks. Stock markets can thus play a unique role in furthering productivity 
and long-term economic growth. 
Markets and institutions can also increase productivity of investment by playing a controlling 
and monitoring role. The markets can promote productivity through monitoring in a number of 
ways. Managerial incentives that use information on stock prices reduce shirking. In general, it 
aligns managerial interest to that of shareholders, reducing the potential for under- or over- 
investment vis-ä-vis the optimum. Through the mechanism of the market for corporate control 
inefficient management is forced out of office. More importantly, the threat of takeover 
induces managerial discipline, deterring management from taking actions that waste firms' 
resources. 
In summary, the growth in output (G) in an economy, which is an aggregate measure of 
performance, is partly determined by the effectiveness and efficiency of the financial markets 
and institutions in performing liquidity, risk-pooling and sharing, information and monitoring 
functions. 
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5.4 Empirical Model and Variables Measure 
5.4.1 Empirical Model 
In order to investigate empirically the strength of the correlation between stock market 
development and the growth rate of economic activity in Jordan, we have to determine first the 
version of the empirical model that we will use to examine this relation. In order to do this we 
extend the endogenous growth model mentioned above to incorporate the stock market 
development effects. As we have shown, the expressions for growth in (5.10) are combined 
with three equations that capture the effect of financial market development on growth: the 
social marginal productivity of capital (A), or what is called the level of total factor 
productivity, the savings rate (s) and the proportion of savings channelled to investment (ß). 
Based on the theoretical framework proffered above, we consider the behavioural nature of 
these equations as follows: First, we assume that the behaviour of s and 0 are influenced by 
some measurements of stock market development as follows: 
In s, =cp0+(p1 STOCIc+i 
1n, ß1-(50 +(51 STOCII+, ut 
(5.11) 
(5.12) 
where STOCK, is the vector of stock market development measurement, rat and µt are the 
white-noise error terms, and t represents time period. Second, the behaviour of A, is 
influenced by stock market development, and following Romer (1986) and Locas (1988) it is 
influenced also by capital-output ratio and human capital accumulation, hence: 
In A= po +pI STOCK, + p2 (K r/ 
}) +p 3Hr +V 
(5.13) 
where K/Y is capital-output ratio, H, is an indicator of human capital, and v, is white-noise 
error term. Substitute equations (5.11), (5.12) and (5.13) into (5.10) and we obtain the 
following empirical model: 
Gt =ao +a, (Kt /Yr)+a2Hr +a3STOCK r +Et 
(5.14) 
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where Et is white-noise error term (s, = iidN(O, o'2) ). The argument in the above basic 
empirical model is that the savings and investment activities in the financial markets, e. g. 
stock markets, induce economic growth endogenously. Consistent with the growth literature, 
we used the growth rate of per capita real GDP as a measure of real economic growth. We 
generated the growth rate of real per capita GDP as the first difference in the logarithm of the 
real per capita GDP series. Consistent with most studies in economic growth, we used the 
secondary school enrolment rate as a proxy for the stock of human capital (HI ) 8. 
Data on the capital stock for Jordan are not available as such, thus making it difficult to 
estimate a long-term growth equation such as (5.14). And since no existing methods are 
reliable for estimating such data9, we make simplified assumptions to transfer equation (5.14) 
into a form that can be estimated. Following recent growth studies10, we use the Investment- 
output ratio (I / Y) , rather than the capital-output ratio (K / Y) . Thus, our basic statistical 
model used to test the impact of stock market development on the country's economic growth 
is specified as follows: 
Gt =ao +a, (It IYt)+a2Ht+a3STOCK t+Et 
(5.15) 
As mentioned before, the main objective of this chapter is to test the hypothesis that stock 
market development in Jordan is robustly correlated with real economic growth. Thus, our 
explanatory variable, whose influences we are interested in, is the stock market development 
indicator (STOCKt). If the coefficient estimate of this variable enters positively and 
statistically significantly into the growth regression, this implies that by providing more 
8 Empirically human capital is proxied by many variables including primary school enrolment rate, secondary 
school enrolment, total estimated average schooling years and labour force participation rate. Although none of 
them can perfectly represent human capital, secondary school enrolment rate is widely used in many studies 
(Barro, 1991; Mankiw, et al., 1992; Levine et at., 2000; and others). 
9 One of the greatest difficulties in estimating the capital accumulation data is in determining the initial capital 
stock K0. Some researchers base their estimate on an assumption of an initial capital stock of zero (see for 
example, King and Levine, 1993a) others suggest deriving a guess of the initial capital stock in 1950, which 
assumes that a country was at its steady-state capital-output ratio in 1950 (see for example, Harberger, 1978, 
1998; Collins and Bosworth, 1996; Orlov, 1999; Levine and Zervos, 1998a; Beck et al, 1999b; and Levine, et at., 
2000). All these assumptions are surely wrong and basing estimates on any of them will not give a real picture of 
the capital stock accumulation. 
'o See for example Ghura (1997) and Beddies (1999). 
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accurate information about production technology, exerting corporate control, facilitating risk 
management and improving the liquidity assets available to savers, a more developed stock 
market can enhance productivity growth, facilitating resource mobilisation to most efficient 
use, and encouraging investment in higher productive activities, thereby accelerating real 
economic growth. 
As we have shown in Chapter IV, an intensive debate in the literature focuses on the relative 
merits of stock markets as opposed to banks. Many authors stress the advantages that banks 
have over stock markets in financing a country's economic growth. Others, however, 
emphasise the comparative merits of stock markets. Another argument is that the stock market 
versus banks debate is of second-order importance. According to this view, both banks and 
stock markets arise to ameliorate information and transaction costs and thereby provide 
financial services that enhance economic growth. Furthermore, banks and stock markets might 
act as complements in providing financial services and promoting economic growth. 
Therefore, in addition to the main objective of this chapter we can examine an important issue: 
whether the stock market and the banking sector are substitutes for each other or 
complementary in providing financial services and promoting economic growth in Jordan, and 
whether the stock market or the banking sector is better at facilitating economic growth, or if it 
is the overall level of financial development that is critical for economic growth. 
In order to examine the above issues, we require in our empirical model to account for the 
effect of banking sector development. Consequently, we add to the basic empirical model 
(equation 5.15) another variable (BANKt) that measures banking sector development. If the 
coefficient estimate of the stock market development indicator (STOCKt) is still significant 
and relatively stable after including the banking sector development indicator (BANKt), this 
implies that the stock market and the banking sector are complementary rather than substitutes 
in providing financial services to the Jordanian economy. The magnitudes of the coefficients 
estimate of the stock market and banking sector development indicators provide us with an 
indicator about the importance of stock market development compared with banking sector 
development in enhancing economic growth in Jordan. 
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In the light of the recent empirical literature on growth, which has identified a large number of 
variables that are partially correlated with growth, we also run other regressions to evaluate 
the strength of partial correlation between real per capita GDP growth and each of the stock 
market and banking sector development indicators to changes in the conditional information 
set. Specifically, besides the above explanatory variables, we include three variables that are 
most generally used in growth literature. 
5.4.2 Variables Measure 
The following paragraphs provide a detailed description of (1) the stock market development 
variables, (2) the banking sector development variables, and (3) the conditioning information 
set variables. 
A. The Stock Market Development Variables 
These variables are of particular analytical interest for this study. As mentioned above, well- 
functioning stock markets can play an important role in economic development processes by 
performing the following functions: aggregate and mobilise capital, enhance liquidity, provide 
risk pooling and sharing services, monitor managers and exert corporate control. It is difficult, 
however, to construct accurate measures of these functions. Consequently, in this study we use 
indicators to suit the purpose of the concept of stock market development, by constructing 
proxies for stock market development that are most commonly used by academics and 
practitioners (see Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1996a; Levine and Zervos, 1998a, b; and Beck 
et al., 1999a). These indicators are associated with the size, stability, and liquidity of the stock 
market". While these indicators may be still imperfect measures of how well a stock market 
performs the above functions, these measures or indicators together may provide a more 
accurate picture than if we use only a single indicator. 
Specifically, in this chapter we use six indicators related to stock market development. We use 
one measure of stock market size, one measure of stock market volatility, and four measures 
of stock market liquidity. 
'I Levine and Zervos (1998a) also discuss integration with world markets, but we refrain from the analysis, since 
it is difficult to compute time-series estimates of market integration. 
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1. Stock Market Size 
We use market capitalisation adjusted for the size of the economy i. e., market capitalisation 
divided by the GDP, as indicator of stock market size. The market capitalisation refers to the 
total value of listed shares on the stock exchange. Capitalisation of a company is calculated by 
multiplying the number of shares outstanding of that company by its share price. To calculate 
the market capitalisation, this information is aggregated for all the companies listed in the 
stock market. The assumption underlying the use of this variable as an indicator for stock 
market development is that the size of the stock market is a measure of the availability of 
finance (Zingales, 1996; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; and Subrahamanyam and 
Titman, 1999) and the ability to mobilise capital, diversify the risk and resources allocation 
processes. Bekaert and Harvey (1995b, 1997) also argue that the ratio of equity capitalisation 
to GDP is a useful tool in characterising the time-series of market integration. A large market 
size (market capitalisation relative to economic activity) suggests that the country is more 
likely to be integrated into world capital markets12. Furthermore, in an important empirical 
study, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996a) find that large stock markets measured by equity 
capitalisation to GDP are more liquid, less volatile, more internationally integrated, stronger 
with regard to information disclosure laws and international accounting standards, and have 
unrestricted capital flows than smaller markets. While we include this indicator in our 
analysis, past works by Levine and Zervos (1996,1998a) suggest that market capitalisation is 
not a very good predictor of economic performance. 
Unlike the past studies, we carefully deflated the indicator statistics. Since the stock market 
capitalisation is a stock variable measured at the end of a year, while the GDP is a flow 
variable measured relative or over the year, simply using the stock market capitalisation by the 
GDP can produce misleading measures of the stock's market development, especially in 
highly inflationary environments. To address this problem, we used the procedure defined by 
Levine et al., (2000). Specifically, we deflated the end-of-year stock market capitalisation by 
the end-of-year consumer price index (CPI) and deflated the GDP series by the annual CPI. 
12 Morck et at., (2000) and Wargler (2000) also argue that larger markets have more informative prices (due to 
the more effective arbitrage facilitated by liquidity and low transaction costs) which help investors and managers 
distinguish between good and bad investments through more accurate measures of stocks. 
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Then, when we computed the average of the real stock market capitalisation (MC) in year t 
and t-1 and divided this average by real the GDP measured in year t, the end-of-year CPI is the 
value for December. The formula is the following: 
MCA 
+ 
MC 
t_1 
0.5 x 
CPI 
e,, 
CPI 
e, t_, 
GDP, 
CPI 
at 
2. Stock Market Volatility 
(5.16) 
No set of measures of stock market development would be complete without a measure of the 
volatility of the stock market, because volatility of stock returns is another attribute that has 
received great attention in the theoretical literature and is of great interest to practitioners. A 
high level of volatility can lead to a negative future of stock markets in that it can undermine 
the financial system as a whole13. In an efficient market, new information will be correctly and 
quickly incorporated into price and even though that may entail price jumps, price 
overshooting and deviations from the equilibrium prices are reduced in efficient markets 
Volatility also discourages risk-averse investors and savers, and stock market fluctuations may 
raise the cost of capital to corporations'4 and may also increase the value of the "option wait" 
hence delaying investments. Volatility would also tend to discourage firms from seeking a 
stock market listing or attempting to raise funds by new issues. Thus, a high level of market 
volatility will impede investment and slow overall economic growth (De Long et al., 1989). 
Garner (1988) and Starr-McCluer (1998) also argue that stock price volatility may adversely 
affect real economic activity through several possible channels. It may adversely affect 
consumer spending through wealth and by consumer confidence changes. Further, if extreme 
stock price volatility causes a financial system crisis, financial intermediation could break 
s down, causing monetary and credit problems in the economic system' 
13 Dernirguc-Kunst and Levine (1996a) however argue that greater volatility is not necessarily a sign of more or 
less stock market development. Indeed, high volatility could be an indicator of development. 
14 See for example Bekaert and Wa (2000), Singh (1992a, 1996,1997a, 1999), Glen, et al., (2000); Singh, et al., 
(2000) and Kim and Singal (2000). 
15 This argument is also mentioned by Singh (1999) and Singh et al., (2000). 
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In order to carry out any empirical study of the relationship between stock market volatility 
and economic activity, one must first construct a measure of that volatility. Volatility can be 
measured in many different ways and uses many different frequencies: annual, monthly, or 
daily volatiles can be calculated. One popular method of calculating unconditional volatiles 
involves a moving standard deviation of the rate of change of variable. Several papers use this 
model as a proxy for volatility, for example Officer (1973), Merton (1980) and Levine and 
Zervos, 1996,1998a). This model uses either 12 lagged monthly returns, or 6 lagged returns to 
calculate the standard deviation of returns. One disadvantage of using this method is the ad 
hoc nature of the choice of the order of the moving standard deviation. 
Another approach to constructing volatility measures is to model conditional variance 
measures. The most widely used model here is the autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity or ARCH model of Engle (1982). If the stock market returns uncertainty is 
being proxied by an ARCH model, a possible specification may look like this: 
Rr =0+ P1Rt-1 + ur 
7t =hr+h1 t2 1 
(5.17 ) 
where R, . is the rate of return at time t; Ott , is the error term at time t; and sir - N(0, o), is 
the error term at time t. 
Hence, the variance of the error term is conditional on the squared error in the previous time 
period; the estimated 6t can be interpreted as a measure of the volatility surrounding the one 
period change in the stock return between t-1 and t. One problem with this model of 
measuring volatility is that the modeller must make certain assumptions about the vector of 
explanatory variables included in both equations. In addition, the proper lag structure of the 
included variables must be determined. This model may introduce a whole host of mis- 
specification problems. Also, according to Pagan and Ullah (1988), the use of ARCH as a 
proxy for risk does not escape the classic errors-in-variables problem, as the "true" variable 
will still be measured with error. Another important problem in implementing the ARCH 
model is that it typically requires quite a large number of observations for robust estimation 
(Figlewski, 1997). 
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Another conditional variance model proposed by Antle (1983) is the linear moment (LM) 
model. Here the error variance is a function of the regressors used in the regression that 
specifies the mean of the variable of interest. The main difference between the LM and ARCH 
method is that the LM model allows the variance to be conditional on past values of 
explanatory variables, whereas the ARCH models allows the variance to be a function of 
previous forecast errors. 
No method of measuring volatility appears to be greatly superior, since they all have different 
drawbacks. We have chosen to use the simplest measure of the volatility: the standard 
deviation of returns. Our reasons for this choice are threefold: ease of computation, ability to 
6 match frequency of available data, and its wide use in academic studies' 
Letting Rt = In( 
P, 
`) represent weekly returns on an equity asset, the simplest measure of the 
t-1 
volatility of R, over the period of time t through t+s is the sample standard deviation of return 
from the recent past. Derivative textbooks commonly recommend this procedure and it is 
apparently widely used. We calculated the actual annualised standard deviation as a proxy for 
the annual degree of stock market volatility (v) by using a weekly rate of returns (R) as17: 
v= Ný i 
ýNO)(Re, - Rý (5.18) 
where N(t) is the number of trading weeks within a year, R, ,t 
is the return on the i -th trading 
week of the t-th year, and R is the mean of the weakly returns during year t. 
16 One problem with using this procedure, however, is that it is based on assumptions of stability, either constant 
variance, or constant parameters of the variance process which are unlikely to hold over long periods. In other 
words, it does not take into consideration one major problem which is that volatility may change over time (time- 
varying volatility). For a more detailed discussion of the use of this procedure for estimating volatility see 
Figlewski (1997). 
17 We use weekly data rather than daily data in order to avoid the possibility of the "thin" trading problem 
(noncontinuous trading). 
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3. Stock Market Liquidity 
Liquidity is an important attribute of stock market development because theoretically more 
liquid stock markets improve the allocation of capital to their optimal use, influence 
investment in the long term and facilitate technological innovation, thereby enhancing long- 
term growth18. Greater liquidity also has a direct impact on the effectiveness of the governance 
function of the stock market. First, increased market activity encourages information 
acquisition, which in turn increases the information content of share prices. Second, the 
effective use of the stock market for corporate control activities requires that the market be 
liquid. Takeovers require a liquid capital market where bidders access a vast amount of capital 
at short notice. Thus, measures of market liquidity may reflect the function of the market for 
corporate control as well. Therefore, a measure of market liquidity may be a good proxy for 
information production as well as the monitoring control function of capital markets. 
Increased stock market liquidity can also reduce the cost of equity capital through a reduction 
in the expected return that investors require when investing in equity to compensate them for 
the risks i. e., risk premium (Ahimud and Mendelson, 1986; Ahimud et al., 1997; Henry, 
2000a, b)19. 
A comprehensive measure of liquidity would quantify all the costs associated with trading, 
including the time costs and the uncertainty of finding a counterpart and settling the trade. To 
measure liquidity, we will use four related measures: turnover ratio and value traded adjusted 
for the size of the economy (GDP); and the value traded and turnover ratios scaled by the 
20 volatility of the stock market. 
The value traded adjusted for the size of the economy refers to the value of all trades in the 
stock exchange. This measure is divided by the GDP to adjust for the size of the economy. A 
18 Miller (1991) argues that liquidity is one of the most important functions that stock markets provide. 
19 Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Brennan et al., (1998) and Chordia et al., (2001) find a negative and 
significant relationship between expected returns and the level of liquidity measured by trading volume and share 
turnover. 
20 Another measure of stock market liquidity that is widely used by researchers is the bid-ask spread. 
Unfortunately, data on bid-ask spread in Jordan is not available. Peterson and Fialkowski (1994) and Dactar et 
at., (1998) also show that the quoted spread is a poor proxy for the actual transactions costs faced by investors 
and call for an alternative proxy (turnover rate), which may do a better job of capturing the liquidity of an asset. 
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higher value traded corresponds to greater liquidity in the market and greater attractiveness for 
investors. If trading in the market represents the actions of investors buying and selling to 
attain their desired position, then trading activity measures the speed at which new information 
is incorporated into prices. The ratio of organised equity trading as a share of GDP positively 
reflects liquidity on an economy-wide base. This ratio also complements the market 
capitalisation ratio since the market size measured by market capitalisation be large, but 
relatively inactive as measured by trading activity. Since both numerator and denominator of 
this ratio are flow variables measured over the same time period, deflating is not necessary in 
this case. 
The second measure of market liquidity is the turnover ratio. This ratio is equal to the value 
traded divided by market capitalisation. It measures the size of equity transaction relative to 
the size of the stock market. High turnover ratio is often used as an indicator of low 
transaction costs. A higher turnover ratio may represent greater liquidity and market 
efficiency. Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) find that the number of analysts following a 
stock is strongly positively related to the liquidity of the stocks and that low turnover stocks 
are followed by fewer analysts and thus are slower to react to information than high turnover 
stocks. Thus, illiquid stocks react to market information more slowly than do liquid stocks. 
However, an excessively high turnover ratio may represent inefficiency or excessive 
speculative trading. The higher turnover ratio in many Asian markets has been attributed to the 
speculative trading in those markets, which may not represent useful economic activity. 
Bencivenga et al., (1996) give a model in which excessive liquidity and turnover lower the 
economic growth rates. Since this indicator is the ratio of a stock and a flow variable, we 
apply a similar deflating procedure as for the market capitalisation indicator. 
It is worth noting here that the turnover ratio complements the earlier cited measure of 
liquidity, since although markets may be small compared to the size of the economy (as 
measured by the value traded as a percentage of GDP) they may be liquid. Thus, while an 
absolute measure of liquidity (such as the value traded as a percentage of GDP) may be 
indicative of liquidity in the economy as a whole, it may be misleading as a measure of market 
liquidity if the size of the economy is very large. A classic example is Brazil. In this country 
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there is not much equity trading relative to the size of the economy (which is large), however, 
it has a higher turnover ratio reflecting a small but active stock market (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine, 1996a). Consequently, incorporating market size measures by market capitalisation, 
total value traded as a percentage of GDP, and turnover ratio, provides a more comprehensive 
picture of stock market development than any single indicator can provide. 
Since the liquid stock should support more trading with fewer price movements than the less 
liquid markets, we use another two measures of stock market liquidity, that are related to the 
above cited measures. Particularly, the trading-volatility ratio equals the value-traded ratio 
divided by the stock market volatility and the turnover-volatility ratio equals the turnover ratio 
divided also by the stock market volatility. One reason why high values of trading-volatility 
ratio and turnover-volatility ratio are positive indicators of stock market liquidity is that the 
large value of these ratios indicates a high value of trading relative to the price movements. 
However, it is important to note here that the value-traded and trading-volatility ratios have 
advantages over the other liquidity indicators. Unlike turnover and turnover-volatility ratios, 
trading-volatility and value-traded ratios have a theoretical motivation for their link with long- 
term economic growth. Levine (1991), for example, shows that higher transaction costs are 
associated with a lower value-traded ratio. Bencivenga et al., (1995,1996), however, show 
that higher transaction costs which are associated with lower value-traded ratios have an 
ambiguous effect on savings rates and therefore on economic growth rates. 
Another advantage of using value-traded ratio and trading-volatility ratios is that the main 
purpose of this study is to evaluate whether the liquidity services provided by the stock market 
are robustly correlated with economic growth. Unlike much of the literature on liquidity that 
focuses on evaluating whether a stock's liquidity affects its price and rate of return we do not 
want to measure the degree of liquidity. We want to measure the degree to which the stock 
market provides liquidity to the Jordanian economy. The stock market may be highly liquid 
with correspondingly high turnover and turnover-volatility ratios, but it may not be providing 
significant liquidity to the economy as a whole. Thus, turnover and turnover-volatility ratios 
may not satisfy our objectives. However, value-traded ratio measures trading relative to the 
size of the whole economy. Therefore, the value-traded and trading-volatility ratios may 
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provide more information about the provision of liquidity than turnover and turnover-volatility 
ratios. 
Finally, many researchers argue that trading-volatility and turnover-volatility measures are 
flawed, because high volatility may not signal illiquidity. The stock markets' volatility may 
simply reflect the frequent arrival of information irrespective of transaction costs or the 
volume of trading. The trading-volatility ratio also fails to capture an important component of 
liquidity that they called "inin, ediacv", which reflects how long it takes to find a counterpart to 
a desired transaction and the risk of information arriving that changes the price before a 
counterpart is identified (see Grossman and Miller, 1988). 
As shown from the above discussion, it is apparent that the value-traded ratio is more closely 
associated with this study, because, unlike other liquidity indicators, it focuses on economy- 
wide bases. However, using the value-traded ratio has a potential disadvantage. If the market 
anticipates large corporate profits, stock prices will invariably rise. This price rise would 
increase the value of transactions and therefore raise the value-traded ratio. In this case, this 
liquidity indication would rise without a rise in the number of transactions or a fall in the 
transaction costs (Levine and Zervos, 1998a). This price also affects the market capitalisation 
ratio. To avoid the influence of the price effect we need to look at the stock market 
capitalisation and the value-traded ratio together. If we include both indicators together in the 
regression and the value traded remains significantly correlated with growth after controlling 
for the market capitalisation ratio, then this implies that the price effect is not dominating the 
relationship between the value-traded ratio and growth. 
B. The Banking Sector Development Variables 
Since a large part of the debate concerns the usefulness of stock markets vis-ä-vis banks, the 
need to understand the independent channels of transmission that both the stock market and 
the banks sector in Jordan have in the growth process is of paramount importance. A large 
theoretical literature shows that banks can emerge to lower the costs of acquiring information 
about firms and lower the costs of conducting transactions 21. By providing more accurate 
21 See Levine (1997) and Bossone (2000). 
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information about production technologies, exerting corporate control, managing risk, 
improving the liquidity of assets variable to savers, and reducing transaction costs, banks can 
influence resource allocation in ways that may accelerate long-term growth rates (King and 
Levine. 1993b; and Greenwood and Smith, 1997). 
Researchers, however, have not been able accurately to direct measures of the above 
functions. In this study, we use two indicators of banking sector development that have been 
used recently by Beck et al., (1999b) and Levine et al., (2000): the ratio of total bank assets to 
GDP and the value of credit given by the banking sector to the private sector divided by GDP. 
The first indicator gives evidence of the importance of the financial services performed by the 
banking sector relative to the size of the economy. While this measure does not distinguish 
whether the claims of banks are in the public or the private sector, the second indicator 
concentrates on claims to the private sector22. In addition, as pointed out by Levine (1997) 
"financial systems that allocate more credit to private firms are more engaged in researching 
firms, exerting corporate control, providing risk management services, mobilising savings, 
and facilitating transactions than financial systems that simply funnel credit to the government 
or state owned enterprises" (p. 705). Recent work shows that private credit exerts a large, 
positive influence on economic growth. Since both indicators are the ratio of a stock 
(financial balance sheet item) and flow variable (GDP), we deflated both numerator and 
denominator, with the numerator equalling the average of the end-of-year value for year t and 
year t-1, both deflated by the respective end-of-year CPI, and GDP deflated by the annual 
value of the CPI. 
D. The Conditional Information Sets Variables 
In order to examine the sensitivity of the results, we experimented with different conditional 
information sets as suggested by the recent empirical literature on growth23. We sought to 
reduce the chance that the growth regression either omits an important variable or includes a 
selected group of regressors that yields favourable results. The recent empirical literature on 
growth has identified a large number of variables that are partially correlated with growth. 
22 This measure excludes credits issued by the central bank and credits to the public sector. 
23 See for example Barro, 1991; Mankiw, et al., (1992); Levine and Renelt, 1992; Barro and Sala-I-Martin 
(1995); Beck et al., 1999b; and others. 
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Both time and technical (the degree of freedom) constraints compel us to limit our conditional 
variables to the ones most generally used in the literature. We include the inflation rate (based 
on consumer price index) and the ratio of government expenditure to GDP as indicators of 
macroeconomic stability, 4, and the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP to capture 
the degree of openness of the economy. 25 
5.5 Data and Summary Statistical Analysis 
Whereas the AFM was established in 1978, establishing statistically significant links between 
its development and economic growth poses data problems: the scarcity of sufficiently long 
length annual time series. The possible solution to overcoming this problem is by using 
quarterly frequency data. However, quarterly frequency data on the gross domestic product 
(GDP) is only available in Jordan since 1992 (unpublished data). It is also well known now 
that as far as the power of recent time series tests is concerned the span of data is much more 
important than the number of observations (Campell and Perron, 1991). As suggested by 
Demetriades and Hussein (1996), it is preferable to use data sets conforming to fewer annual 
observations over a long time period than data sets containing more observations over a short 
time period. 
Annual time series data are used spanning the period 1978-98, since the establishment of the 
AFM. Data on macroeconomic variables as well as banking sector variables- per capita GDP, 
gross domestic product (GDP), investment, government expenditure, consumer price index 
(CPI), exports and imports, total assets of the banking sector, and the total banks claims on the 
private sector- are retrieved from annual reports of the CBJ. The data series for the stock 
market indicators- market capitalisation, value traded, and turnover ratio- are retrieved from 
annual reports of the AFM. Data on secondary school enrolment rates are from the Yearbook 
published by the Ministry of Education. Since the annual degree of market volatility is 
24 Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995) argue that government expenditure divided by GDP is a good proxy for 
political corruption, non-productive public expenditure, or taxation. 
25 As discussed by Edwards (1993), the literature on endogenous growth emphasises that economies that are more 
open to international trade can grow more rapidly by virtue of their larger markets and of becoming more 
efficient. 
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computed from a weekly series of stock market returns, we obtained the weekly price index of 
the AFM over the first of January 1978 to the end of December 1998 from the AFM database. 
Due to the potential nonlinear relationship between economic growth and the assortment of 
economic indicators, we use the natural logarithms of the regressors in the growth regressions. 
Table (5.1) provides summary statistics for the entire above variables over the sample period 
used for estimation: 1978-98. As can be seen, the entire variables, except for the inflation 
rates, do not have significant values of kurtosis and positive/negative skewness. This indicates 
that these variables do not significantly depart from a normal distribution (values of skewness 
and kurtosis are 0 and 3 respectively, if the observed distribution is normal). 
Jarque-Bera test statistics for the normality is not high either and is insignificant for all 
variables, except for inflation rates, suggesting that the null hypothesis of these variables 
conforming to a normal distribution cannot be rejected. The inflation rates show significantly 
high values of kurtosis (5.82) indicating that for the given level of standard deviations, 
observations for this variable cluster around a central point with a small number of large 
outliners. Jarque-Bera test statistics are highly significant suggesting that the inflation rates 
depart significantly from a normal distribution. 
Prior to estimating the relationship between the economic growth and its determinants, it is 
important to consider whether or not the data are stationary. We tested for stationarity to 
ensure that the variables used in the regressions are not subject to spurious correlation. The 
problem of spurious correlations can also emerge when variables are deflated by a stochastic 
series such as GDP. Phillips (1986) argues that regressions involving non-stationary variables 
may lead to spurious results showing apparently significant relationships even if the variables 
are generated independently. We employ the Phillips-Perron test, introduced by Phillips- 
Perron (1988), to determine the order of integration of the variables of interest. The Phillips- 
Perron test statistics (PP) are modifications of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller t-statistics (ADF) 
that take into account the less restrictive nature of the error process. The (PP) test is an 
attractive alternative to the standard ADF test since the choice of lags in the ADF has been 
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criticised as arbitrary26. The last two columns in Table (5.1) present the results of unit root test 
for all the variables of interest. The PP tests fail to reject the unit root hypothesis at the five- 
percent level for all variables in log levels. All variables are I(1). However, the test rejects the 
null hypothesis of a unit root for each series in first differences. Therefore, it is necessary 
before estimating the regressions to transform the variables of interest by taking the first 
differences operator to achieve stationarity. `7 
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics 
Mean Median Std. Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
Jarque- PP in PP in 1st 
Bera level Difference 
Real Per Capita GDP 0.612 0.792 0.621 7.03 -0.233 3.69 -2.823 -5.631 Growth Rate (0.736) 
Secondary School 2.65 62.90 65.20 6.17 -0.585 1.71 -2.655 -4.595 Enrollment Rate (0.265) 
0.458 
Investment Ratio 28.89 29.30 6.45 0.195 2.38 -1.690 -3.279 (0.795) 
et Capitalisation Mark 56 98 56 80 14.22 0.450 2.21 1.25 -1.609 -5.004 Batik . . (0 535) 
Value traded Ratio 16.64 15.21 7.22 1.33 3.82 (0.322 -2.439 -5.321 
1.457 
Turnover Ratio 20.34 18.14 8.59 1.24 4.54 (0.240) -2.338 -5.027 
Value Traded 00 1 837 0 0.733 1.384 4.80 
1.558 
-2.475 -5.549 Ratio/Volatility . . (0.284) 
Turnover 61 1 1 530 1.98 1.2 3.71 
4.92 
-2.838 -5.915 Ratio/Volatility . . (0.200) 
Volatility 9.93 9.77 1.99 0.052 2.16 
0.614 
(0.613) -2.100 -5.987 
Banks Asset Ratio 141.7 143.54 42.52 -0.051 1.45 (0: 
308) 
-0.839 -6.426 
Banks Credit Ratio 65.37 68.50 12.47 -0.305 1.95 
1.291 
(0.524) -2.627 -3.686 
Government 
28 66 47 28 2 48 0.05 1.74 
1.389 
-2.158 -5.397 Expenditure Ratio . . . (0.499) 
(Export+Import)/GDP 76.98 78.00 12.81 -0.23 2.23 
0.695 
(0.795) -2.309 -5.527 
Inflation Rate 7.33 6.5 5.79 1.655 5.82 
16.558 
(0.0002) -2.537 -4.391 
(F-Value in Parentheses). I% critical value of FF test is equal -i. a iu, : )-lo cnucai value is equal -j. vLY lu iv -/a ti auýai vaiuc .a ýyua. -ý"ýýý" 
Notes: Market capitalisation ratio is the market capitalisation divided by the GDP. Value Traded ratio is the total value of the equity 
transactions divided by the GDP. Turnover ratio is the total of equity transactions divided by the market capitalisation. Volatility is the 
estimated standard deviation of the stock returns. Bank asset ratio is the total asset of the banking sector divided by the 
GDP. Bank credit ratio 
is the ratio of bank claims on private sector to GDP. Government Expenditure ratio is the current government expenditure 
divided by the GDP. 
26 More detailed information about these tests will be provided in the next chapter. 
27 Another advantage of running the regressions using first differences of the data is to reduce any influence of 
multicollinearity, thus improving the robustness of the estimation results. 
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Table (5.2) presents the correlation among the variables. The first number is the correlation; 
the second number is the P -value (a value of less than 0.05 indicates that the correlation is 
significant at the five-percent level). As can be seen, all stock market development indicators 
are significantly correlated with growth (per capita real GDP growth). The stock market 
capitalisation and all liquidity measures, the value traded, turnover, trading-volatility, and 
turnover-volatility ratios, are positively and significantly correlated with growth at the five- 
percent level. The volatility measure is also significantly but negatively correlated with 
growth. The ratio of total bank assets to GDP is positively but insignificantly correlated with 
growth. The ratio of bank claims on the private sector to GDP highly positively and 
significantly correlated with growth. 
The correlations among the stock market development indicators show us three important 
points. First, the four measures of market liquidity: the value traded, turnover, trading- 
volatility and turnover-volatility ratios, are significantly and positively correlated, the 
correlation coefficient is greater than 70 percent. The conclusion is that the four measures are 
substitutes and may reveal similar aspects of stock market development. Second, the stock 
market size indicator- the market capitalisation- is significantly positively correlated with the 
liquidity indicators, and negatively correlated with the volatility measures. This leads to the 
conclusion that when the size of the stock market increases, the stock market becomes more 
liquid and efficient. Thus, our data set confirms the finding of Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
(1996a) that large stock markets measured by equity capitalisation to GDP are more liquid and 
less volatile. Finally, liquidity, volatility and market capitalisation are significantly correlated; 
the correlation coefficients among these variables are below 0.50 on average. This suggests 
that different indicators capture different aspects of stock market development. For example, 
while market capitalisation may capture the ability of the stock market to mobilise capital and 
hedge risk, the market liquidity may reveal the information production and governance 
functions of the stock market. 
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As can also be seen from Table (5.2), there are strong correlations between bank sector 
development indicators and stock market development indicators. A possible explanation of 
this correlation is that the stock market transmits information that is useful to creditors. Prices 
quoted on the stock market at least partially reveal information that more informed investors 
possess. This revelation of information may make lending to a publicly quoted firm less risky. 
As a result, greater development in the stock market may increase the ability of firms to obtain 
credit and encourage banks to provide more credit28. 
5.6 The Empirical Results 
The results obtained from the TSLS estimation in our regressions are summarised in Table 
(5.3) and (5.4)29. It is important to note before analysing the results that all regressions 
estimated in the first differences to achieve stationarity. To avoid misspecification of the 
estimated regressions, two dummy variables have been included to account for large outliers 
in per capita real GDP growth in 1989 and 199230 
Regression 1 represents the basic regression, where its explanatory variables appear in all 
regressions thereafter. The dependant variable is the economic growth proxied by the per 
capita real GDP growth. The secondary school enrolment rate, the investment ratio, and the 
stock market development indicator as proxied by the market capitalisation (adjusted for the 
GDP), are the explanatory variables31. As can be seen, the regression explains about 48.77 
percent of the variation in measuring the economic growth of Jordan. The F-statistics for the 
regression, F=6.161, reject the null hypothesis of no explanatory power for the regression as a 
whole at the one-percent level. The test of residuals shows some interesting information. The 
Lagrange Multiplier test of residual serial correlation accepts the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation. In addition, there appears to be no significant autoregressive conditional 
28 Thus, our preliminary results confirm the finding of Levine and Zervos (1996,1998a), Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine (1996a), and Garcia and Liu (1999) that banking sector development and stock market development are 
complements rather than substitutes. 
29 We used one-lag value of explanatory variables as instruments in the TSLS estimators. 
30 See Chapter II. 
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heteroscedasticity ARCH using 9 lags. And the heteroscedasticity test based on the White test, 
involving an auxiliary regression of the squared errors, the original regressors and their 
squares, could not reject the null of homoscedasticity. The statistical test of the skewness of 
the residuals corresponds to that of a normal distribution. Finally, a regression specification 
test or RESET test rejected the null of correct specification of this model at the five-percent 
level. This provides evidence that the regression estimated in column 1 is not appropriate here 
and that a research for alternative specification is warranted. 
The individual coefficients on the regression enter with the appropriate signs. The proxy for 
the human capital stock, the secondary school enrolment rate, enters positively, but not 
statistically significant at the ten-percent leve132. Furthermore, it does not show up as 
statistically significant in all regressions thereafter 33. This could be explained by reference to 
the fact that Jordan suffers from high level of unemployment especially the structural one in 
which there is a mismatch between the output of the education system and the needs of the 
economy. 
The importance of the investment proxied by gross capital formulation adjusted by GDP is 
emphasised by the strongly positive and statistically significant (at the one-percent level) 
relationship that it exhibits with economic growth34. A one-percentage point increase in the 
growth rate of investment to GDP is associated with a 0.46 percentage point increase in the 
per capita real GDP growth. This result is consistent with the theoretical view35. Economic 
theory holds that higher rates of savings and investment are essential to the long-run rate of 
31 All the regressions equations in this section were also re-estimated including the lagged growth rate of real per 
capita GDP as explanatory variable, to control for the component of growth predicted on the basis of lagged 
growth. The results (not reported) are essentially unchanged and similar to the results reported below. 
32 This result is consistent with (many) growth studies that have found no or very limited effects of human capital 
on growth (see for example, Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995). 
33 We also used another three alternative variables proxies for human capital: primary school enrolment rate, the 
total average schooling years and the growth of the working age population. Similarly, we failed to find any 
significant relationship between any of these variables and the growth of real per capita GDP. 
34 This result is consistent with the findings in Sinha and Tapen (1999). They study the effects of growth of 
openness and investment on the growth of GDP in 15 countries including Jordan. They find the coefficient of the 
growth of domestic investment in Jordan is highly positive and significantly different from zero at the one- 
percent level. It is also consistent with the findings in Maghyereh (1993), who studies the effect of private 
investment on economic growth in Jordan. 
35 And also with empirical evidence that high output growth is associated with high investment rates (see for 
example, Fielding, 1997; and Bassanini et al., 2001). 
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growth of a country. The suggestion behind Solow's (1956) framework is that higher 
investment over savings rates lead to more accumulated capital per worker, resulting in an 
increase in per capita output, but at decreased rates. Under endogenous growth theory with an 
emphasis on broader concepts of capital, such as that of Rebelo (1991), per capita real GDP 
growth and investment ratio tend to move together. The high significance of the total 
investment coefficient may reflect the effects of embedded technological change on aggregate 
supply working through the new investments. It will be noted that in the time period under 
consideration 1978-98 Jordan's economy has been transformed from a mainly agrarian-based 
economy to services- and industrial-based economy dominated by tourism, construction, 
mining and manufacturing sectors. This structural change required a persistent process of 
installation of new capital goods, construction and machinery that change supply capacity 
enormously. 
The most important result in this regression is that the stock market indicator as proxied by the 
market capitalisation adjusted for the GDP enters a highly significant (at the one-percent level) 
positive correlation with economic growth. A one-percentage point increase in the growth rate 
of market capitalisation to GDP is associated with a 0.242 percentage point increase in per 
capita real GDP growth36. This result is not surprising; it is consistent with the importance of 
the stock market in mobilising capital to the Jordanian economy during the period under 
consideration. As we have shown in Chapter III, the new issues on the stock market have been 
important in terms of financing a considerable proportion of the private sector investment in 
Jordan especially during the late 1998s and the 1990s. 
This favourable result gives rise to two basic questions: First, is this result "robust" i. e. does 
the inclusion of other variables that are known to influence growth negate the significance of 
the stock market indicator as proxied by the market capitalisation? Second, does the stock 
market capitalisation as an indicator of the stock market development exert an independent 
channel of influence? Or does it merely capture the explanatory power of another variable, say 
for example the banking sector? 
36 This result is inconsistent with the findings in Levine and Zervos (1996,1998a). They find results suggest that 
market capitalisation is not a very good predictor of economic growth. 
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In denying the importance of stock markets to the growth process, economists have levied two 
kinds of charge. There are those who believe that those financial factors are not important to 
the growth process. An increase in new models in the theoretical literature and a wide body of 
evidence in the empirical literature are emerging to refute that claim. However, even for those 
who do acknowledge that financial factors are important in the growth story, they are still 
sceptical as to the role of stock markets in promoting growth. These researchers are of the 
opinion that banks are relatively adequate for providing credit, liquidity and risk management 
and the other markets are not important in the financial intermediation story. 
The thereafter regressions in Table (5.3) answer all the above questions and attempt to refute 
the claims of such economists. To test the importance of the stock market vis-ä-vis banks in 
Jordan, we included proxies for both the stock market and the banking sector development in 
the same regression. In regression 2, in addition to the base regression variables, we included 
the banking sector development indicator-proxied by the total banks assets to GDP, to measure 
the role of the banking sector in the economic growth process. All the fixed variables enter 
with anticipated signs and similar levels of statistical significance as in regression 1, while the 
banking sector development indicator enters positively but not statistically significantly (at the 
ten-percent level). There are two possible interpretations of this result. When one is looking at 
the balance sheet of Jordanian banks one finds foreign assets (balance with foreign banks) 
accounting for more than 30 percent of the total assets, and the cash in vaults and deposits 
with the CBJ accounting for more than 10 percent. The conclusion is that more than 40 
percent of the total assets of the Jordanian banks are not utilised in the local economy. Another 
reason is that the largest locally based commercial bank, the Arab Bank37, which caters mainly 
for Palestinians throughout the world, is playing a modest role in the local economy and not 
on a par with its size. 
The interesting result from equation 2 is that after controlling the indicator of the banking 
sector development, the stock market development as proxied by the market 
capitalisation/GDP remains positively and significantly correlated (at the one-percent level) 
37 A Palestinian institution that moved to Amman from Jerusalem in 1948. 
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with economic growth. The fit of regression with an R2 of 51.9 percent is in close 
approximation with the results obtained from regression 1. However, the F-statistic for the 
regression declined to 4.045, but still rejects the null hypothesis of no explanatory power of 
the regression a as whole at the five-percent level. The test of residuals shows that the 
regression is quite similar to the initial one. There is no significant autocorrelation, 
heteroscedasticity or ARCH in the residuals. The RESET test, as regression 1, rejects the null 
of no functional form mis-specification at the five-percent level. 
Regression 3, in addition to the variables which were included in regression 2, includes other 
conditioning variables commonly included in literature, the government expenditure 
(current)/GDP, export plus import/GDP, and the inflation rate. The results further validate the 
results obtained from the previous regressions. All the fixed variables enter as anticipated in 
regressions 1 and 2. Government expenditure as a percentage of GDP enters negatively but not 
statistically significantly at the ten-percent leve138. The explanation of this result can be found 
in the supply side theorists since the Jordanian budget revenue is based mainly on taxes (direct 
and indirect)39. These theorists argue that taxes required for financial government expenditures 
distort incentives and reduce efficient resource allocation and the level of output4o 
The effect of the growth of openness, as measured by the ratio of export plus import to the 
GDP, is positively and statistically significantly correlated (at the five-percent level) with 
economic growth41. The implication of this is that an increase in the value of exports and 
imports relative to the GDP of the country increases its economic growth. Exports can affect 
economic growth through two channels. First, although industrialisation is critical to economic 
growth, the domestic demand is low. Exports provide an outlet for this excess production and 
generate income. Second, in the long-term, exports help growth because exports tend to gather 
technical progress and more savings. Also, they improve the credit rating of the country by 
38 This result is consistent with many empirical studies see for example Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995); Bailliu 
(2000); and Bassanini et al., (2001). 
39 The total taxes revenue (direct and indirect) in Jordan accounted for 60 percent of the current expenditures, and 
for 15 percent of the GDP in 1998. 
ao See Leibfritz et al., (1997) for a comprehensive survey on the link between taxation and economic 
performance. 
41 This result is consistent with findings in Bloom and Malaney (1999); Bailliu (2000); Bassanini et al., (2001); 
and others. 
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Table 5.3: Stock Market Development and Growth: Per Capita Real GDP Growth as a 
Function of M9rkPt u., +.., 
1 2 3 4 5 
1.084 0.877 0.848 0.584** 0.350** 
Constant (0.249) (0.432) (0.576) (0.049) (0.054) 
1.211 0.816 0.580 2.146 2.113 
Secondary School Enrollment 0.037 0.0305 0.0091 0.0314 0.0069 
Rate (0.375) (0.716) (0.845) (0.689) (0.857) 
0.911 0.486 0.198 91 f 0.1877 
0.464* 0.439* 0.496* 0.580* 0.534* 
Investment Ratio (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) 
3.607 3.358 3.283 4.278 (5.220) 
Stock Market Development 0.2428** 0.217* 0.201 ** 0.1763** 0.1794* 
Indicator (0.043) (0.006) (0.023) (0.017) (0.012) 
(2.201) 3.372 2.729 2.697 2.896 
Banking Sector Development 0.182 0.106 0.492* 0.4203** 
Indicator (0.548) (0.475) (0.007) (0.027) 
0.615 0.746 3.011 2.495 
Government Expenditure -0.173 -0.349 
Ratio (0.234) (0.260) 
-1.266 -1.192 
0.142** 0.210** 
(Export+lmport)/GDP (0.042) (0.066) 
2.382 2.043 
Inflation Rate -0.452** -0.395** 
(0.0462) (0.027) 
-2.012 -2.590 
R2 
R--adjusted 0.487 0.519 0.711 0.645 0.851 
DW 0.416 0.402 0.629 0.578 0.721 
F-Statistics 1.766 1.653 1.666 1.849 1.457 
6.162* 4.045** 4.224** 6.832* 9.804* 
xz sc (1) 
2 (0.426) (0.684) (0.831) (0.457) (0.641) ff (1) x 
z (0.035)** (0.044)** (0.283) (0.141) (0.289) x n (2) 
2 0.72 (3) 0.746 () 0.943 () 0.703 () 0.968 () X h (1) (0.592) (0.766) (0.544) (0.438) (0.604) 
ARCH (9) (0.420) (0.276) (0.342) (0.447) (0.326) 
PP (3) 
-3.698** -3.937* -4.099* -3.660** -4.062* 
Heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics in brackets} (P-values in parentheses). 
significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 10% level. 
The sample period is 1978-98. R2 adjusted is the usual R2, adjusted for the degrees of freedom; DW is the Durbin-Watson test 
for residual serial correlation. The F-test tests the null hypothesis that all coefficients except for the intercept are zero. The 
reported misspecification tests are conducted to test a number of null hypotheses on the residuals for the regression. These 
tests are x2 sc (1), x2 ff (1), x2 n (2), x2 h (1), ARCH (p) which are defined respectively as follows: X2 sc (1) = Serial 
correlation; Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation. x2 ff (1) = Functional form; Ramsey's Reset test using 
square fitted values. x2 n(2) = Normality, based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residual. x2 h(1) Heteroscedasticity, 
based on a regression of squared residual on squared fitted values. ARCH (p) = Autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity test. Finally, PP (p) is residual-based Phillips-Perron test of cointegration. 
Notes: investment ratio is the volume of gross capital formulation divided by GDP. Stock market indicator is the market 
capitalisation divided by GDP. Bank indicator in regressions 2 and 3 is the total banking sector assets divided by GDP, in 
regression 4 and 5 is the ratio of banking sector claims to the private sector to GDP. Government expenditure ratio is total 
government current expenditure divided by GDP. 
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generating hard currency and thus make obtaining foreign loans easier. Imports also help the 
country. Imports of capital goods and energy can help economic growth if they are used 
efficiently 42 . 
The effects of the inflation rates enter strongly negatively and statistically significantly at the 
five-percent level. This result is consistent with certain theoretical and empirical views43. The 
negative and high significant coefficient of this variable (0.423) is explained by reference to 
the fact that for the most of the period 1978-98 there has been sustained high inflation in 
Jordan. High inflation could be associated with inflation uncertainty, that is, increased 
uncertainty regarding future inflation. For the economy to function efficiently, economic 
agents require clear signals from markets when making decisions regarding consumption and 
investment because these decisions are largely dependent on the formation of expectations 
regarding prices. However, inflation uncertainty causes the real value of future payments and 
earnings to be uncertain, and could thereby distort agents' decisions regarding investment and 
consumption44. Inflation also discourages long-term lending by financial intermediaries, which 
reduces the investment rate. 
The most important result from regression 3, however, is that even after controlling for other 
known influences on economic growth and the indicator of the banking sector development, 
i. e. stock market development, retains the same signs and level of significance as in regression 
2. The banking asset ratio remains positively and statistically insignificantly correlated (at the 
ten-percent level) with economic growth. The market capitalisation ratio also remains 
positively and significantly correlated (at the five-percent level) with economic growth. 
Although, as can be seen, inclusion of the other conditioning variables improves the overall fit 
of the regression (R2 rises from 51.9 percent in regression 2 to 71.1 percent in regression 3). 
42 This explanation is consistent with the fact that Jordan's imports during the period under consideration have 
been dominated by capital and machinery goods as well as raw materials (accounted for about 70 percent of total 
value of the county's imports) all imported for the purpose of capital formulation and expanding potential 
aggregate output. Coe and Helpman (1995) find that countries with a higher import propensity have a higher 
productivity growth. 
43 See for example, Temple (1999); Khan and Senhadji (2000); Bassanini et al., (2001); and others for empirical 
evidences and Dotsey and Sarte (2000) for theoretical explanations. 
as In fact, a high inflation rate encourages speculative, less-productive or non-productive investment in land and 
real estate, and discourages long-term and illiquid investment projects, thereby having a negative effect on 
economic growth. 
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The F-statistics from the regression, F=4.22, also reject the null hypothesis of no explanatory 
power for the regression as a whole at the five-percent level. Residual autocorrelation, 
heteroscedasticity and ARCH are not significant. More importantly, functional form mis- 
specification from the RESET test is no longer a significant problem. 
In regressions 4 and 5, the variables are similar to those included in regressions 2 and 3, but 
we replaced the banks asset ratio as indicator for the banking sector development with the 
ratio of total banks claims to the private sector to GDP. In regression 4, the stock market 
development indicator continues to remain positively and significantly correlated (at the five- 
percent level) with economic growth45. The banking sector development indicator, the ratio of 
banks claims to private sector to GDP, enters strongly positively and statistically significantly 
(at the five-percent level). This result indicates that the ratio of banks claims to private sector 
to GDP is a better measure of banking sector development and a better predictor of growth 
than the banks asset ratio. As argued by Beck et al., (1999b) and Levine et al., (2000), the 
ratio of banks claims to private sector to GDP has a clear advantage over measures of banks 
asset ratio, in that it more accurately represents the actual volume of funds channelled into the 
private sector. 
It should be noted that the coefficient of the banking sector development indicator (0.49) is 
larger than the coefficient of the stock market development indicator (0.17), suggesting that 
the banking sector development has a bigger effect on economic growth than stock market 
development. A one percentage point increase in the growth of banks lending to private sector 
to GDP is associated with a 0.492 percentage point increase in the per capita real GDP growth, 
while a one percentage point increase in the growth rate of market capitalisation to GDP is 
associated with a 0.176 percentage point increase in the per capita real GDP growth. This 
result may simply reflect the translation ratio between market capitalisation and eventual 
finance through new share issues. Unlike a JD of credit, a JD of market capitalisation does not 
necessarily mean that some firm obtained a JD of finance (Rajan and Zingels, 1998). This 
result also may indicate that the banking sector is more important for the real growth than the 
stock market in Jordan. This implication seems to be consistent with some studies reviewed in 
45 This result is consistent with the findings in Levine and Zervos (1996,1998a). 
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this study. For an emerging economy without mature entrepreneurial experience, banks will be 
relatively more important. This argument seems to be applicable to Jordan during the early 
part of the period under study. 
The regression summary statistics and the test of residuals show a significant improvement 
over regression 2. The fit of this regression, with an R2 of 74.5 percent is better than that 
obtained by regression 2, where the banking sector development was proxied by the total bank 
asset to the GDP. The F-statistics of the regression, F=6.832, are also improved, which rejects 
the null hypothesis of no explanatory power for the regression as a whole at better than in the 
one-percent level. Residual autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity and ARCH are not significant, 
and functional form mis-specification is no longer a significant problem. More importantly, 
this result answers the first question posed above. It is consistent with the view that the 
banking sector and stock market provide different bundles of services to the nonfinancial 
sectors. If they provided the same financial services, then they would not both enter the 
growth regression significantly. A possible explanation of this result is that banks primarily 
ameliorate information asymmetries, while stock markets primarily enhance liquidity and 
46 facilitate risk diversification 
After including the other conditioning variables in regression 5, the results further validate the 
results obtained from regression 4. All the fixed variables enter with the anticipated signs and 
similar levels of statistical significance to all the previous regressions. The conditioning 
variables also enter with the anticipated signs and similar levels of statistical significance to 
those in regression 3. The interesting result, however, is that the stock market and banking 
sector development indicators remain positively and significantly correlated with economic 
growth. Furthermore, the coefficient of the bank development indicator is stronger in 
magnitude than that of the stock market indicator. The fit of this regression with an R2 of 85.1 
percent is better than that obtained in all previous regressions. There are also significant 
improvements in the F-statistics, F=9.804, rejecting the null hypothesis of no explanatory 
power for the regression as a whole at better than at the one percent level. Again notice the 
46 However, well-functioning stock market may create incentives that reduce information asymmetries, and banks 
may enhance liquidity as shown by Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Thus, we need a comprehensive theory in 
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improvement in residual test statistics. Residual autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, ARCH 
and functional form mis-specification from the RESET test are not significant. 
Based on the above results, we shall offer only this conclusion at present: the stock market is 
not unimportant in the Jordanian growth process. Moreover, it offers an independent channel 
of transmission to growth by providing an array of services that complement the other 
components of the financial system i. e. the banking sector. 47 
While we have empirically established the link between the stock market and the economic 
growth of Jordan, the entire analysis is based on the single stock market development 
indicator, the market capitalisation ratio. To test the "robustness" of our results, we tested 
whether our results are particular to the choice of the stock market development indicator or 
whether the various proxies that capture different faces of the level and the degree of the stock 
market give similar conclusions. 
The question then is "are the various other proxies of the market development also correlated 
with the economic growth of Jordan? " Regressions 6-10 of Table (5.4) attempt to answer this 
question. In these regressions, the stock market development is proxied by the total value- 
traded ratio, turnover ratio, trading-volatility ratio, turnover-volatility ratio, and volatility, 
respectively. Since the total banks assets ratio appeared insignificantly correlated with 
economic growth in regressions 2 and 3, we have replaced this indicator with the ratio of 
banks claims on private sector to GDP as a proxy for the banking sector development in all 
these regressions. 
As is evident from Table (5.4) in each of the cited regressions, the indicator for the stock 
market development, except the market volatility, is statistically significantly correlated with 
economic growth. As can be seen from regressions 6-9, all liquidity indicators enter positively 
and statistically significantly (at the five-percent level) correlated with economic growth. 
which stock market and banks both arise, prosper, and provide services to the economy that are positively and 
independently associated with future long-run economic growth. 
47 This result is consistent with the framework provided by Boyd and Smith (1998). 
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Table 5.4: Stock Market Development and Growth: Per Capita Real GDP as a Function 
of Other Proxies for Stock Markft flPvPlnnmPnt 
6 7 8 9 10 
Constant 0.387** 0.376** 0.3920** 0.3106** 0.339** 
(0.028) (0.048) (0.037) (0.056) (0.053) 
(2.550) 2.138 2.507 2.111 2.139 
Secondary School 0.0268 0.0055 0.0315 0.0411 0.0510 
Enrollment Rate (0.476) (0.887) (0.573) (0.338) (0.6060 
0.732 0.155 0.587 0.912 0.529 
0.480** 0.387** 0.353** 0.341 ** 0.3873* 
Investment Ratio (0.030) (0.0416) (0.039) (0.026) (0.016) 
(2.522) 2.265 (2.342) 2.532 {3.017 
Stock Market Development 0.0632** 0.0597** 0.069** 0.0504** -0.063 
Indicator (0.025) (0.022) (0.045) (0.0362) (0.331) 
2.485 (2.789) 2.326 2.672 (-1.123) 
Banking Sector Development 0.4679* 0.4800* 0.5135* 0.4584* 0.4498* 
Indicator (0.008) (0.011) (0.006) (0.001) (0.010) 
3.262 2.978 (3.233) 13.127) 3.322 
Government Expenditure -0.401 -0.437 -0.391 -0.515 -0.569 
Ratio (0.263) (0.509) (0.549) (0.330) (0.270) (-1.136) (-0.679} {-0.616} {-1.147} {-1.156} 
(Export+Import)/GDP 0.197 0.154*** 0.176 0.166 0.216 
(0.216) (0.113) (0.157) (0.392) (0.156) 
1.306) 11.796 (1.605 0.867 {1.579 
Inflation rate -0.364** -0.494** -0.429** -0.596** -0.477* (0.006) (0.032) (0.031) (0.015) (0.003) 
J-3.2911 {-2.419 -2.442} {-2.852 -4.275) 
R2 0.905 0.918 0.939 0.902 0.8103 
R2-adjusted 0.841 0.852 0.879 0.824 0.7257 
DW 1.566 2.027 1.837 2.027 2.037 
F-Statistics 16.365* 16.600* 26.405* 15.790* 7.323* 
x2 se (1) (0.632) (0.577) (0.504) (0.502) (0.509) 
X2 of 1 (0.336) (0.322) (0.350) (0.384) (0,181) 
2n (2) X (> (0.864) (0.868) 
(0.929) (0.928) (0.892) 
x2 h (1) (0.678) (0.573) (0.547) 
(0.565) (0.452) 
ARCH (9) (0.461) (0.4731) (0.468) (0.402) (0.647) 
PP (3) -3.883* -4.036* -3.893* -3.978** -4.481 * 
IHeteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics in brackets} (P-values in parentheses). 
*significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 10% level. 
The sample period is 1978-98. RZ adjusted is the usual R2, adjusted for the degrees of freedom; DW is the 
Durbin-Watson test for residual serial correlation. The F-test tests the null hypothesis that all coefficients except 
for the intercept are zero. The reported misspecification tests are conducted to test a number of null hypotheses 
on the residuals for the regression. These test are x2 sc (1), x2 ff (1), x2 n (2), x2 h (1), ARCH (p) which are 
defined respectively as follows: x2 sc (1) = Serial correlation; Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial 
correlation. x2 ff (1) = Functional form; Ramsey's Reset test using square fitted values. x2 n(2) = Normality, 
based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residual. x2 h(1) = Heteroscedasticity, based on a regression of 
squared residual on squared fitted values. ARCH (p) = Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity test. 
Finally, PP (p) is residual-based Phillips-Perron test of cointegration. 
Notes: investment ratio is the volume of gross capital formulation divided by GDP. Stock market indicator in 
regressions 6-10 is the value-traded ratio, turnover ratio, trading-volatility ratio, turnover-volatility ratio and 
volatility, respectively. Banking sector development indicator is the ratio of total banks claims on private sector 
to GDP. 
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Besides being statistically significant the estimated coefficients suggest that the relationship 
between stock market liquidity and growth is economically large. The estimated coefficient on 
value-traded ratio implies that with an increase of a one-percentage point in the growth rate 
this variable would increase economic growth by 0.063-percentage point. The estimated 
coefficient of turnover ratio also suggests a similarly large economically relationship between 
stock market liquidity and economic growth. Specifically, an increase of a one-percentage 
point in the growth rate of turnover ratio would increase economic growth by 0.026- 
percentage point. The other two indicators of stock market liquidity- trading-volatility and 
turnover-volatility ratios- also confirm the above results. In regressions 8 and 9, we replaced 
the trading value and turnover ratios with trading-volatility and turnover-volatility ratios, 
respectively. Again, these liquidity indicators enter positively and statistically significantly (at 
the five-percent level). And the coefficients estimated are approximately similar to that 
estimated for the value trading and turnover ratios in regressions 6 and 7. 
The "price-effect"- a change in the value-traded and market capitalisation ratio due purely to a 
change in stock prices- does not drive the strong link between liquidity and economic growth. 
This can be derived from two results. First, both the value-traded and turnover ratios are 
significantly correlated with economic growth. This implies that increases in stock prices are 
not driving the liquidity results. Second, when the market capitalisation and value-traded ratios 
are simultaneously included in the regression growth, both remain enter significantly 
correlated with economic growth with little change in the estimated coefficients 48. This 
implies that changes in the stock prices are not driving the results on the value-traded, since 
both the market capitalisation and the value-traded ratio influence by the price changes. If the 
price effects were driving the value-traded results, then both indicators would not enter 
significantly correlated with the growth. Therefore, the evidence is consistent with the view 
48 Specifically, when the market capitalisation and value traded ratio are simultaneously included in the growth regression with other 
conditioning variables, the following results are obtained: 
Growth= 0.328 + 0.046 (Secondary School Enrollment Rate) + 0.482 (Investment ratio) + 0.189 (Market Capitalisation) + 0.069 
(0.053) (0.909) (0.015) (0.026) (0.015) 
{2.325} (0.118} {2.929} {2.613} {2.538} 
(Value Traded Ratio) - 1.228 (Government Expenditure Ratio) + 0.04 (export+import/GDP) -0.587 (Inflation 
Rate) 
(0.8006) (0.824) (0.017) 
{-0.154} {0.227} {-2.845) 
with an R2 of 0.886, R2-adjusted = 0.745, DW=1.744, and F-statistics=8.379*, x se (1) = (0.457), x ff f (1) =(0.324), x2 n (2) _ (0.946), 
x2 h(1) = (0.602), ARCH (9) = (0.365). PP (3) =-3.842*. Where the p-values are in parentheses, and t-statistics in brackets. 
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that the ability to trade ownership of an economy provides technologies, which easily promote 
more efficient resources allocation, capital formulation and accelerate economic growth. 
An interesting result, however, is obtained from regression 10. In this regression stock market 
volatility enters negatively but not statistically significantly (at the ten-percent level) 
correlated with the economic growth``. This result can be explained by reference to the fact 
that during the period of consideration Jordan's stock market has exhibited stable and low 
level of volatility in its stock returns. 
As is evident from Table (5.4) also, in each of the above-cited regressions, the banking sector 
development indicator proxied by the ratio of bank claims on private sector to GDP enters 
statistically significantly (at the one-percent level) correlated with economic growth. This 
result confirms the fact that both the banking sector and the stock market are important in the 
growth process of Jordan. The result also validates the argument that the stock market 
performs a different set of functions not provided entirely by the banking system. 
The fit of the regressions in Table (5.4) with an R2 greater than 80 percent is relatively 
satisfactory. The F-statistics in each of the cited regressions reject the null hypothesis of no 
explanatory power for the regression as a whole better than at the one-percent level. In 
addition, all residual tests are insignificant. 
From the results shown above a clear picture arises. First, we confirm the finding that stock 
market development indicators are robustly correlated with economic growth even when 
including other variables that affect economic growth. Second, the results indicate that if we 
include the banking sector development indicator, the stock market development remains an 
important determinant; this implies that the stock market and the banking sector are 
complementary rather than substitutes for each other in financing economic growth in Jordan. 
The third observation is that we need to be careful with the statement that stock market 
development is crucial to economic growth. Our results till now confirm the view that there is 
49 This result is consistent with the findings in Levine and Zervos (1996,1998a). They find that stock market 
volatility is positively but not statistically significantly correlated with growth. 
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a strong relation between economic growth and the stock market development and this relation 
is due not merely to a simultaneity bias. In other words, the findings merely suggest that there 
is an exogenous component of stock market development that positively influences economic 
activity. Two main equations still need to be addressed. Is the stock market a leading sector in 
the process of economic development of Jordan? Or it is a two-way direction? 
5.7 Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter we have provided a simple theoretical framework that links together the 
endogenous growth theory and the current theory on functions of financial markets and 
institutions, in order to study how financial markets development affects economic growth. In 
this framework we identified three mechanisms by which financial development may 
encourage endogenous economic growth: (1) financial markets can encourage a more efficient 
allocation of new investment-additions to capital stock from relatively less to relatively more 
productive uses by intermediation between savers and entrepreneurial investors; (2) financial 
markets can induce an increase in the rate of accumulation of capital by providing increased 
incentives to save and invest; and (3) financial markets can improve productivity of capital by 
providing an important function in controlling and monitoring managerial actions. We have 
argued that the degree to which the stock market influences real economic growth depends on 
how effectively it provides liquidity bands, risk sharing and pooling, information and 
monitoring functions. Then we extended a model of the Romer (1986), Lucas (1988), Rebelo 
(1991), and Pagano (1993a) type of endogenous growth economy in order to incorporate the 
effect of stock market development. 
We attempted to investigate empirically the strength of the independent correlation between 
stock market development and economic growth in the small, developing country of Jordan. 
Given the still incomplete state of the data and the tentative, simple econometric testing done, 
the conclusions reached in this chapter can only be regarded as provisional and as providing us 
with preliminary answers to our questions. However, this is the first study to incorporate such 
an a broad array of indicators to measure individual stock market development in a small 
developing country like Jordan, and to test its correlation with the economic growth process. It 
185 
applies an alternative estimation and testing procedure that departs from the previous study in 
this subject. 
As is evident from the results, the stock market has played a significant role in the Jordanian 
growth process. More specifically, we have found that the links between most of the stock 
market development indicators and economic growth are robust, even after controlling for 
economic variables associated with growth. The stock market size indicator- namely the 
market capitalisation ratio - enters positively and statistically significantly correlated with real 
per capita GDP growth. All the four liquidity indicators- value-traded, turnover, trading- 
volatility, and turnover-volatility ratios- enter positively and statistically significantly 
correlated with growth. Consistent with the previous studies the stock return volatility enters 
negatively but statistically insignificantly correlated with real per capita GDP growth. 
We also found that measures of both the stock market and banking sector development enter 
significantly in the growth regressions. Besides emphasising that development of the financial 
sector in Jordan is important in its process of economic development, this finding suggests that 
the banking sector performs different functions from those performed by the stock market. 
This result is consistent with the view that the stock market offers opportunities primarily for 
trading risk and boosting liquidity; in contrast, banks focus on establishing long-term 
relationships with firms because they seek to acquire information about projects and managers 
and enhance corporate control. Overall, the results in general lend strong support to the 
model's theoretical prediction that the stock market and the banking sector have played a 
significant and complimentarily role in the growth process. 
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Chapter VI 
Macroeconomic Evidence: Causality Test 
6.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we investigated the hitherto neglected role of stock market 
development on economic growth in Jordan and found evidence to support the hypothesis that 
stock market development robustly affects the rate of economic growth. In consideration of 
these favourable results, however, they merely suggest that there is an exogenous component 
of stock market development that positively influences economic growth. Thus, these results 
are insufficient, by themselves, to lead us to conclude that the stock market is a leading sector 
in Jordan's economic development. Therefore, in order to deepen our analysis the following 
fundamental questions need more investigation. Is the stock market a leading sector in the 
process of economic development of Jordan? Or is there any feedback consequence effect of 
the growth generated elsewhere? Or it is a two-way causation? Using some of the latest time- 
series techniques, in this chapter we attempt to answer these questions. 
The answers to the above questions could have policy implications for Jordan and for other 
countries with a similar economic structure. Providing evidence of causality will influence the 
degree of urgency attached to policy reforms designed to promote stock market development. 
Also providing evidence as to causes of stock market development will help policy makers 
design reforms that do indeed promote growth, enhancing stock market development. 
Following Granger (1988), Sims et al., (1990) and Toda and Phillips (1993), since 
cointegration has implications for the way causality testing is conducted, the causality tests are 
performed within a framework based on unit-root testing and cointegration. The advantage of 
testing for cointegration is the identification of a stable long-term relationship between stock 
market development and economic growth, which could also be interesting from a theoretical 
point of view. The cointegration tests used are based on both the Engle-Granger (1987) two- 
step procedure and the Johansen (1988,1991) maximum-likelihood method. Unlike most 
existing empirical literature, by using the Johansen approach we identify and report the long 
run relationship between stock market development and economic growth vectors, which is 
very important because significant implications can be derived concerning the equilibrium of 
the system. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 provides a theoretical background 
to the idea that there is a two-way direction of causality between financial development and 
growth. Section 6.3 provides a review of the previous empirical studies and discusses their 
contributions and shortcomings. Section 6.4 presents the theoretical framework by defining 
and illustrating concepts of causality, stationarity, and cointegration. Section 6.5 describes the 
methodology and testable hypothesis. Section 6.6 discusses data. Section 6.7 presents the 
empirical results. Section 6.8 summarises the conclusions. 
6.2 Theoretical Background 
Recently, certain theoretical frameworks put forward the idea that there is a two-way direction 
of causality between financial development and growth. Patrick (1966) and more recently St 
Hill (1992) have worked out a useful reference framework for the study of the causal 
relationship between financial development and economic growth. They propose a distinction 
between the "supply-leading" approach and the "demand following" approach to financial 
development. "Demand following" financial development appears as a consequence of the 
development of the real sector. This implies the continuous widening of markets and a 
growing product differentiation, which makes necessary more efficient risk diversification and 
better control of transaction costs. This type of financial development, therefore, plays a more 
permissive role in the economic growth process. On the other hand, "supply-leading" financial 
development precedes demand for financial services and can have an autonomous positive 
influence on the growth process. Its role is to mobilise the resources blocked in the traditional 
sector, and transfer them to the modern sector which is capable of promoting growth. 
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According to Patrick's point of view that "supply-leading" financial development dominates 
the early stage of economic development, once the economic development process has 
reached maturity, "demand following" financial development takes over. According to him, 
the role that financial institutions play in the process of development is either passive, merely 
reacting to the demands for financial services- "demand-following"- or positively active in 
devising and providing financial services for the real sector in anticipation for them- "supply- 
leading 
Patrick's framework is of interest as it highlights the two-way causality which may exist 
between financial development and growths. Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) suggest that 
economic growth renders the development of intermediation systems profitable and, at the 
same time, the establishment of intermediation systems helps speed up both growth in the real 
sector and the structural transformation of the economy. Levine (1992) argues that economic 
growth even influences the type of financial intermediation systems that the economy can 
afford. When real per capital income is low, the economy will select simple forms of financial 
intermediary whose main purpose will be to mobilise savings, diversify productivity risks and 
manage liquidity risks. The rise in per capita income enables the economy to develop more 
sophisticated financial intermediaries, whose financing will be correspondingly more costly as 
they will be involved in monitoring investment projects and the identification of the most cost- 
effective innovations. 
Saint-Paul's (1992) is among the few models in which growth and financial development are 
jointly determined. In his model, financial markets entail real resource costs that are fixed or 
less than proportional to the volume of funds intermediated: as the economy grows, the 
individual incentive to participate in financial markets increases, as the benefits increase with 
e the scale of funds invested while costs rise less or not at all. 
Other endogenous growth models, such as those of Berthemey and Varoudakis (1996) and 
Greenwood and Smith (1997), also suggest that there is a two-way causal relationship between 
1 Goldsmith (1969) also argues that the correlation between financial development and growth reflects a two-way 
causal relationship. 
2 Aside from the existence of fixed costs, the unit cost of financial intermediation may decrease with growth 
because of more aggressive competition among intermediaries. 
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financial development and economic growth. In particular, these theoretical analyses 
emphasise the role of financial markets in improving the allocation of resources and the costs 
to society of establishing a sophisticated financial super-structure. The general idea is that, on 
the one hand, financial markets and institutions facilitate the channelling of savings into 
productive investment opportunities, while, on the other, wealthier economies have a greater 
demand for financial services and are more able to afford a costly financial system. Harrison et 
al., (1999) present a theoretical model of banking and growth, which generates a feedback 
effect between financial development and economic growth. They argue that economic growth 
increases the banks' activity and profits, and thus induces the entry of more banks. This entry 
reduces the average distance between banks and borrowers, promotes regional specialisation 
and reduces the cost of intermediation. This in turn increases investment and economic 
3 growth- . 
Blackburn and Hung (1998) present a theoretical analysis of the two-way causal relationship 
between growth and financial development by focusing on the role of financial institutions as 
delegated monitoring agencies which emerge endogenously to provide the most efficient 
means of channelling savings into investment. They argue that financial institutions, on one 
hand, lower the agency costs that must be paid by privately informed firms to secure loans for 
undertaking research projects. On the other hand, an increase in the number of such projects 
reduces the costs of establishing delegation. 
In an important theoretical study, Boyd and Smith (1998) also suggest a two-way direction of 
causality between financial development and growth. Particularly, they have developed an 
endogenous growth model which presents a framework in which capital formulation is 
financed by issuing debt and equity. Boyd and Smith examine an economy in which 
investments are undertaken by a set of agents who require external financing, and in which 
their financial decision depends on the amount of information needed by the investor to 
3 Similarly, Deidda and Crenos (2000) also provide a theoretical model which suggests that 
financial and 
economic development are jointly determined. They point out that, "In the case of positive growth the market 
for 
deposits expands. This raises profitability of banking sector, which causes new 
banks to enter. The resulting 
inter-bank competition generated in this way increases the efficiency of the 
intermediaries operating in the credit 
market, since banks become more specialised. Via this basic mechanism 
financial intermediation could 
endogenously develop at some critical level of economic development" (p. 
3). 
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monitor management. Boyd and Smith suggest two kinds of technology available to the 
investors: one which yields a return which is freely observable only by the initiating investor 
(debt): the other which yields a return which is publicly observable (equity). They conclude 
that as an economy moves along a growth path and accumulates capital, the relative price of 
capital falls, as a result monitoring costs will rise as the economy grows. As a consequence, 
investors will tend to employ observable capital production technology more intensively as an 
economy grows. Hence, as the economy grows, there will be an increased volume of equity 
market activities, and a fall in the debt/equity ratio. Accordingly, Boyd and Smith's analysis 
suggests that there is a bi-directional relationship between stock market development and 
economic growth. 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue that finding a correlation between financial development and 
economic growth does not imply a causality relationship between these two variables. They 
show that both financial development and growth could be driven by a common omitted 
variable such as the propensity of households in the economy to save. Rajan and Zingales also 
show that there is a potential problem of anticipation. Financial development may predict 
economic growth simply because financial markets anticipate future growth. For example, 
stock market capitalisation presents the value of growth opportunities, while financial 
institutions lend more if they think real sectors will grow. 
From all the above, we can see that besides the question of relation, there exists also the 
question of the direction of causality between financial development and economic growth. 
More and more authors stress the reciprocal relationship between financial development and 
economic growth. Economic growth makes the development of a financial intermediation 
system profitable, and the establishment of an efficient financial system permits faster 
economic growth. By pooling funds, risk diversification, liquidity management, project 
evaluation and monitoring, financial intermediation improves the efficiency of capital 
allocation and increases the productivity capacity of the real sector. At the same time, the 
technological efficiency of the financial sector increases with its size, because economies of 
scale and learning-by-doing effects are present in financial intermediation activities. As a 
result, the real sector can exert a positive externality on the financial sector through the 
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volume of savings. Therefore, financial development and economic growth positively 
influence each other in the process of development. In this chapter we attempt to investigate 
this issue i. e., the direction of influence between stock market development and economic 
growth, taking Jordan as our case study using recently developed time series techniques. 
6.3 Previous Empirical Literature 
The empirical literature on the issue of causality between financial development and economic 
growth remains, however, very limited and current empirical literature in this field has 
completely ignored the stock market. This may be attributed to the scarcity of long time series 
for both national accounts and financial development (especially in developing countries). 
The first study on the causality issue between financial development and economic growth as 
shown in the survey by Demetriades and Hussein (1996) is that of Gupta (1984). By utilised 
industrial output (available in quarterly frequency as opposed to national accounts which are 
available in annual frequency) to measure economic development and broad money (M2) to 
measure financial development, Gupta was able to show that changes in (M2) precede or lead 
changes in industrial output. However, the paper addresses certain issues not quite central to 
the debate and suffers from certain technical flaws. By concentrating on narrow definitions of 
financial development (M2), and economic development (industrial output)4, the study 
addresses the question of what causes industrial output (thereby addressing the real effects of 
monetary policy), rather than the important question "does financial development cause 
economic growth? " Also, his analysis includes many observations over a short period of time. 
Campbell and Perron (1991), have shown that as far as the power of a time series is 
concerned, the span of the data is more important than the number of observations i. e. it is 
preferable to use data sets containing fewer annual observations over a long time period than 
data sets containing more observations over a shorter time period. Hendry et al., (1984) also 
argue that increasing sample size by simple "time disaggregation" is not likely to reveal the 
long-run relationships. 
4 In many countries this represents a small proportion of total output. 
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Jung (1986) improved on this by addressing the causality issue using annual data and more 
standard measures of financial and economic development. However, Jung's causality tests 
were conducted in a levels Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model. Sims et al., (1990), however, 
have shown that test statistics derived from levels VAR model are not valid unless the 
variables employed are stationary and cointegrated. 
Two recent papers are much technically sound, Demetriades and Hussein (1996) and 
Rousseau and Wachtel (1998). Using data on sixteen countries over 27 years, Demetriades and 
Hussein (1996) conducted causality tests between financial development (as proxied by bank 
deposit liabilities to nominal GDP and the ratio of bank claims on the private sector to GDP) 
and real GDP growth. They found varying causality patterns across countries: limited 
evidence of finance as a leading sector in the process of economic development, considerable 
evidence of bi-directionality and some evidence of reverse causality. Their conclusions 
highlight the dangers of statistical inference based on cross-country studies alone, which 
implicitly treat different economies as homogeneous entities. Again, while this study is 
extremely revealing, it suffers from shortcomings. The interpretation of financial 
intermediation is limited to banks and takes no account of financial intermediation via other 
intermediaries such as stock markets. 
Rousseau and Wachtel (1998) attempt to uncover the existence of any long-run relationships 
between financial and economic development for five industrialised countries from 1870- 
1929. They find unique cointegration relationships between real per capita levels of output, 
financial intermediation (as proxied by assets of commercial banks, assets of commercial 
banks and saving institutions, and assets of commercial banks, savings institutions, insurance 
companies, credit co-operatives, and pension funds) and money (as proxied by monetary 
base). Furthermore, they show that financial intermediation Granger-causes real output per 
capita, but find no evidence of feedback effects from output to financial intermediation. While 
their inclusion of the range of financial intermediaries is governed by the time period of their 
study, they do not include other intermediaries, e. g. stock markets development, which would 
be considered important in today's context. They point out that, "data limitations associated 
with the historical period of our study and the dominant roles of commercial banks, saving 
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banks, and insurance companies in the financial systems of these countries at the time justify 
our narrowed focus. Nevertheless, the role of financial markets in a broader context remains 
an important topic for fu rther investigation " (p. 675). 
Luinte and Khan (1999) examined the long-run causality between financial development and 
economic growth in a multivariate vector autoregressive framework using 10 countries sample 
for a data set span of 38 years5. Their results show that in the long-term, financial depth, 
measured as a ratio of total deposit liabilities of deposit banks to one period lagged nominal 
GDP, is positively and significantly affected by the levels of per capita real income and real 
interest rate. Furthermore, they find bi-directional causality between financial development, 
proxied by financial depth, and economic growth in all countries included in their analyses. 
As we have shown above, the most recent empirical literature in this field is restrictive in its 
definition of finance in that it has failed to look at financial intermediation outside of the 
banking sector and has completely ignored the stock markets. Consequently, in this chapter we 
address this shortcoming by examining the direction of causality between stock market 
development and economic growth with Jordanian data. Particularly, we run Granger-causality 
tests between the stock market development indicators and the per capita real GDP growth 
during the period 1978-98. In spite of the fact that the number of observations available is not 
ideal, the tests presented in this chapter provide us with preliminary answers to our questions. 
Nevertheless, the results obtained are quite encouraging and deserve to be taken into 
consideration. This study also, by extension of some of the work being conducted in the 
empirical growth and financial literature, is the first attempt to study the linkages between 
stock market development and economic growth in a time series framework using the recent 
econometric technique in testing causality6. 
5 Using multivariate VAR, Sinha and Macri (1999) also examine the causality between economic growth and 
financial development, measured by Ml, M2 and domestic credit, for eight Asian countries. Their results show 
that there is a two-way causality relationship between growth and financial variables for India and Malaysia, one- 
way causality from financial variables to growth for Japan and Thailand and reverse causality for Korea, Pakistan 
and the Philippines. 
6 However, one year after completing this chapter, a study was published by Rousseau and Wachtel (2000). 
While their study is similar in sprit to ours, there are two essential differences. They examine the causality 
between stock markets and economic growth using panel data vector autoregressive for forty-seven countries; 
thus, they focus on between-country differences, while our focus is on one-country experiences. Another 
essential difference is that they conducted causality in a level VAR and they do not tests for stationarity and 
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6.3 Theoretical Framework of the Causality Test 
The conventional procedure to test for Granger-causality between two variables x1, and x2tis to 
specify a k"' order Vector Autoregressive (VAR) system as follows: 
_11t = 
µ, + 7111 (L) x1, 
_1 
+ 1L 12 
(L) x21-1 + EIt (6.1) 
_t-, t =µ2+ 7c zI (L) x11-I+ 7r22 (L) x2 _1 
+ 62t (6.2) 
where ti and t2 are constant drifts and m; j(L) are polynomials of order k-1 in lag operator L. 
Following Granger (1963), xlt causes X2t, if for all s>O, the mean squared error (MSE) of a 
forecasting of xt+s, based on (xlt, x1t_1,... ) is not the same as the forecast of x1 that uses both 
(xlt, xlt_1.... ) and (x2t, x2t_1.... ). In other words, for linear functions, X2t Granger-causes xlt, if: 
MSE 1 E(xlt+s /x11 
, xýr-i,.... 
) 1: # MSE 1E (xir+s I xit xis-i,.... x2 , xar-1,... ) 
1 (6.3) 
In terms of the VAR system defined above, X2t Granger-causes xlt when 7t12(L) is different 
from zero, and similarly xlt Granger-causes X2t when the polynomial n12(L) is not equal to 
zero. 
The above VAR supposes that the variables xlt and X2t are stationary. If, however, the 
variables have unit roots, 1(1), as Granger (1988) argued, the VAR model in levels is mis- 
specified, in which case causality testing can lead to erroneous conclusions. In this case we 
can exploit the possibility of cointegration between xlt and X2t, that is, if there exists a long-run 
relationship due to movements of these variables and possibilities that they will trend together 
towards a long-run equilibrium state, then according to the Granger theorem, it is necessary to 
re-parameterise the model in the equivalent "error-correction model" (ECM) forms: 
Axt =µ I+ y1i (L) Air-i +y 12 (L) &2t-l +ai (ß'X r-i) +Eit 
(6.4) 
AX2t = Ft2 +721 (L) LýXlr-l +722 (L) Ax2r-i + (2 
VX 
t-1) +s zr 
(6.5) 
cointegration, therefore, their results do not shed any light on long-term trends between stock market 
development and economic growth. 
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where (3'x, _, is a stationary linear combination of x1t_1 and x2t_1 and which represents the 
residuals from the cointegrating relationship. And yij is now polynomials of order (k-2). 
Generalising equation (6.4) and (6.5), the ECM model can be rewritten as: 
AX, = µ+F(L) zXt-1 +11 Xr-1 +Er (6.6) 
where Xt= (x, t , .v,, 
)' , ,u=(, u, , , u, 
)' , I'(L) = 
ý1j I, II = aß', 0 is the first-difference 
operator and Et is a vector of impulses which represent the unanticipated movements in Xt. If, 
however, the I(1) variables are not cointegrated then the system in (6.4) and (6.5) is not 
stationary and the Granger-causality tests may be performed without including the error 
correction term ßýit_17. 
Therefore, if xlt and x2t are I(1), then the attention focuses on the long-run parameter matrix 
II = aß' in model (6.6). With one cointegration vector, r =1, H has rank equal to one with a 
and 8 both (2x1) vectors. /3 are the parameters in the cointegrating vector and a are the 
adjustment coefficients which measure the strength of the cointegrating relationship in the 
ECM. Hence the cointegrating methodology illustrates well the conflict that exists between the 
equilibrium framework and the disequilibrium environment for which data are collected. As 
formulated in the ECM, extending the equilibrium framework into one that accounts for 
disequilibrium by including the adjustment mechanisms represented by the error-correction 
terms can solve this conflict. Once the equilibrium conditions are imposed, the ECM describes 
how the system is adjusting in each time period towards its long-run equilibrium state. Since 
the variables are cointegrated, then in the short-run, deviations from this long-run equilibrium 
will feedback on the changes in the dependent variables in order to force their movements 
towards the long-run equilibrium state. The cointegrating vector from which the error- 
correction term is derived indicates the direction in which a stable, meaningful long-run 
equilibrium state exists. The coefficients of the error-correction term, a, and a2 represent the 
7 As noted elsewhere also, if there are no unit roots, the VAR in equation (6.1) and (6.2) are stable and {x[} is a 
stationary process. Hence, the congenital Granger-causality tests are valid in a level framework. 
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proportion by which the long-run disequilibrium in the dependent variables is corrected in 
8 each short-term period. 
Thus, if xlt and x2t are cointegrated, causality tests can be carried out using the ECM model. It 
should be noted here, however, that according to Granger (1988) and Granger and Lin (1995) 
in models (6.4)-(6.5) each equation contains two sources of interaction between X2t by xlt. For 
example. in equation (6.5), the first source is through the lagged dynamic terms Oxit_1, if i21#0, 
which indicates the causal effects of xlt on X2t. The second is through the error-correction term 
ß 
r_1when caz # 
0, which indicates the adjustment of X2t to its long-run equilibrium with xlt. 
Hence, the ECM-based causality is identified in a system where the short-run dynamics of the 
variables is influenced by their adjustment to their long-run equilibrium relationship. 
According to the standard Granger-causality test, the error correction approach allows for the 
detection of a Granger-causal relation of xlt on X2t, even if the coefficients lagged difference 
terms (721) is not significant. Thus, ECM measure the long-run equilibrium relationship, while 
the lagged difference terms measures the short-run causal relation. Granger (1988) notes that 
cointegration between two or more variables are already sufficient to indicate the presence of 
causality in at least one direction. 
6.4 Empirical Methodology 
In order to investigate the Granger-causality test between the stock market and economic 
growth in Jordan we perform methodology deals with the issues of unit roots and cointegration 
in terms of their implications for causality testing, which is gaining wide acceptance among 
researchers. This methodology involves the following steps: 
1) The first step in our methodology involves the pre-testing for unit roots i. e. the 
investigation must first establish that the series of interest are non-stationary. In other words, 
the unit root tests are aimed at establishing the order of integration of each variable. Both the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root tests are herein used to 
8 For more discussions of ECM model, see for example, Davidson and Mackinnon (1993, p. 715-30); Hamitlon 
(1994, Chapter 19, p. 571-629); and Patterson (2000, Chapter 8, p. 316-72). 
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investigate the stationary status of each variable. First, however, we shall present some 
theoretical background of these two tests. 
a. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test 
The early approach to testing for the degree of integration and stationarity was called the 
Dickey-Fuller test. This approach tests for the value of p in equation (6.7) having a value of 
one or a value less than one 
yt =µ+ Ayt-I + £t (6.7) 
where µ and p are parameters and et is assumed to be white noise. y is a stationary series and 
integrated of order zero (a random walk with drift), if -1<p<l. If p=i, y is a nonstationary 
series, if the process is started at some point, the variance of y increases steadily with time and 
goes to infinity. If the absolute value of p is greater than one, the series is explosive. 
Therefore, the hypothesis of a stationary series can be evaluated by testing whether the 
absolute value of p is strictly less than one. Both the DF and the PP tests take the unit root as 
the null hypothesis Ho: p=l. Since explosive series do not make much economic sense, this 
null hypothesis is tested against the one-side alternative H1: p<1. 
There are some theoretical problems with equation (6.7) because the potential of 
nonstationarity breaks the assumptions of OLS regressions, which assume a constant variance 
in the residuals. Thus, the equation has to be re-specified in terms of changes in yt as follows: 
Ay, = µ+ryt-1+£t (6.8) 
where y=p-1 and the null and alternative hypotheses are Ho: y=0, HO=y<O. 
The simple unit root test described above, however, is valid if the series is an AR(1) process. 
If the series is correlated at higher order lags, the assumption of white noise disturbance is 
violated. Using the Augmented Dicky-Fuller test (ADF) solves this problem. The ADF test 
makes a parametric correction for higher order correlation by assuming that y series follows an 
AR (p) process and by adjusting the test methodology. 
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The ADF approach controls for higher order correlation by adding lagged difference terms of 
the dependent variable y to the right hand side of the regression: 
0)', =µ+ yYr-1 + 81 DYt-1 + 82 Ayt-a + ... +8 p-i 
AY, 
-p, 1 + E, 
(6.9) 
this augmented specification is then used to test Ho: Y--O, HI: y<O. 
While this test is widely used in literature, it is sensitive to the degree of augmentation. 
Moreover, the distribution theory supporting the tests assumes the errors are statistically 
independent (serially uncorrelated) and have a constant variance. 
b. The Phillips-Perron (PP) test 
Phillips and Perron (1988) propose a non-parametric method of controlling for higher-order 
serial correlation in series. While the ADF test corrects for higher order serial correlation by 
adding lagged difference terms on the right-hand side of the AR(1) process, the PP test makes 
a correction to the t-statistic of the y coefficient from the AR(l) regression to account for the 
serial in e. This test allows for the fairly mild assumptions concerning the distribution of errors 
i. e. it allows the distributions to be independently identically normally distributed (NIID) 
(Rao, 1994). 
Although, in theory, the PP test is known to be superior, Stock (1994) has shown that the ADF 
test performs better in practice. Cheung and Lai (1994,1997, and 1998) and Martinez (1999) 
however, have shown that the PP test yields more favourable evidence than the ADF test. 
Consequently, we use both tests conducted for up to three-lag length around a nonzero mean 
and around a linear trend, to arrive at any conclusions. 
2) One determines the order of integration for the variables under consideration; 
cointegration tests using both the Engle-Granger and Johansen approaches are employed to 
test for the possibility of cointegration among I(1) variables. The Engle-Granger two-step 
procedure is the simplest cointegration test for a bivariate model and is widely used in 
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empirical studies. In the first step, the parameters of the cointegration vector are estimated by 
running the following static regression in the levels of the variables: 
vlt ýA+ 
92 
-V 2t 
ý- Vt (6.10) 
where vt is the residuals. For the consistency of the parameters estimates, the right hand side 
variable should be weakly exogenous with respect to the cointegrating parameters. The second 
regression tests for a unit root in these residuals of the relevant cointegration and is of the 
form: 
n 
Av 1= pvt-, +ds Av, S S=1 
(6.11) 
the null and alternative hypotheses of non-cointegration between xlt and X2t being Ho: p=0, H1: 
p<09. It is worth noting here that the Engle-Granger procedure is safer from poor finite sample 
properties which may result in a large bias in the OLS estimators of the cointegrating 
relationship (Inder. 1993). 
The Johansen procedure focuses on the rank of matrix aßß, which determines the number of 
distinct cointegrating vectors. Johansen and Juselins (1990) describe two likelihood ratio tests, 
trace and maximal eigenvalue tests, which provide the cointegration rank and estimate the 
long-run parameter matrix aßß. The trace test is based on the stochastic matrix and is defined 
as: 
k 
k 
trace 
(r) _-T 11og(1-ý ) 
i=r+i 
(6.12) 
for r=0,1.... k-1, where T is the number of useable observations, and 2. is the estimated value 
of the characteristic roots. The null hypothesis of this test is that the number of distinct 
cointegrating vectors is less than or equal to r (i. e, no cointegration vector) against the 
alternative r>O (one or more cointegrating vectors). 
The second test, which is the so-called maximal-eigenvalue test, is based on the following: 
9 For more detailed information about the Engle-Granger two-step test see for example Maddala and Kim (1999) 
and Patterson (2000). 
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k 
max 
(rl, r+1) -T 11og(1-kr+1) (6.13) 
i=r+I 
for r=0,1,.. k-1, where T is the number of useable observations; r is the number of cointegrating 
vectors; and X, j is the estimated value of characteristic roots (called eigenvalues) from the 
estimated uß' matrix. Based on the above equation, we can also compute the maximum 
eigenvalue statistic from the trace statistic as: 
kmax = (rl`r+1) = ktrace `r)ktrnce (r+1) (6,14 
This statistic tests the null hypothesis that the number of cointegration vectors is r against a 
specific alternative of (r+l) cointegrating vectors. The distribution of these statistics depends 
on the number of nonstationary components (i. e., the number of variables we are testing for 
cointegration) defined by (n-r). 
Since these tests are sensitive to the choice of the lag length in various model specifications, 
we must determine the appropriate lag length of various model specifications in VAR. As 
shown for example by Thornton and Batten (1985), the choice of a specific lag length of VAR 
model can have a significant influence on the test results. One possible procedure is to allow 
for different lag lengths for each equation. However, in order to preserve the symmetry of the 
system it is common to use the same lag length for all equations. Appropriate lag length 
selection is important since if the lag lengths included is too few, the models may be 
misspecified whereas if the number of lag lengths included is too large, degrees of freedom are 
wasted (Hsiao, 1981). 
Unfortunately, there does not exist a generally best method for choosing the lag length. One 
test statistic used in the literature is the likelihood ratio (LL) statistics recommended by Sims 
et al., (1990). However, this statistic is based on asymptotic theory that is not very useful for 
the small size sample which is available for this study. The approach taken here is the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC)1°. This information criterion has been widely used in the time 
10 AIC information criterion of VAR is defined as: -2i/T+2n1T, where n=K(d+px) is the total number of estimated 
parameters in VAR, T is the number of observation, i is the log-likelihood value is computed assuming a 
multivariate normal (Gaussian) distribution as: i=(TK/2)(l+log2rt)-(T/2) logjQj, where SZ is the estimated residual 
covariance. For more details see Grasa, (1989). 
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series analysis to determine appreciative length of the distributed lag (Lutkepoht, 1991; and 
Maddala and Kim, 1999). The basic methodology involves selecting the models with the 
lowest AIC values. Specifically, the methodology involves first calculating the AIC values for 
a lag length of one, then increasing the lag length by one i. e. calculating the AIC value for the 
new lag length: if the higher lag length yields a lower number repeat step two, if increasing the 
lag length yields a higher number, stop and choose the lag length that yields the lowest value, 
which indicates that this length leaves the residuals approximately independently identically 
normally distributed (NIID)11. 
In this contest it is important to note that the Johansen procedure has several advantages over 
the popular residual-based Engle-Granger two-step approach in testing for cointegration. 
Specifically, they may be summarised as follows: (i) the Johansen procedure does not, a priori, 
assume the existence of at most a single cointegration vector; rather it explicitly tests for the 
number of cointegrating relationships; (ii) unlike the Engle-Granger procedure which is 
sensitive to the choice of the dependent variable in the conitegrating regression, the Johansen 
procedure assumes all variables to be endogenous; (iii) the Johansen procedure is established 
on a unified framework for estimating the testing cointegrating relations within the VECM 
formulation. Moreover, as reported by Campbell and Perron (1991), OLS estimates of 
conitegrating vectors, particularly in small samples, may be severely biased12; (iv) the 
Johansen procedure estimates the short-run dynamics simultaneously, which increase the 
efficiency of estimation; and (v) the Johansen procedure allows for testing the restrictions on 
the cointegrating vectors13. Nevertheless, the Johansen procedure is not free from problems 
either. As is now well known, Johansen procedure results are sensitive to the lag length of the 
VAR (Benerje et al., 1993). 
3) When the evidence of cointegration is optioned, the VAR with an error-cointegration 
constraint is set up (using residuals), and is in the form: 
11 The presence of autocorrelation in the residual vector is an indicator of model mis-specification (see Ender, 
1995) 
12 For a more detailed discussion of this argument see for example Masih and Masih (1995,1998). 
13 See for example Kennedy (1998, Chapter 17, pp. 263-77). 
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O. xit = µi +1'iß Av,, 
-i 
+y12 dpi, 
-, 
+1'13 dt21-1 +y14 AX2t-2 +a1 (ß'XX-1)+Et (6.15) 
Ox,, = µ2+, y, I 
0x, 
1-1 +y,. 
Ax, 
, +723 x21-1 +1'24 Axir-2 +a2(ß'Xt-1)+£t (6.16) 
where 8x, -, are 
the error-correction terms given by the residuals from the cointegrating 
equation; c1 and c are the adjustment coefficients; xlt represents economic growth and x2t 
stock market development indicator. 
Granger (1988) points out that if a pair of series is cointegrated, then there must be Granger- 
causation in at least one direction. To investigate the causality between stock market 
development and economic growth, we perform two types of causality test, depending on the 
source of causality tests. 
" F-tests are applied to test the joint significance of lagged dynamic terms in equation 
(6.15) and (6.16): 
Fl: Ho: Y13 = Y14 = 0, 
F2: Ho: Y21 = Y22 = 0. 
These tests are tests of Granger-causality between economic growth and stock market 
development. F1 tests the null hypothesis that stock market development does not Granger- 
causes economic growth, and F2 tests the null hypothesis that economic growth does not 
Granger-cause stock market development. If the null F1 (Ho: Y13=y14=O) is not rejected, this 
implies that the stock market development variable does not cause economic growth in the 
short-run. Likewise, non-rejection of the null F2 (Ho: Y21=y22=0) implies that economic growth 
does not cause stock market development in the short-run (no feedback effect). On the other 
hand, rejection of F1 n F2 implies a bi-directional relationship between stock market 
development and economic growth in the short-run. 
" t-tests are applied to test for the statistical significance of the lagged cointegrating 
vector in two of the equations, which are tests of weak exogeneity of the variable. A 
dependent variable is weakly exogenous when the error-correction term is insignificant in its 
equation. This means that this variable is not adjusting to the long-run equilibrium state 
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t1: Ho: a1=0, 
t, Ho: a2 = 0. 
where t, tests for weak exogeneity of x I, t-, tests for weak exogeneity of X2t. If the null ti (Ho: 
a1=0) is not rejected then the economic growth vector is weakly exogenous with respect to the 
stock market development variable vector implying that stock market development does not 
cause economic growth in the long-run. Likewise, non-rejection of the null t2 (Ho: (x2=0) 
implies that the stock market development variable vector is weakly exogenous with respect to 
the economic growth, hence economic growth does not cause stock market development in the 
long-run. On other hand, rejection of ti n t-, implies a bi-directional relationship between stock 
market development and economic growth in the long run. 
4) In the absence of cointegration evidence, we tested for causality between stock market 
development and economic growth within the VAR model, which is described in equations 
(6.15) and (6.16), without including an error-correction term. In such a case, the Granger- 
causality between stock market development and economic growth are performed by one type 
of causality test. The joint significance of lagged dynamic terms in the model: 
Fl: Ho: Y13 = 'Y14 =0, 
F2: Ho: 721=1'22=0 
if the evidence does not reject the null hypothesis in Fl, this implies that stock market 
development does not Granger-cause economic growth, and if the evidence rejects the null 
hypothesis in F2, this implies that economic growth does not Granger-cause stock market 
development. On the other hand, rejection of F1 n F2 implies a bi-directional relationship 
between the stock market and economic growth. 
6.5 Data 
Since the aim of our study is not so much to highlight what factors cause economic growth as 
to examine whether the stock market is a leading sector in the process of economic growth 
in 
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Jordan, or whether there is a feedback consequence effect of the growth generated elsewhere, 
the focus here is therefore on the causal link between the two variables, economic growth and 
stock market development. Consequently, we do not include the other known variables that 
may cause economic growth. Moreover, the power of the statistical tests and estimation 
procedures with include more variables besides the stock market development indicator is 
greatly reduced in small samples. This is an additional reason why we do not attempt to 
estimate the models containing other variables that may affect growth. 
As in Chapter V, six indicators for stock market development are used. These indicators are 
associated with the stock market size, volatility and liquidity. In brief, the stock market 
capitalisation adjusted for the size of the economy (GDP) is used as an indicator for the stock 
market size. Volatility is measured as an annualised standard deviation that is based on weekly 
market returns. Finally, we use four indicated measures of market liquidity: value-traded, 
trading-volatility, turnover and turnover-volatility ratios14. As has been noted elsewhere, each 
of these indicators has shortcomings and non-directly measures the provision of financial 
services provided by the stock market; using a variety of measures provides a richer picture of 
ties between stock market development and economic growth than if a single indicator is 
l useds 
Following the standard practice in the economic growth literature, we proxy the growth rate of 
real per capita GDP for economic growth, which is generated as the first difference in 
logarithm of the real per capita GDP series. The consumer price index has been chosen as a 
deflator. 
All data are annual, spanning the period 1978 to 1998. We use here annual data containing 
fewer observations rather than using quarterly data containing more observations over a short- 
term period16, because it is now well-known that unit root and cointegration tests require a 
14 All the variables are translated into their natural logarithm prior to analysis. 15 As in Chapter V and throughout this study, we distinguish between two groups of measures depending on 
denominator. The first groups consist of ratios of two stock variables, whereas the measures in the second group 
are ratios of a stock variable and a flow variable, especially GDP. Whereas stock variables are measured at the 
end of a period, flow variables are defined relative to a period. This presents problems in the second group of 
indicators, both in terms of correct timing and in terms of deflating correctly. 
16 As we have mentioned in Chapter V, quarterly data on GDP is available in Jordan only since 1992. 
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long time span of data rather than merely a large number of observations. There is no gain in 
switching from low frequency to high frequency data and merely increasing the number of 
observations (Campbell and Perron, 1991; Hakkio and Rush, 1991; Demetriades and Hussein, 
1996; and Luinte and Khan, 1999). Campbell and Perron (1991) suggest that "in most 
applications of interest, the data set containing fewer annual data over a long time period will 
lead to the test having higher power than if use was made of the data set containing more 
observations over the short period' (p. 153)7. 1 
Hakkio and Rush (1991) argue that there is no answer to the question, how long is the long 
term. However, they argue that the length of the long term is varies between problems. For 
some problems the long term may be a matter of decades while for others a matter of months. 
In previous studies on the causality issues between financial development and growth, Jung 
(1986) and Demetriades and Hussein (1996) using bivariate time-series tests of causality for 
data sets have an average time span of 15 and 27 years, respectively, Rousseau and Wachtel 
(1998) and Luinte and Khan (1999) using multivariate tests of causality for data sets have an 
average time span of 50 and 37 years, respectively18, and they argue that these spans of data 
are long enough to capture the long run relation between financial development and economic 
growth19. Based on the above views, the available data set in this study, which has a time span 
of 21 years, could be enough to capture the long-run relationship between stock market 
development and economic growth in a bivariate vector autoregressive (VAR) model used 
here. 
The data source for growth is compiled from various issues of the annual report of the CBJ. 
The data series for the stock market development indicators- stock market capitalisation, 
value- traded, and turnover ratios- were obtained from various issues of the annual report of 
the AFM. The weekly price index from the first of January, 1978 to the end of 
December, 
1998 is obtained from the AFM database. 
17 Groen (2000) also points out "Extending the number of observations through an 
increase in the data frequency 
for the same time span does not improve the power of tests on unit roots or cointegration" 
(p. 2). 
'$ In Rousseau and Wachtel (1998), VARs consist of three variables and 
in Luinte and Khan (1999) VARs 
consist of five variables. 
19 In a more recent study Catalan, et at., (2000) used bivariate time-series 
tests for causality between the 
development of contractual savings and stock markets using 17 observations. 
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6.6 Empirical Results 
As mentioned above, the focus here is on the causal link between the two variables, economic 
growth and stock market development. In the following paragraphs we present the test results 
concerning unit root, cointegration, and Granger-causality. 
6.6.1 Test Results for Unit Root 
Before we examine cointegration, the order of integration of the stock market development 
and economic growth variables must be determined. As is well known, the cointegration 
relationship exists within a set of nonstationary time series when a linear combination of the 
variables that yields stationary results can be identified. For this purpose, we perform a unit 
root test using both the ADF and PP tests. These tests are applied to the level variables as well 
as to their first differences in logarithm terms. The null hypothesis tested that the variable 
under investigation has a unit root, against the alternative that they do not. 
The results of the unit root tests are presented in Table (6.1). The second and third columns of 
Table (6.1) report tests of stationarity about a non-zero mean. We then test stationarity about a 
deterministic linear time trend. The results of these tests are reported in the fourth and fifth 
columns of the table. The reported results indicate the presence of a unit root in log levels of 
all variables i. e., the null hypothesis that each of the time series has a unit root cannot be 
rejected at the five-percent level for both tests. However, as we can show from the bottom half 
of Table (6.1), there is no evidence from either test to support a unit root in first difference of 
all the variables (both tests reject the null hypothesis at the five-percent level). These results 
are broadly consistent with the hypothesis that all the variables under investigation are 
individually integrated of order one I(1). 
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Table 6.1: Test Results for Unit Rnnte 
Stationary around a non zero 
mean 
Stationary around a linear 
trend 
ADF PP ADF PP 
Level 
Per Capita Real GDP Growth -2.233 -2.823 -2.187 -2.817 Market Capitalisation Ratio -1.142 -1.609 -2.029 -2.408 
Value Traded Ratio -2.286 -2.439 -2.483 -2.509 
Turnover Ratio -2.260 -2.338 -2.017 -2.202 
Trading/Volatility -2.220 -2.475 -2.394 -2.738 
Turnover/Volatility -2.489 -2.838 -2.379 -2.853 
Volatility -2.752 -3.100 -3.057 -3.039 
Ist Difference 
Per Capita Real GDP Growth -3.059 -5.631 
Market Capitalisation -3.802 -5.004 
Value Traded Ratio -4.382 -5.322 
Turnover Ratio -4.030 -5.027 
Trading/Volatility -4.236 -5.549 
Turnover/Volatility -4.223 -5.915 
Volatility -5.917 -5.987 
1% Critical Value 
5% Critical Value 
10% Critical Value 
-3.857 
-3.040 
-2.661 
-3.830 
-3.029 
-2.655 
-4.535 
-3.675 
-3.276 
-4.574 
-3.692 
-3.286 
The variables are as defined in the text. The null hypothesis tested is that the relevant series contains a unit root 
against the alternative that it does not. ADF is the Argumented Dickely-Fuller test. PP is the Phillips-Perron 
test. 
6.6.2 Test Results for Contegration 
Given the results of the unit root test, it is necessary to use cointegration methodology in order 
to test the existence of the stable relationship between economic development as proxied by 
the level of real per capita GDP growth and the state of the stock market development as 
captured by: stock market capitalisation ratio, value-traded ratio, turnover ratio, traded- 
volatility ratio, turnover-volatility ratio and volatility. For this purpose we report the 
cointegration test based on the Engle and Granger (1987) and Johansen (1988) methods. 
Table (6.2) presents results of testing for cointegration using the Engle-Granger procedure. 
Each row reports coefficients from two regressions. As mentioned in Section 
6.4, the first one 
is the cointegration regression, equation (6.10), where the dependent variable 
is the per capita 
real GDP growth and the independent variable is the stock market 
development indicator. The 
second one, equation (6.11), tests for unit root regression the relevant cointegration regression. 
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The coefficients reported from the first regression are ßl and ß2 and the p is the ADF test for 
the residuals from (6.11). 
The estimates of the cointegration regressions and the results of applying the ADF test for 
detecting a unit root in the residuals of these cointegrations are reported in Table (6.2). As can 
be seen, this test suggests that five of the stock market development indicators- namely the 
market capitalisation, value-traded, turnover, traded-volatility and turnover-volatility ratios are 
cointegrated with the per capita real GDP growth at the five-percent level of significance. 
These results are consistent with the inference that there is a stable, long-run equilibrium 
relationship between each of these variables and per capita real GDP growth. however, the 
Engle-Granger results for market volatility do not detect cointegration with per capita real 
GDP growth even at the ten-percent level of significance. 
Table 6.2: The Engle-Granger Cointegration Tests 
PI P2 p k 
Market Capitalisation -1.832** 0.276** -3.910* 3 (-2.545) (2.255) 
Value Traded Ratio -1.051* 0.061*** -3.231** 2 (-2.767) (1.611) 
Turnover Ratio -1.106* 0.056** -3.892* 3 (-3.328) (2.452) 
Trading/Volatility -1.090* 0.0405** -3.260** 2 (-3.202) (2.080) 
Turnover/Volatility 1.088* 0,0410** -3.343** 1 (-3.244) (2.586) 
Volatility 1.648** -0.786 -2.589 2 (2.467) (-1.221) 
The coefficient (31 and (32 are estimated from the regression in (6.10) using OLS. The coefficient p is estimated 
from the regression from (6.11) using OLS, and k indicates the number of lags used. The numbers in parentheses 
are the t-statistics. The residuals in (6.10) are also checked using Ljung-Box Q statistics (the results not reported 
here) for first and higher order serial correlation. "*" Significant at the 1% level, "**" significant at the 5% level, 
"***" significant at the 10% level. 
The second test of cointegration is based on the maximum likelihood estimates of a vector 
autoregressive model of Johansen. This test identifies the number of stationary long-run 
relations that exist among an integrated time series. Table (6.3) reports results of this test, 
which included both maximum eigenvalue and the trace statistics and the corresponding X 
values. Table (6.4) reports estimates of corresponding H, which contains the cointegrating 
vectors and the adjustment coefficients of variables. Since the Johansen procedure is sensitive 
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to the choice of the lag length in VAR, we selected a lag length based, as mentioned in Section 
(6.5), on the Akaike's information criterion (AIC). Using this lag specification, diagnostic 
checking tests for normality and absence of serial correlation were performed on the residuals 
of each equation in VAR. The results of these tests (not reported here) indicate that this lag 
length left the residuals approximately in an independently identically normal distribution. 
As can be seen from Tables (6.5) and (6.6), Johansen cointegration test results, in most cases, 
yield relatively the same results as Engle-Granger cointegration tests. However, these results 
are unexpected since the two procedures are different and use different techniques. While the 
Engle-Granger cointegration method uses ordinary least squares to estimate the cointegration 
vectors and the VECM in two separate steps, the Johansen method uses the maximum- 
likelihood procedure and estimates jointly the cointegration vectors and the VECM. In 
addition, one would suspect that, with the Engle-Granger procedure, substantial bias is 
occurring in the OLS estimates of cointegration vectors (Inder, 1993). The Johansen 
procedure, as we have mentioned before, is not free from problem either. The main 
shortcoming of this technique is that it is highly sensitive to the lag length of the VAR. 
The Johansen cointegration test results under both the maximum eigenvalue and trace statistics 
suggest that the per capita real GDP growth and each of the stock market development 
indicator used- the market capitalisation ratio, value-traded ratio, turnover-ratio, traded- 
volatility ratio, turnover-volatility ratio and volitality- is cointegrated at least at the five- 
percent level of significance. 
These results indicate in general that there is a stable, long-run equilibrium relationship, which 
ties together the evolution of stock market development and the evolution of per capita real 
GDP growth. Consequently, the cointegrating relationship can be regarded as a long-run 
equilibrium state and short-run dynamics of the variables can be viewed as fluctuations around 
this equilibrium. Hence the short-run movements of the variables are characterised by the 
dynamic interaction among them with feedback going from one variable to the other, or both 
ways, depending on the direction of causality. The cointegration vectors indicate the 
direction 
in which the system should be moved to reach this long-run equilibrium state. 
The error- 
correction term indicates how far the variables are away from their long-run equilibrium path. 
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Thus, since they are cointegrated, in each short-run period the per capita real GDP growth and 
the stock market development indicator are adjusting to their long-run equilibrium 
relationship. 
The estimated ct vectors are significant indicates that the stock market development indicators 
and per capita real GDP growth are adjusting to their long-run equilibrium relationship, and 
the magnitudes of these coefficients shows the speed of adjustment to disequilibrium from 
their long-run equilibrium state. In general, for each of these indicators, the speed of stock 
market development towards long-run equilibrium seems to be higher than that of the per 
capita real GDP growth. 
The interpretation of the effects of the error correction terms in the ECM model is important 
because significant implications can be derived concerning the equilibrium of the system. For 
example, given the estimated long run relationship between per capita real GDP growth (xlt) 
and the market capitalisation ratio (x2t), the error correction term (, 8zr_, ) can be written as: 
ßX 
l, _1 = x1 _1 - 
Q. 688x2t_1 -4.961. Since the error-correction coefficient (a) of this term is 
negative in the economic growth equation (6.15), which is acorrect sign, since the 
cointegration vector is normalised (the coefficient takes a value of unity in the vector) in per 
capita real GDP growth (xlt), then, depending on whether the error-correction term is positive 
or negative or zero, there are three different types of effect on economic growth coming from 
the error-correction term. When the variables in the previous period are in equilibrium state, 
then there is no effect on economic growth coming from the error-correction term. This 
happens when the ßx, _1 
is equal to zero. When the error-correction term is negative (ßxt_, < 
0) then its effect on economic growth is positive. In particular, negative deviation from the 
stationary relationship will be corrected by an increase in economic growth. Finally, when the 
error-correction term is positive (ßx, _1> 
0), then its effect on economic growth is negative; 
the positive deviation from the stationary relationship will be corrected by a decrease in 
economic growth. 
The facts above have straightforward implications concerning the short-run behaviour of 
economic growth in connection to the long-run relationship that exists between stock market 
211 
development and the real sectors of the economy. They state that, in the short-run, an 
imbalance between per capita real GDP and a certain level of market development will have 
either a negative or a positive impact on economic growth. 
Table 6.3: The Johansen Cointegration Tests (Testing the Rank of II) 
Maximal Eigenvalue Test Trace Test 
Ho Hl Statistics Ho Hl Statistics 2' 
(1) Variables included in VAR: Per Capita Real GDP Growth, Market Capitalisation Ratio (k=2) 
r= 0r >_1 23.008* r= 0 r=1 26.412* 0.614 
r<_1 r=2 3.325 r<_1 r=2 3.325 0.153 
(2) Variables included in VAR: Per Capita Real GDP Growth, Value Traded Ratio (k=2) 
r=0r >_1 32.304* r =0 r=1 39.365* 0.850 
rS1r =2 7.060 r< 1r =2 7.060 0.339 
(3) Variables included in VAR: Per Capita Real GDP Growth, Turnover Ratio (k=3) 
r=0r >_1 20.274* r =0 r =1 24.557* 0.595 
r: 5 1r =2 4.283 r<1r =2 4.283 0.212 
(4) Variables included in VAR: Per Capita Real GDP Growth, Traded-Volatility Ratio (k=2) 
r=0 r>_1 14.005** r=0 r=1 18.752* 0.541 
r< 1r =2 4.746 r<_ 1r =2 4.746 0.231 
(5) Variables included in VAR: Per Capita Real GDP Growth, Turnover-Volatility Ratio (k=2) 
r=0 r ?1 17.356* r =0 r=1 21.731 * 0.595 
r <_ 1r =2 4.375 r51r =2 4.375 0.268 
(6) Variables included in VAR: Per Capita Real GDP Growth, Volatility (k=1) 
r=0r >_1 14.638** r =0 T=I 17.586** 0.663 
r: 5 1r =2 2.948 r <_ 1r =2 2.948 0.255 
Notes: Hfl and Hl are the null and alternative hypotheses, respectively. 4, the corresponding value. the Ylk 
critical values for the maximal eigenvalue test are 15.87,9.16, respectively and the 10% critical values are 13.81, 
7.53, respectively, for H) and Hl. The 5% critical values for the trace test are 20.18,9.16, respectively, and the 
10% critical values are 17.88,7.53, respectively, for Hl and H2. "*" denotes significant at 5 percent, and "**" 
denotes significant at 10 percent. For each stock market development indicator the Johansen Cointegration tests 
were performed with lag lengths (k=n) based on the Akaike's Information (AIC) criterion. Using these lag 
lengths, the residuals in each of the VAR equations were checked for normality and absence of serial correlation. 
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TahlP 6_4- ThP rY nncI R 
Variables (3 a 
(1) Variables included in VAR: Per Capita Real GDP Growth, Market Capitalisation Ratio 
Per Capita Real GDP growth 1.000 -0.202* 
(-3.939) 
Market Capitalisation Ratio -0.688** 0.291** 
(-2.321) (2.321) 
Intercept -4.961*** 
(-1.876) 
(2)Variables included in VAR: Per Capita Real GDP Growth, Value Traded Ratio 
Per Capita Real GDP growth 1.000 -0.0764* 
(-2.848) 
Value Traded Ratio -1.547 * 0.140** 
(-3.434) (2.095) 
Intercept -11.375* 
(-3.242) 
(3)Variables included in VAR: Per Capita Real GDP Growth, Turnover Ratio 
Per Capita Real GDP growth 1.000 -0.0591** 
(-2.316) 
Turnover Ratio - 1.402* -0.0982*** 
(-2.916) (-1.865) 
Intercept -4.461 
(-0.517) 
(4)Variables included in VAR: Per Capita Real GDP Growth, Traded-Volatility Ratio 
Per Capita Real GDP growth 1.000 -0.1226** 
(-2.156) 
Traded-Volatility ratio - 3.461** 0.0212 
(-2.461) (1.306) 
Intercept -3.713 
(-0.918) 
(5)Variables included in VAR: Per Capita Real GDP Growth, Turnover-Volatility Ratio 
Per Capita Real GDP growth 1.000 -0.117** 
(-1.982) 
Turnover-Volatility Ratio - 2.858** 0.069* 
(-2.448) (3.671) 
Intercept 3.504 
(0.798) 
(6)Variables included in VAR: Per Capita Real GDP Growth, Volatility 
Per Capita Real GDP growth 1.000 0.062* 
(3.231) 
Volatility 2.179** 0.0845 
(3.517) (1.069) 
Intercept 9.160 
(1.597) 
In each case the cointegration vector (ß') is normalised on per capita real GDP growth. The numbers in 
parentheses are t-statistics. and "***" indicates statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
213 
6.5.3 Test Results for Granger-Causality 
In order to know whether the dynamic interactions between stock market development and 
economic growth in Jordan are characterised by feedback going from stock market 
development to real output or from real output to stock market development, or both, we 
should now turn to testing for the direction of Granger-causality. Given the results of the 
cointegration tests, we conduct VECM based causality tests using the Engle-Granger and/or 
Johansen cointegrating vectors, for the pairs of variables for which each of the two procedures 
shows evidence of cointegration, otherwise the causality test is conducted using first- 
differenced VARs. We use two statistical tests to examine the direction of causality: F-tests 
applied to test the dynamic exogenous terms in the VECM, and t-tests applied to test the 
coefficients of the error-correction terms in the VECM. For the stock market development 
indicators for which any of these techniques shows clear evidence that they are not 
cointegrated with per capita real GDP (market volatility in which the Engle-Granger test failed 
to detect cointegration) we conduct causality tests using first-differenced VARs applying one 
type of statistical test, F- tests. 
Table (6.5) reports the results of these statistical tests using Engle-Granger cointegration 
vectors; Table (6.6) contains the same tests using the Johansen cointegrating vectors. It is 
interesting to note that, with both procedures, the Granger-causality tests are in favour of the 
hypothesis that the relationship between stock market development and economic growth in 
Jordan is bi-directional. As can be seen from Table (6.5), for each of the four stock market 
development indicators- the market capitalisation, value-traded, turnover, traded-volatility 
ratio and turnover-volatility ratios- the Engle-Granger based causality tests reject the 
hypothesis of non-causality from each of these indicators to per capita real GDP growth under 
both possible sources of causation (the error-correction term and the lagged dynamic terms) at 
the five-percent level of significance. The statistical significance of the Fl statistics (joint test 
for the coefficients of the lagged dynamic terms) indicates that short-term changes in the 
growth rate of each of these stock market development indicators have an influence on future 
growth rates of per capita real GDP. This means that a higher growth rate of stock market 
capitalisation or any one of the liquidity indicators results in higher growth rates of per capita 
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real GDP growth. The statistical significance of t1 statistics (tests for the coefficients of the 
error-correction terms) implies that each of these indicators (in level not in growth rate) has an 
influence on economic growth through the error-correction terms. Since the error-correction 
terms enter significantly into the economic growth equation, it means that, in each short-term 
period, economic growth is adjusting to the previous period's imbalance between stock market 
development and per capita real GDP growth. 
On the other hand, the hypothesis of non-causality from per capita real GDP growth to each of 
these indicators is rejected also under both possible sources of causation at the five-percent 
level of significance. This implies that a higher rate of per capita real GDP growth yields a 
higher-level growth in these indicators. Thus, there seems to be a bi-directional (a two-way 
causality) relationship between economic growth and these indicators of stock market 
development. These important results suggest that an expansion of the stock market induces 
the real economy to grow and, in turn, increases the demand for its resources. In other words, 
economic growth enhances stock market development, and the higher development in stock 
market permits faster economic growth. By facilitating liquidity, diversification risk, 
aggregating and disseminating information about firms, promoting corporate control and 
monitoring. mobilising capital, the stock market improves the efficiency of capital allocation 
and increases the productive capacity of the real sector. At the same time, the efficiency of the 
stock market increases with its size and liquidity. As a result, the real sector can exert a 
positive externality on the stock market through the volume of savings. Therefore, stock 
market development and economic growth positively influence each other in the process of 
development. 
Since the Engle-Granger cointegration tests (Table, 6.2) suggest that there is no cointegration 
between per capita real GDP growth and market volatility, we tested for causality between this 
indicator and economic growth within a first-difference VAR model without including an 
error-correction term. The results of this test are also reported in Table (6.5). As can be seen 
from the Fl-statistic, there is no evidence of causality from market volatility to per capita real 
GDP growth even at the ten-percent level, but there is evidence of reserve causality from per 
capita real GDP growth to this indicator at the five-percent level of significance. 
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Table 6.5: Granger-Causality Test Results: The Engle-Granger Procedure 
(1) Granger-causality between Per capita real GDP growth (x1) and market capitalisation ratio (x2) 
Null Hypothesis: x, does not Granger-cause xi x, does not Granger-cause xi 
t, =4.314* F, = 6.644* t, = 2.495** F2=3.137*** 
(2) Granger-causality between Per capita real GDP growth (x1) and value traded ratio (x2) 
Null Hypothesis: x, does not Granger-cause x, x2 _does not 
Granger-cause xi 
t1=1.919*** F1= 3.622** t2=4.257* F2=4.954** 
(3) Granger-causality between Per capita real GDP growth (x1) and turnover ratio (x2) 
Null Hypothesis: x, does not Granger-cause xt x2 does not Granger-cause x1 
t1= 2.043*** F, =3.848** t2=3.359* F2=3.982** 
(4) Granger-causality between Per capita real GDP growth (x, ) and traded-volatility ratio (x2) 
Null Hypothesis: x2 does not Granger-cause xl xz does not Granger-cause xl 
ti=1.886*** F1=2.980*** tz= 2.870* F2=4.016** 
(5) Granger-causality between Per capita real GDP growth (x1) and turnover-volatility ratio (x2) 
Null Hypothesis: x, does not Granger-cause xl x2 does not Granger-cause xi 
tim 2.257** F1=3.039*** t2=3.848* F2=6.016* 
(6) Granger-causality between Per capita real GDP growth (x1) and volatility (X2)a 
Null Hypothesis: x, does not Granger-cause xl x2 does not Granger-cause x1 
F1=1.71 ** F2=3.821 
"*" " ""**., indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% leves, respectively. 
a since the Engle-Granger cointegration tests (Table 6.2) suggest that per capita real GDP growth and market 
volatility are not cointegrated, we tested for causality between these two variables within a first-difference 
VAR model without including an error-correction term. 
Table (6.6) contains the results of Granger-causality tests based on the Johansen cointegrating 
vectors. In general, in most cases the results are broadly consistent with those obtained from 
the Engle-Granger causality based tests2°. All the stock market development indicators exhibit 
causation from stock market development to per capita real GDP growth through both the 
error-correction terms and the lag dynamics terms. These results emphasise largely the 
previous results from the Engle-Granger cointegration vectors. The statistical significance of 
both the error-correction terms and the lag dynamics terms, as we have mentioned above, 
20 These results, however, are unexpected since the two procedures are different and use 
different techniques. 
The While Engle-Granger approach uses ordinary least squares, the Johansen method uses the maximum- 
likelihood. According to Vilassuso (2001) the maximum-likelihood estimation is more suited to test the causality. 
He argues that conclusions drawn from least squares causality tests may lead to an erroneous claim that a 
statistically significant causal relation exists. Vilassuso points out that, "Misleading inference associated with 
least squares may be traced to two explanations. First, because the set of regressors 
in a VAR includes lagged 
dependent variables, least-squares standard errors are not consistent and may not support correct statistical 
inference..... A second explanation for the unsatisfactory performance of least-squares causality tests traces 
to a 
failure to adequately differentiate between causality in mean and causality in variance" 
(p. 26). 
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implies that the short-term changes in the level of each of these indicators of stock market 
development is in part responsible for future changes in real per capita GDP growth, and in 
each short-term, economic growth is adjusting to the previous period's imbalance between 
these indicators of stock market development and per capita real GDP growth. 
On the other hand, of the six stock market development indicators tested by Johansen's 
cointegrating vectors causality approach and included in Table (6.6), three reject the 
hypothesis of no-causality from per capita real GDP growth to stock market development 
through both the error-correction terms and the dynamic terms. These indicators are market 
capitalisation, value-traded and turnover-volatility ratios. In the case of the turnover and 
traded-volatility ratios, there is also evidence of causation from per capita real GDP growth to 
these indicators but emanating only from the error-correction terms in which the lag dynamics 
terms appear statistically insignificant at the ten-percent level. In the case of market volatility, 
however, there is no evidence either from the error-correction term or the dynamic term of 
reverse causation from per capita real GDP growth to this indicator. 
Table 6.6: Granger-Causality Test Results: The Johansen Procedure 
(1) Granger-causality between Per capita real GDP growth (xi) and market capitalisation ratio (x2) 
Null Hypothesis: x, does not Granger-cause xl x2 does not Granger-cause xl 
t, =3.939* F, =3.914** t, =2.322** F2=6.634* 
(2) Granger-causality between Per capita real GDP growth (x1) and value traded ratio (x2) 
Null Hypothesis: x, does not Granger-cause xl x2 does not Granger-cause x1 
t, =2.549** F1=3.911** t2=2.095** F2=3.508** 
(3) Granger-causality between Per capita real GDP growth (x1) and turnover ratio (x2) 
Null Hypothesis: x, does not Granger-cause xi x2 does not Granger-cause xl 
ti=2.317** F1=3.520** t2=1.166 F2=7.273* 
(4) Granger-causality between Per capita real GDP growth (x1) and traded-volatility ratio (x2) 
Null Hypothesis: x, does not Granger-cause xl xZ does not Granger-cause xl 
t1=2.156** F, =3.160** t2=1.305 F2=6.802* 
(5) Granger-causality between Per capita real GDP growth (x1) and turnover-volatility ratio (x2) 
Null Hypothesis: x, does not Granger-cause xl x2 does not Granger-cause x, 
t1=1.982*** F1=4.772** t2=3.671* F2=9.999* 
(6) Granger-causality between Per capita real GDP growth (x1) and market volatility (x2) 
Null Hypothesis: x, does not Granger-cause xs x, does not Granger-cause xI 
t1=3.232* F1=4.772** t2=1.069 F2=2.383 
"*" "**" "***" indicates significance at the 1U/o, 51/o and 1u'Ao, respectively. ine numner in parentneses arc 
degrees of freedom. 
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To sum up, we report in Table (6.7) the test results from cointegation and causality. The 
Johansen procedures causality tests are based on the Johansen cointegrating vectors; in other 
cases we report the results of causality based either on Engle-Granger (if the procedure detects 
cointegration) or the first difference VAR-based tests. As can be seen, while the evidence from 
this chapter largely supports the view that there is a stable, long-term equilibrium relationship 
between the evolution of stock market development and the evolution of economic growth, it 
provides no support for the view that the stock market is a leading sector in the process of 
Jordan's economic development. Most of the evidence, however, supports the view that the 
relation between stock market development and economic growth in Jordan is bi-directional. 
Higher development in the stock market causes higher real economic growth. High economic 
growth in turn promotes development in the stock market. As income increases, its cyclical 
component such as the volume of savings should impact stock market development. This 
result may reflect the fact that the open stock market to both domestic and foreign investors 
may be beneficial to economic growth. 
Table 6.7: Summary Results, Contegration and Causality 
Tests using Engle-Granger Procedure Tests using Johansen Procedure 
Stock Market Development 
Indicators Cointegration 
Does Market 
Causes 
Growth? 
Does Growth 
Causes 
Market? 
Cointegration 
Does Market 
Causes 
Growth? 
Does Growth 
Causes 
Market 
Market Capitalisation 
Ratio 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Turnover Ratio Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Value Traded Ratio Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Turnover-Volatility Ratio Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Traded-Volatility Ratio Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Volatility NO NO Yes Yes Yes No 
6.6 Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have attempted to investigate empirically the long-run causality between 
stock market development and economic growth in Jordan. In particular, we have attempted to 
answer the following question: is the stock market a leading sector in the process of economic 
development of Jordan? Or is it a two-way causation? The causality issue was investigated 
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using recent time-series techniques and utilising six proxies of stock market development that 
are most commonly used by academics and practitioners. 
Following Granger (1988), Sims et al, (1990), and Toda and Phillips (1993), since 
cointegration has implications for the way causality testing is conducted, the causality tests are 
performed within a framework based on unit-root testing and cointegration. The advantage of 
cointegration is the identification of a stable long-term relationship between the stock market 
development indicators and economic growth, which could be interesting from a theoretical 
point of view. The cointegration tests used are based on both the Engle-Granger (1987) two- 
step procedure and the Johansen (1988) maximum-likelihood method. Where we found the 
cointegration, we used cointegration vector obtained from each technique in error-correction 
model (ECM) based causality tests, and then we performed two types of causality test, 
depending on the sources of causation. The first type related to the joint significance of lagged 
dynamic terms and the second was a test of statistical significance of the cointegrating vector 
terms. 
The evidence presented in both Engle-Granger and Johansen cointegration tests support the 
view that there is a short- and long-run relationship between stock market development and 
economic growth in Jordan. These findings are consistent with the theoretical predictions of 
both the finance-growth literature and endogenous growth literatures. On the other hand, there 
was no evidence to support the view that the stock market in Jordan is a leading sector in the 
process of the country's economic development. In particular, the evidence seems to favour 
the conclusion that the relationship between stock market development and economic growth 
is bi-directional. This implies that there is a feedback effect between stock market 
development and economic growth in Jordan. This important finding is highly consistent with 
the views of Patrick (1966) and St Hill (1992), as well as with a number of endogenous growth 
models such as those of Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Berthelemy and Varoudakis 
(1996), Greenwood and Smith (1997) and Boyd and Smith (1998), which predict a two-way 
causality between financial development and economic growth. 
Overall, the findings in this chapter have important policy implications for Jordan and other 
developing countries that have a similar economic structure. The evidence indicates that 
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economic development plays an important role in stock market development. Thus, it is 
important to liberalise the economy when undertaking financial liberalisation, and in order to 
promote the development of the stock market, Jordan can encourage economic growth by 
means of the appropriate policies. 
220 
Chapter VII 
Microeconomic Evidence: Stock Market Development 
and Firms Growth 
7.1 Introduction 
In the last two chapters we have examined the relationship between the level of stock 
market development and its links with macroeconomic out-turns for the economic growth 
process in Jordan. In this chapter we investigate the interaction between stock market 
development and economic growth in Jordan using micro data. Specifically, we provide a 
firm-level test of the hypothesis that the development of the stock market is an important 
determinant of economic growth in Jordan. This is the first study which attempts to 
examine empirically the effect of stock market development on economic growth using 
firm-level data within a specific country experience. Firm-level analysis is important 
because in an environment with uncertainty and market imperfections, the manner in 
which the firm finances its operation influences and is affected by the level and efficiency 
of its investment. By mitigating the adverse consequences of market imperfection', 
financial markets can potentially influence the dynamics of growth at the micro level. 
Financial markets can mitigate these problems by performing various functions. They 
aggregate and mobilise capital, enhance liquidity, provide risk pooling and sharing 
services, assess and select projects and management through producing information, and 
monitor inside decision making. 
In this chapter we construct a simple empirical model in which stock market development 
affects firm growth through enhancing productivity growth within the firm. Particularly, 
utilising corporate financial theory, we argue that stock markets provide risk sharing, 
enhance liquidity, and promote responsible governance and control through providing 
These capital market imperfections can take many forms. Technological and incentive frictions can exist, 
which prevent individuals from having access to economic of scale, increase the costs of acquiring 
information, increase asymmetric information and create incomplete contracts. In addition, restriction on 
outside investors with a variety of mechanisms for monitoring inside decision makers. 
This, in turn, facilitates technological innovations and improves the economic efficiency 
with which the firm utilises its resources, and therefore, contributes to higher productivity 
growth`. In our empirical model, we assume that the degree to which firms benefit from 
stock market functions depends on how much the firm relies on the stock market to finance 
its investment. Thus, our empirical model predicts that firms which rely more on equity 
finance will benefit more from stock market development. 
Empirically, the particular questions we attempt to address in this chapter are as follows. 
Do firms that depend heavily on equity finance grow at a faster rate than firms that do not 
depend heavily on equity finance when the stock market becomes more developed? Are 
the banks or the stock market better at providing financial services and promoting the 
growth of Jordanian firms, or is the overall financial development critically important in 
influencing the firms' growth? Are the banking sector and the stock market complements 
in providing financial services to the corporate sector in Jordan? Do developments within 
the banking sector and the stock market have different effects on the growth of large and 
small firms? 
Our analysis is carried out with the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) for panel 
data utilising instrumental variables. One advantage of using panel data over congenital 
cross-sectional or time-series data sets is that it usually gives a large number of 
observations, which increases the degrees of freedom and reduces the multicollinearity 
among explanatory variables, hence improving the efficiency of econometric estimates3. 
Furthermore, it is generally argued that the production function may actually differ across 
firms. It is empirically difficult for single cross-sectional approach to allow for such 
differences in the production function. Thus, the most important advantage in using the 
panel data approach is that it allows for the difference in the production function across 
firms in the form of unobservable individual `firm effects". 
international capital flows, lack of international market integration and high transaction costs will effect the 
efficient allocation of capital. 
2 In addition, stock market development also directly impacts on the rate of physical capital accumulation. 
3 For more detailed discussion see for example Hsiao (1985,1986); Appelpe et al., (1992); Ahn and 
Schmidt 
(1999); and Baltagi (2000). 
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We use two GMM dynamic panel estimators. These estimators specifically address the 
econometric problems induced by firm specific effects and predetermined explanatory 
variables (endogeneity). The fact that the model includes fixed effects, lag dependent 
variables and the possibility of predetermined explanatory variables implies endogeneity 
and autocorrelation. Moreover, using this type of data may give rise to heteroscedasticity. 
However, GMM enables consistent estimation in spite of heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation (Stock 2001), which would blur the results if a method like least squares, 
fixed or within estimators was used (Johnston and Dinardo, 1997; Ahn and Schmidt, 1999; 
Nerlove, 2000; Blundell, et al., 2000; and Andrews and Lu, 2001). Furthermore, GMM is 
particularly suitable for panels containing many firms and a small number of time periods 
(Bond, et al., 1999). 
In order to address the possible omitted variable bias created by firm-specific effects in the 
first GNIM dynamic panel estimator we difference the regression equation. Thus, we take 
differences to eliminate firm-specific effects and thereby remove variable bias. Then, we 
instrument the right-hand side variables (the differenced values) of the original regressors 
using lagged values of original regressors (measured in levels) as instruments. This last 
step removes the inconsistency arising from simultaneity bias. 
The problem with the difference estimator is that it generally suffers from weak 
instruments, especially, lagged values of the levels of the original regressors which 
frequently make weak instruments for the differenced values of the regressors used in 
panel equations. This shortcoming may induce large biases in finite samples and poor 
precision (Blundell and Bond, 1998a). To mitigate this problem, we use a system GMM 
estimator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998b). This 
estimator controls for the presence of unobserved firm-specific effects and for the 
endogeneity of the current-dated explanatory variables. Besides the difference panel 
equations where the instruments are lagged levels of the original regressors, this estimator 
simultaneously estimates the original levels equation where the instruments are lagged 
values of the differenced regressors. Thus, to investigate our issues in this chapter, we use 
4 
the GMM dynamic panel technique with both a difference and a system estimator. 
4 The GMM estimates that we report are computed using DPD99 
for OX (see Doornik, et al., 1999). 
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The sequence of the rest of the chapter is as follows. Section 7.2 provides a review of the 
previous empirical literature. Section 7.3 outlines the theoretical framework. Section 7.4 
describes the empirical model and the hypotheses to be investigated. Section 7.5 provides a 
detailed description of the econometric methods which will be used to estimate the model. 
Section 7.6 presents the data. Section 7.7 presents empirical results based on the estimation 
of a dynamic panel data model. Section 7.8 provides a conclusion to this chapter. 
7.2 Previous Empirical Literature 
Empirical literature on the relationship between stock market development and firms' 
growth has been rather limited. The lack of empirical literature in this field may be 
attributed to the unavailability of sufficient data at the firm level (especially for developing 
countries). Nevertheless, recently some research has been conducted. Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1998,2000) provide micro-level support for the proposition that financial 
development facilitates economic growth using firm-level data from developed and 
developing countries. In their work they used firm-level data and they focused on 
international (between-country) differences rather than on national, between-firm 
differences. Particularly, for each firm in their sample they estimate a financial planning 
model to obtain the maximum growth rate (defined as sales growth) the firm could attain 
without access to long-term finance (long-term debt plus equity). Then they estimate how 
the proportion of firms in each country whose rate of growth exceeds the predicted rate 
depends on the development of the stock market and the banking sector. In particular, they 
test the hypothesis that the more developed the market, the greater the proportion of firms 
able to grow at rates in excess of the predicted rate. 
Using two indicators for stock market development, the ratio of market capitalisation to 
GDP and turnover ratio, and one indicator for banking sector 
development, the ratio of 
asset deposit banks to GDP, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic run cross-country 
regressions and find that there is a strong relationship 
between the development of 
financial markets and banks and the proportion of firms growing at rates requiring 
long- 
term external financing. They concluded that firms 
in countries that have easier access to 
external funds (e. g. active stock markets and high ratings 
for compliance with legal norms) 
tend to grow faster. 
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Rajan and Zingales (1998) have also investigated the relationship between financial 
development and industry growth. In particular, they test whether industries that depend on 
external finance for their growth are relatively "better off' in economies with well- 
developed financial markets. They identify an industry's need for external finance from 
data on U. S industries and then they examine whether the industries that are more 
dependent on external finance grow faster in countries that initially have better developed 
financial markets and institutions. Using the sum of the ratio of total market capitalisation 
to GDP and the ratio of domestic credit to GDP as an indicator for financial development, 
Rajan and Zingales run cross-sectional regressions on a panel data consisting of 42 
developed and developing countries and 36 US industries throughout the 1980s. They find 
that industries which rely more heavily on external finance grow faster in countries with a 
better-developed financial system. They also find that the intensity of investment in 
industries dependent on external finance is disproportionately higher in countries with 
more developed financial markets. 
Based on the methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1998) and their data set, Beck and 
Levine (2000) examined the following issues in addition to Rajan and Zingales hypothesis. 
They investigated whether externally dependent industries grow faster in bank-based or 
market-based financial systems or whether it is the overall level of financial development 
that enhances the growth of externally dependent industries. They also examined whether 
bank-based or market-based financial systems are better at fostering new firm formation or 
existing firm expansion, or whether it is the overall level of financial development that is 
critical for the emergences of new firms and the expansion of existing ones. Using the 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) data on a panel of 42 countries (developed and developing 
countries) and 36 US industries over the 1980s, they find evidence that confirm the results 
obtained by Rajan and Zingales (1998); industries that rely heavily on external finance 
grow faster in countries with a better-developed financial system. They also find that 
industries that depend heavily on external finance do not grow faster in either bank-based 
or market-based financial systems; they grow faster in economies with higher levels of 
overall financial development. Furthermore, there is not a robust relationship between the 
degree of bank-based or market-based financial systems in a country and the rate of new 
firm formation or existing firm expansion. Overall financial development explains cross- 
country variation in the growth in the number of establishments. 
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The work of Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Beck and Levine (2000), however, suffer from 
several shortcomings in their empirical method that we address in this chapter. First, they 
do not distinguish between external debt and equity finance. We argue that different firms 
may be dependent on different types of finance. The theories of corporate finance suggest 
that banking finance will be more prevalent in industries requiring active screening and 
monitoring and stock market finance high risk industries. In contrast, in our methodology 
we split external finance into bank and stock market dependence to distinguish between 
firms that are susceptible to information asymmetries and to risk. Second, they used 
aggregate industry data rather than firm-specific data and we use firm specific data. Third, 
their test is based on the unrealistic assumption that financial dependence of U. S industries 
is a good proxy for the demand for external funds in other countries. It might be argued 
that the amount of cash flow produced by firms in a certain industry is likely to be 
dissimilar worldwide. In addition, the stage of a product cycle and the demand for external 
funds that arise as a result of technological shocks in other countries, especially developing 
countries, are different to those of corresponding U. S industries. In contrast, we base our 
studs' on the information in relation to external need (debt and equity finance) of each 
individual firm in the sample. Finally, another important shortcoming in these works is that 
by basing analysis on aggregate industry data they assume that all the firms in each 
industry are traded in the stock markets and may benefit from financial services provided 
by stock markets5. Actually this is not true, especially in developing countries in which few 
firms are listed and traded in the stock markets. To address this shortcoming, we base our 
work on a sample of industrial firms listed in the stock market. 
In another related study Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) have examined the 
amount and maturity of the debt of firms in 30 countries during the period 1980-91, they 
related this to turnover on stock markets and bank assets to GDP ratios. They find that 
stock market turnover is associated with more long-term debt amongst large but not small 
firms. They also find that bank sector development is associated with more long-term debt 
of small but not large firms. Their results are consistent with the argument that banks are 
particularly important in the financing of small firms and the stock market in the financing 
of large firms. Carlin and Mayer (1999) used data from 27 industries in 20 OECD 
5 To benefit from financial services provided by stock market, the firm should actually be traded in the 
market. 
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countries over the period 1970-1995. They find that equity financed industries tend to grow 
faster, carry out more R&D, and employ higher skilled workers in countries with relatively 
better accounting standards. Unlike equity-financed industries, Carlin and Mayer find that 
bank-financed industries grow more slowly in countries with a developed financial 
infrastructure and tend to undertake less R&D. Finally, Love (2000) studies the 
relationship between financial development and financial constraints by using a firm level 
data for 40 countries. He finds a strong negative relationship between the sensitivity of 
investment to the availability of internal funds and an indicator of financial market 
development, and concludes that financial development reduces the effect of financing 
constraints on investment. His result provides evidence for the hypothesis that financial 
development reduces imperfections i. e., informational asymmetries in financial markets 
which leads to an improvement in the allocation of capital and ultimately to a higher level 
of growth. 6 
In addition to what we have mentioned above, there are a number of common 
shortcomings that can be seen in previous work in this area that we will address in this 
chapter. First, all these studies perform Barro-type reduced form growth regressions (single 
cross-country regressions). They have a single set of data points for each country 
averaging, ten or five years of data into a single data point. This method loses information 
that could be country-specific, firm specific, and/or time-specific. Furthermore, as we have 
mentioned in detail in Chapter V, this method suffers from measurement, statistical and 
conceptual problems. In terms of measurement problems, since they have firms data for 
both the developing and developed countries which is collected from different sources, 
officials in different parts of the world some times define, collect, and measure variables 
very differently, and hence, their data set has measurement inconsistencies across 
countries. Thus, we should interpret the coefficients from their analysis very cautiously. 
When averaging over long periods many changes are occurring simultaneously: countries 
change policies, economic experience business cycles, and governments rise and fall. 
Thus, aggregation may blur important events that may affect firms' behaviour differently 
across countries. Furthermore, all previous studies by running single cross-country 
regressions are based on the assumption that firms across countries have identical 
6 In the most recent study in this field, Wurgler (2000) uses industrial data for 65-country and runs cross- 
country regressions, he finds that the development of financial markets, as measured by the size of the 
domestic stock and credit markets relative to GDP, are associated with a better allocation of capital. 
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production functions. This assumption is surely wrong. It is generally felt that production 
function of firms may actually differ across countries, and more than that it may differ 
across firms within a country. In contrast, we address these shortcomings by focusing only 
on one country's experience, that of Jordan, using a panel data analysis framework. 
Secondly, none of these studies have used a formal model to links firm growth to financial 
market development whilst taking into account other important elements of firm growth 
such as labour and capital growth, ownership structure and competition in product markets. 
In this study we propose and implement a simple plausible empirical model taking into 
account, in addition to the financial market development effects, other important factors 
that may affect a firm's growth. Thirdly, none of the previous literature examines whether 
banking sector and stock market development have different effects on firms' growth 
depending on their size. Finally, most of these studies analyse the impact of financial 
development on growth without taking into account the possible endogeneity of the level 
of financial development. Financial markets may develop in anticipation of the financial 
needs of the industries or the firms. In this study, we address this shortcoming by used the 
more recent econometric methods (GMM dynamic panel techniques) to estimate the 
dynamic panel model used here that controls for simultaneity bias and reverse causality. 
7.3 Theoretical Framework 
The corporate finance theory provides a rich analytical framework illuminating the links 
between investment and finance at the micro-level. In these models, this link is arising as a 
consequence of market and contractual imperfections. Thus, financial markets and 
institutions arise to mitigate informational problems and transaction frictions. To do this, 
financial markets perform various functions. They aggregate and mobilise capital, enhance 
liquidity, provide risk sharing and pooling, assess and select projects and management 
through producing information, and monitoring inside decisions making. 
The financial markets play a key role in mobilising and allocating resources to their 
efficient use. They aggregate small savings of numerous investors for use by agents with 
entrepreneurial and managerial talents who need funds for large-scale capital investment. 
In doing so, they also provide investors as well as entrepreneurs, with risk-pooling and 
sharing facilities. By enhancing capital mobilisation and providing risk pooling and 
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sharing, financial markets enable the undertaking of risky technological innovations and 
therefore, improve firm productivity growth. 
As we have mentioned in Chapter IV, numerous theoretical studies directly address the 
link between financial markets and firms' technological choices. In brief, Bencivenga et 
al., (1995,1996) argue that an especial feature of industrial development is the adoption of 
technologies that require large-scale illiquid capital investment. Financial markets that 
provide risk sharing and liquidity possibilities make it economically feasible to implement 
such technologies. Bencivenga and Smith (1991) argue that financial markets promote 
growth as a means for reducing liquidity risk, thereby increasing funds available for 
productive capital. Saint-Paul (1992) presents a model in which financial markets interact 
with the technological choice of the firm in that financial markets allow riskier but more 
productive technologies, and technological choice, in turn, affects the viability of financial 
markets. Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) argue that financial intermediates influence 
technological choice through their risk sharing and pooling services. They facilitate high- 
yield investments and thereby growth by pooling idiosyncratic investment risks across a 
large number of investors. Levine (1991), Fulgieri and Rovelli (1998), and others argue 
that greater liquidity of stock markets will induce a shift to long-term, higher-return 
technologies. Finally, Boyd and Smith (1998) assert that the absence of stock markets 
would prevent firms from employing their most productive capital technologies. 
From above, we can conclude that financial markets and technology are strategically 
complementary in that both are instruments for risk sharing and liquidity providing. In 
conditions where stock markets provide limited liquidity and poor risk sharing services, 
diversification and liquidity occur through the choice of short term investment projects that 
uses inferior technologies which are less specialised and less productive. 
Another important function of financial markets is facilitating responsible governance and 
control within firms. In a world of uncertainty and incomplete contacting, problems of 
imperfect information and moral hazard may prevent the first-best value-maximising 
investment behaviour. Investment and operations in the firm would be prone to agency 
problems in which agents engage in value destroying behaviour. The governance role of 
financial markets constitutes information production and monitoring that mitigate the 
consequence of costly information and moral hazard. To the extent that financial markets 
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mitigate such problems, they would have an effect on a firm's economic efficiency? and 
therefore productivity growths. 
Stock markets have a vital role in processing information about firms (Grossman 1976; 
Grossman and Stiglitiz, 1980; Holmstrom and Tirol, 1993; Subrahmanyam and Titman, 
1999; Morck, et al., 2000; Stulz, 2000; Pagano and Zingales, 2000; Morck, et al., 2000; 
and others). Trading activity among participants produces information which can be 
conveyed through price signals. This information production role is very important for 
entrepreneurs in augmenting their understanding of the market's environment. It provides 
the knowledge about how investors evaluate both their own and the competitors' current 
decisions, future plans and managerial performance (Dow and Gorton, 1997; and 
Subrahmanyarn and Titman, 1999) 9. It enhances entrepreneurs' knowledge about efficient 
firms and their ability to develop more efficient production methods. Thus, the link 
between this information function and firm productivity growth is straightforward: simply 
put, developed stock markets that generate better information enable firms to make better 
investment decisions. 
It is important to note here that, financial institutions such as banks and other lending 
institutions also provide an information production function. The information created by 
these institutions, however, is not as widely disseminated and the firms are not accessed as 
continuously and efficiently as they are when traded in stock markets. Most of the 
information collected by banks remains as private assets. On the contrary, stock markets 
evaluate firms on a daily basis, aggregate information across the board and provide it 
freely available to the public. Thus, from this point of view, stock markets are certainly 
more significant than banks. 
Stock markets and institutions also may impact on firms' productivity growth through their 
governance function. As is well known, contractual relationships are prone to severe 
agency problems due to conflicts of interest among stakeholders in the 
firms, including 
7 Economic efficiency is defined as the degree to which the firm's observed behavioural goal 
diverges from 
its optimum. 
8 See for example Lehmann (1997) and Stulz (2000). 
4 This information is also useful to creditors. It makes lending to a publicly quoted 
firm less risky and 
therefore reduces the costs of debt finance. As a result, the existence of an active stock market 
increases the 
ability of firms to obtain long-term credit at lower costs (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1996,1999). 
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those between management and shareholders that may result in sub-optimal managerial 
actions. Stock markets play an important function in controlling such sub-optimal 
behaviour. Stock markets can do this in a number of ways. First, they generate information 
to evaluate the quality of past managerial decisions (Dow and Gorton, 1997). Second, 
information in stock prices allows managerial incentive schemes (Holmstrom and Tirol, 
1993). Third, the threat of takeover through the facilitation of stock markets mitigates 
managerial inefficiencies and create incentive for managers to work harder make better 
investments decisions to reduces the probability that their firms may take over in the 
future. Thus, stock markets can have an effect on firms' economic efficiency (through their 
governance role) by inducing agents (management) to perform as close to the value 
maximising first best in their investment and operational decisions. 
From all of the above we can conclude that the degree to which stock markets influence 
firm growth depends mainly on how effectively they carry out both its allocation and 
governance functions. A stock market that merely serves as a conduit of capital provision 
would not be effective in accelerating growth; equally important is the information 
production and control role. Capital mobilising and information production have a critical 
role in enhancing firm growth through impact on the productivity growth component; 
facilitation of risky technological advances and improving economic efficiency with which 
the firm utilises its resources. 
7.4 Empirical Model 
As we have mentioned before, the main objective of this chapter is to provide a micro-level 
test of the hypothesis that the development of the stock market is an important determinant 
of economic growth in Jordan. Utilising the theoretical framework provided above, in this 
section we propose and develop a new simple plausible empirical model for firm growth 
that incorporates the effects of financial markets in addition to other important factors that 
may affect firm growth. 
Following microeconomic growth theory, we postulate that the firm employs a bundle of 
resources or inputs to produce output, we base this on the traditional production function 
which consists of four variables: output (Y), capital (K), labour (L) and the total factor 
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productivity (A) which has two components: economic efficiency and the level of 
technological progress. The production function is defined as follows10: 
Yi, 
t = .f 
(K ,, r 
A;, 
r , 
L;., ) (7.1) 
where i and t denote firm and time subscript, respectively. Differentiating the above 
equation with respect to time we obtain: 
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where ß; K and ß; L are the elasticity of output with respect to capital (K) and labour (L), 
respectively. R1 reflects the total source of growth other than the contribution of capital 
and labour, which represents what is called growth in total factor productivity (TFP). 
Based on equation (7.3) one can distinguish between growth that follows from increases in 
total factor productivity and growth that arises from increases in the firm's factor stock. 
This later growth includes the standard factors of production, labour and capital. Factor 
productivity may change due to shifts in the underlying technology and changes in the 
economic efficiency of the production process. Consistent with the theoretical framework 
presented in the last section in which stock markets may effect firm growth mainly through 
facilitating risky technological advances and improving economic efficiency with which 
the firm utilise its resources, we extend the firm growth model (equation 7.3) to 
incorporate stock market effects and other elements by using the hypothesis that Ri, t can be 
10 The derivative here follows Barro (1998). 
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expressed as a function of the stock market factor (SMF;, t) and a vector of variable X; tl 
l 
Since the degree to which the firm benefits from the stock market is based on the degree of 
its presence in the stock market through raising equity, the stock market factor (SMF;, t) in 
total factor productivity growth will therefore be the interaction between the stock market 
development and the firm's dependence on equity finance. Thus, our hypothesis is based 
on the argument that firms that are heavily users of equity finance should benefit 
disproportionately more from greater stock market development than firms that are not 
heavy users of equity finance. 
That is to say R;, t can be expressed as follows: 
R., =f (SMF i, t'X. 
) (7.4) 
To be able to isolate the effects of the stock market effect, the X,, t vector should ideally 
consist of all other factors that affect firm productivity growth. For example, variables 
which measure competitive conditions, organisational influence, labour relation, labour 
market regulations, external network, managerial ability, firm strategy and ownership 
structure, may be important'2. However, due to data limitations at the firm level we include 
only three variables that may affect firm total productivity, growth: the age of the firm, the 
product market competition and the ownership structure. 
An effect that might affect productivity is related to learning by doing, which is supposed 
to be associated with the age of firm (Evan, 1987; Dune and Hughes, 1994; Heshmati, 
2000; and Li and Weinberg, 2000). An older firm is expected to become more productive 
over time if, for instance, it has improved its organisation and learned how to utilise the 
workers and the capital in the best possible way. On the other hand, an older firm might 
have become petrified in some sense or might not have as strong an incentive as a younger 
firm to invest in new technology (Brezis, et al., 1993). Moreover, due to vintage effects, a 
younger firm might be more productive if its capital stock is more modem than the capital 
stock of an older firm (Wolff, 1996). 
11 In fact, stock markets development may also have an impact on the rate of capital accumulation (see 
for 
example Lehmann, 1997). 
12 For more detailed discussion about these factors see for example Storey (1994), Delmar (1997), Davidsson 
and Henrekson (2000), and Loof and Heshmati (2000). 
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The belief that competition improves company productivity is widespread. According to 
Nickell, et al., (1997) there are two direct explanations for this influence of competition on 
the productivity performance of the firms. Firstly, in a competitive environment it is easier 
for owners or the market to monitor managers 13. Secondly, more competition will raise the 
probability of bankruptcy at any given level of managerial effort. So, managers will work 
harder to avoid this outcome. In addition, competition can encourages productivity growth 
by increase the incentives to invest in productivity enhancing technology14. A number of 
empirical studies have shed positive light on the impact of competition on the productivity 
performance of the firms. Nickell (1996) finds that productivity growth in companies is 
positively correlated with the number of their competitors and negatively correlated with 
the average level of rents which they generate. Nickell, et al., (1997) also find that average 
rents normalised on value added (an inverse measure of competition) are negatively related 
to total factor productivity growth15. Here, following Nickell, et al., (1997) we use ex-post 
rents (profits less capital costs) normalised on value added as an inverse measure of 
competition' 6 
Finally, another important factor that may influence the firm's productivity is its ownership 
structure. It is argued that managers may be under greater pressure to perform well when 
there is a significant major shareholder than when the shareholdings are very widely 
dispersed (Mayer, 1996; and Carlin and Mayer, 1999). Thus, in the presence of dispersed 
shareholders there is little incentive and power for any one shareholder to control 
managers. Larger ownership stakes also imply that owners can internalise more of the 
returns to monitoring and thereby this tends to encourage monitoring. However, empirical 
studies so far have presented mixed results related to the effect of ownership concentration 
on firm's performance. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find no significant correlation between 
ownership concentration and accounting profit rates for 511 large corporations in USA. 
13 This view also mentioned by Glen, et al., (2000). 
la Hay and Liu (1997) and Roberts and Tybout (1996) provide empirical evidence show that increased 
competition leads to increased technical efficiency. In addition, Brown and Earle (2000,2001) provide 
evidence from panel data on 14,961 Russian enterprises that product market competition has strong positive 
effects on total factor productivity. 
15 Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999), however, find that market share and industry concentration have no effect on 
the firms' productivity growth. 
16 Other measure of competition which widely used in empirical studies is concentration ratio. This measure, 
however, does not convey adequate information about the intensity of competition in the economy (Glen, et 
al., 2000). It may be a high concentration ratio in an industry and yet competition may be intense between 
oligopolistic firms over market share, new products, design, sales, ect. Concentration ratio also does not take 
in consideration foreign competitors (Nickell, et al., 1997). 
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McConnell and Servaes (1990) find in a sample of more than 1,000 firms that corporate 
performance, as measured by Tobin's Q, is positively correlated with the levels of 
ownership concentration. More recently, Xu and Wang (1997) find that ownership 
concentration has significant, positive effects on the performance of publicly listed 
companies in China. Claessens and Djankov (1999a, 1999b) used data on recently 
privatised firms in the Czech Republic. They find that firms with concentrated ownership, 
foreign ownership and ownership by non-bank investment funds are more profitable and 
have higher labour productivity. 
Theoretically, both of the schools can find their roots in this literature. Fama (1980), for 
example, argues that if a firm is viewed as a set of contracts, ownership of the firm is an 
irrelevant concept. A properly functioning managerial labour market may discipline 
managers and solve incentive problems caused by the separation between ownership and 
control. Burkhart et al., (1996) and Shleifer and Vishny (1995) argue that concentrations of 
ownership may reduce incentives and create conflicts between majority and minority 
investors. Heinrich (2000) argues that large share ownership stakes imply that ownership 
portfolios are less well diversified and that owners are more exposed to firm-specific effect 
risk. This effect tends to encourage owners to shift firm risk towards the firm's manager 
and hence discourages owners from monitoring. On the other hand, economists argue that 
ownership structure may matter. For example, Grossman and Hart (1980) show that if a 
firm's ownership is widely dispersed, no shareholder has adequate incentives to monitor 
the management closely. Finally, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) develop a model to 
demonstrate that a certain degree of ownership concentration is desired in order for the 
takeover market to work more effectively. They also believe that large shareholders may 
help reduce the free-rider problem for small investors and hence increase corporate control. 
Thus, our basic statistical model used to test the impact of the stock market development 
on the firm's growth is a dynamic panel data model specified as follows: 
Y1, t = Yi yj, t-i+ y2GKi't+73GL<<+74 
SMF,, 
t+y5AGEIt+y6COMit 
+ y7CR; t+ ai + at + E< < 
(7.5) 
where yi, t is firm i's growth rate of real value added at time t. Value added is 
defined as 
operating profits after depreciation plus wages and interest payments. GKi, t and GL;, t are 
the growth rate of real capital stock and the number of employees, respectively. The capital 
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stock is defined as the book value of total assets. The number of employees is used because 
data does not allow us to use a more precise definition (e. g., total working hours). SMF;, t is 
the stock market factor measured by multiplying the dependence on equity finance for 
firm i at time t with the stock market development indicator at time t. A firm's dependence 
on equity finance is defined as the proportion of the total firm's investment expenditure 
that has been financed by new equity issues. AGE;, t is defined as the firm age. COM,, t is the 
inverse competition indicator, defined as the ratio of ex-post rent (profit minus capital cost) 
to value added. CR;, 2 is the ownership concentration ratio, measured by the percentage of 
shares controlled by large shareholders who own 10 percent or more of the firm. of is an 
unobserved firm specific effect and at captures any common period specific effects. El, t is 
the error term, represents those effects which cannot be controlled by the firm, such as 
business cycle, quality and access to labour, labour market conflicts, measurement errors in 
the independent variable, and other explanatory variables that have been omitted17. It is 
assumed to be independently and identical normally distributed with zero mean and 
constant variance, e. = iidN(0, U2)) . Absence of serial correlation is assisted by the 
inclusion of dynamics in the form of a lagged dependent variable. The literature on lagged 
dependent variable is vast and varied; some of the most important articles are those by Lee 
et al., (1996) and Islam (1995). Following Islam (1995) we included the lag (one-year) of 
the dependent variable in our model to capture the fact that whenever factors of production 
are changed it typically takes some time for output to reach its new long-run level. For 
example, if new capital goods are purchased it may take a considerable time before the 
machines are fully effective. 
As mentioned before, the main objective of this chapter is to test the hypothesis that firms 
that are heavily dependent on equity finance, with more development in the stock market, 
grow faster than firms that are not heavily dependent on equity finance. Thus, our 
17 The basic assumption of the panel models is that, conditional on the observed explanatory variables, the 
effect of all omitted variables are driven by three types of variables: individual time invariant, period 
individual-invariant, and individual time-varying variables. The individual time-invariant variables are 
variables that are the same for a given cross-sectional unit through time but vary across-sectional units. The 
period individual-invariant variables are variables that are the same for all cross sectional units at any given 
point in time but that vary through time. The individual time-varying variables are variables that vary across- 
sectional units at a given point in time and also exhibit variations through time. Thus, the residual consists of 
three components; a;, represents the effects of the omitted variables that are specific to individual cross- 
sectional units but stay constant over time, a1 represents the effect of those omitted variables that are specific 
to each time period but are constant for all cross-sectional units and E;,, represents the effects of the omitted 
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explanatory variable whose influences we are interested in, is the interaction between a 
firm's dependence on equity finance and the stock market development indicator (SMF;, t). 
If the coefficient estimated of this variable enters positively and statistically significantly in 
the firm growth regression, this implies that firms that are more dependent on equity funds 
to finance their investment opportunity will be better off when the stock market becomes 
more developed. 
The stock market and the banking sector are important as direct sources of capital and 
mechanisms for monitoring that the investors have access to information about firms' 
activities. However, as Levine (1991) argues, capital raised through equity issues is long 
term, while the investor at short notice, without impacting the firm's projects, can liquidate 
shareslg. By contrast, if the firm finances with non-tradable, finite maturity debt held by 
banks, shocks to the banks may be transmitted on to the firm and force liquidation of long- 
term projects. Stock markets create a separation between the liquidity shocks of investors 
and the investment needs of firms, to the extent that the latter can take a longer-term view 
and invest more efficiently. Stiglitz (1991) also argues that capital raised through equity 
issues' has two related distinct advantage over debt. "Risk is shared with provider of 
capital, and there is no fixed obligation for repaying the funds. Thus, if times are bad, 
payments to the providers of capital are suspended. The firm will not face bankruptcy, and 
will not be forced to take the extreme measures intended to slave off bankruptcy. ... 
because risks are shared between the entrepreneur and the provider of capital, the firm 
will not normally cut back production as much as it would with debt finance, if there is a 
downturn in the economy"(p. 7). Stock markets also may be better at providing capital for 
new ventures and financing risky technical innovations and may mobilise additional 
financial resources for investment (Pagano, 1993b; and Pagano and Zingales, 2000). Boyd 
and Smith (1998) show that stock markets might be act complement with debt markets by 
making them operate more efficiency through make debt capital issue cheaper. 
An alternative view is that managers who are constantly evaluated by the stock market tend 
to take the short-term view and, therefore, it is better that they obtain finance for long-term 
projects from the banking sector. Myers and Majluf (1984) in their model focus on the 
variables that are peculiar to both the individual units and time periods which are characterised by an 
independently identically distributed random variable with mean zero and constant variance. 
18 See Chapter IV for a more detailed discussion. 
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distinction between external equity and debt finance. They argue that because debt finance 
is less sensitive to asymmetries of information between the firm and investors, it will be 
preferred to equity financing when such asymmetries are significant. In addition to the 
main objective of this chapter we can examine an important issue; whether the stock 
market and banking sector is a substitute or a complement in providing financial services 
to Jordanian firms and whether the banking sector or the stock market is better at 
facilitating the firms' growth. 
In order to examine the above issue, we require a specification to account for the effect of 
banking sector development. Consequently, we added to the basic regression another 
financial variable (DMF;, t), measured by multiplying the dependence on debt finance for 
firm i at time t by the banking sector development indicator at time t. A firm's dependence 
on debt finance is defined as the proportion of the total firm's investment expenditure that 
has been financed by debt (short and long-term debt). If the coefficient estimated for the 
interaction of equity dependence and the stock market development is still significant after 
including the new financial variable (DMF;, t), this implies that the stock market and the 
banking sector are complementary rather than substitutes providing different financial 
services to the Jordanian corporate sector. The magnitudes of the estimated coefficients of 
the two variables (the stock market and the debt market factors) provide us with an 
indicator about the importance of the stock market development compared with the 
banking sector development in fostering the firm's growth. 
It is likely that the stock market and the banking sector development have different effects 
on large and small firms. Griliches (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Laeven (2000) 
argue that the information constraints are likely to have a greater impact on small firms 
than on large firms, partly because large firms tend to be mature and have more credible 
relations with providers of firms. This theoretical approach implies that small firms are 
likely to be the most dependent on internal finance and the least on external finance. 
Changes in the development of financial markets are thus likely to have a more significant 
influence on the growth of larger firms. Another argument for size is that information 
asymmetries between insiders in a firm and the stock market are lower for large firms. 
Therefore, under this argument large firms are likely to be more dependent on equity 
finance and less dependent on debt finance (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Pagano and 
Zingales, 2000; Paranque, 2000; and Shin and Stulz, 2000). Thus, changes in stock markets 
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development are likely to have a more significant influence on larger firms' growth than on 
the growth of smaller firms. 
To investigate the hypothesises that the stock market and banking sector development may 
have different effects on large and small firms' growth; that the stock market development 
has greater affects on large firms than small firms and that the banking sector development 
effects small firms more than large firms, we create a dummy variable (DUM) equal to one 
if the firm is large and zero if small. The large firm is defined as the firm that has total 
assets above the median of the total assets of the firm sample. We interacted this dummy 
variable with the stock market factor (SMF) and the debt market factor (DMF). We then 
included these two new variables in the regression equation. If the estimated coefficients of 
DUM*SMF and/or DUM*DMF enter significantly in the regressions estimate, this implies 
that the stock market and banks have different effects on large and small firms. If the 
coefficient of DUM*SMF enters positive and significant, this implies that the stock market 
development impacts on large firms more than small firms that are dependent on equity 
finance. If the coefficient of DUM*DMF enters negative and significant, it implies that the 
banking sector development effects small firms more than large firms that are dependent 
on debt finance. 
7.5 Estimation Methods 
This section describes the two econometrics techniques that we use to estimates our 
dynamic panel data regressions. We use these techniques mainly to control the 
simultaneity biases that may arise from the joint determination of the financial markets 
development and firm's growth (endogeneity of the level of the financial market 
development) and also to elimina te any omitted variable bias induce by firm-specific 
effects. 
As well now known estimating dynamic panel regression models which contain many 
firms and a small number of time periods using the OLS estimator are not consistent 
because of the following econometric problems; the possible correlation between 
unobserved firm-specific effects and other explanatory variables, the potential correlation 
between the lagged endogenous variables and residuals and the possibility that explanatory 
variables are not exogenous. In panel data estimation, consistent estimates of coefficients 
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depend on the stochastic properties of the model. If the error term is orthogonal to the right 
hand side variables, an OLS estimator will be consistent. On the other hand if all 
explanatory variables are strictly exogenous, then a fixed effect estimator will be 
consistent. The equation model we estimate here contains unobservable firm fixed effects, 
which are correlated with explanatory variables as well as endogenous variables. Hence, 
the orthogonality conditions between the error terms and the variables are not likely to be 
met for an OLS or fixed effect estimator to produce consistent estimators (Blundell and 
Bond, 1998a, b-, and Nei-love, 2000). 
One can achieve the orthogonality conditions under certain circumstances through 
appropriate differencing of the equation. However, in our model we have a lagged 
dependent variable as well as possible endogenous variables as regressors. Therefore, the 
error terms in the differenced equation are correlated with the lagged dependent variable 
through contemporaneous terms in period t+j even if there was no unobserved firm or time 
fixed effects that correlate with the regressors. Neither the fixed effect estimator nor the 
OLS will produce consistent estimates. An instrumental variable estimator that can account 
for corrected fixed effects as well as account for the possibility of endogeneity of 
regressors is therefore needed. Chamberlian (1984) has proposed a generalised method of 
moment's (GMM) estimator that allows the regressors to be transformed to achieve 
orthogonality between them and error terms'9 . 
While the GMM estimator can account for 
firm heterogeneity, it does not account for the endogeneity of regressors. The dynamic 
growth effects may introduce autoregression in error structure. Arellano and Bond (1991) 
have proposed a dynamic panel estimator that optimally exploits the linear moment 
restrictions implied by the dynamic panel model we use here. This method uses all past 
values of endogenous regressors as well as lagged values of all strictly exogenous 
regressors as instruments20. Thus we use this method to estimate equation (7.5). 
Notice that the error term in our model, equation (7.5), has three components: unobserved 
firm specific effects a;, time-specific effects at, and the standard innovation error term Ei, t. 
In order to get consistent estimators Arellano and Bond (1991) propose to first-difference 
19 For full theoretical and empirical details about Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation see 
Matyas (1999). 
20 When the explanatory variables are predetermined but not strictly exogenous, only lagged values of these 
variables are valid instruments. If these variables are strictly exogenous, the current and lagged values are 
valid instruments. 
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the regression equation to eliminate the unobserved firm fixed effects. Thus, the regression 
equation after taking the first difference of equation (8.5) can be written as: 
Ay, = Yº Ayi' º+ y2 AGK;., + Y3 AGL', + Y4 ASTVIF, + y5 A AGE1 + Y6 ACOMT t+ 
Y7 4CRH F-i't (7.6) 
GMM methods are used to estimate the parameters in equation (7.6). Given that the F;, t's 
are serially uncorrelated, the GMM is the most efficient one within the class of 
instrumental variable estimators (Honore and Hu, 2000). In estimating (7.6), Yi, t-2 or higher 
lagged values (wherever feasible) are valid instrumental variables. Thus typically the 
coefficient estimates of the parameter vector 0= (y,,... y7) are given by: 
A 
Bcnlnl = (X' wa, 1 w' 
X)-'(X" wan wý Ay) (7.7) 
where X is the vector of the first differenced explanatory variables, w is the matrix of 
instrumental variables, an is the weighting matrix, and Ay is the (NT X 1) vector of the first 
differences of firm's growth rates. Under the assumptions that there is no serial correlation 
in the error term E and that the explanatory variables are weakly exogenous, in the sense 
that they are assumed to be uncorrelated with future realisations of error the term, the 
following moment conditions apply to the lagged dependent variable and set of 
explanatory variables: 
E yý, t-s 
( Eý, t - Ei, t-I 
)1 =0 fors _ 
2; t=3,..., T (7.8) 
E 1Xi, I-s 
( Eý, ý - Eý, ý-z 
)ý =0 fors >_ 2; t=3,..., T (7.9) 
Using these moment conditions, Arellano and Bond (1991) propose a two-step GMM 
estimator using an estimated variance-covariance matrix formed from the residuals of a 
preliminary consistent estimate of O. In other words, in the one-step they assumed that the 
error terms are independent and homoscedastic across firms and over time. In the two-step, 
they used the residuals obtained from the one-step to construct a consistent estimate of the 
variance-covariance matrix, thus relaxing the assumption of independence and 
homoscedasticity. Thus, two different choices for an result in two GMM estimators. The 
one-step estimator can be found by using: 
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IN 
an = -IWi hwi 
N; (7.10) 
where h is a T-2 square matrix with twos in the main diagonals, minus ones in the first 
subdiagonals, and zero otherwise. This matrix is given by: 
2 -1 p 
-1 2 ... p 
h; = h° = 
-1 
00 -1 2 
A two-step estimator is found by letting 
N -1 
an =-I wi Del De; hwl N 
(7.11) 
where De is the residuals from a consistent one-step estimator of Ay. We use the two-step 
estimator to estimate the coefficients of the firm's growth model and we will refer to this 
estimator as the difference estimator. 
Blundell and Bond (1998b) however, show that when the lagged dependent and the 
explanatory variables are persistent over time, lagged levels of these variables are weak 
instruments for the regression equation in differences. The instruments' weaknesses have 
repercussions on both the asymptotic variance and the small-sample performance of the 
difference estimator. As the variables' persistence increases, the asymptotic variance of 
the coefficients obtained with the difference estimator rises. Furthermore, according to 
Blundell et al., (2000) simulation studies suggest that the difference estimator has a large 
finite-sample bias and poor precision, especially with samples which have a small time 
series dimension. 
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To confront these econometric problems, we also use the GMM system estimator 
developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998b). This estimator 
combined the regression in differences with the regression in levels. The instruments for 
the regression in differences are the same as above i. e., the lagged levels of the 
corresponding variable, so that, the moment conditions in equations (7.8) and (7.9) apply 
to the first part of the system. The instruments for the regression in levels are the lagged 
differences of the corresponding variables. The latter are valid instruments under the 
following additional assumption: although there might be a correlation between the level of 
the right-hand side variables and the firm-specific effects in equation (7.5), there is no 
correlation between the differences of these variables and the firm-specific effects: 
E[y,., 
+E, 'a; 
]=E[_y, 
t+q'a; 
] and E[X, t+p'aj]=E[X, t+q'aj] 
for all p and q (7.12) 
Therefore, the following forms give the additional moment conditions for the second part 
of the system (the regression in levels)21 
(a, + £i. t 
)] =0 
E [(x=,, 
-s - 
xi,, 
N-1) 
(a; + st, t 
)] =0 
for s =1 (7.13) 
for s =1 (7.14) 
For this estimator (system of equations), in first differences and levels, the one-step uses 
the following weighting matrix: 
0 
h; 
hi D 
0 l; 
where hiD is the weighting matrix described above for the first differenced estimator, and It 
is an identity matrix with a dimension equal to the number of level equations observed for 
individual i. In both cases the corresponding two-step estimator uses equation (7.11). 
Thus, we will use the GMM system estimator to generate consistent and efficient 
estimators of the parameters of interest. However, the consistency of the GMM estimator 
21 Given that the lagged levels are used as instruments in the difference specification, only the most recent 
difference is used as an instrument in the level specification. Using other lagged differences would result 
in 
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depends on the assumption that the lagged value of the firm's value added growth and the 
other explanatory variables are valid instruments in the growth regression and that the error 
terms do not exhibit serial correlation. To address these issues we perform three tests 
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991); Arellano and Bover (1995); and Blundell and 
Bond (1998b). The first test examines the hypothesis that the error term is not serially 
correlated. In both the difference regression and the system difference-level regression we 
test whether the differenced error term is second-order serially correlated22. Under the null 
hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation, this test is distributed standard-normal. 
The second one is the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions23. This tests the overall 
validity of the instruments and for the GMM estimator in the first-differenced model this 
test statistic takes the following form: 
Sd =1-A el wi an w; De, N 
(7.15) 
where an is the optimal weight matrix as in (7.11) and Dej are the two-step residuals in 
differenced model. Under the null-hypothesis of validity of the instruments this test is 
distributed x2 with degrees of freedom calculated as the difference between the number of 
instruments and the number of regressors. For the system estimator, the same test is readily 
defined. 
The third test is the difference Sargan statistic, which tests the additional set of restrictions 
of the system estimator. This test is obtained as the difference between the first-difference 
and the system Sargan statistics. This statistic test is asymptotically distributed as x2 under 
the null-hypothesis of validity of the additional instruments. The degree of freedom of the 
difference Sargan test is given by the number of additional restrictions in the system 
estimator, which is given by the difference between the number of degrees of freedom of 
the system estimator and that of the difference estimator24. Failure to reject the null 
hypothesis of both tests gives support to our model specification. 
redundant moment conditions (Arellano and Bover, 1995). Increasing the number of moment conditions can 
lead to the instruments being weak, having low correlation with the variable they are instrumenting. 
22 By construction, if the error terms are not serially correlated, it is likely to be evidence of serial correlation 
in differences residuals, and no evidence of second order serial correlation in the differenced residuals 
(see 
Arellano and Bond, 1998). 
23 See Sargan (1958) and the development for GMM in Hasen (1982). 
24 Full details of these test procedures can be found in Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and 
Bover 
(1995). 
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7.6 Data 
This section provides the data sources, sample selection, variables measurement and 
summary statistical analysis. 
7.6.1 Data Sources and Sample Selection 
All our industrial firms' data set of publicly traded companies of the years 1988 to 1998 are 
obtained from the "Guide of the Publicly Held Corporations" published annually by the 
AFM since its establishment in 1978. Companies listed at the AFM are required to submit 
certain data and a copy of their annual reports to AFM. Data related to these companies are 
compiled from these reports, the AFM, and other resources, and then published in the 
"Guide" to present a close approximation of companies' annual overall operations. The 
purpose of the "Guide" is to provide information about these companies for those who are 
concerned, especially for investors at the AFM. 
In 1998, the "Guide" includes information about 175 companies listed in the AFM; out of 
them 90 are industrial companies. Industrial companies included in our sample must have 
information about the variables under investigation for the base year, and year +1. The 
base year is the year from which the variables under investigation are measured. Among 
the 90 industrial companies, we find that 56 companies satisfy this criterion every year 
during the period 1988 to 1998. Therefore, our sample company data set includes 56 
industrial companies over an 11-year period of time in a balanced panel with no missing 
values for the variables under investigation. It may be useful to note here that the industrial 
companies included in our sample are highly diversified and operating in a number of 
unrelated fields. 
To highlight the economic significance of the sample companies included, they accounted 
for about 14 percent of total investment in the Jordanian private sector as a whole and 
about 40 percent of total investment in the industrial sector for the period 1988-98. As a 
percentage of the gross domestic product, the total value added of these companies 
accounted for about 8.0 percent during the same period. As a percentage of industrial value 
added, which represents about 25 percent of the GDP, the total value added for our sample 
accounted for about 32 percent during the same period. Finally, the total market 
capitalisation of these companies accounted, on average, for about 23.4 percent of GDP; 
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about 31 percent of total market capitalisation and about 76 percent of market 
capitalisation of the industrial sector during the period 1988-98. 
7.6.2 Measurement and Data Summary Statistical Analysis 
The firm-specific variables are measured as follows. The firm's real growth rate is 
measured as the ratio of value added in year +1 adjusted for inflation (using the CPI) to the 
value added in year 0, minus one25. Similarly, the growth rate of capital expenditures is 
defined as the ratio of capital expenditures in year +1 adjusted for inflation to the capital 
expenditures in year 0, minus one. The growth rate of employment is measured as the ratio 
of the number of employees in year +1 to the number of employees in year 0, minus one. 
The ownership concentration ratio is measured by the percentage of shares controlled by 
large shareholders who own 10 percent or more of the firm. Firm age is defined as the last 
year for which we have data minus the year of establishment. 
Following Nickell (1997), we use ex-post rents normalised on value added as an inverse 
measure of competition. The theoretical assumption under this measurement is that 
monopoly rents generated by firms decrease with more competition in the market 
(competition is associated with lower levels of rents generated). Rents are defined as 
follows: profit before tax + depreciation + interest payments - (cost of capital x capital 
stock). The cost of capital is equal to rr +6+ ? gyp, where rr is the real interest rate (nominal 
interest rate on business loans minus the inflation rate), b is the rate of depreciation 
assumed to be constant at 4 percent26, p is the risk premium equal to the firm's market 
return less the short term interest rate (interest rate on three months JD certificates of 
deposits), X is a weight equal to equity/(equity + debt). 
Next, we have to define what we mean by equity and debt finance. A firm's dependence on 
equity finance is defined as the ratio of changes in the firm's paid-up capital emanating 
from changes in the number of shares outstanding as well as the price of shares to the 
capital expenditures. Alternatively, the dependence on equity finance can be defined as the 
share of investment that cannot be financed through internal finance (cash flows) and debt 
finance (capital expenditure minus cash flow from operations and debt divided by capital 
25 This is a standard method to measure growth rates. 26 4 percent depreciation used here because all Jordanian quoted companies follow the international 
accounting standards Committee (IASC) norms which is not more than 4 percent depreciations. 
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expenditure)''. The operating cash flow is defined as the earnings after tax, less dividend, 
plus depreciation. The debt finance is defined as the change in the firm's total liabilities28. 
The firm capital expenditure is defined as the change in total assets. Similarly, the 
dependence on debt finance is defined as the ratio of debt issues (short and long-term) to 
capital expenditures. 
As we have mentioned before, the degree to which the stock markets and banks influence 
growth depends on how effectively they carries out their mobilising, risk-sharing, liquidity 
and governance functions. Thus, to test our hypothesis, we need appropriate measures for 
these functions. While the perfect measures certainly do not exist, recent literature has 
developed indicators that proxy relatively well for the banking sector and the stock market 
development. In this chapter we use four indicators to measure the stock market 
development and one indicator to measure the banking sector development. It is important 
to note that each of these indicators has shortcomings and none of them directly measures 
the provision of financial markets functions. We therefore use a variety of measures to 
provide a richer picture than if a single indicator was used. The development of the stock 
market is measured by the following indicators: The market capitalisation ratio equals the 
value of listed shares divided by GDP, the total value of shares traded ratio equals the total 
of shares traded on the market exchange divided by GDP, the turnover ratio equals the 
value of total shares traded divided by the value of shares listed and the stock market 
volatility measured as an annualised standard deviation that is based on weekly market 
returns29. The banking sector development is measured by the value of credits to the 
private sector divided by GDP30. We include all of the above indicators in our regressions 
in logs instead of levels to allow for the nonlinearity in the relationship between financial 
development and growth illustrated by Levine et al., (2000) and Beck and Levine (2000). 
27 Both measures give us the same results. 
281t is well known that the firm can obtain capital to finance the investment by increasing its short-term 
liabilities, such as the amount it owes to its suppliers or to financial intermediates, or by increasing long-term 
liabilities, such as long-term debt. Therefore, the increases in the firm total liabilities represent the capital 
expenditures that are financed by debt (short- and long-term debt). 
29 In the last two empirical chapters (Chapter V and VI) we also use trading/volatility and turnover/volatility 
ratios, but we refrain from this chapter and thereafter chapter, since they give similar results as the value- 
traded and turnover ratios. 
30 We exclude other empirical measure of banking sector development i. e., total banking sector assets to 
GDP, from the empirical analysis in this chapter as well as in following empirical chapter because it has been 
insignificant in macroeconomic analysis (see Chapter V). 
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As we have mentioned earlier our explanatory variables we are interested in to test our 
issues are the interaction variables. Here we use mainly two types of interaction variables; 
namely, the stock market factor (SMF;, t) and the debt market factor (DMF;, t). The stock 
market factor for firm i at time t is measured by multiplying the dependence on equity 
finance for firm i at time t with the stock market development indicator at time t. Similarly, 
the debt market factor for firm i at time t is measured by multiplying the dependence on 
debt finance for firm i at time t with the banking sector development indicator at time t. 
Table (7.1) provides summary descriptive statistics of all our variable measures in this 
chapter over the period 1988-98. As can be seen be from the table, there is a large variance 
in the measurement of the firm-level characteristic variables31. It is interesting to see that 
our sample firms rely heavily on new issues of shares on the stock market to finance their 
investment. As can be seen from the table, equity finance contributes about 46.5 percent to 
the firms' total capital expenditures during the period 1988-1998. With regard to debt 
finance, it accounts for about 28.5 percent of the firms' total capital expenditures during 
the same period. The remaining 25 percent of firms' capital expenditures were financed 
internally. This evidence is not surprising and also not new. It is consistent with the fact, 
as we have shown in Chapter III that the new issues on the stock market have been 
important in financing a considerable proportion of the private investment in Jordan. These 
new issues represented about 23 percent of total private investment in the country during 
the period 1988-98. More importantly, it is also consistent with the findings of Singh and 
Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995). Particularly, Singh and Hamid (1992) found that the 35 
largest manufacturing companies listed on the Jordanian stock exchange during the period 
1980-88 financed more than 50 percent of their growth from equity issues. Singh (1995) 
used the same Jordanian company sample but for a longer time period (1980-90). The 
Singh results confirm the earlier findings: he found that these Jordanian companies 
32 financed more than 40 percent of their growth from equity issues. 
31 This is a normal phenomenon in panel firm studies. 
32 One of the reasons lying behind the reliance of the Jordanian firms on the stock market to finance their 
growth is the economic instability in Jordan which resulted in a shortage of long-term debt during the second 
half of 1980s and the early of 1990s. Therefore, the firms would have no choice but to relay more heavily on 
equity instruments, if they tap external markets for finance. Additionally, high stock market return and high 
domestic interest rates during this time would also cause the Jordanian firms to choose equity over debt, as 
both these factors reduce the cost of equity finance. Moreover, it appears that the banks in Jordan, due to the 
concentration of deposits in short-term maturities, are very reluctant to provide long-term credit in order to 
avoid a strong mismatch between the maturity structure of assets and liabilities. This may also have played an 
important role on why the Jordanian firms rely heavily on equity finance 
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Table 7.1: Summary Statistics 
Mean Median Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera 
4.72 3.47 45,7 2 311 8 291 48.62 Y . . (0.00) 
GK 6 4 4.3 19.9 2.421 9.782 
30.291 
. (0.00) 
GL 3 08 2.74 28.13 3.85 12.13 
36.69 
. (0.00) 
AGE 24 73 21.00 11.46 0.806 3,021 
32.62 
. (0.00) 
COM 18 4 14,24 16.42 ý 1.23 4.35 
17.58 
. (0.00) 
CR 26.2 24.5 0.71 2.75 23.25 31.7 (0.00) 
ED 2 46.5 39.83 43.68 2.36 10.47 
53.44 
(0.00) 
55.35 
DD 
28.54 21.53 56.49 3.55 13.84 (0.00) 
0.882 
MCR 65.97 65.80 12.82 0.49 2.03 (0.643) 
2.24 
VTR 18.64 15.73 8.94 0.924 2.787 (0.325) 
3.038 
TR 16.87 13.30 11.00 1.25 3.58 (0.218) 
0.149 
VOL 
10.17 9.80 2.06 -0.06 2.44 (0.928) 
0.904 
BDR 59.59 59.79 1103 0.29 1.724 (0.636) 
y is the real growth rate of value added. UK is the growth rate or capital stOCKS. LJL is me grown race or empioyuieui. 
AGE, is the firm's age. COM is the inverse completion indicator. CR is the ownership concentration ratio. ED is the 
equity dependence (equity finance). DD is the debt dependence (debt finance). -MCR is the stock market capitalisation 
ratio. VTR is the stock market value traded ratio. TR is the stock market turnover ratio. VOL is the stock market 
volatility. BDR is the ratio of credit to private sector to GDP. 
Table (7.2) shows the correlation among the variables used in this chapter. The interaction 
of equity dependence and each of market capitalisation ratio, value-traded ratio and 
turnover ratio have a significantly positive correlation with the firm's growth at the five- 
percent level. The interaction of equity finance and market volatility is negatively 
correlated with the firm's growth (significant at the five-percent level). The interactions of 
debt dependence with the banking sector development indicator are positively and 
statistically significant (at the five-percent level) correlated with firm's growth. 
The 
inverse measure of the consumption, age and the growth rate of employees are negatively 
and significantly correlated with firm's growth. Not surprisingly, the growth rate of capital 
expenditure and the ownership concentration ratio are positively and significantly 
correlated with firms' growth. 
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7.7 Empirical Results 
In this section we begin our analysis of the relationship between financial development and 
the firms' growth. In particular, we investigate three related hypotheses. Firstly, on a cross- 
sectional basis, we expect that firms which are heavy users of equity finance should benefit 
more from more development in the stock market than firms that are not heavy users of 
equity finance. Thus, the explanatory variable whose influence we are interested in is the 
interaction between a firm's dependence on equity finance and the stock market 
development. Secondly, the stock market is complementary rather than a substitute for the 
banking sector in providing financial services to the corporate sector in Jordan. Thirdly, the 
market and the banking sector development have different effects on large and small firms. 
The changes in the stock market development are likely to have more significant 
influences on larger firms than on smaller ones, while the changes in the banking sector 
development are likely to have more influences on smaller firms than on larger firms. 
The regressions we estimated here are dynamic in that they include the lagged dependent 
variable and regressors that may be likely to be endogenous/or correlated with the firm- 
specific effects. OLS levels estimation is therefore likely to be biased and in particular 
gives an upward bias in the estimate coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. 
Conversely, Within Groups estimation is likely to give a downward bias for the lagged 
dependent variable in a short panel (Bundell et al., 2000). We therefore use the difference 
and system dynamic panel estimators described above. We use lagged values of the 
corresponding variables as instruments in the regression equation in differences and both 
the lagged levels and lagged differences of the explanatory variables in the system 
estimators. We work with two lags in order to avoid cases for which there might be first- 
order autocorrelation of the residuals. This technique assumes that past values of the 
explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the contemporaneous error term. At the same 
time, past explanatory variables are correlated with the contemporaneous value of 
explanatory variables. 
The dynamic panel estimates suggest that financial sector development in Jordan 
influences on the firm's growth. Table (7.3) presents the results using the difference GMM 
dynamic-panel estimator. Table (7.4) gives the results from system GMM dynamic-panel 
estimation. We only present two-step GMM dynamic-panel estimators, since they are more 
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efficient than one-step estimates, and since only the Sargan test of over-identifying 
restrictions is heteroscedasticity-consistent only if based on the two-step estimates. 
The tables present asymptotic "t" statistics calculated from heteroscedastic consistent 
standard errors associated with the GMM estimates, statistics for Sargan tests and test 
statistics for first and second order serial correlation. The model's goodness of fit statistics 
indicates that it fits the data very well, in all regressions. We reject the null hypothesis that 
the variations in the dependent variable cannot be explained by the explanatory variables 
as indicated by x2 statistic of the joint test of significance. 
Before discussing the coefficient estimates, we discuss some specification tests since the 
validity of our results depend upon the consistency of the GMM-estimator we use. The key 
moment condition we exploit in our estimates is the lack of serial correlation among error 
terms. The test statistics presented in Tables (7.3) and (7.4) indicate that we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis of the absence of first or second order serial correlation33. The Sargan 
tests of overidentifying restrictions indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
there is no correlation between the error terms and the instrument vector and that the 
models are correctly specified. Although the results of the system estimate are similar to 
those generated by difference estimates, the difference Sargan test for the validity of 
additional instruments does support the use of the GMM system estimator. These results 
imply that differences in the right-hand side variables are not correlated with the 
unobserved firm-specific effects, so that we can assume that the additional moment 
restrictions used in the system estimation hold. 
We now discuss the coefficient estimates of GMM dynamic-panel estimation. We begin by 
discussing the explanatory variables that appear in all regressions. As can be seen from 
Tables (7.3) and (7.4), the coefficients of the regressions estimated by GMM difference 
estimator have relatively similar order of magnitude as the coefficients of the regressions 
estimated by GMM system estimator. The growth rate of capital expenditure has a large 
and significant positive correlation with the firm growth at the one-percent level or better. 
The growth rate of the number of employees has a small and significantly negative 
33 In this test the null hypothesis is that the errors in the differenced equation exhibit no k-order serial 
correlation. 
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correlation with growth. This result may be explained by the effect of diminishing returns 
of labour productivity (adding more labour to production could increase the level of value 
added but not its rate of growth) that arises mainly from low capital-labour ratios, 
inadequate skills and short work-experience of young labour force. The results also suggest 
that older firms' have slower growth34. This supports the argument that older firms may 
have become petrified in some sense or may not have as strong an incentive as a younger 
firm to invest in new technology. Moreover, due to vintage effects, a younger firm may 
become productive if its capital stock is more modem than the capital stock of an older 
firm. As we expected, productive market competition and shareholder control have 
plausible effects on the firm's growth. More specifically, rents normalised on value added 
(an inverse measure of competition) are negatively related to the firms' growth, ownership 
concentration is positively related to future growth. The lagged dependent variable which 
captures the autoregressive nature of growth is positive and highly significant at the one- 
percent level or better. 
We turn now to the main issue of the effect of the financial market development on a 
firm's performance in terms of value added growth. Column 1 of Tables (7.3) and (7.4) 
shows results for a firm's growth as a function of stock market factor (SMF) and also other 
explanatory variables that appear in all the regressions, where the stock market 
development indicator in this interaction term is the market capitalisation as a percentage 
of the GDP. As can be seen, in both, the difference and the system dynamic panel growth 
regressions, the coefficients estimated for the stock market factor (the interaction of stock 
market capitalisation ratio and equity dependence) is positive (0.073 in the difference panel 
dynamic regression and 0.052 in the system dynamic panel regression) and highly 
significant at the one-percent level or better. This result supports our hypothesis that firms 
that are heavily dependent on equity finance benefit more from the greater stock market 
development than firms that are not heavily dependents on equity finance. This result also 
indicates that, for a given firm with a positive equity dependence ratio, the higher level of 
the stock market capitalisation results in a higher growth rate of the firms. This result is 
inconsistent with Levine and Zervos (1996,1998a) in which they fail to find a relationship 
between stock market capitalisation and growth in per capita GDP, Rajan and Zingales 
34 This result is consistent with Dune and Hughes (1994) and Heshmmati (2000) results that found negative 
relationships between the growth and age of firms in the U. S., UK and Sweden. However, Das (1995) found 
age and growth to be positively related using Indian hardware computer industry. 
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(1998) also fail to find market capitalisation as having effect on relative growth of 
financially dependent industries. However, this result is consistent with Demirguc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic (1998,2000) findings at the firm-level data 
To illustrate the significance of this result, we consider the "differential in real growth 
rate" which indicates how much faster the firm at 75th percentile of equity dependence (for 
example, DAR AL-DAWA DEVELOPMENT&INVESTMENT) would have grown 
compared to the firm at the 25`h percentile (for example, ARAB CENTER FOR 
PHARMACEUTICALS AND CHEMICALS)35. The coefficient estimates from the 
difference dynamic panel regression predicts that the DAR AL-DAWA 
DEVELOPMENT&INVESTMENT would grow 2.8 percentage points faster than the 
ARAB CENTER FOR PHARMACEUTICALS AND CHEMICALS36. This result 
therefore indicates that more development in the stock market ameliorates the market 
frictions and thereby promotes the growth of firms that rely more heavily on equity 
finance. This result also provides firm-level support and confirmation of the proposition 
that the development of the stock market facilitates the economic growth in Jordan. 
Column 2 of Tables (7.3) and (7.4) show the results for the firm's growth as a function of 
the stock market factor (the interaction of the market capitalisation ratio and equity 
dependence) and the debt market factor (the interaction of the banking sector development 
and debt dependence), where the banking sector development indicator in the interaction 
term is the ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP. The reason behind including the 
debt market factor in the regression is to control the effect of debt finance and more 
importantly to shed any light on the argument that the banking sector is either 
complementary or a substitute to the stock market in providing financial services to 
corporate finance and whether the banking sector or the stock market are better at fostering 
firm growth in Jordan. 
The results from the regression show that the debt market factor (DMF) in both the 
difference and the system dynamic panel growth regressions are positive and highly 
35Both firms are working in the same industry (Drugs industry). 
36 The growth differential is calculated as follows: 0.073 (the coefficient of the interaction term of the stock 
market development indicator and equity dependence) * 0.83 (equity dependence of the DAR AL-DAWA 
DEVELOPMENT&INVESTMENT minus equity dependence of the ARAB CENTER FOR 
PHARMACEUTICALS AND CHEMICALS) * 0.66 (the stock market development indicator; market 
capitalisation ratio). 
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significant at the one-percent level or better. This implies that firms heavily dependent on 
debt finance benefit more from the increased banking sector development than firms that 
are not heavy uses of debt finance. The results also imply that, for a given firm with a 
positive debt dependence ratio, the higher level of the banking sector development results 
in a higher growth rate of this firm. More importantly, as can be seen from the tables, the 
coefficient estimates for the stock market factor are still highly significant and stable after 
including the debt market factor (0.0742 in the difference panel dynamic regression and 
0.044 in the system dynamic panel regression). This implies that the existence of a 
developed stock market as well as a developed banking sector is important in determining 
firms' growth in Jordan. In other words, the results indicate that firms that are heavy users 
of external finance grow faster with the higher overall levels of financial development. 
This result is consistent with the findings of Beck and Levine (2000) that industries that are 
heavily dependent on external finance grow faster in economies with a higher level of 
overall financial development. 
More importantly, this result also suggests that the stock market and the banking sector in 
Jordan play different, yet complementary, roles. They provide different bundles of services 
to the nonfinancial sector. If they are äsubstitute and provide the same financial services 
then they would not both enter the growth regressions significantly. Possible explanations 
of this result can be found in the theoretical literature; banks primarily ameliorate 
information asymmetries, while stock markets primarily enhance liquidity and facilitate 
risk diversification. Thus, policies undertaken to develop the stock market need not 
adversely affect the existing banking system. Our results are also consistent with the 
findings in Chapter V of this study and the conclusion of Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
(1996b), Denurguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) and Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(2000) that stock market and financial intermediary development proceed 
simultaneously 37. 
Furthermore, when we look to the estimated coefficients of the stock market factor and the 
debt market factor, we find that the estimated coefficients of the interaction of equity 
dependence and all of each stock market development indicator used in this chapter are 
37 This is also consisting with Boyd and Smith (1998) view, which argues that equity markets are 
complement to debt markets "by issuing some equity, firms can make it cheaper to issue 
debt. This facts it 
possible for individual firms, and society, to economically employ high return capital productive 
technologies whose might other wise not be feasible" (p. 523-24). 
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greater than the estimated coefficients of the interaction of debt dependence and the 
measure of the banking sector development in the both types of estimators. This implies 
that firms that are equity dependent with a greater development of the stock market thrive 
better than firms that are debt dependent with a greater development of the banking sector. 
One possible explanation of this result can be found in the theoretical literature. As Levine 
(1991) argues, capital raised through equity issues is long-term, while the investor at short 
notice can liquidate shares without impacting the firm's projects. By contrast, if the firm 
finances with non-tradable, finite maturity debt held by banks, shocks to the banks may be 
transmitted on the firm and force liquidation of long-term projects. To the extent that stock 
markets create a separation between the liquidity shocks of investors and the investment 
needs of firms, the latter can take a longer-term view and invest more efficiently. 
Another possible explanation for the above results is that the development of the stock 
market affects the cost of capital and capital efficiency of all firms, not just the financially 
dependent ones, while the development of the banking sector affects firms dependent on 
debt finance only. For example, better risk sharing, more liquidity and control attained 
through the equity market improve economic efficiency and reduce the cost of capital for 
all firms, not just the financially dependent ones. Furthermore, the Jordanian Banks are not 
involved heavily with nonfinancial firms, they hold little shares and are more like Anglo- 
Saxon banks38. Thus, the role of the banking sector in Jordan, in the sense of an Anglo- 
Saxon-Style for corporate control, is limited. They predominantly monitor from a 
creditor's perspective. Another feature of the Jordanian banking sector is the higher 
concentration ratio, where the share of the three main banks in total assets is almost 91 
percent. A highly concentrated banking sector might reduce the ability to channel funds 
efficiently to firms (Beck, et al., 1999a). Deidda and Crenos (2000) argue that increase 
banks competition increase the efficiency of banks operating in the credit market and 
therefore higher growth39. 
38 Under the Jordanian banking law, banks are forbidden to control nonbanking corporations and their 
holdings in these enterprises are limited to no more than 10 percent of the enterprise's capital. In addition, a 
banking corporation's total interest in nonbanking corporations cannot exceed 75 percent of the 
bank's 
capital. 
34 Peterson and Rajan (1995), however, present evidence that small businesses in the 
U. S. are less credit- 
constrained in more concentrated banking markets. Cetorelli and Gamberra (2000) 
find that financially more 
dependent industries grow faster in economies with more concentrated banks sectors. Stulz 
(2000) points out 
that, " lack of competition among financial intermediaries increases the ability of a 
financial intermediary to 
extract rents from successful projects, thereby justifying the expenditure of resources on projects to 
increase 
their probability of success" (p. 19). 
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We will now turn to the question of whether the stock market and the banking sector 
development enhances small and large firms differently. In other worlds, whether the 
changes in the stock market development have a more significant influence on large firms 
than on smaller ones and whether the changes in the banking sector development have 
more influence on small firms than on larger firms. In order to test this hypothesis, in 
addition to the variables that we included in the regressions in column 2, we include 
another two variables; The first one is the interaction of the stock market factor (SMF) and 
dummy variable (DUM) which equals to one if a firm is large and zero other wise. A large 
firm is defined as having total assets greater than the sample median40. The second one is 
the interaction of the debt market factor (DMF) and the firm size dummy variable 
mentioned above. 
The results are reported in column 4 of Tables (7.3) and (7.4). In both the difference and 
the system dynamic panel regressions, the results indicate a significantly positive 
interaction of the stock market factor and firm size dummy variable (SMFx DUM) on firm 
growth. At the same time, the coefficients of the stock market factor in the regressions falls 
but are still significant at the five-percent level. This result supports the argument that large 
firms display more sensitivity to the change in the stock market development than the 
small firms. In the same regressions the coefficients on the interaction terms of the debt 
market factor and the firm size dummy variable (DMFx DUM) are negative but 
insignificant at the five-percent level in the system dynamic panel estimator. In these 
regressions, the coefficients of the debt market factor (DMF) rise and are still significant in 
both types of estimators. In general, this result confirms the view that small firms are more 
sensitive than large firms to the change in the banking sector development. 
When we use alternative measures of the stock market development and re-estimate the 
regression in column 2, we still find a strong, causal relationship between the interaction of 
equity dependence and the stock market development and the firm's growth. The last three 
columns of Tables (7.3) and (7.4) present these results where the stock market 
development indicators in the interaction terms are the value-traded ratio, turnover ratio 
and volatility, respectively. As can be seen in columns 4 and 5, the coefficients on 
interaction terms of equity dependence and the liquidity indicators, the value-traded ratio 
40 Within definition we have 22 large firms and 36 small firms. 
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and turnover ratio, are significantly positive at the one-percent level in both the difference 
and the system dynamic panel growth regressions. These results indicate that with more 
liquidity in the stock market, firms that use equity finance heavily grow faster than firms 
that do not use equity finance heavily. These results are consistent with the previous 
empirical studies in this field as well as our findings in the last two empirical chapters. 
These results confirm also the view that increased market liquidity will increase the 
effectiveness of the governance's function of market and facilitate (risky) technological 
advances, thereby improving total factor productivity of firm41. Increased market liquidity 
can improve the effectiveness of the governance function in two ways. First, increased 
market liquidity induces information acquisition, which in turn increases the information 
content of share prices. The more liquid the market, the easier it becomes for an investor, 
who has obtained information about a firm, to trade at posted prices. Thus, investors can 
profit before the information becomes widely available and the price changes (Kyle, 1984). 
If investors can profit from obtaining information they will be more likely to research and 
monitor firms. More liquidity in markets increases the incentive to research firms, thus the 
improved information will help firms to overcome problems of moral hazard. Second, the 
effective use of the takeover mechanism requires a liquid market where bidders access a 
vast amount of capital on short notice. 
The last column of the Tables 7.3 and 7.4 present the result where the stock market 
development in the interaction term is the market volatility. The result indicates that the 
coefficient on interaction term enters negatively (-0.056) and is significant at the one- 
percent level in the difference dynamic panel growth regression. In the system dynamic 
panel growth regression the coefficient enters negative (-0.060) but is insignificant at the 
five-percent level. Thus, in general, we can conclude that increases in the stock market 
volatility slow down the growth rates of the firms that depend heavily on equity financing. 
As is well known, more volatility in stock prices increases the cost of equity capital to 
firms and also increases the value of the "option wait", hence delaying productive 
investment42. Thus, the higher level of share prices volatility will impede the firms' 
growth, especially for those that are heavily dependent on equity finance. 
41 In Chapter IV we have discussed in detail how more liquidity in stock markets can 
facilitate technological 
advances. 
42 In addition, higher share price volatility may deteriorate the role of share prices that aggregate 
information 
signals about firms as guide manager's investment decisions. A greater volatility in stock prices also would 
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Table 7.3: Financial Market development and Firms Growth: Difference Dynamic 
Panel RearPCCinnQ 
Dependent Variable y;, t Independent Variables 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
0.385 
(75.80) 
0.382 0.368 0.381 0.382 0.383 
Yi, t-i [0.000] 
(74.70) (57.00) (112.00) (96.30) (79.40) 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
0.406 0.386 0.401 0.356 0.407 0.377 
GK;, t (4.98) (4.73) (7.51) (4.95) (4.61) (4.48) 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
-0.0008 -0.0013 -0.00034 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0004 GL;, t (-11.0) (-6.81) (-11.9) (-12.8) (-6.43) (-2.53) 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.013] 
0.073 0.0742 0.0072 0.117 0.157 -0.056 SMF,, t (6.25) (12.1) (2.43) (2.32) (2.52) (-3.49) 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.027] [0.032] [0.013] [0.001] 
-0.282 -0.378 -0.171 -0.569 -0.564 -0.523 AGE;, t (-1.84) (-1.74) (-1.48) (-7.04) (-5.80) (-6.09) 
[0.068] [0.143] [0.242] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
-0.413 -0.326 -0.375 -0.189 -0.516 -0.523 
COM;, t (-6.66) (-5.42) 
(-7.94) (-3.84) (-7.07) (-8.49) 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
0.176 0.141 0.103 0.114 0.116 0.093 
CRg, t (4.26) (3.09) 
(1.61) (4.13) (2.11) (2.04) 
[0.000] [0.002] [0.108] [0.000] [0.037] [0.039] 
0.0167 0.086 0.0136 0.0182 0.0126 
DMF,, t 
(5.85) (5.29) (4.93) (6.351) (4.13) 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000k [0.000] [0.000] 
0.185 
SMF;, t*DUMi, t 
(8.29) 
[0.000] 
-0.055 
DMF; t*DUM;, t 
(-12.20) 
, [0.000] 
1st Order Serial 
Correlation LM (1) [0.650] [0.494] [0.599] [0.596] [0.631] [0.619] 
2°a Order serial [0.239] [0.198] [0.128] [0.281] [0.268] [0.286] Correlation LM (2) 
Joint Test of [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] Significance 
Sargan Test [0.764] [0.794] [0.791] [0.791] [0.915] [0.918] 
Numbers in Parentheses are t-values and numbers in Brackets are p-values. This table reports the (UMM-V1FFEKJNC: b: regression, 
estimated by using DPD99 package for Ox. Time dummies are included in all the regressions. The dependent variable in all models is 
the growth rates of value added. GK;,, and Gl, are growth of capital stock and the number of employees , respectively. 
SMF;,, is the 
interaction between the firm dependence on equity and the stock market development. In the regressions from 1 to 3, the stock market 
development is the market capitalisation ratio. In regression 4,5, and 6, the stock market development are total value-traded ratio, 
turnover ratio and volatility, respectively. AGE;,, is defined as the firm's age. COM, 1 is the 
inverse competition indicator, defined as the 
ratio of ex-post rent to net sales. CR;, is the ownership concentration ratio. DMF;,, is the 
interaction between the firm's dependence on 
debt finance and bank sector development. The bank sector development is the private credit to 
GDP. DUM;,, is the firm's size dummy 
variable equal 1 if the firm is large. LM (k) is the test statistic for the presence of k-th order serial correlation 
in the first-differenced 
residual, the null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no 
k-order serial correlation. Sargan is a Sargan 
test of the overidentifying restrictions; the null hypothesis is that the instruments used are not correlated with 
the residuals. The joint test 
statistic is a test of the joint significance of all independent variables. 
make investors more averse to holding stocks and demand a higher risk premium, which 
implies a higher cost 
of capital and less investment. 
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Table 7.4: Financial Market Development and Firms Growth: Dynamic Panel 
Regressions, System Estimator 
d 
Dependent Variable y;, t Indepen ent 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
0.220 0.225 0.169 0.198 0.221 0.227 
yi, t_1 (41.70) (41.77) (21.20) (17.1) (24.30) (40.50) 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.0001 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 0.330 0.397 0.195 0.362 0.407 0.386 
GK;, t (1.98) (3.27) (2.70) (1.83) (2.09) (1.89) 
[0.049] [0.00] [0.022] [0.069] [0.038] [0.061] 
-0.0003 -0.0017 -0.0020 -0.0005 -0.0012 -0.0009 GL,, t (-3.18) (-12.1) (-7.42) (-10.10) (-3.06) (-3.14) 
[0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.03] [0.002] 
0.052 0.044 0.0147 0.060 0.117 -0.060 SMF;, t (4.32) (2.23) (1.82) (3.29) (1.610) (-1.07) 
[0.000] [0.027] [0.035] [0.00] [0.011] [0.288] 
-0.418 -0.530 -0.386 -0.481 -0.375 -0.296 
AGE;, t (-7.4) (-4.04) (-8.40) (-12.8) (-8.46) (-6.86) 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.00] [0.000] [0.000] 
-0.404 -0,232 -0.348 -0.371 -0.523 -0.443 
COM;, t (-6.61) (-4.42) (-4.45) (-3.99) (-4.86) (-7.48) 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
0.187 0.105 0.103 0.269 0.217 0.153 
CR;, t (5.12) (3.74) (5.20) (6.67) (5.23) (7.36) 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
0.032 0.041 0.022 0.029 0.024 
DMFi, t (8.71) (7.90) (7.43) (8.62) (7.83) 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
0.332 
SMF,, t*DUMi, t (7.01) 
[0.000] 
0.278 
DMF;, t*DUM;, t (-0.653) 
[0.515] 
1" Order Serial 
Correlation LM (1) 
[0.8471 [0.997] [0.499] [0.711] [0.788] [0.785] 
2°a Order serial [0.271] [0.243] [0.729] [0.385] [0.292] [0.288] Correlation LM (2) 
Joint Test of [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] Significance 
Sargan Test [0.999] [0.997] [0.999] [0.995] [0.998] [0.999] 
Numbers in Parentheses are t-values and num bers in Brackets are p-values. This table reports the GMM-SYSTEM regression, estimated 
by using DPD99 package for Ox. Time dummies are included in all the regressions. The dependent variable in all models 
is the growth 
rates of value added. GK;,, and Gl; j are growth of capital stock and the number of employees , respectively. 
SMF;,, is the interaction 
between the firm dependence on equity and the stock market development. In the regressions from I to 3, the stock market development 
is the market capitalisation ratio. In regression 4,5, and 6, the stock market development are total value-traded ratio, turnover ratio and 
volatility, respectively. AGE;, L is defined as the firm's age. 
COM;,, is the inverse competition indicator, defined as the ratio of ex-post rent 
to net sales. CR,, t is the ownership concentration ratio. 
DMF;,, is the interaction between the firm's dependence on debt finance and bank 
sector development. The bank sector development is the private credit to GDP. DUM;,, is the firm's size 
dummy variable equal 1 if the 
firm is large. LM (k) is the test statistic for the presence of k-th order serial correlation in the 
first-differenced residual, the null 
hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no k-order serial correlation. 
Sargan is a Sargan test of the 
overidentifying restrictions; the null hypothesis is that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals. 
The joint test statistic is 
a test of the joint significance of all independent variables. 
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7.8 Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter we provide a test on micro-level data of the hypothesis that the development 
of the stock market is an important determinant of the economic growth in Jordan. In 
particular, we investigate three related issues. Firstly, whether the firms that heavily 
depend on equity finance grow faster with the higher level of the stock market 
development than firms that are not heavily dependent on equity finance. Secondly, 
whether the stock market is a substitute or a complement for the banking sector in 
providing financial services to the corporate sector in Jordan and whether the stock market 
or the banking sector is better in providing financial services and therefore enhancing 
growth in these firms. Thirdly, whether the performance of large and small firms in terms 
of growth react differently to the stock market and banking sector development. 
In order to examine the above issues, we extend a simple empirical model that incorporates 
the financial market development effects and other variables that may affect the firm's 
growth. We begin from a premise that financial markets provide mainly two critical 
functions to an economy: allocation of risk capital through saving mobilising and risk- 
pooling and sharing; and promotion of responsible governance and control through 
providing outside investors a variety of mechanisms for monitoring inside decision makers. 
We argued that these functions of financial markets influence firm performance by 
promoting technological innovations and inducing the efficiency with which resources are 
utilised. 
We use firm-level panel data for a sample of 56 Jordanian industrial quoted companies 
covering the period 1988-1998. With this panel data set we use a difference dynamic panel 
estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and a system dynamic panel estimator 
developed and studied by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998a, 
1998b) which mitigates some of the biases frequently found when using the difference 
dynamic panel estimator. 
Both types of estimators tell the same story: the level of activity and the size of the stock 
market exerts a statistically significant and economically large impact on the 
firms' 
growth. More particularly, we find results indicate that with more development 
in the stock 
market firms that use equity finance heavily grow faster than firms that 
do not. These 
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findings provide firm-level support for the proposition that the development of the stock 
market facilitates economic growth in Jordan, advanced by the last two empirical chapters. 
Our results also show that both the stock market and the banking sector development are 
important in facilitating the firm's growth in Jordan. In particular, we find that measures of 
both market and banking development independently predict firm's growth when entered 
together in firm growth regressions. Besides emphasising the strong link between the 
financial system and firm growth, this result confirms our findings in Chapter V that the 
stock market and the banking sector in Jordan are complementary rather than substitutes in 
providing financial services to the corporate sector. They provide different financial 
services to the corporate sector. So, government policies to develop the stock market need 
not distinguish the importance of the banking sector. Finally, we find results are consistent 
with the hypothesis that the stock market and the banking sector development have 
different effects on small and large firms. The evidence suggests that large firms are more 
sensitive to the stock market development, while small firms are more sensitive to 
variations in the banking sector development. 
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Chapter VIII 
Microeconomic Evidence: Stock Market Development 
and the Financial Choices of Firms 
8.1 Introduction 
The different attributes of debt and equity make the development of markets that facilitate 
the issuance of and trading in these securities very important. The level of financial 
development will be reflected in the financing decisions of individual firms. Financial 
decisions affect firms' investment, profitability and productivity growth. Greenwald and 
Stiglitz (1990) among others emphasised in their theoretical model the effect of a firm's 
financial structure on its behaviour i. e. employment, production, pricing, investment and 
research. Bernstein and Nadiri (1993) point out that, `financial structure affects output 
supply, input demand, and therefore allocative and dynamic efficiency" (p. 2). Moreover, 
Lang et al., (1996) and Boyd and Smith (1998) argue that an increase in the level of 
growth is associated with a lower ratio of debt to equity. Singh and Hamid (1992) point out 
that, "the availability of the appropriate kind of finance could constrain a firm's growth or 
investment plans" (p. 6)1. Therefore, establishing evidence for the effect of the stock 
market on financial structure will add to and confirm the second side to relation between 
the stock market development and firms' growth which has been documented in the 
previous empirical chapter. 
While there are many empirical studies that examine how specific imperfections affect a 
firm's optimal capital structure, there has been very little empirical evidence for the effect 
of stock market development on the capital structure choices made by 
firms, especially in 
I In addition, Nakamura and Nakamura (1982) point out that, "some economists have ignored corporate 
financial decisions on the assumption they do not affect the investment and production 
decisions of firms. Yet 
even if this extreme position is accepted, firms must still make financing decisions which 
in turn have an 
impact on other sectors of the economy. Since interest payments on corporate 
debt are tax deductible, the 
reliance of firms on debt as opposed to equity financing directly affects 
both the revenue of federal 
government collects through taxation of corporate profits. The corporate presence 
in bond markets and 
corporate borrowing from banks can be expected to affect both interest rates and the 
demand for money" 
(p. 384). 
developing countries. In fact, to date only one empirical study has been completed. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) investigated this issue for developed and 
developing countries during the 1980s using cross-country regressions2. By addressing 
some of the shortcomings of this study, in this chapter we examine how the development 
of the stock market affects the ability of Jordanian firms to raise capital for new growth 
and how this development affects the capital structure choices these firms make. 
In a fundamental sense, the value of a firm is the discounted stream of expected cash flows 
generated by its assets. Investors who hold various types of claim on a firm's cash flows 
finance the assets of that firm. Debt holders have a relatively safe claim on the stream of 
cash flows through the contractual guarantee of a fixed schedule payment. The mix of debt 
funds and equity funds (leverage) employed by a firm define its capital structure. Firms 
attempt to issue the particular combination of debt and equity, subject to various 
constraints and imperfections that maximises overall market value. The mix of funds 
affects the cost and availability of capital, and thus, firms' real decisions about investment, 
production and employment (Pagano, 1993b; Zwiebel, 1996; Boyd and Smith, 1998; Biais 
and Casamatta, 1999; Cooley and Quadrini, 2000; Shin and Stulz, 2000; and Yanagawa, 
2000)3. 
Under certain restrictive assumptions, a firm's value is independent of its mix of debt and 
equity. This hypothesis is embodied in the original Modigliani and Miller (1958) value- 
invariance proposition. Modigliani and Miller (MM) assert that in an ideal world with 
perfect and complete capital markets and in the absence of taxes, the value of a firm 
depends only on its cash flows, not on the debt-equity mix. Therefore corporate valuations 
are independent of the existing capital structure. In addition, the cost of capital is 
2 This study will be discussed in detail in Section 8.3. 
3 Masulis (1983) estimates the impact of a change in a firm's capital structure on its value and finds that both 
stock prices and firm values are positively related to changes in debt level and leverage. Opler and Titman 
(1994) find that sales growth is lower for firms in the three highest deciles of leverage, but especially so 
within distressed industries. Lang et al., (1996) examine the relation between leverage and real capital 
expenditure, employment and net investment growths and find a strongly negative relation. Bernstein and 
Nadiri (1993) have provided evidence to suggest that financial decisions are greatly affect the profit and 
productivity growth of U. S firms. In addition, Fazzari et al., (1988), Peyer and Shivdasani (2001), Hayash 
and Inoue (1991), Blundell et al., (1992), Cho (1995) and Lensink and Sterken (1998) find evidence from the 
US, Japan, UK, Korea and the Czech Republic, indicating that investment spending is greatly affected by 
financial policies. Hanka (1998) finds that firms with higher debt have reduced their workforce more often, 
paid more part-time and seasonal employees, and paid lower wages. Finally, Sharpe (1994) finds that there 
is 
a strong relationship between a firm's financial leverage and the cyclicality of its labour force. He points out 
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independent of capital structure, so that the choice between debt and equity is irrelevant 
and does not affect a firm's value. But, if corporate income is taxed and interest payments 
are tax deductible, then leverage has a tax advantage and firms may emphasise debt 
financing. 
Of course, these conclusions are at variance with what one sees in the real world, where 
capital structure matters and banks are extremely reluctant to finance a project with one 
hundred percent debt. MM spurred financial economists to come up with the conditions 
under which financial structure would indeed matter, such a search still continues today 
and is the foundation of modem corporate finance. Broadly speaking, four theoretical 
approaches can be distinguished, namely, models based on tax consideration, bankruptcy 
and financial distress costs, agency costs and symmetric information issues4. These 
theories identify many firm-specific factors that may affect a firm's optimal structure. 
As we have shown in the previous chapters, stock markets are not only a source of capital 
for firms, but are also a marketplace for a firm's future prospects and may even provide 
incentives for investors to acquire information about a firm. We argue that the 
development of stock markets would improve risk sharing and information dissemination, 
which makes both equity and debt less risky, and expansion more attractive. Thus, the 
development of stock markets could allow firms to issue more debt and equity. In this 
circumstance, debt and equity finance are not necessarily substitutes for each other, but are 
possibly financial tools that play significantly different roles in the financing decision. 
In view of the above arguments, this chapter empirically explores the effect of stock 
market development on corporate capital structure in Jordan. In doing so, it provides a 
second side investigation of how the stock market can affect a firm's growth. The 
particular question we attempt to address in this chapter is as follows: How does stock 
market development affect the ability of Jordanian firms to raise capital for new growth 
and how does this development affect the capital structure choices that these firms make? 
It should be noted that this study represents the first attempt to examine empirically the 
that, "employment growth at more highly leveraged firms is more sensitive to 
demand and financial-market 
conditions over the business cycle" (p. 1060). 
4 The brief discussions of these theories are in the following section. 
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effect of stock market development on firms' financial structure within a specific country's 
experience. 
Unlike most previous capital structure studies which study the determinants of capital 
structure using a non-dynamic model, we employ a dynamic adjustment model. This model 
allows us to shed light on the nature of dynamic capital structure adjustment by firms, i. e., 
on whether firms do indeed move towards target leverage ratios or away from them, and 
the speed with which they do that. In addition, our empirical analysis, as in the previous 
empirical chapter, is carried out with the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) for 
panel data utilising instrumental variables. Particularly, we use two GMM dynamic panel 
estimators: GMM-Difference and GMM-System estimators. These estimators specifically 
address the econometric problems produced by firm-specific effects and endogeneity. In 
fact, using this type of data may give rise to heteroscedaciticity. GMM enables consistent 
estimation in spite of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, which would blur the result if 
a method like OLS were useds. 
The sequence of the rest of the chapter is as follows: Section 8.2 provides a review of 
capital structure theories. Section 8.3 provides a review of some previous empirical 
literature. Section 8.4 outlines the empirical model and discusses the variables measure. 
Section 8.5 presents the empirical results. Section 8.6 presents a conclusion to this chapter. 
8.2 Capital Structure Theories 
Theories of capital structure have been well documented in the literature and we provide 
only a short review here6. In this section we identify the main strand of the theoretical 
literature and draw out general principles that have enjoyed the empirical support of 
econometric studies. We also provide a simple theoretical analysis of the effect of stock 
market development on a firm's financial choices. These general themes will provide a 
useful framework for our empirical analysis. 
5 See Section 7.5. 
6 Full surveys of capital structure theories are contained in Harris and 
Raviv (1991). 
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8.2.1 Target Leverage Theories 
Many papers have been written, on the effect of introducing taxation into the MM 
framework. Other papers have introduced the costs associated with bankruptcy and 
financial distress while others have added agency costs and asymmetric information. 
Below, we provide a short discussion of each of these theories. 
I. Taxation theories 
As mentioned above, MM postulated that in an ideal world with perfect and complete 
capital markets and in the absence of taxes, the value of a firm depends only on its cash 
flows, not on the debt-equity mix. Therefore corporate valuations are independent of 
existing capital structure. In addition, the cost of capital is independent of capital structure, 
so that the choice between debt and equity is irrelevant. 
Clearly, in a world of imperfect and incomplete capital markets, this theory cannot explain 
the differences in corporate capital structure. Many discussions on capital structure choice 
deal with the effects of taxes, or more precisely with the effects of different taxation of 
debt and equity. Under these theories, interest paid on debt is deductible from income and 
reduces a firm's tax liabilities whereas dividends are not deductible; therefore, debt has a 
tax advantage over equity. By increasing the amount of debt and reducing equity, a firm 
may increase the rate of profit per dollar invested by shareholders. In other words, the 
more leveraged the firm, the more valuable its equity. This assumes that the returns on 
capital before tax are at least equal to the interest rate on debt (Myers, 1977). However, as 
with the MM postulate, this factor cannot fully explain the differences in capital structure 
across countries. In addition, in most empirical studies of determinants of optimal capital 
structure, tax variables are not significant in explaining leverage rates7. In the case of 
Jordan, it seems that tax consideration is not important determinants of the capital structure 
of the Jordanian firms. In Jordan, interest is tax deductible for corporate tax purpose. On 
the other hand, dividends as well as capital gains are tax-exempt. Therefore, there is no tax 
advantage of debt over equity in the Jordanian tax system. 
See for example Bradley et al., (1984); Mayer (1988), Titman and Wessels (1988) and 
Rajan and Zingals 
(1995) and others. 
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II. Bankruptcy Costs Theories 
In the MM world there are no bankruptcy costs. In reality, bankruptcy imposes both direct 
and indirect costs on a firm. Direct costs include legal expenses and trustee fees. Indirect 
costs include disruption of operations, loss of suppliers and the imposition of financial 
constraints by creditors. These indirect costs of bankruptcy and the financial distress costs 
that may occur if the firm does not enter bankruptcy can be significants. These costs carry 
a number of implications for capital structure choice. First, leverage ratios may inversely 
relate to the measure of financial risk or business risk measured by the variation in a firm's 
cash flows (Graham, et al., 1998, Shin and Stulz, 2000). The bases of this argument are 
that the existence of debt in the capital structure increases the probability of bankruptcy, 
and a firm with more variable cash flows, that is, higher risk, has a higher probability of 
bankruptcy for a given level of debt. Most empirical works support this relation in that the 
optimal leverage ratio is inversely related to business risk (see for example, Castanias, 
1983; Bradely et al., 1984)9. Second, leverage ratios may be positively related to firm size. 
If bankruptcy costs include a fixed component, these costs as a fraction of the value of a 
firm will increase as the firm size decreases (Ang, et al., 1982) large firms may also have 
lower risk through diversification, more stable cash flows and established operating and 
credit histories. These factors provide large firms with greater access to alternative sources 
of finance in times of financial distress. This may encourage them to take on relatively 
high debt burdens. Third, leverage may be positively related to the value of a firm's 
tangible assets or liquidation values (Scott, 1976; Myers, 1977; Alderson' and Betker, 
1995; and Choate, 1997). Higher liquidation values reduce the expected losses accruing to 
debt holders in the event of financial distress, thus making debt less expensive 
(Williamson, 1988)10. Finally, the leverage ratio is positively related to the inverse of 
Tobin's Q ratio which measures the potential loss of growth opportunities in the case of 
bankruptcy (i. e., it also proxies for bankruptcy costs). This implication is highlighted in 
Brealey and Myers (1988), who point out that, "the costs of distress are likely to be greater 
for firms whose value depends on growth opportunities or intangible assets. These firms 
8 For example, Altman (1984) estimates the indirect bankruptcy costs at 17.5 percent of a firm's value one 
year prior to bankruptcy. 
9 Titman and Wessels (1988) however conclude that there is no significant relationship between 
leverage 
ratio and business risk. 
10 Without tangible assets, the cost of borrowing may be prohibitively high since creditors may 
demand very 
high discounts or high interest payments as a prerequisite to making the loan. 
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are more likely to forgo profitable investment opportunities and, if default occurs, their 
assets may erode rapidly" (p. 435). 
III. Agency Costs Theories 
The agency costs theories were initiated by Jensen and Meckling (1976), building on the 
earlier work of Fama and Miller (1972). Under the agency costs theories, debt is 
considered as a necessary mechanism to mitigate the conflict between equity holders and 
managers. The arguments are that debt financing reduces the amount of free cash available 
at the managers' disposal (Jensen, 1986; and Hart and Moore, 1995). Debt can also be 
considered as a mechanism to force liquidation if a firm's cash flow is poor (Williamson, 
1988; and Harris and Raviv, 1990), even though managers may always want to continue 
the firm's current operation, whereas shareholders may be better off by liquidating current 
operations. Further, managers' tendencies towards empire building can be constrained with 
debt financing (Stulz, 1990; and Zwiebel, 1996)11. Another benefit of debt finance is in 
creating an incentive for managers to work harder. The argument here is that if bankruptcy 
is costly for managers, because they lose benefits of control or reputation, then debt can 
create an incentive for managers to work harder, consume fewer perquisites, and make 
better investment decisions, because this behaviour reduces the probability of bankruptcy. 
Once debt is introduced into capital financing, another type of conflict of interest among 
agents emerges: the conflict between equity holders and debt holders. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) argue that in a highly leveraged firm, the incentives for shareholders to push 
managers to pursue riskier projects can result in an asset substitution problem 
12; leverage 
may cause another adverse incentive which is the so-called underinvestment problem, in 
which case managers, acting in the shareholders' interest, might reject investments which 
increase the firm's value because the expected gains would accrue largely to creditors 
(Myers, 1977). 
While the agency cost literature is replete with theoretical models, testable implications are 
limited. One testable implication is that a negative relationship exists between leverage and 
11 Mangers' tendencies towards empire building may sometimes lead them to carry out negative net present 
value projects even though paying out cash is a better choice for shareholders. 
12 Because shareholders have limited liability, thy capture most of the gain if the project is successful, while 
they suffer minimally if the project fails. On other hand, creditors can never receive more than their promised 
return. 
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a firm's growth opportunities. Myers (1977) and Titman and Wessels (1988) argue that 
because growth opportunities are not fully tangible (they are very difficult to monitor and 
value), creditors demand a relatively high return when providing finance for these 
opportunities. Thus, firms with significant growth opportunities should use a greater 
amount of equity finance (Lang, et al., 1996). Similarly, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
Galai and Masulis (1976) argue that firms in growing industries may have greater 
flexibility in their choice of investments, allowing equity holders greater opportunities to 
expropriate wealth from bondholders. The costs associated with agency relationships for 
rapidly growing firms may lead to a preference for equity funds. Another implication is 
that highly profitable slow-growing firms should have more debt. Large profits without 
good investment opportunities create the resources to consume perquisites and build 
empires. Increasing debt reduces the amount of free cash and decreases the manager's 
fractional ownership of residual claim (Harris and Raviv, 1991). 
IV. Asymmetric Information Theories 
In their most basic form, asymmetric information theories argue that managers have more 
information about the firm than do investors. Investors, knowing this, infer that managers 
are more likely to raise equity when share prices are over-valued. With this understanding, 
investors price equity issues at a discount. This discounting of share issues can force firms 
to reject projects even when they have positive net present values' 3. The prohibitive costs 
of external equity can be sidestepped, however, if firms are able to use retained earnings. 
Firms can also overcome the problem if they develop a reputation for providing true and 
accurate information. 
Asymmetric information can also generate a premium on debt funds through the same 
mechanism. Again, the premium on debt can force firms with exhausted internal funds to 
forego some projects with positive net present values. However, the premium on debt will 
be less than that on equity because debt contracts involve less risky streams of income. As 
a result, with information asymmetry, a firm will choose to finance new investment, first 
internally, then with low risk debt, and finally with equity as a last resort. This is often 
referred to as the pecking order theory. According to this theory the capital structure 
13 For formal models of this phenomenon see Greenwald et al., (1984) and Myers and 
Majluf (1984). 
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choice depends on the firm's investment opportunities and its profitability. Highly 
profitable firms might be able to finance their growth by using retained earnings and by 
maintaining a constant leverage ratio. In contrast, less profitable firms will be forced to 
resort to external financing. In general, profitable slow-growing firms should generate the 
most cash, but less profitable fast-growing firms will need significant external financing. 
The most important implication according to asymmetric information theories is that the 
underinvestment problem is least severe after information releases such as annual reports 
and earnings announcements. Therefore equity issues will tend to cluster after such 
releases and the stock price drop will be negatively related to the time between the release 
and the issue announcement. Another implication is that firms with comparatively few 
tangible assets relative to firm value are more subject to information asymmetries. For such 
firms, then, the underinvestment problem will occur more often than for similar firms with 
less severe asymmetries. These firms can be expected to base more on debt finance. 
Finally, as highlighted by Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Pagano and Zingales (2000) this 
information asymmetry problem is more serious for small firms, which have little track 
record, than for large firms, so that in the presence of an asymmetric information problem, 
the probability for a firm to issue equity should be positively related to the size of firm. 
8.2.2 Stock Market Development Effects 
As we have shown above, the corporate finance theories suggest that firms optimally 
structure financing packages to reduce the costs that result from taxes and the various 
imperfections of the financial markets. As financial markets develop, the cost of capital 
will decrease and firms will have greater access to a broader range of financial instruments. 
This would be expected to affect the financing policies of firms with increased investment 
demand. 
While differences in financial structure have been noted in the corporate finance literature, 
there have been very few attempts formally to model the effect of financial market 
development, especially stock markets, on firms' financial choices. Notable exceptions are 
Pagano's (1993a) model of the effect of opportunities for diversification on portfolio 
choice and Boyd and Smith's (1998) framework analysis of debt/equity financing for 
capital investment. 
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Following Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996), we argue that stock market 
development can affect a firm's financial choices and investment decisions by mitigating 
two classes of imperfections: First, the inability of investors and entrepreneurs to diversify 
their portfolio optimally in stock markets. Second, the asymmetric information problems 
that occur because stock markets do not perform the information production function 
efficiently. 
In an economy in which stock markets are imperfect, entrepreneurs face the cost of 
diversifying their portfolio. Investors will demand a higher return for risk. As a 
consequence of the cost of diversification, the entrepreneur may avoid the use of stock 
markets and therefore alter the firm's investment policies (Pagano, 1993a, Lehmann, 1997) 
by several methods: first, the firm may diversify into areas in which it does not have a 
comparative advantage; second, the firm may be worth less than it would if its shares were 
widely held; finally, it may choose less capital incentive production technologies that are 
subject to less long-term risk. 
As we have pointed out several times in the previous chapters, in addition to their function 
of mobilising capital to firms, stock markets have an important information role. Stock 
markets influence the incentive of agents to acquire and disseminate information about 
firms. Trading activity among participants produces information which is conveyed 
through price signals. This information production role of the stock market can mitigate 
information asymmetry problems and thereby reduce the cost of external capital (Pagano 
and Zingales, 2000) 14 
In addition to the above arguments, stock market development also can affect a firm's 
leverage ratio by facilitating the threat of a hostile takeover. It is widely argued that higher 
leverage decreases the probability that a firm will be taken over in the future because a 
higher leverage ratio increases the cost of the takeover activity (Israel, 1991). The existing 
literature suggests two explanations for this relation between leverage changes and the cost 
of takeover. First, Jensen (1986), Novaes and Zingales (1995), Zweibel (1996) and 
Safieddine and Titman (1999) argue that an increase in leverage can increase the 
14 Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986,1990,1993) provide theoretical models to suggest that a central effect of the 
informational problems in the capital market, including asymmetries of information between providers of 
capital and firm managers, is to restrict a firm's ability to raise equity funds in capital markets and this will 
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credibility of a target manager's promises, which in turn increases the target's stock price, 
thereby increasing the cost of the takeover. So this explanation implies that increased debt 
should lead to increased performance15. Second, Harris and Raviv (1988) and Stulz (1988) 
argue that leverage can make a target firm more costly to take over because it increases the 
percentage ownership of the target's management and therefore improves their bargaining 
power. Overall, we can conclude that stock markets that facilitate the threat takeover may 
force managers to increase leverage in order to reduce the probability that the firm will be 
taken over in the future. 
Consequently, as stock markets develop relative to debt markets, we might expect several 
things to happen. If we assume that firms were previously constrained in their utilisation of 
equity, stock market development would result in a substitution of equity for debt, 
primarily because there are certain growth projects that should only be financed through 
equity issues. This would result in falling leverage ratios. However, the more a stock 
market develops, the more its takeover function improves, which may force managers to 
increase leverage as a part of their defence strategies against the increased probability that 
their firms will be taken over in the future. Another possibility is that the development of 
the stock market improves information dissemination, which makes it less costly for 
investors and creditors to monitor firms. This makes both equity and debt less risky, and 
the change in the debt-equity ratio unknown. It is also possible that the increased ability of 
a firm to diversify risk may make expansion more attractive. Again, the expected change of 
debt-equity ratios is unknown. 
8.3 Previous Empirical Literature 
Many researchers into the topic of corporate finance have focused their attention on a 
firm's choice between debt and equity. The investigations have tried primarily to identify 
the determinants of debt-equity ratios. The most comprehensive study in this field has been 
done by Titman and Wessels (1988). In their study of corporate finance for firms in the US 
affect a firm's behaviour (including that relating to employment, production, pricing, investment that 
includes inventory changes, and research). 
15 Stein (1988) also shows that increasing the possibility of a takeover increases a firm's incentive to signal 
its value. Zwiebel (1996) shows that the benefit of debt rests in its ability to constrain managers from 
inefficient projects. In addition, Safieddine and Titman (1999) find that the operating performance of firms 
improves following leverage-increasing recapitalisations. 
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during the period 1974-198216, Titman and Wessels identified eight factors that different 
theories of capital structure have suggested would affect a firm's choice between equity 
and debt. 
The variables selected by Titman and Wessels from the theoretical capital structure include 
the intangible value of assets, non-debt tax shields, expected future growth, uniqueness, 
industry classification, firm size, volatility and profitability17. They find that uniqueness, 
firm size and profitability are important for capital structure decisions. These results 
suggest that large firms in the US have more access to capital markets, and small firms 
prefer short-term debt. Tax structure is not significant. While the cost of equity is 
significant (transaction costs), the other factor determining the cost of debt (interest rates) 
is ignored in this study. 
In a recent study, Graham and Harvey (2001) conducted a comprehensive survey to 
examine capital budgeting, cost of capital, and capital structure for a sample consisting of 
4,440 US firms. In their analysis of capital structure, they found that financial flexibility 
and credit rating were the most important factors in debt policy decisions, and that stock 
price appreciation was the most important factor influencing equity issuance. The degree 
of stock undervaluation is also important to equity issuance. They also found little 
evidence that signalling, transaction costs, underinvestment costs, asset substitution, free 
cash flow consideration, or product market concerns affect capital structure choice. 
16 Baxter and Cragg (1970), Taub (1975), Bradley, et al., (1984), Friend, et al., (1988), Givoly, et al., (1992) 
among others also investigated the determinants of capital structure for U. S. In other studies, Shuetrim, et al., 
(1993), Colombo (1999), Samuel (1996) and Gallego and Loayza (2000) analysed the capital structure 
determinants for Australia, Hungary, India and Chile, respectively. 
1' Firms with assets that can be used for collateral will issue more debt. Firms with large non-debt tax shields 
will issue less debt, as the tax advantage of issuing debt is lower for these firms. In the agency cost theories 
literature, expected growth is negatively related to long-term debt, since equity-controlled firms will invest 
sub-optimally in order to expropriate wealth from the firm's bondholders. This agency cost is expected to be 
higher in large firms. Unique firms will have a higher cost of liquidation if they default. These firms are less 
likely to issue debt. Uniqueness is measured by the ratio of research and development to sales and the ratio of 
selling expenses to sales. Firm size is associated with low debt because of market imperfections, large firms 
may have greater access to capital markets than small firms. As volatility increases, the amount of debt 
decreases; many of the costs associated with debt are fixed (interest payments) and must be paid whether the 
firm is profitable or not. Dividends, however, vary with changes in profitability. Titman and Wessels (1988) 
measure volatility by the standard deviation of the percentage change in operating income. Profitability 
attempts to represent the "pecking order" theory, which states that firms rely more heavily on internal than 
external funds. 
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In his study of UK firms between 1959 and 1974, Marsh (1982) finds that long-term debt 
ratios are determined by firm size, bankruptcy risk and asset composition. In a recent 
study, Bevan and Dabolt (2000) analyse the determinants of capital structure for a sample 
of 822 UK companies using a variety of gearing measures. They find that the level of 
gearing in UK companies is positively related to tangibility and size, and negatively 
correlated with profitability and the level of growth opportunities. In an important study, 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) investigated the determinants of capital structure for G-7 
countries (the US, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, the UK, and Canada). They used four 
key independent variables to analyse the determinants of capital structures in these 
countries: the tangibility of assets, market-to-book ratio, logarithm of sales as a size proxy, 
and a measure of profitability. They found that the factors determining firm leverage were 
similar across these countries. Particularly, they found that firm size, tangible assets, 
profitability, and future expected growth were important determinants of capital structure 
in G-7 countries. 
While there are many studies which examine the importance of firm-specific effects in 
determining a firm's financial structure choices, empirical evidence on the effect of stock 
market development on capital structure choices made by firms is very limited. In fact, to 
date only one empirical study has been completed: Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1996) investigated this issue for thirty developed and developing countries during the 
period 1980-91. 
Using a firm's debt-equity ratio as a measure of corporate capital structure, Demirguc- 
Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) investigated the extent to which variations in aggregate debt- 
equity ratios can be explained by stock market development, banking sector development, 
macroeconomics variables, variations in the tax treatment of different financing 
instruments, and firm-specific variables that have been identified as crucial to the capital 
structure choice. They used an aggregate measure of the debt-equity ratio, stock market 
variables and the banking variables, which were averaged for a period of 1980-91. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic performed three separate sets of analysis. They 
began by 
performing pooled OLS regressions of debt-equity ratios on all the independent variables 
mentioned above with developed and developing markets aggregate together. 
They 
determined that the development of a country's stock market did not explain changes in 
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capital structure, after other variables had been taken into account. They found that as the 
financial sector (the banking sector) develops relative to the stock market, firms rely more 
on debt instruments for new financing. 
Then they split the sample into firms in developed and developing countries, and 
performed the same type of analysis as above. They found that there are significant 
differences in the ways in which firms in developing countries finance new growth, as 
compared to their developed country counterparts. In developing countries, they found a 
significant and positive relationship between stock market development and debt-equity 
ratios. In their study, they concluded that as a stock market develops, firms in developing 
economies tend to rely more on debt. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic argue that this a 
result of increased information sharing and more opportunities for risk sharing, which 
allows firms to increase their borrowing. They also conclude that in countries with 
developing financial systems stock markets and banks play complementary roles. In 
developed countries, debt-equity ratios fall when stock markets develop, indicating that 
firms in developed countries increase their issuance of new equity as stock markets 
become more accessible 
Since Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) performed single cross-country regressions, 
their results suffer from measurement, statistical, and conceptual problems. They have a 
single set of firms' data for each country averaging, twelve years of data into a single data 
firm. This method loses information that could be country-specific, firm specific, and/or 
time-specific 18. In addition, one potential criticism of their results is that data quality varies 
across countries due to differences in accounting standards and practices, causing 
attenuation biases. In this study we address this shortcoming by focusing only on an 
individual country's experience, that of Jordan, using a panel data methodology. 
In addition, in this chapter we address one shortcoming that is common to most of the 
previous work in this field. The common approach in most empirical capital structure 
studies has been to study the determinants of optimal leverage by studying the relation 
between the observed leverage and a set of explanatory variables using non-dynamic 
models. This approach has two shortcomings. First, the observed leverage may not 
necessarily be the optimal one. As Myers (1977) points out, changes in capital structure are 
18We have discussed these shortcomings in detail in the previous empirical chapters. 
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costly to implement. Hence, the observed leverage at any point in time may substantially 
differ from its optimal level. Furthermore, Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that the 
observed leverage may differ from the optimal level predicted by a trade-off of the costs 
and benefits of debt. Second, the empirical analysis, being non-dynamic, is unable to shed 
any light on the nature of the dynamic capital structure of firms. To address these 
shortcomings, we estimate a dynamic adjustment type model within a panel data set19. This 
model allows for the possibility that at any point in time a firm's observed leverage may 
not be optimal. In addition, this model allows us to capture the dynamic of capital 
adjustments, i. e. if the firms indeed move toward optimal leverage ratios or away from 
them, and the speed with which they do that 
Empirically, unlike the existing empirical studies in this field, our analysis is carried out 
with the GMM for panel data utilising instruments variables. Particularly, we use two 
GMM dynamic panel estimators: GMM-Difference and GMM-System estimators. One 
important advantage of using this technique over the traditional ones (OLS) is that it 
enables consistent estimation in spite of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. 
8.4 Empirical Model and Variables Measure 
8.4.1 Empirical Model 
As we have shown above, the theory of capital structure postulated that in a world of 
imperfect and incomplete financial markets, firms could increase value by changes in their 
leverage. However, there are costs involved as well in changing leverage, and it is a trade- 
off between costs and benefits leverage that can imply an interior debt level for a firm 
(Zwiebel, 1996). The value corresponding to this optimal debt level is the maximum value 
of the firm given a level of operating cash flow. And the value of firms that are not at their 
optimal leverage level will be less than the maximum possible. 
19 It should be noted that we are not the first to recognise the importance of employing a dynamic to study 
capital structure. Edwin et al., (1989) provided the first attempts empirically to study a firm's dynamic 
capital structure behaviour. Fisher et al., (1989) also address theoretically the question of firms' 
dynamic 
optimal capital behaviour. They argue that the often-used results of static cross-sectional models are 
questionable if firms follow a dynamic optimal behaviour. In addition, Vilasuso and Minkler (2001) develop 
a dynamic model of the firm's capital structure where the cost of project finance is affected 
by both agency 
costs and the degree of asset specificity exhibited by the investment project. Shuetrim, et al., 
(1993) 
empirically address dynamic capital structure by considering a single lag of the 
leverage in their model. In a 
more recent empirical study, Graflund (2001) introduces a new approach to testing capital structure on a 
firm 
specific level. He uses the Johansen procedure for cointegration testing to test theories of optimal capital 
structure. 
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Based on the above, we assume that the optimal debt-equity ratio, Y*; t, is a function of 
firm characteristics, macroeconomics variables and financial development indicators. For 
the ith firm at time t, we can formalise this by the following equation: 
Yrt = ß, X:, +Yj M, +O Si +A; Bt +ai +ar +e, r (8.1) 
such that i=1,..., N, and t=1,..., T. X;, t stands for the variables capturing firm specific 
characteristics. Mt captures the macroeconomic variables, which vary with time but not 
across firms. St and Bt measure the stock market and the banking sector development 
variables, respectively, which also only vary with time and not across firms. ci and at 
represent unobserved firm specific effects and period specific effects, respectively. E;, t is 
white-noise error term (e« = iidN(0, a; )). 
As can be seen from the above specification the optimal leverage (debt-equity ratio) is 
allowed to vary across firms and over time. Since the factors that determine a firm's 
optimal leverage change over time, it is likely that the optimal leverage ratio moves over 
time even for the same firm. Thus, we capture the dynamic nature of the capital structure 
problem, which has been overlooked in most of the previous empirical literature20. 
In a perfectly frictionless world with no adjustment costs the firm would immediately 
respond to a variation in the independent variables by varying its existing leverage ratio to 
equal its optimal leverage (complete adjustment). Thus, at any point in time, the observed 
leverage of firm i (Y; t) should not be different from the optimal leverage, i. e., Y, 1, = 
Y:. This 
implies that the change in the existing leverage from the previous to the current period 
should be exactly the change required for the firm to be at optimal leverage at time t, 
i. e. yr - y_1 = yr -Y t_ý 
In practice however, the existence of significant adjustment costs 
means that the firm will not completely adjust its actual leverage to Y*. Thus, with less 
than complete adjustment, the firm's observed leverage ratio at any point in time would not 
equal its optimal leverage ratio. We can represent this by a partial adjustment model as21 
20 Most previous empirical studies have employed a single set of firms' data by averaging number of years 
of data into a single firm data. 
21 Marc Nerlove provided this model in 1958 (Gujarati, 1995). Nowadays this model is commonly used in 
empirical studies; for example, Sharpe (1994) used this model to investigate the effect of a firm's 
financial 
policy on the cyclicality of its labour force. Bhatacharya and Bloch (2000) used this model to test industrial 
concentration in Australian Manufacturing. Haynes et al., (2000) used it to determine the factors effect on 
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Yit - Y«-1 _ it (Y« - Yit-1) (8.2) 
where Xjt, is known as the coefficient of adjustment or the speed of adjustment. 
Equation (8.2) postulates that the actual change in leverage ratio at any point in time for 
firm i is the some fraction X of the optimal change for that period. If X; t=1, it means that 
the actual leverage ratio is equal to the optimal leverage; that is, actual leverage adjusts to 
the target leverage instantaneously and continuously i. e., for all ta firm shall consistently 
be at its target leverage. If X; t, <1, it means the adjustment from the period t-1 to t falls 
short of the adjustment required to attain the target. However, if X; t>1, it means that the 
firm makes adjustment more than is necessary and yet is still not at the target level (over- 
adjustment). 
Note that the above partial adjustment model can alternatively be written as 
Y. r=(1-/I1r 
)Y. 
r-r + 
A1rYr (8.3) 
substituting from equation (8.1) into equation (8.3) to remove the unobservable optimal 
leverage, }, gives the following empirical model: 
Y; r=(l-A1 )Yir-, +A1 (ßiX1r+V; Mr+giS1+P1 Bt+a; +af+E1) (8.4) 
Since equation (8.1) represents the optimal, or long-term firm leverage, equation (8.4) 
represents the short run firm leverage since the actual or existing leverage ratio may not be 
equal to its optimal leverage. When an equation in the form of (8.4) is estimated, the 
coefficient of the observed lagged leverage variable, Y; t_1, gives the estimate of one minus 
the partial adjustment. If the coefficient value of the lagged leverage ratio is greater than 
zero we can conclude that the adjustment from period t-1 to t falls short of the adjustment 
required to attain the target, but if the coefficient is less than zero then the firm over- 
adjusts in the sense that it makes more adjustment than is necessary and still does not reach 
the target. The coefficients of the remaining explanatory variables are estimates of the 
long-run impact multiplied by the partial adjustment. 
corporate divestment in the UK. For more detailed information about this model and how to estimate see for 
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As mentioned before, however, the main objective of this chapter is to determine the 
impact of stock market development on the financial choices of Jordanian firms. Thus, our 
explanatory variable whose influences we are interested in is the stock market development 
variable (St). A negative coefficient for the stock market variable indicates that a firm's 
leverage decreases with more development in the stock market. If the coefficient is 
positive, however, this implies complementarities between debt and equity finance. If the 
coefficient is not significant, we can conclude that stock market development does not 
affect the financing choice of firms. 
8.4.2 Variables Measure 
8.4.2.1 Determinants of Financial structure 
We use proxy variables to measure the variables determining the firm's capital structure. 
We can classify these variables into three categories: financial market development 
variables, individual firm characteristics variables and macroeconomic variables. 
I. Financial Market Development Variables 
In the absence of a perfect measure of financial market development, we use empirical 
indicators that proxy relatively well to stock market and banking sector development. We 
use four indicators to measure stock market development and one indicator to measure 
banking sector development. Our stock market development indicators are the ratio of 
stock market capitalisation to GDP (market capitalisation ratio), the ratio of total value 
traded to GDP (value-traded ratio), the ratio of the total value of shares traded to market 
capitalisation (turnover ratio), and the annualised standard deviation that is based on 
weekly market returns (volatility). Market capitalisation ratio is a measure of both the 
stock market's ability to allocate capital to investment projects and to provide significant 
opportunities for risk diversification for investors. Value-traded and turnover ratios are 
indicators of the ability of the market to trade significant positions (liquidity). High share 
price volatility may raise the cost of equity capital and cause the information role of the 
stock market to deteriorate. Our measure of banking sector development is the ratio of 
domestic credit to the private sector to the GDP. This ratio measures the ability of the 
example Patterson (2000). 
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banking sector to provide credit to the corporations. These indicators of stock market and 
banking sector development have been used in the previous empirical chapters of this 
study. 
II. Individual Firm Characteristics Variables 
The variables described in the capital structural theories are not observable. However, the 
basic approach that has been taken in previous empirical studies is to try to identify certain 
proxies for the unobservable theoretical attributes. As Titman and Wessels (1988) have 
explained, this approach certainly has its limitations. First, there may be some attributes 
which cannot be well represented by available proxies, or there may be several proxies that 
can be used for certain attributes. Secondly, the attributes themselves can be related as 
well, so the proxies' chosen may actually measure the effects of several different attributes. 
Thirdly, measurement errors in the proxy variables may be correlated with measurement 
errors in the dependent variables thus creating spurious correlations22. 
In this study we focus on the following five attributes that are most commonly used in the 
empirical studies23: asset tangibility, growth, size, profitability and cost of equity capital. 
a. Asset Tangibility 
In an uncertain world, with asymmetric information, the asset structure of a firm has a 
direct impact on its capital structure since a firm's tangible assets are the most widely 
accepted sources for bank borrowing and raising secured debt. If banks have imperfect 
information regarding the behaviour of the firm, firms with little tangible assets find it 
difficult to raise funds via debt financing. In addition, as discussed above, it is posited by 
some researchers that firms with a higher bankruptcy risk and higher liquidation costs will 
issue less debt. Firms with more intangible assets will have higher liquidation costs 
(Johnson, 1997). Therefore, firms with higher tangible assets will have lower liquidation 
costs and will issue more debt. Overall, we predict that we shall see a positive relationship 
between tangible assets and leverage. We use the ratio of tangible asset to total asset for 
the tangibility attribute. We use the sum of fixed assets and inventories as tangible assets. 
22 However, we address the two latest problems in our empirical analysis by using 
GMM dynamic panel 
estimators (see Chapter VII). 
23 See Harris and Raviv (1991) and Raj an and Zingales (1995). 
281 
b. Size 
Many researchers have found that firm size has an effect on access to capital markets. Firm 
size is an important consideration in the ability of firms to raise capital through debt or 
stock market. In order to be consistent with the existing literature, firm size is proxied by 
the logarithm of total assets. The expected sign of the coefficient of this variable is unclear. 
Large firms, which are more diverse and have a lower probability of being distressed, can 
sustain more debt than small firms. However, if there are substantial market imperfections, 
large firms may have greater access to equity markets (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Pagano 
and Zingales, 2000; Paranque, 2000; and Shin and Stulz, 2000). In addition, transaction 
costs for new equity issues are higher for small firms, thus encouraging a greater reliance 
on debt (Fama and Jensen, 1993; and Kadapakkam et al., 1998). Ritter (1987) has also 
found that there are economies of scale in issuing shares, as large firms have more access 
to equity markets. 
c. Growth 
The agency theory predicts a negative relationship between growth and leverage. Myers' 
(1977) underinvestment problem suggests a negative relationship between profitable 
investment opportunities and long-term debt. The argument is that a firm's growth 
opportunities are intangible assets instead of tangible assets; the cost of financial distress 
which is associated with high leverage may affect a firm's ability to finance its future 
growth. So managers of firms with valuable growth opportunities should choose low 
leverage. Lang et al., (1996) assert that, "Management chooses leverage based on its 
private information about future firm growth. ... management of 
firms with valuable 
growth opportunities should choose lower leverage because these firms might not be able 
to take advantage of their investment opportunities if they have to raise outside funds. 
Consequently, we could observe a negative relation between future growth and leverage 
because management of firms with good growth opportunities choose low leverage" (p. 3). 
Zweibel (1996) also points out that, "the better a manager's investment opportunities, the 
less debt a firm will have .. 
firms in new rapidly expanding industries, for which many 
good new investments are likely to be available, should have less debt than other firms" (p. 
1210). As suggested by Myers (1977) and Smith and Watts (1992) and following Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) and Lang et al., (1996), we use Tobin's Q as a proxy for firm's growth 
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opportunities24. Tobin's Q is measured by (total asset-equity book value + year end stock 
price x number of shares outstanding)/ total assets. 
d. Profitability 
Researchers have different views on the relationship between leverage and profitability. 
The pecking order theory suggests that firms which are more profitable will have less 
leverage, and will instead rely more on internal finance. However, asymmetric information 
theories argue that the choice of the firm's capital structure signals to outside investors the 
information of insiders, in which case investors take larger debt levels as a signal of good 
performance by the firm and of the management's confidence. According to this argument, 
the firm's value (or profitability) and leverage must be positively related. We use operating 
income before interest and taxes to total assets as our indicator of profitability. 
e. Cost of Equity 
One of the most important factors that affect a firm's financial decisions is the cost of 
equity funds. One would expect that as the cost of equity increases the firm should issue 
less equity. The cost of equity capital is a difficult concept to define and measure (Bekaert 
and Harvey, 2000). As a result it is measured in a variety of ways by different firms. The 
source of the difference of opinion is that payments to equity holders vary over time and 
involve no principle repayment; risk and an indefinite life are two important characteristics 
of equity. For that reason, many firms look at the growth rate of earnings, the ratio of 
dividend paid to price, as a measure of equity cost25. The share price can be calculated in 
one of two ways: the market value of equity or the book value of equity. The book value of 
equity, while easy to calculate, is backward looking and is not the relevant price for a new 
issue. Using the market share price at the time of issue resolves this problem. However, 
there is an additional criticism of these measures. Investors expect part of the return on 
their investment to be paid in the form of future share price increases. These expectations 
of increase in share prices must be related to an expectation of future payouts in dividends 
24 Tobin's Q is also used as a rough measure of agency costs because it captures the changing relationship 
between future investment opportunities and existing assets (Graflund, 2001). 
25 Bekaert and Harvey (2000) and Bekaert, et al., (2000a, b, c) used the 
dividend yield to measure the cost of 
capital equity changes pre- and post- stock market liberalisation in 20 emerging markets. 
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as well, since equity is not repaid as debt26. Consequently, in order for firms and investors 
to have comparable views, firms must consider not only current dividend yield, but also 
expected growth in future dividends. Using dividend yield alone as a measure of return on 
equity is likely to induce management to believe that equity is cheaper than debt, a belief 
that ignores that the extra risk shareholders bear and for which they demand 
compensation27. 
An alternative measure of the cost of equity is the price-earnings (P/E) ratio. An increase in 
the P/E ratio indicates a lower cost of equity finance for the firm28. Both the PIE ratio and 
the dividend yield predict the same changes in the cost of equity for given changes in 
market share prices. When share prices increase, the cost of equity falls. However, for 
emerging markets including Jordan, the P/E ratio is the most accepted measure of equity 
cost29. Therefore, consistent with this view, we use the P/E ratio as a measure of the cost of 
equity. 
III. Macroeconomic Variables 
The capital structure is not just a function of a firm's characteristics and financial market 
development: macroeconomic variables are also important for financing patterns. 
Corporate finance theories suggest that the growth rate of real GDP and inflation affect the 
availability of long-term instruments. The growth rate of real GDP is a measure of the 
growth opportunities available to domestic companies, and because corporate finance 
theories suggest that growth opportunities should not be financed by debt30, it is predicted 
that firms with higher rates of growth will rely less on debt instruments31. 
26 This view is consistent with markets in the US and most other developed countries. For example, investors 
in the NASDAQ market are not only interested in the dividend yield but also in the expected future share 
rices. 
7 See Myers (1977) for a more complete discussion of this issue. 
28 A P/E ratio of 22 indicates that it cost JD22 to purchase JD 1 of profit. In this example, cost of equity is 4.5 
percent. 
29 Other methods of measuring the cost of equity finance are the financial pricing models (CAPM, 
APM, 
intertemporal model, market factor model). While these models have been extensively used in the study of 
developed stock markets, many studies argue that financial pricing models are not appropriate methods to 
measure the cost of equity in emerging markets (see for example, Bekaert and Harvey, 
19'95a, b; Bakaert and 
Harvey, 1997; Bekaert et al., 1997; and others). In addition, many studies argue that 
firms' managers in 
emerging markets, including Jordan, do not use these type of models to measure the cost of equity capital; 
instead, they use the PIE ratio (see for example, Glen and Pinto, 1994; Singh, 1995; and 
Aylward and Glen, 
1999). 
30 See for example Zwiebel (1996). 
31 In addition, Gelb (1989) has found that real equity prices are influenced by the economic growth rate. 
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Because higher rates of inflation increase the risk, the typical investor will require a higher 
nominal rate of return. Therefore a higher rate of inflation will increase the cost of issuing 
debt, and so firms will be less likely to rely on debt. On the other hand, high inflation may 
have resulted in a shortage of long-term debt instruments. Therefore, firms would have no 
choice but to rely more heavily on debt instruments, if they tap external markets for 
finance. The net indication of the above consideration is that the effect of inflation on 
leverage is ambiguous. 
In addition to economic growth and inflation, an aggregation of real the cost of debt may 
influence firms' financial decisions. When the real cost of debt is increased given the level 
of equity cost, we should expect that a firm would rely more on equity finance. We use the 
real interest rate as a measure of the cost of debt. The real rate of interest is measured as 
the nominal rate of interest minus the inflation rate. 
8.4.2.2 Financial Structure 
In this study, we use two measures of financial leverage as dependent variables: one is the 
total debt divided by equity book value (LEVB) and the other is the total debt divided by 
equity market value (LEVM)32. Equity market value is measured as the product of year- 
end stock price and the number of shares outstanding. There are two reasons behind the 
choice of both book value and market value leverage. First, various capital structure 
theories have not specified which leverage measurement should be used. Second, for the 
purpose of being consistent, most empirical studies have used both book value leverage 
and market value leverage. 
8.5 Data and Summary Statistical Analysis 
Essentially the same firm sample is being used in this chapter as in Chapter VII of this 
study. Particularly, our firm sample contains panel data for 56 industrial firms listed on the 
AFM over the period 1988-98. Financial accounting data for each of the firms in the 
32 Many other studies employed the market value of debt. This is not applicable in this case as the corporate 
bond market in Jordan has been more or less non-existent. The financing of Jordanian companies is mainly 
carried out via mortgage and by issuing equity. In addition, Titman and Wessels (1988) point out that, 
"the 
cross-sectional correlation between the book value and market value of 
debt is very large, so the 
misspecification due to using book value measures is probably fairly small. Furthermore, we 
have no reason 
to suspect that the cross-sectional differences between market values and 
book values of debt should be 
correlated with any of the determinants of capital structure suggested 
by theory, so no obvious bias will 
result because of this misspecification" (p. 7). 
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sample come from the "Guide of the Publicly Held Corporations" published annually by 
the AFM. 
Table (8.1) provides summary descriptive statistics for the variables used in this chapter 
over the period 1988-98. As can be seen, for all the firm-level variables, the mean is higher 
than the median. Hence, the data is characterised by positive skewness. This is a normal 
phenomenon in panel data firm studies. 
Table 8.1: Summarv Ctntictirc 
Mean Median Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera 
TEVB 1.08 0.898 1.282 1.253 6.090 13.48 
(0.001) 
TEVM 0.881 0.420 1.025 1.426 8.168 .1 (0.000) 
MCR 65.97 65.80 12.82 0.490 2.030 0.882 
(0.643) 
VTR 18.64 15.73 8.94 0.924 2.787 2.24 (0.325) 
TOR 16.87 13.30 11.00 1.250 3.580 3.038 (0.218) 
VOL 10.17 9.80 2.06 -0.060 2.440 
0.149 
(0.928) 
0.904 BCR 59.59 59.79 13.03 0.290 1.724 (0.636) 
46.362 
AT 0.437 0.365 0.359 3.880 18.51 (0.000) 
7.548 
SIZE 16.21 15.959 1.524 0.544 3.250 (0.022) 
12.452 
GROWTH 1.597 1.484 0.635 1.253 5.110 (0.001) 
7.042 
PROF 0.070 0.064 0.061 0.235 3.971 (0.029) 
PER 16.548 18.620 2.120 7.257 
18.279 
(0 000) 19 258 . 
1.500 
RGDPG 2.830 2.100 7.129 -0.338 4.677 (0.472) 
6.944 
INFR 7.481 3.900 7.170 1.730 4.781 (0.031) 
4.403 
RINT 5.585 9.390 7.090 -1.449 4.050 (0.111) 
LEVB is the financial leverage (total debt divided by equity Doox vague). LJ V -LV1 13 uºC unanla w iCYcla6v, 
(total debt divided by equity market value). MCR is the stock market capitalisation ratio. VTR 
is the stock 
market value traded ratio. TOR is the stock market turnover ratio. VOL is the stock market volatility. 
BCR is 
the ratio of banking sector credit to private sector to GDP. AT is the asset tangibility 
(the sum of fixed assets 
and inventories to total asset). SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. GROWTH 
is the measure of growth 
opportunities and is equal to (total assets-equity book value + year end stock price number of shares 
outstanding)/(total assets). PROF is the profitability (operating income 
before interest, taxes to total asset). 
PER is the price-earning ratio. RGDPG measures economic growth (real 
GDP growth). INFR is the inflation 
rate. RINT is the real interest rate (measures cost of debt). 
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The correlation matrix among the variables used in this chapter is presented in Table (8.2). 
Both measures of leverage ratios- total debt/equity book value (LEVB) and total 
debt/equity market value (LEVM)- are positively and significantly correlated (at the five- 
percent level) with each of the capital market capitalisation ratio (CMR), value-traded ratio 
(VTR) and turnover ratio (TOR), indicating that more development in the stock market is 
associated with more debt financing relative to equity. This relation is consistent with a 
priori expectations that further development of the stock market leads to opportunities for 
risk sharing and aggregation of information that allows firms to increase their borrowing 
and encourages creditors to increase their lending. Therefore, the development of the stock 
market could indicate the maturity of the financial sector as whole, which allows firms to 
issue more equity and debt. Both leverage measures are also positively correlated with 
stock market volatility (VOL), indicating that with more volatility in stock market prices 
firms will rely on banks to satisfy their financing needs. Moreover, the correlation between 
the banking sector development indicator (BCR) and both leverage ratio measures is 
positive, which suggests that a more developed banking sector will lead to a greater 
reliance on debt. 
As can be seen from Table (8.2) also, there are positive correlations between both the 
leverage ratio measures and the tangible assets (AT). Moreover, both measures of leverage 
ratio are negatively correlated with the firm size (SIZE), the operating income (PROF), the 
market to book ratio (GROWTH), the price-earning ratio (PER), the real interest rate and 
real GDP growth (RGDPG). The leverage measures are also positively correlated with the 
inflation rate (1NF); however, the relation is not significant at the five-percent level. 
8.6 Empirical Results 
Model (8.4) is estimated using two alternative versions of dependent variables i. e. book 
and market value measures of leverage, and in each version of dependent variable we 
generated alternative versions of stock market development; this is alternatively measured 
as the stock market capitalisation ratio, value-traded ratio, turnover ratio and the market 
volatility. The regression equations estimated here are dynamic in that they 
lagged 
dependent variables and explanatory variables that are likely to 
be endogenous/or 
correlated with firm-specific effects. As in the previous empirical chapter, we use 
the 
GMM dynamic panel technique, with both difference and system estimators. 
We use 
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instruments dated t-2 and earlier. These estimators permit us to overcome the statistical 
problems that are associated with unobserved individual effects, endogeneity of 
explanatory variables, and the use of lagged dependent variables. We present only two 
step-GMM estimators, since they are more efficient than one-step estimators, and since 
only the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions is heteroscedasticity-consistent only if 
based on the two-step estimators. In Table (8.3) the results of both the difference and 
system GMM dynamic panel estimators for the book value leverage measures (LEVB) 
with the alternative measures of stock market development are given. Table (8.4) gives the 
results from both the techniques for the market value leverage measures (LEVM) with the 
same alternative specifications of stock market development variables. 
Before discussing the coefficient estimates, we have to discuss some specification tests 
since the validity of our results depends upon the consistency of the GMM-estimators we 
used. We are interested mainly in the two statistical tests which are reported in Tables (8.3) 
and (8.4): (1) the serial correlation test, where the null hypothesis is that the errors in the 
differenced equations exhibit no second-order serial correlation; and (2) the Sargan test, 
where the null hypothesis is that the instrumental variables are uncorrelated with the 
residuals. 
As can be seen from Table (8.3), for regressions with LEVB, there is no evidence of 
second-order serial correlation and the regressions pass the Sargan specification tests. In 
the system dynamic panel estimators, we do not reject the difference Sargan tests for the 
validity of additional instruments; that is, we do not reject the assumption that the firm- 
specific effect is uncorrelated with the difference of the regressors. Overall, the test 
statistics for the regressions with LEVB support the statement that our results from both 
difference and system dynamic panel estimators do not suffer from endogeneity problems 
and unobserved firm specific effects. For the regressions with LEVM (Table 8.4), both 
second-order serial correlation and Sargan tests do support the use of the difference 
dynamic panel estimators in which neither test rejects the differenced error terms are not 
second-order serially correlated and the orthogonality conditions at the ten-percent level. 
However, the difference Sargan tests for the validity of the additional instruments do not 
support the use of the system dynamic panel estimators for the LEVM regressions 
in which 
the data reject the orthogonality conditions at the five-percent level. These results 
imply 
that the differences in the right-hand side variables are correlated with the unobserved 
firm 
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specific effects, so that we cannot assume that the additional moment restrictions used in 
the system estimation for LEVM regressions hold33 
We now discuss the coefficient estimates of the alternative specifications of the dynamic 
adjustment capital structure model (equation 8.4). We first describe the adjustment 
coefficients (coefficients of lagged dependent variables). These coefficients allow us to 
determine whether firms' observed leverage is different from their target leverage and 
whether firms do move towards target debt-equity ratios (or away from them) and the 
speed with which they do that. Second, we analyse the effects of firm specific 
characteristics and macroeconomic variables on financial structure choice, and compare 
our results with the existing literature. Finally, we discuss the main issue of this chapter 
which is the effect of stock market and banking sector development on the firms' financing 
choices. It is worth noting here that the results given in Tables (8.3) and (8.4) show a 
considerable consistency across specifications and with either version of the leverage 
measure, with few exceptions. 
The results show that, in both the difference and system dynamic panel regressions, the 
coefficients of lagged book and market value measures of leverage across specifications 
enter significantly and greater than zero at any level of significance. These results clearly 
indicate that Jordanian firms always under-adjust in the sense that they fall short of the 
adjustment required to attain the target leverage levels. In other words, these results 
indicate that Jordanian firms have capital structures that are not at the target. The 
conclusion that one can deduct from this result suggests that the financial market 
imperfections constitute a potential serious problem in Jordan during the period under 
investigation (1988-98). This implication is reflected in the inability for the Jordanian 
firms in achieving their optimal capital. The economic instability that characterized the 
Jordanian economy during the late of 1980s and the early of 1990s could be a very good 
reason for these imperfections: in presence of an unstable economic system current 
performance are a very poor indicator for future performances. Therefore, not only 
borrowers do not have any reputation driving from the past, but also they have relevant 
difficulties in building one. In this situation the information problems that are likely to 
33 This calls for some caution with respect to the interpretation of the estimation results. 
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emerge may cause serves forms of credit rationing and may in general create impediments 
to firms in achieving what they consider to be their optimal capital structure. 
Regarding the speed of adjustment, the results, however, did not provide us with a clear 
picture of the speed with which Jordanian firms move towards the target ratios. In these 
regressions the estimated coefficients of lagged leverage that emerge from the difference 
estimator are not similar in order of magnitude to those that obtained from the system 
estimator. For example, the lagged value of LEVB has coefficients of about 30 percent 
which corresponds to a partial adjustment of about 70 percent (the partial adjustment is 1 
minus the estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable) in the difference results, 
while in the system results this variable has coefficients of about 52 percent which 
corresponds to a partial adjustment of about 48 percent. As we can show, in these two 
estimators the speed of adjustment coefficients in the difference estimators is quite a lot 
higher than the speed of those in the system one. The difference between these two 
34 estimators is not negligible 
As shown by Tables (8.3) and (8.4), both techniques give a considerable consistency of 
results across specification and with either version of leverage measure with respect to the 
firm's specific characteristics and macroeconomic variables. The variable related to the 
tangibility of assets, the sum of fixed assets and inventors over total assets, is positively 
and statistically significant in most regressions for both LEVB and LEBM. This implies 
that firms with more tangible assets have more total debt than firms with fewer tangible 
assets. This result is consistent with the view that there are various costs (agency costs and 
expected bankruptcy/financial distress costs) associated with the use of debt funds and 
these costs may be moderate by collateral. Firms with high quality collateral can obtain 
debt at a lower premium because of the greater security for creditors. This result is also 
consistent with the evidence reported in Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996), and Bevan and Dabolt (2000). 
34In the difference results the coefficient of the lagged value of LEVM is estimated by about 18 percent 
which corresponds to a partial adjustment of about 82 percent, while in the system results this variable has 
coefficients of about 34 percent which corresponds to a partial adjustment of about 64 percent. 
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Table 8.3: Capital Structure (LEVB) and Stock Market Development: Dynamic Panel 
Regressions 
Independent GMM -DIFFERENCE Estimator GMM-SYSTEM Estimator 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Lagged Dependent 0.3092 0.3093 0.3099 0.3163 0.5035 0.5242 0.5274 0.5370 
Variable 
(27.50) (27.30) (28.00) (29.00) (66.30) (75.70) (79.20) (55.70) 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
MCR 
0.0212 0.0206 
(2.37) (2.08) 
[0.0211 [0.040] 
VTR 
0.0351 0.0378 
(2.27) (4.99) 
[0.0261 [0.000] 
TOR 0.0162 0.0205 
(2.62) (4.03) 
[0.011] [0.001] 
V OL 0.0025 0.0002 
(2.17) (0.299) 
[0.033] [0,976] 
BCR 0.0476 0.0577 0.0489 0.0350 0.0475 0.0522 0.0330 0.0440 
(4.27) (3.66) (4.62) (4.43) (3.08) (3.93) (3.01) (4.56) 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.030] [0.000] [0.003] [0.000] 
AT 0.0592 0.0616 0.0613 0.0643 0.0712 0.1220 0.0127 0.0195 
(1.12) (1.15) (1.45) (1.89) (4.08) (4.20) (5.46) (5.81) 
[0.266] [0.253] [0.152] [0.060] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
SIZE -0.0506 -0.0565 -0.0681 
-0.0472 -0.0346 -0.0250 -0.0226 -0.0207 
(-2.33) (-2.34) (-2.56) 
(0.036] (-3.96) (-2.78) (-2.62) (-2.35) 
[0.032] [0.021] [0.012] [0.000] [0.006] [0.008] [0.020] 
GROWTH -0.0453 -0.0426 -0.0518 -0.0512 -0.1668 -0.1642 -0.1381 -0.176 
(- 2.21) (-2.15) (-2.00) (-2.90) (-2.29) (-2.38) (-3.16) (-2.23) 
[0.013] [0.051] [0.047] [0.005] [0.024] [0.029] [0.002] [0.028] 
PROF -0.0178 -0.0404 -0.0182 -0.098 -0.1043 -0.1320 -0.215 -0.197 
(-0.230) (-0.364) (-0.247) (-0.94) (-3.22) (-3.48) (-3.78) (-2.15) 
[0.819] [0.692] [0.811] [0.350] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.034] 
PER -0.00055 -0.00057 -0.00055 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.00141 -0.00179 -0.0012 
(-6.19) (-6.95) (-7.00) (-3.96) (-2.63) (-2.76) (-4.04) (-3.96) 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.010] [0.007] [0.000] [0.000] 
RGDPG -0.1198 -0.0657 -0.0647 -0.0542 
-0.0839 
(-1.95) -0.0442 -0.0624 -0.072 
(-1.49) (-1.73) (-1.57) (-1.44) [0.054] 
(-1.55) (-1.82) (-1.28) 
[0.146] [0.087] [0.127] [0.151] [0.123] [0.068] [0.203] 
0.1834 0.2245 0.0744 0.1131 
0.1638 
(2.22) 
0.0825 0.0814 0.1434 
INFR (1.03) (1.69) (0.984) (1.96) [0.028] 
(1.28) (1.23) (1.69) 
[0.305] [0.095] [0.327] [0.052] [0.204] [0.216] [0.094] 
T -0.0572 -0.0634 -0.0122 -0.0130 -0.0235 -0.0157 -0.0187 -0.0354 
(-2.77) (-2.76) (-0.32) (-3.34) (-4.34) (-1.98) (-1.69) (-2.87) 
[0.006) [0.007] [0.6671 [0.001] [0.000] [0.049] [0.092] [0.005] 
1" Order Serial 
[0.041] [0.037] [0.038] 
[0.041] [0.036] [0.039] [0.044] [0.050] 
Correlation LM (1) 
2°d Order Serial [0.713] [0.698] [0.688] [0.690] [0.757] [0.771] [0.667] [0.773] Correlation LM (1) 
Joint Test of [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] Significance 
Sargau Test [0.885] [0.886] [0.887] [0.917] [0.943] 
-- -- r 
[0.938] 
r. r rwrr 
[0.717] 
r ___ A r+w4w 
[0.505] 
.f [1VC1TF7XA 
Numbers in Parentheses are t-values and numbers in Brackets are p-values. CiMM-Ul t. KnINLt anu U1V11V. -3 1 a1LlVl 
regressions estimated by using DPD99 package for Ox. LEVB is the financial leverage (total 
debt divided by equity book 
value). LEVM is the financial leverage (total debt divided by equity market value). MCR is the stock market 
capitalisation ratio. VTR is the stock market value traded ratio. TOR is the stock market turnover ratio. 
VOL is the stock 
market volatility. BCR is the ratio of banking sector credit to private sector to GDP. AT is the asset tangibility 
(the sum 
of fixed assets and inventories to total asset). SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. 
GROWTH measures the growth 
opportunities and is equal to (total assets-equity book value + year end stock price number of shares outstanding)/ 
(total 
assets). PROF is the profitability (operating income before interest, taxes to total asset. 
PER is the price-earning ratio. 
RGDPG measures economic growth (real GDP growth). RINT is the real interest rate 
(measures cost of debt). 
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Table 8.4: Capital Structure (LEVM) and Stock Market Development: Dynamic 
Panel Regressinns 
Independent 
i bl V 
GMM-DIFFERENCE Estimator GMM-SYSTEM Estimator es ar a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Lagged Dependent 0.1806 0.1758 0.1889 0.2001 0.3270 0.3463 0.3929 0 3330 
Variable (34.60) (37.8) (25.70) (20.60) (67.20) (57.60) (53.20) . (67.70) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
MCR 0.0043 0.0037 
(3.93) (2.16) 
[0.000] [0.032] 
VTR 0.0208 0.0345 
(6.17) (7.38) 
[0.000] [0.000] 
TOR 0.0066 0.0025 
(5.35) (2.02) 
[0.000] [0.045] 
VOL 0.0604 0.0147 
(4.34) (3.65) 
[0.000] [0.000] 
BCR 0.0179 0.0180 0.0189 0.0339 0.0085 0.00418 0.00708 0.0095 
(7.81) (4.04) (6.47) (9.03) (2.86) (1.61) (4.94) (7.78) 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.005] [0.109] [0.000] [0.250] 
AT 0.1848 0.2024 0.2440 0.1144 0.0829 0.0685 0.0070 0.0614 
(5.03) (3.48) (4.04) (3.28) (2.46] (2.01) (1.04) (3.54) 
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.015] [0.046] [0.301] [0.001] 
SIZE -0.1214 -0.1214 -0.0847 -0.0858 -0.1084 -00933 -0.0785 -0.0122 (-1.57) (-1.57) (-6.17) (-6.43) (-3.83) (-3.49) (-3.88) (-3.41) 
[0.120] [0.120] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
GROWTH -0.2220 -0.1064 -0.1491 -0.2625 -0.0584 -0.0900 -0.0232 -0.0115 (-5.50) (-3.65) (-4.69) (-7.54) (-4.67) (-4.64) (-1.07) (-0.495) 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.287] [0.622] 
PROF 0.0411 0.0282 0.0215 -0.0955 -0.0964 0.0274 -0.0480 -0.0487 
(0.682) (0.276) (0.227) (-3.48) (-3.23) (1.39) (-3.01) (-3.10) 
[0.548] [0.783] [0.821] [0.001] [0.002] [0.168] [0.003] [0.002] 
PER -0.00079 -0.00066 -0.00111 -0.0014 -0.00287 -0.00658 -0.00133 -0.0024 
(-4.49) (-3.30) (-3.96) (-4.87) (-5.95) (-8.30) (-3.15) (-3.88) 
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.033] [0.000] 
RGDPG -0.0315 -0.0357 -0.0338 -0.0205 -0.0974 -0.1217 -0.1118 -0.1057 
(-1.44) (-1.56) (-1.90) (-2.27) (-6.84) (-4.97) (-7.79) (-6.17) 
[0.152] [0.121] [0.052] [0.027] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
INFR 0.0614 0.0584 0.1190 0.0321 0.0196 0.0148 0.0279 0.0149 
(2.15) (2.20) (0.843) (2.59) (0.560) (0.511) (0.998) (0.351) 
[0.034] [0.030] [0.401] [0.011] [0.576] [0.610] [0.320] [0.727] 
-0.0204 -0.0213 -0.0163 -0.0133 -0.1312 -0.1482 -0.2807 -0.0790 
RINT (-1.15) (-1.20) (-1.82) (-2.36) (-2.98) (-3.38) (-3.86) (-1.60) 
[0.254] [0.234] [0.074] [0.032] [0.003] [0.001] [0.000] [0.112] 
1st Order Serial 
[0.389] [0.382] [0.408] [0.446] [0.187] [0.098] [0.0203] [0.200] Correlation LM (1) 
2nd Order Serial 
[0.321] [0.309] [0.311] [0.328] [0.303] [0.323] [0.272] [0.295] Correlation LM (1) 
Joint Test of [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] Si nificance 
Sargan Test [0.248] [0.489] [0.619] [0.548] [0.000] [0.000] [0.047] [0.040] 
Numherc in Pnrvnfhacr c nrp t-va1npc and nu mhers in Brackets are n-values. This table reports the GMM-SYSTEM 
regression, estimated by using DPD99 package for Ox. LEVB is the financial leverage (total debt divided by equity book 
value). LEVM is the financial leverage (total debt divided by equity market value). MCR is the stock market 
capitalisation ratio. VTR is the stock market value traded ratio. TOR is the stock market turnover ratio. VOL is the stock 
market volatility. BCR is the ratio of banking sector credit to private sector to GDP. AT is the asset tangibility (the sum 
of fixed assets and inventories to total asset). SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. GROWTH measures the growth 
opportunities and is equal to (total assets-equity book value + year end stock price number of shares outstanding)/ (total 
assets). PROF is the profitability (operating income before interest, taxes to total asset). VPROF is profit volatility (the 
absolute value of the first difference of percentage change of operating income). PER is the price-earning ratio. RGDPG 
measures economic growth (real GDP growth). INFR is the inflation rate. RINT is the real interest rate (measures cost of 
debt). 
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The results also show that leverage is negatively and significantly related to the firm size 
variable, the natural log of total assets. This result is inconsistent with most previous 
empirical studies which find a positive relationship between firm size and leverage35. The 
possible explanation of our result can be found in Rajan and Zingales (1995), who point 
out that, "... information symmetries between insiders in a firm and the capital markets are 
lower for large firms. So large firms should be more capable of issuing informationally 
sensitive securities like equity, and should have lower debt" (p. 1450)36. This result can be 
also explained by reference to the fact that the larger Jordanian firms have a higher average 
age and thus have a longer and better reputations than the smaller firms, which enable them 
to access to the stock market at lower cost; the smaller Jordanian firms, on the other hand, 
have a lower average age which reduce their ability to access the stock market for long- 
term funds. Another explanation of this result is also related to the fact that the small firms 
in Jordan are closely held and managed by majority- often family- interest, which may be 
expected to make them more reluctant to issue equity for fear of losing control of the firm. 
The growth opportunity, measured by market-to-book ratios, is significantly and negatively 
related to leverage as predicted by the theory and as has been found in previous empirical 
studies that growing firms to be financed by equity. 
The variable profits over total assets which measure the firm's profitability enter in most 
regressions negatively and significantly related to both measures of leverage. The 
significance of this variable may be related to the high information asymmetry problems of 
the Jordanian banks- due to the economic instability during the most period under 
consideration- and to the undeveloped nature of its bond market. It is also that profitability 
is correlated with growth opportunities so that the negative correlation between 
profitability and leverage is a proxy for the difficulty in borrowing against intangible 
growth opportunities. 
35 Consistent with our results, however, Rajan and Zengales (1995) and Chen and Sterken (1998) in the cases 
of Germany and the Netherlands, have found some evidence of the positive relationship between firm size 
and leverage. In addition, our results are consistent with the findings of Singh and Hamid (1992) and Singh 
(1995) in which small-and medium size firms in developing countries rely primarily on bank loans, while 
large firms rely primarily on equity. However, our results are inconsistent with Helwegge and Liang's (1996) 
findings in which they present evidence that small firms frequently issue outside equity before they issue 
debt. 
36 This also noted by Paranque (2000). 
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In all regressions leverage is negatively and highly significantly related to the price- 
earnings ratio. In addition, the real interest rate in most regressions is negatively and 
significantly related to leverage. These are new results: they have not been tested before in 
the literature. High price-earnings ratios and high interest rates will cause firms to choose 
equity over debt, as both of these factors reduce the cost of equity finance. 
It is puzzling that the results in Tables (8.3) and (8.4) show that in most regressions the 
coefficients of the macroeconomic variables i. e. the growth rate of real GDP and inflation 
rates, are insignificant. The insignificance of the inflation variable suggests that general 
good price inflation has played little independent part in the trend towards higher leverage. 
This may be because creditors are able to compensate themselves for the wealth transfer to 
debt holders created by inflation by means of increases in nominal interest rates. The issue 
is confused, however, by the fact that periods of highest inflation coincided with the 
presence of financial controls which limited the ability of firms to respond with increased 
leverage. The insignificance of the growth rate of real GDP also suggests the unimportant 
role of economic growth in determining the capital decisions of Jordanian firms. This 
result is inconsistent with Zwiebel's (1996) view that " leverage should decrease when the 
market is booming (presuming that this is an indication of good investment opportunities) 
and should increase when the market is weak" (p. 1211). One explanation of this result is 
the slowdown of economic activity vis-a-vis reduced investment opportunity for a wide 
cross-section of firms. As a result of a slowdown, firms are likely to reduce their use of 
both equity and debt funds. 
We turn now to the issue of primary interest, the effect of financial market development on 
a firm's financial choice. As can be seen from Tables (8.3) and (8.4), the banking sector 
development indicator is positively and highly significantly related to the leverage. Thus, 
firms will rely more heavily on debt as the banking sector becomes more developed. This 
result is highly consistent with our a priori expectations and with the findings in 
Demirguc- 
Kunt and Maksimovic (1996). 
In both regressions explaining LEVB and LEVM and in the 
different estimations, the 
results show that the stock market capitalisation ratio is positively and 
highly significantly 
related to a firm's financial choices. When we use alternative specifications of 
the stock 
market development indicator- value-traded ratio, turnover ratio and the market price 
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volitality- we still consistently yield the same pattern, positive and highly significant 
coefficients for the stock market development indicators. These results are perhaps 
surprising but they are consistent with the finding in Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1996). They are surprising because one would expect that as the stock market develops, 
firms in developing countries would rely more heavily on equity finance as the market 
imperfections are removed, as indeed firms in developed countries have been shown to do. 
The question now is why would firms increase debt issues as the stock market becomes 
more developed? The first point to make is that firms are not necessarily substituting debt 
for equity- the evidence suggests that, in fact, firms are increasing the amount of debt 
relative to equity. But the question remains, why more debt? It is possible that further 
development of the stock market leads to opportunities for risk sharing and aggregation of 
information that allows firms to increase borrowing. This, however, assumes that firms 
were credit-constrained before the stock market became more developed. It is possible also 
that further development of the stock market improves its takeover function, which might 
force managers to increase leverage as part of their defence strategies against the increased 
probability that their firms will be taken over in the future. Another possible explanation of 
this result might be that the cost of equity issue is typically higher than debt issue in Jordan 
due to the lack of competition among investment banks. 
A more compelling conclusion for the above result however, is that debt and equity finance 
are not necessarily substitutes for each other, but are possibly financial tools that play 
significantly different roles in the financing decision. The development of the stock market 
allows for more risk sharing and information dissemination, which encourages creditors to 
increase their borrowing. Therefore, the development of the stock market increases equity 
and debt financing opportunities for firms. 
8.7 Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter we have examined the effect of financial market development on the capital 
structure choices of Jordanian firms during the period 1988-98. 
While other researchers 
have examined this issue, this is the first study which 
looks strictly at an individual 
country's experience. In addition, the previous study 
has analysed single cross-country 
regressions, which suffer from measurement, statistical, and conceptual problems. 
This 
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method loses information that could be country-specific, firm specific, and/or time- 
specific. In this chapter we examined how individual firms make financing choices using a 
panel data methodology. In addition, as in Chapter VII, our analysis was carried out with 
the GMM for panel data utilising instruments variables. Particularly, we used two GMM 
dynamic panel estimators: GMM-Difference and GMM-System estimators. 
Furthermore, unlike most previous capital structure studies which study the determinants 
of capital structure using a non-dynamic model, we employed a dynamic adjustment 
model. This model allowed us to shed light on the nature of dynamic capital structure 
adjustment by firms i. e. if firms do indeed move towards target leverage ratios or away 
from them, and the speed with which they do that 
Our results suggest that Jordanian firms typically have capital structures that are not at the 
target. Regarding the speed of adjustment, the results, however, did not provide us with a 
clear picture of the speed with which Jordanian firms move towards the target ratios. We 
find that growth opportunities display a negative relationship with respect to debt-equity 
ratios. This evidence is consistent with Myers's (1977) views that growing firms are 
financed by equity. We also find support for the pecking order hypothesis that there are 
negative relationships between firms' profitability and leverage ratios. This implies that 
firms prefer to finance investments with internally returned funds before issuing debt. 
As for size effect, evidence is presented to indicate that the larger firms employ more 
equity in their capital structures. Theories suggest that this is due to substantial market 
imperfections i. e. asymmetric information, large firms should be more capable of issuing 
equity, and should have lower debt. The evidence suggests that the equity-debt ratios are 
negatively related to price-earnings ratios and the real interest rate. These results indicate 
that high price-earnings ratios and high interest rates will cause firms to choose equity over 
debt, as both of these factors reduce the cost of equity finance. However, the results 
suggest an unimportant role for economic growth and inflation rates in explaining the 
variation in debt-equity ratios. 
Our main results from this chapter have shown that, with further development in the stock 
market, Jordanian firms become more leveraged. This result suggests that, as the stock 
market becomes more developed, and as firms have more access to equity, they will not 
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necessarily issue more equity. In fact, they would issue more debt relative to equity, which 
implies that transaction costs for equity are high relative to debt, firms are credit 
constrained or that the issue cost of equity is high due lack of competition among 
investment banks. 
It is also possible that improved information dissemination, monitoring and risk sharing, 
make firms better credit risks for bank loans. In addition, these results support the findings 
of the previous empirical chapters that debt and equity are complementary tools of finance, 
each providing different benefits to firms. Therefore, the development of the stock market 
increases equity and debt finance opportunities for firms. 
The policy implications of this chapter further emphasise the fact that the Jordanian 
government should not necessarily abandon the development of one component of the 
financial sector. Since debt and equity are complementary financing tools, each playing a 
different role, the sectors should be developed together. 
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Chapter IX 
Summary Results and Policy Implications 
9.1 Major Results of the Study 
This study provides considerable knowledge about the impact of stock market 
development and economic growth in the small developing country of Jordan. Some of this 
knowledge might appropriately be generalised to other developing countries that have a 
similar economic structure. The detailed findings are numerous and discussed throughout 
the thesis; the following points, however, capture the major results. 
(1) Our survey of Jordan's economy and the development of its stock market (Chapter II 
and III) suggest that: 
a. The real economic development has been impressive especially during the 1970s and 
the first half of the 1980s. The Jordanian economy realised an impressive rate of GDP 
growth and managed to transform the social, health, public utilities, infrastructure support 
(transportation and communications) and, especially, educational services from a 
rudimentary stage to one favourably comparable with the Middle-Eastern countries. Thus, 
we can conclude that Jordan, during these periods, has achieved both economic growth and 
development. 
b. However, the relatively small size of the economy and its limited natural resources had 
forced Jordan to develop strong external economic and financial relations to cover its 
economic development need. The level of economic activities in Jordan tends to be greatly 
affected by these relations. Important implications of these relations are foreign trade with 
neighbouring Arab markets, foreign financial assistance (aid and grants), and remittances 
from Jordanian expatriates, particularly from the Arab oil exporting countries. The 
anomaly of this dependence on external relations has been the vulnerability of the 
economy to exogenous factors beyond the control of the economy itself. In addition to this 
peculiar set up, the economy itself is characterised by the following: first, structural 
problems indicated by a low degree of complementarily among the various sectors, and 
extensive dependence on foreign markets for imports and exports; second, serious 
discrepancies between investment and national savings, leading to a significant 
dependence on external sources, mainly aid, grants, remittances from Jordanian expatriates 
and debt to financing investment; third, chronic imbalance between budget revenues and 
expenditures, and the existence of a long-standing budget deficit; finally, imbalance 
between population density and employment, resulting in structural distortion in the 
employment market. 
c. Faced with increasing economic difficulties at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of 
the 1990s, Jordan embarked on wide-ranging structural reform programs. As a 
consequence, over the last few years, Jordan has made significant progress towards 
liberalisation of its trade, exchange rate and interest rate regimes and, to a lesser extent, 
moving toward achieving greater integration into the international financial system. In 
particular, Jordan has made progress in eliminating import and exchange and interest rate 
restrictions, lowering import tariffs, and adopting current account convertibility. In recent 
years, liberalisation of inward capital movements has been pursued in Jordan, together with 
a gradual relaxation of controls on outward capital flows. 
d. However, more than any other country in the region, Jordan's future performance 
depends on the progress in the political stability in the Middle East. Its major three sources 
of revenues: tourism, remittances and regional trade as well as foreign direct investments 
are vulnerable to political setbacks. Political stability in the region and removal of the UN 
embargo on Iraq will inspire confidence in the Jordanian economy. The government also 
needs to continue with the policies of economic restructuring, privatisation and 
liberalisation, and to put in place key legislation governing investment and taxation in 
order to stimulate the local and foreign investment needed to accelerate the economic 
growth. 
e. Financial sector in Jordan is relatively well developed. This fact has also been 
documented by many World Bank studies. More specifically, these studies have classified 
Jordan within the countries that having developed financial sector. In fact, the Jordan 
financial system has witnessed extensive development both quantitatively and qualitatively 
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during the last two decades. Total assets of licensed banks as a percentage of GDP 
increased from 81.7 percent in 1978 to over 200 percent at the end of 1998. The banking 
system played an effective role in intermediating short-term savings and medium-term 
financing requirements. Total outstanding credit facilities of licensed banks increased from 
42.6 percent in 1978 to more than 81 percent in 1998, reflecting a deepening of private 
sector financing. This quantitative growth was accompanied by increasing modernization 
and sophistication in terms of the day-to-day banking business. Although Jordan's banking 
sector has witnessed extensive development, it still suffers from segmentation, with 
relatively little competition and little participation of foreign banks. It is worth noting that 
the Government has already embarked on a programme of addressing this segmentation in 
the banking sector. 
f. The evolution of the AFM is discussed in Chapter III. It was clear from the chapter that 
the AFM has evolved at a very fast pace since its establishment in 1978. The AFM 
represents one of the most developed and organised markets in the region as well as many 
other emerging markets with a high capitalising to GDP, low level of volatility, low 
transaction costs, relatively high quality of regulation, availability of information and 
visibility that is superior to other Middle Eastern as well as many emerging markets. In fact 
the AFM today ranks among the leaders of emerging markets. 
g. The AFM has served the Jordanian economy for almost twenty years and contributed 
greatly to the establishment of the financial foundation for the development of the natural 
resources of the country in the early 1980s. One reason behind this success is the strong 
local demand for stocks in addition to demand generated by Jordanian expatriates and 
citizens from oil-rich countries. In addition, local companies have started to realise the 
financial benefits of raising funds in the stock market as opposed to the traditional bank 
lending. The value of the primary capital issues has been steadily rising which indicates 
that companies are increasingly turning to the stock market as a means of raising 
funds. 
With over 20 percent of gross capital formulation that has been financed 
by primary equity 
issues on average during the period 1978-98, Jordan represents one of the top three 
countries in emerging economies according to the important role of equity 
issues in 
financing investments. 
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h. However, compared with some emerging markets as well as the developed markets, the 
AFM is a relatively low liquid market. The relatively low liquidity of the AFM can be 
attributed to the following reasons: (i) the current method of trading on the exchange in 
which there are no markets makers which tends to limit the size of trades that can be 
executed, (ii) the substantial government's share portfolio, and a significant part of which 
is not traded, and (iii) the lack of any but a few undeveloped institutional investors 
(pension funds, insurance companies and mutual funds) 
i. Recently, as part of the economic reform program, the AFM has taken a number of 
initiatives to achieve higher levels of excellence as it addresses the issues of trading 
capacity, liquidity, and fairness, and how to improve the technological, regulatory, and 
inter market capabilities of the major securities markets across the Arab World, through 
substantial investment in technology and facilities. 
J. Jordan's bond market is still in an early stage of development. Major factors inhibiting 
the growth of the bond market in Jordan are as follows: (i) the lack of an institutional and 
legal infrastructure (ii) the bulk of the bonds outstanding are in the hands of financial 
institutions, mainly banks, following a buy and hold strategy, and (iii) the lack of market 
makers. 
(2) The literature on the stock market-growth nexus was reviewed in Chapter IV. In short, 
we can summarises the main conclusions of this chapter as follows: 
a. The role and the impact of stock markets on economic growth process have not received 
as much attention as other elements of financial sector in theoretical literature. Historically, 
the most theoretical studies have focused on banks. Recently, more attentions have been 
given to the role of stock markets on economic growth process. However, all these studies 
concentrate on specific aspects of stock markets and their impact on real activity. None of 
these studies have provided a comprehensive framework of the different effects of stock 
markets and at empirically testable relationships. 
b. The existing theoretical literature has identified various mechanisms to explain the 
positive incidence of stock markets on long-run economic growth rate. 
The mechanisms 
emphasised by these studies rely on the premise that stock markets 
help to promote 
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physical capital accumulation, improve capital mobilising and increase total factor 
productivity growth. Theoretical analysis in these studies show that stock markets can do 
this by performing different financial functions: decrease liquidity and productivity risks, 
facilitating liquidity, information production, exerting corporate control and monitor, 
improving capital mobilising to their efficient use and transmission path for monetary 
policy. 
c. Numerous economists, however, tend to argue that since stock markets do not raise 
much capital, they are insignificant in the development process. Stock markets may even 
have a negative effect since they are merely "Casinos". Moreover, because most stock 
markets in developing countries are very thin, some researchers argue that this may lead to 
excessive volatility in share prices. Stock price volatility may seriously hamper economic 
development. In addition, other researchers argue that because stock markets have many 
more problems with asymmetric information, and since banks and other financial 
intermediates perform similar functions, they are more suitable than stock markets for 
developing countries. 
(3) The first empirical analysis of the relationship between stock market development and 
macroeconomic growth was presented in Chapter V. The evidence presented in this 
chapter challenged some economists' belief that stock market development is not 
important in the growth process of countries, especially for developing countries, since 
other financial intermediaries can provide the same financial services. The empirical 
results suggest the existence of a strong positive relationship between the stock market 
development and economic growth in Jordan. This result has an important implication; it 
provides a high degree of confidence that the development of stock market is an effective 
policy towards promoting the Jordanian economic growth. We tested the relation between 
the stock market development and economic growth by using different specifications of an 
empirical model extended from a simple endogenous growth theory, where the stock 
market is assumed to effect economic growth through increasing capital accumulation, 
mobilising capital to its efficient use and improving total factor productivity growth in an 
economy. To control the endogenous determination of stock market development (a subset 
of the stock market development may not be exogenous), all regressions were run with 
TSLS technique. In short, we can summarise the findings of this chapter as 
follows: 
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a. The findings from estimation of the basic regression, which consisted of the per capita 
real GDP growth as the dependent variable and the labour, capital, and stock market 
development as the independent variables, showing that the stock market capitalisation is 
statistically significant correlated with per capita real GDP growth. A one-percentage point 
increase in the market capitalisation is associated with (0.242) percentage increase in per 
capita real GDP growth. This result is highly consistent with the theoretical view that the 
ability of the stock market to mobilise capital and sharing risk is intimately associated with 
economic growth. This appreciated result, however, is inconsistent with the previous 
studies which failed to find a relationship between stock markets capitalisation and 
economic growth. 
b. When we added the banking sector development indicator, measured as the total assets 
of the banking sector divided by GDP, to the basic model and re-run the regression we 
found that the stock market capitalisation coefficient remained positively and statistically 
significant correlated with per capita real GDP growth, whereas the banking sector 
development variable inters positively but insignificant. To further reinforce the above 
result, we were re-run the above regression, but this time we added three additional 
regressors to account for the contribution of other factors known to influence growth of per 
capita real GDP: inflation rate and the ratio of government expenditure to GDP as 
indicators of macroeconomic stability and the sum of export and import as share of GDP as 
indicator of the openness of economy. The results obtained show that, even after taking 
into account the role of these factors, the banking sector development indicator remained 
insignificant and the stock market capitalisation also still significantly contributes to real 
economic growth. 
c. After replacing the total assets of the banking sector/GDP with another alternative 
indicator of banking sector development i. e., the total value of private credits from the 
banking sector divided by GDP, we found that stock market capitalisation continues to 
remain positively and significantly correlated with per capita real GDP growth. In addition, 
the alternative indicator of banking sector development becomes positively and statistically 
significant correlated with growth. This result was also robust to the inclusion of other 
factors known to influence economic growth. This result has an important implication; it 
validates the argument that stock market development performs a different set of functions 
not entirely provided by banks. While there are direct benefits of stock markets 
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development to the growth process through challenging of funds to their most optimal use, 
hedging risk, increasing liquidity and exerting corporate governance, the indirect effects of 
stock market development are equally important. Stock markets promote regular 
publication of financial statements of listed companies, standardising of accounting 
practices, better investor protection law, and establishment of a regulatory agency, all of 
which have important growth effects not fully provided by the banking system. Banks on 
the other hand, are no less important and are the primary saving institutions that engage in 
deposit gathering, safekeeping, providing liquidity, and providing capital mobilising 
services. The empirical finding above has important policy implications; it emphasise that 
the Jordanian government should not necessarily abandon the development of one 
component of the financial sector. Because the stock market and the banking sector are 
playing complementary roles in promoting economic growth, the sectors should be 
developed together. 
d. When we used other proxies of stock market development that may capture another 
function of the stock market, the results obtained yield relatively similar conclusions to 
those mentioned above. Each stock market liquidity indicator used i. e., turnover, value 
traded, turnover/volatility, and traded/volatility ratio, and the value of private credits from 
the banking sector divided by GDP appeared to exert a significant and positive influence 
on per capita real GDP growth. Besides being statistically significant the estimated 
coefficients suggest that the relation between the stock market liquidity and growth is 
economically large. These results have important implications from the theoretical point of 
view. First, increased market liquidity allows agents to avoid both liquidity and 
productivity risk, thereby encouraging investment in the long-run, facilitating 
technological innovation and enhancing the long-run growth. Second, greater liquidity has 
a direct impact on the effectiveness of the governance and information functions of the 
stock market and therefore upon firms' economic efficiency. Increased market activity 
induces information acquisition, which in turn increases the information content of share 
prices which enable firms to make better investment decisions. The effective use of the 
stock market for corporate control activities also requires that the market 
be liquid. 
Takeovers require a liquid capital market where bidders access a vast amount of capital on 
short notice. Finally, increased stock market liquidity can reduce the cost of equity capital 
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through reducing the expected return that investors require investing in equity to 
compensate them for the risks i. e., risk premium. 
e. Our results also suggested that the "price-effect", a change in the value traded and 
market capitalisation ratio due purely to in a change in stock price, were not driving the 
findings of the strong link between the stock market liquidity and economic growth. This 
conclusion was derived from two results. First, both the value-traded and turnover ratios 
are significantly correlated with economic growth. This implies that increases in the stock 
prices are not driving the liquidity results and this price effect does not influence the 
turnover ratio. Second, the market capitalisation and value-traded ratios were 
simultaneously included in the regression growth; both remained significantly correlated 
with the economic growth, with little change in the estimated coefficients. This further 
implies that changes in the stock prices were not driving the results on the value-traded, 
since both the market capitalisation and value-traded ratios are influenced by the price 
changes. If the price effects were driving the value-traded results, then both indicators 
would not enter significantly correlated with growth. 
f. Consistent with the previous cross-country studies, the coefficient on the market 
volatility indicator was found to be negatively but not statistically significant. 
g. Over all, the empirical results in this chapter yet confirmed the significance of the stock 
market in the development process of the small developing country of Jordan. This 
knowledge might appropriately be generalised to other developing economies that have a 
similar economic structure. Thus, the developing countries that have similar economic 
structure to Jordan would be well advised to develop of their stock markets in order to 
mobilise a greater amount of national savings. This also would, inter alia, improve the 
investment, raise the efficiency of investments, increase output and consequently improve 
the prospects of growth and development. 
(4) While the analysis in Chapter V was offered comprehensive evidence on the strength of 
the relation between the stock market development and economic growth, its findings 
merely suggest that there is an exogenous component of the stock market development that 
positively influences per capita real GDP growth. Thus, one fundamental question was 
unanswered in Chapter V. Is the stock market a leading sector in the economy? Or is there 
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any feedback consequence effect of the growth? Using Grander-causality tests within a 
framework based on unit root and cointegration tests, Chapter VI was devoted to 
answering this question. The eointegration tests used were based on both the Engle- 
Granger (1987) two-step procedure and Johansen (1988,1991) maximum-likelihood 
method. While the results from this chapter largely support the view that there is a stable, 
long run equilibrium relationship between the evolution of the stock market development 
and the evolution of per capita real GDP growth, they provide no support to the view that 
the stock market is a leading sector in the process of Jordan's economic development. 
Most of the results presented in this chapter support the view that the relation between the 
stock market development and economic growth in Jordan is bi-directional. The policy 
implication of the present chapter is clear by now. The reforms that contribute to the 
process of economic development may also contribute to the process of the stock market. 
In short, we can summarise the results of Chapter VI as follows: 
a. Both the Argument Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips-Perron (PP) tests were used to 
investigate the stationarity statutes of each variable. The results from both tests were highly 
consistent, suggesting that all stock market development variables and economic growth 
variable are integrated of order one. 
b. Given that the variables of interest are I(I), we next examined the possibility that per 
capita real GDP growth and each of the stock market development indicators: market 
capitalisation, value traded, turnover, traded/volatility, turnover/volatility ratio and market 
volatility, exhibit a common stochastic trend. In other words, given that all the variables of 
interest are integrated of order one, we might use cointegration methodology to test for the 
existence of a stable long-run relationship between the level of per capita real GDP growth 
and the state of development of the stock market indicators. The inference was based on 
both the Engle-Granger and Johansen approaches. Both test results suggested that per 
capita real GDP growth and each of the stock market development indicators (except 
market volatility, which yielded conflict results; the Engel-Granger test failed to detect 
cointegration) are cointegrated. These results have an important implication: it implies that 
there is a stable, long-run equilibrium relationship between the evolution of the stock 
market development and the evolution of per capita real GDP. In each short-run period per 
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capita real GDP and each of these variables of stock market development are adjusting to 
their long-run equilibrium relationship. 
c. Given the results from the cointegration tests, we conducted VECM based Granger- 
causality tests using the Engle-Granger and/or Johansen cointegration vectors, for the pairs 
of variables for which of the two procedures showed evidence of cointegration, otherwise 
the causality tests were conducted using first-differenced VARs. Remarkably, the results 
obtained from the Engel-Granger approach were broadly consistent with those obtained 
from Johansen approach (except the market volatility, which yielded confused results); the 
data provided no evidence to support the view that the stock market is a leading sector in 
the process of Jordan's economic growth. On the other hand, most of the evidence 
suggested that the stock market development and economic growth exhibit bi-directional 
causality. Thus, the two-way relationship between the stock market development and 
economic growth in Jordan suggests that not only does the stock market development 
influence growth but also there are feedback effects from greater output to an increased 
demand for the stock market development. This result is highly consistent with the view of 
a number of endogenous growth models, which predict two-way causality between 
financial development and economic growth. 
(5) In Chapter VII we provided micro-level tests for the relationship between stock market 
development and economic growth in Jordan. Particularly, using firm level data for 56 
industrial firms during the period 1988-98 we examined the causal relationship between 
stock market development and firms' real economic performance. Focusing on the 
mobilising capital, information production and governance roles of stock markets, we 
constructed a simple dynamic firm growth empirical model in which stock markets 
developments affect firm growth mainly through enhancing productivity growth within the 
firm. Using this model we investigated three related issues. Firstly, whether the 
firms that 
heavily depend on equity finance grow faster with the higher level of the stock market 
development than firms that are not heavily dependent on equity finance. Secondly, 
whether the stock market is a substitute or a complement 
for the banking sector in 
providing financial services to the corporate sector in Jordan. 
Thirdly, whether the 
performance of large and small firms in terms of growth react 
differently to the stock 
market and banking sector development. 
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Using the GMM dynamic panel technique with both a difference and a system estimator 
which enables consistent estimation in spite of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, we 
found evidence consistent with our hypothesis and confirmed our conclusions from macro- 
level tests in previous empirical chapters in that the development of the stock market has a 
significant effect on Jordan's economic growth. In short, we can summaries the findings of 
Chapter VII as follows: 
a. The evidence suggested that the level of liquidity, size, and volatility of the stock 
market exerts a statistically significant and economically large impact on the firm's 
growth. Particularly, we found evidence which indicated that with more development in 
the stock market, firms that use equity finance heavily grow faster than firms' that do not. 
This key empirical evidence was robust to changes in the method of estimation. This 
favourable result is consistent with our view that more development in the stock market 
which is associated with improvement in capital mobilising, information production, and 
monitor and control functions, provides net value added to the firms through improvements 
in their efficiency and productivity. Thus, in this chapter we provided a firm-level support 
for the proposition that the development of the stock market facilitates economic growth in 
Jordan, advanced by the previous empirical chapters (Chapter V and VI). 
b. The evidence also showed that both the stock market and banking sector development 
are important in facilitating the firms' growth in Jordan. Particularly, we found that 
measures of both market and banking sector development independently predict firms' 
growth when entered in firm growth regression. Beside emphasising the strong link 
between financial development and economic growth at firm-level, this evidence highly 
confirmed our conclusion in Chapter V in that the stock market and banks in Jordan are 
complementary rather than substitutes in providing financial services to the corporate 
sector. 
c. Consistent with our hypothesis that the stock market and the banks have different 
effects on small and large firms, we found evidence suggests that large firms' performance 
in term of value added growth is more sensitive to the stock market development while 
small firms performance is more sensitive to variations in the banking sector development. 
One interpretation of this result is that information symmetries between insiders in a firm 
and the stock market are lower for large firms. Therefore, large firms are likely to 
be more 
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dependent on equity finance and less dependent on debt finance. Thus, changes in stock 
market development are likely to have more significant influence on a large firm's growth 
than on the growth of a smaller one. 
(6) Given that firms in developing countries make different corporate financing choices 
than their developed country counterparts largely due to differences in market conditions, 
this study also investigated the effect of these conditions on the corporate capital structure 
made by Jordanian firms. Chapter VIII investigated how the stock market development 
affects the ability of Jordanian firms to raise capital for new growth and how this change 
affects the capital structure choices that these firms make. The main results presented in 
this chapter suggest that as the stock market develops, Jordanian firms will be likely to 
issue more debt than equity. Particularly, we found that the stock market development is 
positively and significantly effect correlated with leverage ratios. The implication of this 
result is that debt and equity are not necessarily substitutes for each other. As the stock 
market becomes more developed and as firms have more access to equity, they will not 
necessarily issue more equity. In fact, they would issue more debt relative to equity, which 
implies that capital costs for equity were high relative to debt, firms were credit 
constrained or that the issue of equity was high due to lack of competition among 
investments banks. It is also possible that the stock market development leads to 
opportunities for risk sharing and information dissemination and monitoring that allow 
firms to increase their borrowing. In addition, this result provides support for the argument 
that debt and equity are complementary tools of finance, each providing different benefits 
to the firms. Therefore, the development of the stock market increases the equity and debt 
financing opportunities for firms. 
In sum, our empirical implication from this chapter is that debt and equity are not 
necessary substitute financial instruments because stock market and financial 
intermediaries play complementary roles in the economy, so that government policies to 
develop the stock market need not distinguish the importance of the banking sector. This 
investigation also has important implication for the developing countries: it suggests that 
the stock market can play an important role even where the economy has a banking sector 
which is already well developed. 
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9.2 Policy Implications 
The analysis and empirical findings of this study have important implications for the 
conduct of economic policy regarding the role of the stock market in Jordan's economy. 
There is reasonable confidence that development of the stock market is an effective policy 
towards promoting Jordan's economic growth. By adopting measures in favour of stock 
market development, the Jordanian government might be successful in establishing a 
strategy that enhances the role of the stock market in the process of economic 
development. In this respect, given the past and actual performance of the stock market in 
Jordan, considerable progress has been made towards improving the regulatory framework, 
which is expected to enhance the role of the stock market in the economy. Yet, there still 
remains standing critical issues that represent a challenge but which are necessary for 
promoting the activities of the stock market in a competitive global environment. 
It was clear from the analysis that, from a macroeconomic perspective, the key factors 
determining the future development of the stock market in Jordan and its relation with 
international capital markets are the domestic macroeconomic policy stance and the status 
of external financial relation. These will remain the key issues in influencing investors' 
perceptions of transfer risk. To this end, the government needs to continue with the policies 
of economic restructuring, privatisation and liberalisation, and put in place key legislation 
governing investment and taxation in order to stimulate local and foreign investment. 
Equity flows to Jordan will also be influenced by political stability in the region. 
Specifically, foreign capital inflows may be expected to respond positively to the 
achievement of a comprehensive, just and durable peace in the region. A comprehensive 
and just peace would impact on the country specific risk through the issuing reduction in 
the region risk component. 
In addition, Jordan needs a set of policies aimed specifically at enhancing demand and 
supply of equities. The Government might be recognizing the role of the stock market in 
the privatisation process. As illustrated by the experience of Latin America countries, the 
successful implementation of privatisation programs may be viewed as having a two-way 
causal relation with stock market development. Carrying out privatisation process through 
local stock exchange may produce significant direct and indirect benefits 
for local stock 
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market development. Privatisation sales through public offerings lead to significant 
increases in market capitalisation. Listings of large privatised companies also provide a 
substantial impact on trading liquidity on the local stock market while at the same time 
increasing the investment opportunities for local investors to increase their portfolio 
diversification. These effects have a positive impact on the risk-sharing function of the 
market and lead to market deepening. Thus, privatisation through the stock market may 
solve the low listing trap by adding diversification possibilities, which in turn encourages 
both investment and listing by private firms. New listing due to privatisation sales reduces 
the non-systematic risk of a local equity portfolio, and increases the willingness to invest in 
stocks, leading to higher liquidity. 
Jordan's banks have an important role to play in the development of the stock market. The 
importance of banks in enhancing the development of the stock market comes mainly from 
their role as intermediaries between the business sector and the investors. Both of them 
need specialised institutions to help them plan the start-up companies, and assist them raise 
the required capital. What Jordan needs most are investment banks that can provide strong 
financial analysis, underwriting of share issues at their own risk, floating of the shares to 
the public at large and making markets for these issues. Aside from the commission, 
income generated from buying and selling securities for clients, banks can establish their 
own trading portfolios utilising the market intelligence gained through active trading for 
customers. They could also provide portfolio management services for those clients who 
do not have the time or knowledge to manage their own investments in the stock market. 
Banks can also participate in venture capital business to help turn new ideas into 
productive concerns and provide equity capital to small enterprises. 
Investment banking activities might be developed either from within the existing 
commercial banking system or through the existing commercial banks or through the 
establishment of new institutions that would be able to provide brokerage services, 
portfolio and fund management, trading and underwriting of securities. Serious 
consideration should also be given to the role of banks as market makers, allowing them to 
take positions and create markets by buying and selling shares. This will undoubtedly give 
added depth to the market and enhance the transparency of share trading in the market. 
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In addition, Jordan needs to develop and promote the creation of specialised financial 
institutions: pension funds, insurance companies and mutual funds. These institutions can 
play a very important role in the development of the stock market. These institutions can 
play a potential role in increases depth and liquidity in the stock market. These institutions 
can play important role in the modernisation of the stock market, the development of an 
efficient trading and settlement system, the adoption modern accounting and auditing 
standards, enhance transparency and information disclosure and strengthen corporate 
governance. 
The development of specialised financial institutions can increase the demand for shares 
and the level of professional fund management, hence, they can increase market 
capitalisation, and the value traded both relative to GDP. This can be explained because, 
for a given stock of assets, a development specialised financial institutions increase the 
institutional demand for shares. In addition, since these institutions are illiquid assets in 
wealth-holder's portfolios, their development can promote agents to rebalance their 
portfolios in order to restore desired levels of liquidity. Thus, asset-holders reduce holding 
of illiquid assets they control (e. g., real state and non-traded financial instruments) in 
favour of liquid assets such as cash, bonds and shares. 
The development of specialised financial institutions can also be beneficial to product 
innovation in the capital market by stimulating the use of hedging strategies and 
derivatives. In addition, the development of specialised financial institutions can create 
opportunities for the modernisation of the stock market, the development of efficient 
trading and settlement systems, the adoption of modem accounting, auditing and disclosure 
standards, including the promotion of quality information, and improvement in market 
infrastructure. 
Furthermore, the development of specialised financial institutions can promote 
improvement in the stock market regulation, especially regarding protection of minority 
shareholders rights, protection against insider information, and conflict of interest. Finally, 
the development of these institutions can improve corporate governance. These institutions 
monitor the companies they invest in and press for improved governance, when 
appropriate, to ensure that investments produce the highest possible returns. 
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It is also important to stress the need for the simultaneous strengthening of the banking 
market. Indeed, a sound and competitive banking sector plays an important role in 
fostering the development of an efficient capital market. Hence, policy efforts to develop 
the stock market should not come at the expense of the strengthening of the banking sector. 
Interestingly, several of measures required for the latter, especially those affecting the 
competition environment. 
In conclusion, the success of Jordan in strengthening the role of its stock market in 
economic growth and development efforts is likely to depend on three key factors: first, 
success in reducing perceptions of the country-specific risk through the continuous 
sustained implementation of adjustment and reform economic policies; secondly, 
recognising the stock market in the implementation of the privatisation program; thirdly, 
the ability of authority to address institutional inhibiting of the stock market deepening and 
more generally, the balance development of financial markets through promote 
establishing specialised and contractual financial institutions. 
9.3 Limitations 
This study is not without its limitations which might have affected the empirical results. 
Clearly, reliable data is an issue in any study of developing countries. In addition, the most 
important limitation aspect is the availability of data. The small sample used in the macro 
analysis is annual time series data covering merely the period 1978-98 which may not be 
long enough and so is likely affect the robustness of empirical results. 
More important is that the stock market indicators we used in our empirical analysis may 
not be the appreciate measures for the stock market development. As we have shown 
before, stock markets can influence economic growth by performing different functions. 
They aggregate and mobilise capital, enhance liquidity, provide risk pooling and sharing, 
assess and select projects and management through producing information, and monitoring 
managers. It is quite difficult, however, to construct direct measures of these functions and 
also perfect measures certainly do not exist. Therefore, using proxies may not accurately 
reflect how stock markets carried out these functions. 
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9.4 Future Research 
While this study makes important contributions to the growing empirical literature in this 
field, much still needs to be done. Some possible future extensions of this study could be: 
1. Future research could expand the analysis of this study to study other countries, 
extend the sample period and examine the effects of other financial intermediaries such as 
the insurance market and the market for other financial intermediaries 
2. While this study provides comprehensive empirical tests at macro- and micro-levels 
of the relation between stock market development and real economic performance, it does 
not explore the channels through which the stock market affects growth. Therefore, more 
research in this area is needed. At macro-level, future research could assess the effect of 
stock market development on capital accumulation, private savings rates and productivity 
growth. At micro-level, future research could investigate the causal relationship between 
stock market development and firms' investment rates, technical changes and economic 
efficiency. 
3. In this study we do not consider the effect of the stock market liberalisation. By 
raising the demand for shares on the stock market, opening the stock market to foreign 
investment lower the cost of capital for local firms and adds their incentives for going 
public, which in turn makes market more liquid and efficient. This in turn increases local 
investors' opportunities for portfolio diversification which raises their motivation to invest 
in shares. Open market for foreigners also increases the liquidity which has an indirect 
impact on the monitoring and control functions of stock markets. With greater liquidity, 
the market become more efficient in that it better reflects information about firms. This 
makes the firms' stock prices more informative and hence more useful in monitoring 
management investment decisions. Therefore, we should expect that a more international- 
integrated stock market have a strong effect on economic growth. This topic is not 
extensively investigated. 
4. Finally, the results of this study should promote a study of the implication of 
developing stock markets in developing countries. If the stock market can be shown to 
influence economic development, reforms that promote the development of stock markets 
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should be encouraged so that a country has the adequate infrastructure to support capital 
markets. Much additional research however is needed to formalise these results in any 
theory of economic development. The conclusions derived from country's experience may 
not be bound to apply to other countries. But it opens up an exciting topic for research. 
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